
Leadership Is a Matter of Life and Death

The Psychodynamics of Eros and Thanatos Working in Organisations



Adrian N. Carr and Cheryl A. Lapp

Leadership Is a Matter of Life and Death

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
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2006 978-1-4039-9163-8

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First published 2006 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world

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ISBN 978-1-349-54300-7 ISBN 978-0-230-20787-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230207875

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Carr, Adrian, 1951–
Leadership Is a matter of life and death : the psychodynamics of Eros and Thanatos working in organisations / Adrian N. Carr & Cheryl A. Lapp.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents: Contents: Contemplating death: introduction and overview – The death instinct and destruction: Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein – Expanding on the death instinct: Sabina Spielrein and destructive reconstruction – Moving graveyards: Herbert Marcuse and the death instinct – Turning into one another: the death instinct in group study – Leadership is a matter of organizational life and death.
ISBN 978–1–4039–9163–8 (cloth)
1. Leadership. 2. Organizational behavior. 3. Death instinct. I. Lapp, Cheryl A., 1963– II. Title.

HD57.7.C3677 2006
658.4'092–dc22 2005058063

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06

Transferred to Digital Printing 2011

Contents

List of Tables and Figures vi

About the Authors vii

Acknowledgements viii

Chapter 1 Contemplating Death 1

Chapter 2 The Death Instinct and Destruction: Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein 19

Chapter 3 Expanding on the Death Instinct: Sabina Spielrein and Destructive Reconstruction 56

Chapter 4 Moving Graveyards: Herbert Marcuse and the Death Instinct 90

Chapter 5 Turning into One Another: The Death Instinct in Group Study 113

Chapter 6 Leadership Is a Matter of Organisational Life and Death 162

Chapter 7 Conclusions 205

Notes 211

References 217

Index of Authors 236

Index of Subjects and Terms 240

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1	Reiterative and recursive discussion model for Eros and Thanatos at work, their theorists, and connections to psychodynamic and organisational studies theories and research	16
5.1	The dialectics of leadership and followership	154

Figures

1.1	Thanatos on Roman Provincial coinage	7
2.1	Freud's topography of the mind	28
2.2	Depressive positions and shared ego-ideal: High-level compromise	44
2.3	Paranoid-schizoid split of shared ego-ideal: The beginnings of low-level compromise	46
2.4	Formation of the Thanatic triangle	47
2.5	Repetition compulsion: Decursive movement around the Thanatic triangle	49
3.1	Three phases of planned change	71
3.2	The topographies	72
3.3	Thanatic depressive positions and shared ego-ideal: High-level part-compromise	75
3.4	Partial dissolution of ego-ideal: Paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position	80
4.1	The psychological contract: Contribution-inducement exchange process	106
4.2	Etzioni's compliance types	108
5.1	Normally narcissistic self	148
5.2	Normally narcissistic other	148
5.3	Self, other, and group identities	148

About the Authors


Adrian N. Carr is an Associate Professor (Organisation Studies and Applied Social Sciences) and holds the research-only position of Principal Research Fellow in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. Dr Carr's major area of research interest is psychodynamic theory and its implications for organisational application. Dr Carr's PhD was in the area of psychodynamic theory and he is the author of over 200 refereed journal publications and number of books, the most recent of which are: *Cyberspace romance: The psychology of online relationships* (with M. Whitty) and *Art and Aesthetics at Work* (co-edited with P. Hancock). In addition to his five university degrees, Dr Carr holds an advanced accreditation to administer and purchase the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Dr Carr is a member of a number of professional associations and editorial boards, the latter including: *Policy, Organisation & Society;* the *Journal of Management Development; Administrative Theory & Praxis: A Journal of Dialogue in Public Administration; Journal of Organizational Change Management; Radical Psychology: A Journal of Psychology (founding co-editor), Politics and Radicalism; TAMARA: Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science; Global Business & Economics Review; Journal of Managerial Psychology; Human Relations;* and, the *Journal of Critical Perspectives on International Business.*

Cheryl A. Lapp has a Masters of Education in Adult and Higher Education degree and a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada; and from Grant MacEwan College, Edmonton, Alberta, honours Management Studies Certification. She is also a Canadian Certified Human Resource Professional who has been an instructor, researcher and practitioner of organisational leadership, followership, management and change for more than 20 years in universities and the telecommunications industry. As President and Principal Consultant for Labyrinth Consulting, Cheryl conducts research, reports and coaches on leadership, followership and management processes for profit and not-for-profit organisations. Cheryl has co-researched and co-authored numerous manuscripts published in the *Journal of Strategic Management, E:CO,* and the *Journal of Change Management* and she has presented research findings around the world.

Acknowledgements

In bringing this volume to fruition there are many people to thank and acknowledge. First and foremost, we wish to express our thanks to all of our respective families and friends who have unconditionally supported our intellectual trek. We would also like to thank those who have helped us in a variety of ways both personal and intellectual; in particular: Guy Adams, C. Fred Alford, Barbara Allen, Glen Allen, Yochanan Altman, Deepak Anand, Richard Bates, Keith Bennett, David Boje, Curtis Boychuk, Doris Boychuk, Edward Boychuk, George Boychuk, Mary Ann Boychuk, Jose da Costa, Jane Coulter, Kay Devine, Carol Dobson, Larry Dobson, Alexis Downs, Yiannis Gabriel, Diane Jeffels, Manfred Kets de Vries, Dennis Koroluk, Janet Koroluk, Benjamin Lapp, Roy Lapp, Jim Livingstone, Sid Lowe, Mary Mackay, Peter Mackay, Sharon Mason, Elizabeth Meuser, Burkard Sievers, Barry Sliwkanich, Rose Sliwkanich, Hank Stam, Edith Stodola, Mike Stodola, Gary Wilson, Lynn Wilson, and Lisa Zanetti. We thank Paula Hyde for her research contributions. Our thanks also go to a number of organisations including the *Standing Conference for Management and Organization Inquiry* (sc'Moi) and its attendees and those journals granting us permission to use some of our previous work for this volume – specifically: *The Journal of Managerial Psychology* (Emerald); *The Journal of Change Management* (Emerald); and *Journal of Psycho-Social Studies* (E-journal). We would also like to thank Eric McFadden and Victor England, directors of Classical Numismatics Group, Inc., for granting permission for the use of photographs of ancient coins used in this book. Finally, we would like to thank Jacky Kippenberger, Rebecca Pash, Shirley Tan and the other people with Palgrave for their expertise in support of this project.

1
Contemplating Death



Coaching, training, recognition and rewards, participative management, performance evaluations, nice e-mails and flame-mails, continual restructuring and re-engineering, always trying to kill the competition, competing with co-workers, 70, 80, 90, more than 100 hour work weeks, vacationless work years, crying, bullying, sexual harassment, yelling and desk pounding, gossip, politics, theft, love affairs with work colleagues, stress, murders and suicides – what do all of these have in common? What they have in common is that they are all manifestations of workplace behaviours when we allow our own and others' life and death instincts to lead us. This book is about how and why we allow these types of behaviours to occur even when we know they should not. This chapter provides the outline of how we intend to explore the fact that leadership *is* a matter of life and death in and outside of our workplaces.

There is a cliché that death, like taxes, is inevitable. Yet, in Western societies at least, the topic of death is not easily discussed in general conversation. Such is our general avoidance and repulsion for the subject, Beverley Clack recently argued that in Western societies "human culture ... is ... defined by the attempt to overcome the knowledge of human mortality" (Clack, 2002, p. 61). When mortality and death are discussed, they are often couched in euphemism, so instead of dying, "one passes on", "meets an end", or "resigns".

Mortality and death are also often broached within the context of hope suggesting that the finality of it all might be transcended in a spiritual sense and perhaps, to a spiritual place. To illustrate, the graphic above was used in the introduction for each of the 1961 to 1966 episodes of the popular North American medical television drama *Ben Casey, MD*. Each symbol was slowly and deliberately hard pressed with

pure white chalk onto a blackboard to depict a top-down, column-like appearance. As each symbol was solemnly scribed, it was chased with its spoken name in a deep, serious, masculine voice-over: "Man... Woman...Life...Death...Infinity" (Moser & Penn, 1962) as if there was some kind of natural sequence to what they represented. The sequence of the symbols is a 'traditional' ontological procession in which we are *all implicated*. Man and woman procreate and the parents die in order to go to their 'just rewards'.

We do seem so keen to postpone the inevitability of death that we often show a tendency to reify and even deify those with ingenious, wily ways to avoid it. For example, the 'Ben Casey' gifted doctors in our world, medical scientists, diet gurus and fitness people, tend to command such status. When the impact of AIDS first became appreciated, in Australia, a government-sponsored marketing campaign commenced with advertisements where death was personified as the grim reaper – out there to cut down those who were not engaging in safe sex. The message was: AIDS is the grim reaper. This strategy was extremely successful because so many people were so willing to accept the need to fight the dark scythe-holding, hideous, cloaked skeleton – one of the ugliest depictions of our own death-fear. The way this message was delivered tapped into our most basic fear – death – an actuality that could be postponed.

Both the avoidance of the topic of death and the manner in which we seem to place it as a discrete and compartmentalised entity in a sequence of 'events' are matters that do not seem to draw reflective analysis in the discourse of social sciences and the very organisations in which society works. Few attempts have been made to account for human behaviour in terms of how living is intertwined with our awareness of death and, in particular, how the subliminal 'recognition' of death features in our living (Carr, 2003a, 2003b; Sievers, 1990). As Burkhard Sievers (1994) wisely noted, "by ignoring death we have lost our frame of life" (p. 56).

Due to its subliminal nature, its frightening connotations, and its obscurity in many fields of study, it is not surprising that death seems to be viewed as something unrelated to what we are doing in our lives, including our organisational lives. Well, at least in the organisation discourse there appears to be little discussion to suggest otherwise. In fact, it is rare to see anything on this topic written in the organisation discourse, except in the instance of an obituary notice for a very significant organisation theorist – and, even this form of recognition is rare. This is also curious. As 'living' entities, organisations seem to maintain an air

of immortality, which relieves us of having to think about death – or at least, that seems to be what we project onto their existence.

Work organisations and death

If we devise ways to avoid dealing with our fear of death and if we devise ways to cloak its existence, are we then missing out on something very relevant to our personal and professional lives? Some of Western society's fastest growing organisations are the anthropomorphised heroes that strengthen our beliefs in immortality while burying our fears of mortality (Becker, 1973/1997). Organisational values that give life to our illusions of immortality become our religions and the leaders from whom they emanate, our gods: "it is the human need to search for deathlessness that helps to erect the edifices of religions and philosophies" (Fraser, 1999, p. 20). Joel Bakan has most recently described the corporation as being naturally pathogenic because its "legally defined mandate is to pursue, relentlessly and without exception, its own self-interest, regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to others" (2004, pp. 1–2). The more organisations are able to protect our self-esteem by minimising death-fear, the stronger is our tendency to worship them (Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1998): and sometimes, at any cost. For example, tobacco and drug companies habitually bury unfavourable research findings regarding deadly consequences of their products. It is only after media exposure that they might confess to having such knowledge.

Inasmuch as they protect the value of purchasing power, organisations are also 'molds'. They shape our identities and aspects of our self-concept whether we are investor, consumer and or employee. Some of our organisations have become so good at preserving life that we equate this ability to an illusion that they might also give us freedom from death (Lapp & Carr, 2005b). They don't give us such freedom, but they do willingly help feed the fantasy; lest we forget that perhaps, we should owe our personal and work lives to our organisations, but not our 'deaths' (Carr & Lapp, 2005d). So, it is no wonder that even the most diseased of these organisations can be shielded by society.

Feelings of immortality reach optimum heights when expressed biologically, theologically, creatively, naturally, and transcendentally; and these expressions become especially powerful when some or all are acted out in combination (Lifton, 1979). The underlying belief is that if something does not cause our death then it must add to our life, which also helps to create fantasies of immortality; a neat cycle of subconscious

reassurance. No wonder we are so keen to foster it. And no wonder organisations are so keen for us to do just that.

The multi-million dollar industries that have grown up around dieting, healthy life-styles, exercising, health care, and especially elective plastic surgery, all illustrate these points. We have faith that these creative procedures will make us look more appealing, less old; less close to death. We may attract a 'better' mate for the procreation of generations to come that will naturally exceed our current space and lifetime, thus transcending our lives beyond what we know to be today. And, these 'beauty marks' have been realised in monolithic proportions. In 1960, in the United States, plastic surgery was considered to be a new branch of medicine (Day, 2002). Today, it is an industry on the cutting edge of building self-esteem, filled with organisations that supply us with products and services we consume to make us state of the art; aesthetically pleasing others and thus ourselves. By 1998, in the United States GDP rose by $1.2 billion dollars (Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Advice & Links, 2004) from 100,000 elective plastic surgeries completed on men and one million on women (Day, 2002). In the year 2000, the American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS) advertised a projection that more than 15 million elective plastic surgeries would be conducted in the year 2003 (ASPS, 2004a). Ostensibly, this advertisement was one way to market the industry's services and products.

Although those targets were not met, within that five-year period there was a greater than 750% increase, equating to more than 8.7 million procedures and more than $9 billion dollars 'injected' into that economy by "... people who took action to proactively manage signs of aging..." (ASPS, 2004b, p. 1). Today's society seems to agree that being beautiful and feeling beautiful are some Erotic, primary constructs of self-esteem and self-efficacy, which are the corner posts of having a good life and avoiding death, inside and outside of our workplaces; "... cosmetic surgery is available – no questions asked – to anyone with a vague sense of feeling rotten at work and a valid credit card" (Bedell, 2004, p. 4).

What the ASPS did not report (ASPS, 2004a, 2004b) was the opposite, often devastating and deadly corollary: the number and severity of complications from nip-and-tuck outpatient surgeries using general anaesthesia (see Vila, 2004 in Lamas, 2004, p. 2.; see also Coldiron, 2004 in PRNewswire/Surgery News, 2004). One reason is that whilst it is the organisation's responsibility to report these incidents, many rarely do (Lamas, 2004). Another is that if these procedures were considered to be unsafe, there would be many fewer alternatives to evade looking and feeling like one is dying. We as a society are lax in

demanding enforcement of reporting in the first place (Boodman, 2004). In somewhat ironic juxtaposition, people deliberately risk death, or other near-death consequences, to avoid the physical and psychological reminders that death is getting closer.

In this book we explore some accounts of our behavioural reactions to such examples of both the overt and subliminal awareness of death. The intention is to particularly highlight aspects of death-fear that have implications for the field of organisation studies and specifically, leadership. To do this, we look to informative theories that are derived from the body of work called psychoanalytic theory or psychodynamic theory. In other words, we believe that organisational studies theory can be better understood if first, we look to psychodynamics.

Work organisations and death: Why a psychodynamic approach?

In this book we have drawn upon psychodynamic accounts of human behaviour in understanding the 'awareness' of death (or the subliminal significance of death) and how this gets played out in work organisations and in leadership behaviour. We prefer to use the term psychodynamics because in comparison to psychoanalysis, it is a less 'treatment' oriented one that implies the normality and dynamic nature of psychological processes. Our preference also stems from a number of major assumptions about some of the qualities of psychodynamics; and two in particular.

First, we subscribe to the notion that much of the mental activity responsible for human behaviour resides below the 'surface', hidden from our conscious awareness. Although not the 'discoverer' of the unconscious, it was Sigmund Freud who argued that the unconscious was a seat of motivation and an active mind's way of keeping thoughts and desires hidden from awareness. This understanding was in contrast to the prevailing 'wisdom' that the unconscious was a passive or less active state of being – "that is, brain activity unaccompanied by mental activity" (Hewett, 1889, pp. 32–33; see Carr, 2002; Carr & Gabriel, 2001). The unconscious is to be understood as the subterranean strata of the mind consisting of previous experiences, memories, feelings and urges of which the individual is largely unaware. The hidden meaning of actions, desires and emotions are brought to light through a study of human behaviour that views conscious phenomena as expressions of unconscious ones.

As a fundamental tenet, we would argue that unconscious forces are at play in virtually all human endeavours and these forces can stifle or

stimulate creativity, cooperation, achievement and learning. Unconscious forces can blind us to the most obvious deficiencies in our plans and leadership endeavours yet these same forces can also stimulate the most enterprising and innovative solutions and effective leadership. Even our most 'rational' endeavours may often and quickly be revealed to be underwritten by an emotional agenda such as ambition, excitement, anger, fear, nostalgia and so forth (Gabriel & Carr, 2002). A psychodynamic approach also recognises that through the world of work, people pursue many different conscious and unconscious aims that have a complexity and a dynamic quality that much of the 'motivational' theories that are taught in management schools fail to recognise. This embrace of psychodynamics is less about a search for 'facts' but for an understanding of underlying motivations and the meaning of human behaviour and experiences.

The second commending feature of psychodynamics that leads us to prefer such an approach is that there already exists a body of work within this broader school of thought that has explored the notion that life and death are intertwined. Most importantly, this idea can be demonstrated in behaviours that are manifested in our relationships with others. It can also be found to be the source of individual and collective attitudes and motivations. Much of this body of work relates to Freud's view that humans are instinctual beings. In particular his posit that there are two basic classes of drives or instincts that, while fundamentally antagonistic to each another, may also combine in a variety of ways to be expressed in psychological and behavioural terms. These two classes of instincts are the life instinct (*Eros*), and the death instinct (*Thanatos*). The expression of these instincts is subject to repressive psychodynamics that are themselves culturally shaped. Thus for Freud, Thanatos was a fundamental constituent in the biological and culturally influenced psychodynamic processes that are the psyche or 'mind'. Before saying any more about the work of Freud and other psychodynamic theories related to death, at this early juncture it is worth reminding ourselves of the Greek myths to which the terms Thanatos and Eros traditionally refer.

Thanatos and Eros: A brief contextual interlude from Greek mythology

In Homer's famous 8th century BC tome, *The Iliad*, *Thanatos* was the embodiment of death. "**Thanatos**...In Greek mythology, the personification of death. He was the twin brother of Hypnos (sleep) and the

son of Nyx (night) and Erebus (darkness), or of Nyx alone" (Cotterell, 1989, p. 243). One famous example of the role of Thanatos is carved in the Antoninus Pius (AD 86–161) column that once resided in the Niche of the Fir Cone, which is now erected in the Vatican Museum. On the base of this column the relief shows Thanatos as an angel leading the Emperor Antoninus Pius and his wife, Faustina the Elder, toward the heavens.

This conception of Thanatos can also be noted in other artifacts of antiquity. In Greek Imperial coinage – coinage of the Roman Empire issued by Greek cities and Roman Colonies – Thanatos is shown as having wings and stands leaning on an inverted torch. Figure 1.1 shows such a coin: one of Philip II as Caesar (AD 244–249) that was minted in Thrace, a northern coastal region of Greece.

Figure 1.1 Thanatos on Roman Provincial coinage



Source: The Classical Numismatic Group listing #728804, 2002

This graphic is provided to us, courtesy of The Classical Numismatic Group – a large auction house and extremely well respected authority on ancient coins – who often accompany listings of this coin type with a following background note:

> The winged figure with an inverted torch symbolizes Thanatos, or the personification of Death. The figure sometimes also holds a poppy, associated with forgetful sleep, or Hypnos. He represents not a morbid preoccupation with death, which would seem a peculiar

> subject for a coin, but rather the ultimate fate of warriors. The two brothers appear in the *Iliad* (book xvi) when Sarpedon, the heroic king of Lycia falls in battle against the Greeks besieging Troy. His bravery impels Zeus to order Apollo to rescue the body, and Thanatos and Hypnos carry it back to Lycia for a hero's burial. Such a fate would resonate with the Council of Young Men – Cynedrion Neon, which was probably an organization of ephebes, or young men in training for military duties.
>
> (Classical Numismatic Group listing #733450, 2002; see also Cotterell, 1989; Reinhold, 1972)

Thanatos is shown here extinguishing the light of a torch as though it were the extinguishment of life itself. He is seen as an angel of death – he does not wish for the death of mortals. As comforter and escort, he seeks to ease the pain of death on the journey that lies ahead. Another important aspect of Thanatos is that he is a lesser god. He is commanded by Zeus, the god of all gods and ruler of the 'upper-world', and Hades, Zeus' brother and god of the underworld, to do their bidding. One could even say that Thanatos really did not have a mind of his own.

In Greek mythology there were also those who would battle death but would never win the war. Sisyphus, the best known deceiver, manipulator, and opportunist in Greek mythology was so cunning, for a time he actually made death die when he:

> ... ambushed Thanatos [and] imprisoned him in chains to prevent his own death. Of course there resulted a moratorium on death everywhere until the god of war Ares liberated Thanatos. Since he had to die, Sisyphus asked his wife to die in his place and when she refused, he made her promise elaborate funeral rites. (Reinhold, 1972, p. 317).

After arriving in the underworld, or what many in Western society know to be hell, Sisyphus lied to the keeper of the underworld by saying his wife needed to be punished for not keeping her promise. He then continued to evade numerous attempts to be relocated with Hades; to complete the work of being dead. Very much angered, Zeus irreversibly killed Sisyphus and gave him as punishment, an unending task. The task was to forever, push a boulder almost to the top of a hill only to have it roll back just before reaching the apex.

For many, Thanatos is better remembered in partnership with the god of life, Eros and its constituents of love and sex. Eros and Thanatos work simultaneously to effect progression through the ontological procession. The common moral to the heroic stories above, is that those who tried to over power death for egoistic and self-preservation purposes, rather than for the love of others, were irrevocably punished. Sisyphus was a prime example of this. On the other hand, when love and care for others were considered, death-fear and death itself became more malleable. Yet, the ultimate conclusion is that no matter how clever the solution, the answer to the question is that yes, we are all going to die. What we don't know, what we don't understand is how and when. In outlining the framework for both life and death inside and outside of our organisations, we specifically refer to working conceptualisations of Thanatos, the death instinct and its adversary, Eros, the life instinct that originated within the field of psychodynamics.

We would like to make our reader aware of an important issue. The terms Eros and Thanatos were used by Freud as poetic metaphors to capture an embodied sense of an abstract concept rather than giving a sense of precision. Thus, when Freud used the term Eros, he did not necessarily refer to a 'love instinct' or 'sexual instinct' as one might assume from a narrowly construed understanding derived from Greek mythology, but rather in the sense that Rycroft (1995) explained with the help of 'Larousse':

> The appropriateness of the metaphor derives from (a) the fact that Eros was the secret lover of Psyche and (b) the fact that 'his role was to co-ordinate the elements which constitute the universe. It is he who "brings harmony to chaos" and permits life to develop. This primitive deity, a semi-abstract personification of cosmic force ...' – *Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology*. (Rycroft, 1995, p. 50)

Indeed, in discussing Eros, Freud (1940/1986) specifically asserted:

> ... we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, *Eros* and *the destructive instinct* (The contrast between the instincts of self preservation and the preservation of the species, as well as the contrast between ego-love and object-love, falls within Eros.) The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus – in short, to bind together; the aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so destroy things. In the case of the destructive instinct we may suppose that its final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the death instinct. (pp. 379–380)

Thus, Freud used the term Eros not to simply refer to a 'love instinct', or 'sexual instinct', but "to connote the whole of the life instincts as opposed to the death instincts" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988, p. 153). In similar fashion, we will normally use the term Eros as a synonym for the whole class of life instincts of which the 'love instinct', or 'sexual instinct', is a single instance of the class. We also use Thanatos as a synonym for death instincts. In adopting such a traditional approach to this terminology, when being descriptive of a tendency or quality derived from these two classes of instincts, we will use the terms *Thanatic* and *Erostic* to preserve the appropriate grammar.

The psychodynamic approaches in this book

As we have noted, in Freud's dual-instinct theory Thanatos seeks to express itself in its pure form as an instinct of aggression and destruction. However, when opposed to or combined with Eros it can result in a variety of psychological and behavioural outcomes, some of which we will identify as being manifested in leadership and other behaviour in work organisations.

Starting with Freud, the father of psychodynamics, seems a logical place to begin a psychodynamic approach to the manner in which the awareness of death is significant to the understanding of human behaviour. However, we will note that Freud was not the person who introduced the phrase "death instinct" to the psychodynamic community. One of the first, if not *the* first person to use the term was Sabina Spielrein, whose work we discuss in some detail in Chapter 3. Spielrein's work has only recently come to light with the discovery of a cache of documents and diaries relating to her life, relationships and influences on and by other prominent psychodynamic theorists including, most consciously, Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung.

Spielrein agreed with the Freudian precept that we are instinctual beings who appear driven to maximise pleasure and suppress displeasure. However, in contrast to Freud, she saw these two antagonistic tendencies as being two components of *the* sexual instinct. The simultaneous presence of a destructive component, Thanatos, within the sexual instinct is a presence that Spielrein viewed as important in the emergence of something new. For Spielrein the destruction or dissolution component of the sexual instinct was crucial for a process of transformation to occur. In her 1912 diary she mused on this idea after reading a work of a colleague, Wilhelm Stekel, in relation to the interpretation of dreams and the meaning of the fairytale, Godfather Death, in *Grimm's Fairy Tales*:

> Where death appears, the life urge can also be found. In the fairy tale about Godfather Death, the doctor asks Death to replace his waning life flame with a new one. What does Death answer? I cannot. One flame must go out before another can be lit. (Stekel, 1911, cited in Carotenuto, 1980/1982, p. 49)

In our focus upon the death instinct in relation to individuals and the clinical issues that consequently arise, we also review the work of Melanie Klein who, within this broader church of psychodynamics, was one of the founders of the object-relations school of thought. Klein accepted much of the Freudian orthodoxy except that for her, the drive theory, or a theory of instincts could not simply be seen as energy that needs to be discharged. For Klein, instinctual satisfaction implied a world of objects and it was not simply a case of reducing instinctual tension from within, but the manner in which we internalise objects from our external world.

In this book we discuss the manner in which the death instinct induces an anxiety that causes individuals to project these impulses onto objects outside the self, to split the world into an overly simplified dichotomy of good and bad objects. In relation to the death instinct, the works of Klein, Freud and Spielrein do draw attention to different individual and collective behaviours. These theorists also draw our attention to similar behaviours that we note in the context of workplace settings.

In addition, we discuss the work of Herbert Marcuse and C. Fred Alford. Marcuse built upon Freud's notion that life and death instincts are subject to repressive psychodynamics that are culturally shaped. In particular, Marcuse cogently described the manner in which these instincts are 'managed', 'controlled' and 'manipulated', through the provinces or realms of the mind that Freud called the ego and the super-ego. Marcuse said that early parental influences on the super-ego are joined or replaced by powerful institutional ones. Marcuse provided us with an understanding of how social control becomes a retarding and repressive force on Eros in a manner that draws upon or harnesses the energy of the death instinct. Freud thought the forces that were retarding and repressing Eros were the price we paid for a civilised society. Marcuse posed the question of whether the extent of these forces had become excessive, or even necessary. He argued that repression was a socially manipulated psychological phenomenon and that there was a large degree of "surplus repression" being exercised over and fostered within individuals, which not only serves specific and vested interests, but, in its wake leaves 'workers' alienated. In this context, technology is experienced as a form of institutionalised aggression.

C. Fred Alford is our final, major theorist. We discuss his views on psychodynamics in some detail because we see his work to be a synthesis of that which was previously offered. Like the work of Marcuse, Alford's research is about the collective, but in this case the focus is the manner in which Eros and Thanatos are implicated in group development and, in particular, leadership and *followership* behaviour. Alford drew upon Klein's and others' object-relations theories to make the fundamental point that it is the instinct for self-preservation that drives the individual's need to participate in combined efforts to accomplish something that could not be completed through individual performance alone. He argued that the constant need to be a part of a group is continually tempered by the individual's fear of identity loss – thus, the desire to be identified with a group is accompanied by a Thanatic fear that the individual will experience identity annihilation. Fantasies of identity dissolution, being subsumed into, or engulfed by the group induce the individual to put some of the best parts of the self into "cold storage". The manner in which this subliminal dynamic is managed and certain defences are triggered is at the heart of Alford's examination of leadership and group dynamics. It will be argued that in the development of psychodynamic theory about the death instinct, Alford's work is the transformational connector. It will also be argued that psychodynamics in general, tells us why and how certain behaviours reported in organisational studies research are produced. We do not want to rehearse contextual arguments at this time, but we will make a number of more general observations as to the relevance of the topic of death and its subliminal presence to organisation studies.

Death matters at work

Burkhard Sievers (1990) made the observation that if we take our cue from Greek mythology, the issue of immortality and work organisations leads to some interesting conclusions. Specifically, Sievers also noted that Sisyphus tried to defraud the gods of their immortality and would not allow his contemporary mortals to be part of divine immortality, condemning them to alienating and repressive forms of work. Sievers argued that:

> it seems to me, our enterprises have taken over the function of the ancient city; the bigger companies, in particular, tend to symbolize our accepted contemporary notion of immortality. Despite the fact that some of them may go bankrupt again and again, they are

> built on the underlying assumption that they will exist forever. And according to the underlying splitting it is the managers who, by devoting their lives to the permanent growth and survival of the enterprise, continuously try to prove their own immortality. At the same time, those at the bottom, the workers, even seem to be defrauded of their immortality as they increasingly are converted into production means, tools, cogs, dead-wood or scrap. And to the extent that workers are perceived and treated like things, they are also regarded as non-mortals. (Sievers, 1990, p. 322)

Reflecting on Sievers' observation, one might note that a number of 'human resource management' practices and policies seem to embody or impart a similar attitude. The issue of 'down-sizing' comes readily to mind as displaying the hallmarks of this subliminal dynamic. The manner in which the workplace has become depersonalised and controlled by policies, practices and language that insist upon uniformity in social relations is also an instance of where 'life' and emotionality seem to have been bled out of interpersonal relationships. We argue that generally, these are instances of the subliminal expression of the death instinct. Indeed, as Yiannis Gabriel (1999) thoughtfully suggested, two aspects of bureaucratic control – centralisation and formalisation – are representations of the death instinct that work against embodiments of the life instinct, exemplified through the dearth of worker participation in decision-making.

One of the retarding influences of the death instinct, which we will note from the work of Freud, is the compulsion to repeat. Compulsive repetition is a feature of much behaviour in highly formalised organisations; it is personified as a set of rules and regulations that is supposed to safeguard against partiality. Examples in particular are Total Quality Management (TQM) and the ISO 9000 programmes, which some have labeled to really be 'cement life jackets'. The edifices, practices, rituals and language that we create and foster in our work organisations need to be carefully examined in terms of whether we are being driven by a subliminal dynamic that is taking us to places that will be counterproductive to the betterment of human kind. It is the manner in which death, and the fear of it, makes an 'appearance' in the subliminal or as an unconscious motivation for human behaviour in work organisations, that is of prime concern to us in writing this book. Our wish is to put the heart and soul of the ontological procession back into its rightful place in discourse in both organisational and psychodynamic studies.

By reviewing some of the history and narrative surrounding Thanatos, we can see that regardless of whether we speak of organisational life or life in general, death is very much a part of the ontological procession. No matter how we try to deny and repress the fear of it, death does precede transcendence but not on its own. Enacting interrelationships among aspects of life *and* death are the means by which we try to achieve transcendence. Therefore, we must also remind ourselves that Thanatos works with Eros. Together, they determine the quality and the quantity of that which is between man or woman and infinity. It is for this reason that the glass sculpture, *Lovers*, was chosen for the book's cover. Man, woman, birth, death, and infinity are required to work – love – together, at the same time, in order for transcendence to become part of the process. By reviewing matters of life *and* death, we write this book to explore humans' self and other leadership away from acknowledgement of mortality in the ontological procession of life. We want to find out more about what has happened to the mortal means by which we live and work to our ends.

Discussion framework

In this book, discussions of these psychodynamic accounts are preceded by a vignette of a typical workplace environment introduced with the title, *Reflections on Eros and Thanatos working in organisations*. The purpose of these vignettes is to make conscious, those subliminal, covert aspects of the instincts that shape our overt behaviours. Then by using both psychodynamic and organisational studies research conclusions, we analyse each of the vignettes to meld praxis with academic theory – what we call *'pracademic'* – which is similar to Sievers' (1999) notion of *Thanatospraxis*. Thanatospraxis is a specific instance of a pracademic approach as it refers to the very specific theory of the death instinct, whereas we use the term pracademic as a more generic description of any approach that seeks to meld a specific application to a specific theory. Indeed, the purpose of the vignettes is to provide a practice ground for theoretical application so instinctual behaviours can be identified, analysed, and better understood. It is this pracademic approach that not only re-integrates consideration and respect for death in the framework of organisational life, but puts these specific theories of Eros and Thanatos to work.

Research approach

To strengthen our secondary research findings that both Eros and Thanatos are at work in our organisations, pracademics also contributes to our ability to triangulate or "vary in some way the approach used to generate the finding that [we] are seeking to corroborate" (Gall, Borg & Gall, 1996, p. 575). To examine the means by which leadership of life and death are carried out in the workplace, we use extensive study of many instrumental cases studies to advance understanding of theories used in this book (Berg, 1998, p. 216; see also Stake, 1994, 1995). Two sets of collective, instrumental variations include analyses of four different minicase studies and one major case study. Similar to Czander, Jacobsberg, Mersky, and Nunberg's (2002) layered consultations, we provide re-readings of these cases to check for deeper and alternative implications that, in our context, relate directly to Eros and Thanatos at work. These cases illustrate two major classifications of theory, psychodynamic and organisational studies. Within these major classifications we look to individual psychology and group psychology and organisational theory and organisational behaviour leadership theory to inform our conclusions. Additional work has been done to include both quantitative and qualitative research studies, pertaining respectively, to *Terror Management Theory* and the use of case study analysis itself. To connect previous choices, we employ aspects of the naturalistic approach to the research in this book so as to uncover both similarities and differences among psychodynamic theories on the death instinct and between psychodynamic and organisational studies theories, as they are evidenced in the cases' data (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).

So, we need to alert our reader to a conscious attempt by the authors to write this book in what might be thought of as a reiterative and recursive style to show that "all 'parts' of reality are interrelated, so that the study of any one part necessarily influences all other parts" (Guba, 1981, p. 77). Each chapter addresses a body of thought that is not closed off to reflection in subsequent chapters. Table 1.1 illustrates our meaning of this reiterative and recursive discussion format.

The perforated lines among major theorists on the death instinct are purposeful. As one moves from Freud to Alford, there is a continual building of knowledge so that at first, it is that Freud's contributions are added to those of Klein whose are added to those of Spielrein, etc. The aspect of recursiveness is that some interrelated parts of their theories move forward to create a synthesis of ideas not typically seen in

Table 1.1 Reiterative and recursive discussion model for Eros and Thanatos at work, their theorists, and connections to psychodynamic and organisational studies theories and research

Reflections on Eros and Thanatos at Work: *Vignette*	***And there they were gone* or *If I am a leader, where are my followers?***		***Look out! There are Erostic people in your organisation!***	***12,000 degrees of corporate stupidity: Feeling Hot! Hot! Hot!***	***I want to be loved by you, just you and nobody else but you***
Theorist / Theorist's View	**Freud**	**Klein**	**Spielrein**	**Marcuse**	**Alford**
Concentration Underscored by Maximisation of Pleasure and Minimisation of Displeasure	individual psychology	object relations and individual psychology	individual psychology	depth psychology (individual psychology in object relations)	individual psychology; group psychology; and depth psychology
Life Instinct	Eros: preservation of life, sex, libido	self-preservation; reassurance, love, identity	sex; love; self-preservation; self-destruction	Eros: love, unrepressed society; organisational-ideal	Eros: reassurance, self-concept, identity, love
Death Instinct	Thanatos: death, dying, purely destructive	persecution, identity dissolution; purely destructive	death in sex; destructive reconstruction; transformation	surplus repression; organisational-ideal	persecution; identity dissolution; minimal transformation; excursiveness

Table 1.1 Reiterative and recursive discussion model for Eros and Thanatos at work, their theorists, and connections to psychodynamic and organisational studies theories and research – *continued*

Reflections on Eros and Thanatos at Work: ***Vignette***	***And there they were gone* or *If I am a leader, where are my followers?***		***Look out! There are Erostic people in your organisation!***	***12,000 degrees of corporate stupidity: Feeling Hot! Hot! Hot!***	***I want to be loved by you, just you and nobody else but you***
Theorist / Theorist's View	**Freud**	**Klein**	**Spielrein**	**Marcuse**	**Alford**
Instinctual Balance	Nirvana	depressive position	never really achieved	Utopia: imbalance – elimination of Death Instinct	reflexivity
Prominent Connections to Organisational Studies Theory	intrapersonal conflict resolution; loci of control; expectancy theory; dyadic conflict resolution; self-leadership	and interpersonal conflict resolution; equity theory self and other leadership	and organisational change; creativity; transactional leadership; contingency leadership; transformational leadership	and personal power profile; politics in the workplace	and leadership trait theory; informal leadership; group development; organisational development
Qualitative and Quantitative Research Evidence	**Case Study:** ***When a leader dies***				
	Terror Management Theory (TMT)				

individual works alone. This is also true of the vignettes – each has its own power and together they form a different view that is further transcended through analysis of the major case study in Chapter 6.

For example, in the next chapter that primarily examines the work of Freud and Klein, we will discuss the implications of their ideas for the field of organisation studies and particularly the issues of intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict resolution styles and their comparative effectiveness when coupled with authoritarian leadership. And to illustrate the parallels and disconnections among these theories we analyse the vignette we have adapted from Martin (2003) that we have entitled *And there they were, gone* (or, *If I am a leader, where are my followers?*).

In the following chapter we will do likewise with the work of Spielrein and another different vignette. However this chapter will also recall the work of Freud and Klein to note what we will continually refer to as the "resonances and differences" with the work of, in this instance, Spielrein, and what this means in terms of the implications for the field of organisation studies and leadership. This approach, or style of writing, is continued throughout the book and is an attempt by the authors, amongst other things, to keep the discussion open. It is our wish to begin a conversation on a topic that has largely been ignored in the leadership of our lives and our organisations. Now we turn our attention to the founder of psychodynamics, Sigmund Freud.

2

The Death Instinct and Destruction: Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein

In this chapter we examine the death instinct in perhaps its most widely known and even its most popular forms that are biological urges transmuted into acts of destruction and aggression (Gillespie, 1995). Our research finds that Sigmund Freud's and Melanie Klein's works on the death instinct show that it is not comprised of merely the one attribute of aggression. In fact, under both the umbrellas of Sigmund Freud's posits of individual psychology and Melanie Klein's object-relations theorising, we find that the death instinct is comprised of a class of instincts, one of which culminates in aggression or a "derivative of the death instinct" (Rycroft, 1968/1995, p. 5). So, this chapter reveals how these classes interact to provide a psychodynamic process of instinctually based thoughts and behaviours, or defence mechanisms including, but not limited to aggression.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the works of Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein to show the instrumentality of the death instinct from which one intermediate, terminal result may be aggression if death instinct manifestations are not curbed or treated. Then, we use these psychodynamic conceptualisations to outline and underscore organisational study topics of intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict management – two subjects particularly apposite the individual's and the dyad's reluctance to compromise and collaborate.

Origins of the death instinct

It appears the originator of the death instinct's conceptualisation was the noted Russian biologist and founder of immunology Élie Metchnikoff (see Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, p. 216). The notion of a "death instinct" or "death drive" entered the vocabulary of psychoanalysis

Pracademic reflections on Eros and Thanatos working in organisations: And there they were, gone! or If I am the leader, where are my followers?

Willem was a CEO both quick and skillful at decision-making, an intuitive manager. Still, he had no idea what to make of the call he'd just received from Hong Kong. Kenny, his favorite regional president, was on the line complaining about how the organizational structure of the firm, DevTek, impeded his ability to manage his business and win in Asia. Willem had heard much grousing before about the structure, but it all came from managers he saw as whiners. Kenny never complained. Willem had to take his concerns seriously.

DevTek had started as a German company, organized by function. Everybody in the organization reported to the VP of Marketing, or the VP of Manufacturing, or...and each of these VPs reported to the CEO. As DevTek grew...it established a new structure in which there was a managing director (MD) for each of the six product lines with full profit responsibility and reporting directly to the CEO.

As the firm expanded globally...Willem created a new organization with regional presidents in charge of the four regions – North America, Latin America, Europe, and Asia....

Still dissatisfied, Willem created an overlay organization charged with coordinating product lines across geographies. These global product-line primes (PLP) had no profit responsibilities or direct line authority over personnel, but they were to create long-term global strategies, which Willem hoped would offset the competitive disadvantages inherent in DevTek's regionalized structure.

It was this new overlay structure that set Kenny off. "It takes so long to get anything done around here," he complained. "Everybody has three bosses....telling them not to pay too much attention to the short-term concerns of their regional boss and instead work for the long-term global benefit of the product line, whatever the hell that means!"

Willem knew the current three-way matrix of regional presidents, product-line primes and functional VPs wasn't working. There were too many fights for control, too much ambiguity and confusion. It was time to make a change.

> Willem worked with organizational design experts within DevTek and top experts from outside to redesign the structure.
>
> At first the change was greeted with enthusiasm, especially for the promise of simplification and single-point accountability. However, as managers tried to operate in the new design, they quickly became confused, then angry....[it] seemed such a sham that everyone began to question the design team's sincerity.
>
> When Willem heard the feedback he became more frustrated than ever. "Don't they understand the power of the new structure? It's so much simpler. They just have to get used to it and then they'll get it."
>
> He issued a 'flame-mail' to the entire organization, to tell them that they had to forget the past and embrace this new simplified organization. Anybody who had a problem with it should speak with him directly. When Willem's savvy secretary read the e-mail she knew she would not have to set aside much time for meetings on the subject. And she was right. There weren't many volunteers brave enough to come forward and challenge the new structure. (Martin, 2003, pp. 61–65)

in the first decade of the 1900s through the work of Sabina Spielrein, Wilhelm Stekel and Theodor Reik. And, although it is not entirely clear, Spielrein may have been the first to introduce the term "death instinct" to the domain of psychodynamics. Spielrein recorded the general idea of a death instinct in her diaries as early as 1906 or 1907 (Spielrein, 1906–7/2001; see also Kerr, 1994, pp. 300 & 500). She also used the term in a presentation given to the *Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society* in 1911 (Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, p. 216) In 1912, Spielrein published a paper, *Destruction as a cause of coming into being*, in which she used the term "death instinct" (Spielrein, 1912/ 1994) within a context of sexuality. This view differed significantly from those of Freud and Klein and so warrants a section, Chapter 3, solely devoted to Spielrein.

Notwithstanding the work of Spielrein, the notion of a death instinct, or death drive, is most strongly identified with the work of Sigmund Freud. Such is the potency of his work that the recent volume of the *Encyclopaedia of psychoanalysis* devoted to the death instinct does not have a single mention of Spielrein, or any of the death instinct's 'true' originators (see Weatherill, 1999). So, we think it appropriate to begin a

discussion on the death instinct with the founder of psychodynamics – Sigmund Freud – and his ideas from which others in the field are commonly taken as points of departure. Freud's stance was that, in its purest expression, the death instinct was a destructive force. It is this idea that leads us to the work of Melanie Klein. The insights that these theories of the death instinct bring to understanding organisational dynamics are then discussed.

Sigmund Freud's conceptualisations of the death instinct: A comprehensive view

We believe, as does Weatherill (1999) that "If Freud's first point of reference was the Oedipus Complex, then the second is the death drive" (p. 1): the first sentence in the preface of the volume *Encyclopaedia of psychoanalysis* that was devoted to the death instinct, or death drive. Indeed, in a retrospective reflection on his work, Freud wrote that "since I put forward my hypothesis of the existence of two classes of instinct (Eros and the death instinct) and since I proposed a division of the mental personality into an ego, a super-ego and an id, I have made no further divisive contributions to psychoanalysis" (1935/1986, p. 257).

By reading two of Freud's principal works, namely: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920/1984); and, *The Ego and the Id* (1923/1984) we can get a fairly comprehensive view of how Freud conceived of the death instinct. However, this is not to say that it can be easily understood; nor was it supported by all of his followers, for these works are expressed in a convoluted and an ambiguous manner. For example, Freud revised his ideas within the same work, and connected ideas through glides of logic that are very questionable. Some writers, and even some of Freud's supporters, have expressed the general sentiment that his work on this topic "is arguably the most obscure piece of writing he ever produced" (Robinson, 1993, p. 87; see also Gay, 1988, p. 398) and indeed one "of his most fanciful works" (Robinson, 1993, p. 81). Lind (1991) also observed that: "One has to read between the lines and, to some extent, criticise and reinterpret what Freud wrote" (p. 60). Freud's rhetorical flourishes and metaphorical and mythological allusions can confuse and sometimes lead to perceived contradictions, some of which can be understood in his attempts to capture dynamic processes. However, despite these criticisms, if one delves deeper into Freud's thoughts about the death instinct we find that they do emerge as a coherent, comprehensive argument and 'narrative'.

Freud's notion of a death instinct arose in the context of clarifying his ideas about humans as instinctual beings. These ruminations likely began as early as 1900 in his *Interpretation of Dreams*, where he first suggested that the psyche's reflex reaction to displeasure is to decrease or eliminate negative consequences – excitation – thereby creating a feeling state of pleasure:

> A current of this kind in the apparatus, starting from unpleasure and aiming at pleasure, we have termed a 'wish'; and we have asserted that only a wish is able to set the apparatus in motion and that the course of the excitation in it is automatically regulated by feelings of pleasure and unpleasure. (Freud, 1900/1986, p. 757)

Succinctly put, the pleasure principle is a principle upon which the psyche acted at an unconscious level to satisfy instinctual needs, either directly (e.g. by food to satisfy hunger, drink to satisfy thirst, etc) or indirectly through wish fulfilment. The aim of the pleasure principle is two-fold: to gratify, or bring about pleasure; *and,* to avoid the pain or unpleasure of the tension that is created by the instinctual demand. Indirect satisfaction through wish fulfilment uses fantasies, dreams and illusions to provide a substitute, or a symbolic gratification of the desire (e.g. a dream to be the apprentice of Donald Trump). Freud considered human behaviour to be propelled, or "automatically regulated" (1920/1984, p. 275), by what he dubbed the *"pleasure principle"*. However, it was also in Freud's (1920/1984) *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* where he started to articulate the notion of a death instinct. In our view this is because he had yet to fully explore his original statement that unpleasure was experienced before pleasure (Freud, 1900/1986) and therefore needed to fully understand the constituent relationship between these feeling states.

Although Freud commonly used the term pleasure principle, he did describe what involved more of an avoidance of pain or response to tension rather than a positive pursuit of pleasure *per se*. At an earlier point, Freud spoke of the principle as "the unpleasure principle" (1915/1991, p. 104). Thus it is sometimes referred to as a "pleasure-pain principle" or a "pleasure-unpleasure principle" (Freud, 1933/1988, p. 122; see also, English & English, 1958/1966, p. 394; Rycroft, 1995, p. 135). However, Freud made a curious discovery when working with veterans from World War I: they often had recurring dreams that were traumatic. This was contrary to Freud's consistent view that dreams were a conduit for wish fulfilment whose aim was to also fend off unpleasant memories (see Freud, 1900/1986). As Freud (1920/1984) noted:

> The study of dreams may be considered the most trustworthy method of investigating deep mental processes. Now dreams occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing the patient back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he wakes up in a fright. This astonishes people far too little. (p. 282; see also Barford, 1999, p. 14)

What Freud could not reconcile was why these people continued to revisit such trauma in their dreams if human instinctual behaviour is governed by the pleasure principle. Clearly, such repetitive 're-enactments' were not in the best interests of the general well being of the individuals' suffering from such a trauma.

Freud was to argue that traumatic situations did not allow the mind to draw upon its own resources to respond appropriately. Indeed this should be contrasted to situations where an anxiety reaction is triggered in which there is a perception of a "danger-situation" (Freud, 1933/1988, pp. 117–118; Carr, 1991); thus an expectation of what is about to transpire and the degree of preparedness to respond. A part of this preparation is the release of hormones such as adrenalin, to the place the individual in a state of heightened awareness with short-term energy bursts of various magnitudes. In relation to the purpose of these recurring dreams, Freud argued, "these dreams are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis" (1920/1984, p. 304). Freud viewed the mind's response to a variety of stimuli, as being implicated in a process of "*binding*". The mind processed experiences by psychically binding stimuli, and any influx of energy (see Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988, p. 51), thus giving it time to work through how best to respond to the stimulus. However, in the cases of the soldiers' traumatic experiences, there was no "binding" of the experience. Instead, the individuals simply and continually reacted in a "reflex manner" (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 302). Thus, unbinding is economic cathexis that bypasses normal mental processes.

Freud discussed other manifestations of the "compulsion to repeat" and "unbinding" experiences:

> The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat ... exhibit to a high degree an instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the appearance of some 'demonic' force at work. (p. 307)...
>
> But how is the predicate of being 'instinctual' related to the compulsion to repeat? At this point we cannot escape the suspicion that we

> may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or at least not explicitly stressed. *It seems then that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things* which every living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life. (Freud, 1920/1984, pp. 307 & 308–309)

Freud had a particular view about the nature of this adversarial relationship. He argued that the life instinct "seeks to force together and hold together the portions of living substance" (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 334), whereas, the death instinct is to be found in the pull toward dissolution, fragmentation and as an instinct of destruction. The death instinct "rushes forward so as to reach the final aim as swiftly as possible"; and the life instinct "jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong the journey" (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 313).

The compulsion to repeat is seen by Freud as common to all instincts and as being "an expression of the *conservative* nature of living substance" (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 309). In fact, Freud viewed this conservative nature as being something that is learnt through the generations such that one needs to respond to one's environment. By way of illustration, he used the migrations of fish at spawning time and migratory flights of birds as examples where this compulsion to repeat is historically determined and has been environmentally contingent. However, if the "urge inherent in organic life" is "to restore an earlier state of things" then ultimately "we shall be compelled to say that *'the aim of all life is death'*" (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 311). It is in the context of setting forth this biological, essentialist model that Freud first used the term "death instinct" (1920/1984, p. 316). In a footnote, the editors of his work noted that this is "the first published appearance of the term" (Footnote 2, Freud, 1920/1984, p. 316) – well, at least in respect to Freud's work.

Giving life to Eros and Thanatos

In a footnote of his own, Freud sought to clarify his terminology and retrace some of the development in his theory:

> With the hypothesis of narcissistic libido and the extension of the concept of libido to the individual cells, the sexual instinct was transformed for us into Eros, which seeks to force together and hold

> together the portions of living substance. What are commonly called the sexual instincts are looked upon by us as the part of Eros which is directed towards objects. Our speculations have suggested that Eros operates from the beginning of life and appears as a 'life instinct' in opposition to the 'death instinct' which was brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance. (1920/1984, p. 334)

Freud came to regard the death instinct as *a class of instincts* and, as we note from the citation above, he conceived it as being involved in a psychodynamic relationship with *Eros*.

Freud often employed ideas and figures from classical mythology to give a more embodied sense to his more abstract concepts. As we noted in the previous chapter, from Greek mythology, *Eros* is the god of love and the term, in Freud's time, was generally associated with love. Freud used the term *Eros* as a synonym for the "life instinct" – which was itself a conflation of what he had previously referred to as the sexual instinct.

In this context Freud used the term *Eros* in 'opposition' to *Thanatos*, the death instinct. As we also noted in Chapter 1, in Greek mythology, Thanatos or pitiless death is considered to be the brother of Hypnos or gentle sleep (Borbely & Tononi, 1998). A more well-known expert in mythology, Edith Hamilton, argued that Thanatos was a demi-god, related to Hades, the Greek god of the underworld who was also known as pitiless death: "He was King of the Dead – not Death himself, whom the Greeks called Thanatos" (Hamilton, 1942, p. 28). Thanatos has since been transmuted to represent not only the finality of death but stages of mortality that bring us closer and closer to being dead in that it also symbolises life's losses and disconnection (O'Connor, 2000).

The term Thanatos was not used by Freud in his works. But according to his close friend, colleague and official biographer, Earnest Jones, Freud used the word in everyday conversation as shorthand to refer to the death instinct (see Jones, 1957, pp. 273 & 295). Some have suggested that Freud refrained from using Thanatos in the written word, as Wilhelm Stekel had already used the expression in print. To formally use the term Thanatos would have meant that Freud also needed to acknowledge an initiative of a person he had come to detest (see Roazen, 1975, p. 218).

Thanatos is a term that certainly captured the implied relationship that Freud claimed existed between the life instinct and the death


instinct, inasmuch as they were to be thought of as adversaries. It does, however, remain a mystery as to why Freud did not name this 'force' in a manner akin to the way in which he dubbed the energy associated with the life instinct as "libido". The term libido was never really clearly defined by Freud and at times, he used the term in an inconsistent manner. But as Laplanche and Pontalis (1967/1988) correctly observe: "Freud's libido never extends to the whole domain of the instincts. ... in Freud's final account ... libido is now opposed to the death instincts" (p. 239). It was the absence of a term that was akin to libido that led some of his later followers to use terms such as "mortido" – a term coined by Paul Federn (1952); and, "destrudo" – a term coined by Charles Brenner (1973). These latter titles have not gained widespread acceptance in the psychoanalytic community, and the generality of the expression "Thanatos" has been preferred without having the consequent obligation to postulate the manner in which two separate forms of energy might simultaneously exist (see Dufresne, 2000, p. 24; Rycroft, 1995, p. 95).

The house that Freud built

Shortly after his initial discussion of a death instinct, Freud revised his theory of the topography of the 'mind', as articulated in *The Ego and the Id* (1923/1984), Chapter 4, headed "IV – The Two Classes of Instinct". It is in the context of Freud's new reckoning of the mind that we find some elaboration and refinement of his views concerning the existence of the death instinct.

As gleaned from *The Ego and the Id,* Freud's revised or second theory on the 'mind', posited a topography of the now famous *id, ego* and *super-ego*. This topography, which he later described as an "unassuming sketch" (Freud, 1933/1988, p. 112), was not to be taken as a literal pictorial representation because he insisted that psychical processes have an intangible quality. The metaphorical fiction called the mind and its fictive constructs, gave Freud an imagery that captured what he believed were specific interactive processes among the ego, id and super-ego. Freud had, nonetheless, felt it necessary to diagrammatically represent these constructs (see Freud, 1923/1984, p. 363; also Freud, 1933/1988, p. 111). Although we agree with Freud's notion that diagramming can lead to a reductionist view of psychical processes, we also think it useful to provide an interpretive depiction of his unassuming sketch, below in Figure 2.1, Freud's topography of the mind.

Figure 2.1 Freud's topography of the mind[1]



Source: Based on Carr, 1989; Freud, 1923/1988, 1933/1984; Jones, 1964.

The ego is, according to Freud, that province or realm of the mind that uses logic, memory, and judgement to appropriately seek to satisfy the unconscious biological urges, drives, or instincts of the id. Consequently, both Eros and Thanatos reside in the id. The ego must resolve whether to satisfy, postpone satisfaction, or suppress the demands of the id. Simultaneously, the ego must take into account the external world. The external world is comprised of past, present, and forecasted experiences, including achievable and non-achievable wishes and expectations. The *reality of* conditions in the individual's external world imposes upon the form/expression and the appropriate timing for the satisfaction of the demands of the id – thus, operating in accordance with what Freud dubbed the *"reality principle"* (1923/1984, p. 363). Freud (1923/1984) described the relationship of the ego with the id in the following manner:

> The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normal control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as it were its own. (p. 364; see also Freud, 1933/1988, pp. 109–110)

In making decisions in relation to the passions of the id, another aspect that needs to be considered by the ego is the social acceptability and constraint involved in carrying through the demands of the id. These *societal rules* are part of the realm of the super-ego. The super-ego takes on the rules of conduct that are demanded by parents (i.e. through the Oedipus or Electra complex – complexes derived from the Greek myth i.e., the unconscious desire an individual has, from around the age of five, toward the parent of the opposite sex while at the same time having hostile feelings toward the parent of the same sex who is seen as a rival) and other significant authority figures. Through the process of identification the super-ego gains its script, which guides the ego in its functioning in both a positive and negative manner. Badcock elegantly captured this important dynamic when he said, "The super-ego provides a sense of moral and aesthetic self-judgement (conscience and values, in other words), both in a positive sense as acting as an *ego-ideal* and in the negative one in performing the role of censor of the ego's wishes" (Badcock, 1988, p. 112; see also Carr, 1994, p. 211; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 145). The ego-ideal is that which initially derives from the positive identifications with the loving assuring parent and later becomes the idealised sense of self to which the individual aspires. The failure of the ego to meet the demands of the super-ego results in 'punishment' in the form of anxiety, guilt and shame. Indeed, if the ego fails to properly manage its own 'house', Freud noted that forms of anxiety could result, i.e.,

> Thus the ego, driven by the id, confined by the super-ego, repulsed by reality, struggles to master its economic task ... If the ego is obliged to admit its weakness, it breaks out in anxiety – realistic anxiety regarding the external world, moral anxiety regarding the super-ego and neurotic anxiety regarding the strength of the passions of the id. (Freud, 1933/1988, pp. 110–111)

In *The Ego and the Id*, Freud (1923/1984) delved further into forms of anxiety and said that the concept of fearing death itself "is something that occurs between the ego and super-ego. ... The fear of death in melancholia only admits of one explanation: that the ego gives itself up because it feels itself hated and persecuted by the super-ego, instead of loved" (p. 400).

In accordance with how Freud conceptualised the structural relationships of the mind, Figure 2.1 has endeavoured to reinforce some of the fundamental structural features that included:

- The id operates in the realm of the unconscious and only has 'access' to the external world through the ego and the space occupied by the id is far larger than that of the ego;
- The repressed is contained totally in the realm of the unconscious but "merges into the id as well, and is merely a part of it. The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego through the resistances of repression: it can communicate with the ego through the id" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 362); and,
- The super-ego merges with both the id and the ego, but unlike the ego does not have an immediate access to the conceptual system that perceives the outside world.

Also in this new work of *The Ego and the Id,* Freud dubbed the life instinct (Eros) as a class of instincts that is comprised of both "the uninhibited sexual instinct proper" and "the self-preservative instinct" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 380). He re-confirmed the antagonistic relationship of Eros with Thanatos, asserting that Thanatos has as its task "to lead organic life back into the inanimate state" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 380). Freud and so too his daughter Anna Freud stressed that while instinct theories are really in the realm of biology, psychology is concerned with such theories insofar as they make a "constant claim on the mind and urges the individual to take certain actions" (Anna Freud, 1952/1992, p. 58; see also Anna Freud, 1936/1966). Of particular interest, in *The Ego and the Id* was the manner in which "*the two classes of instinct are fused, blended, and alloyed with each other*" (1923/1984, p. 381, italics and underlining are our added emphases) such that they manifest themselves in psychological representation. In the very next paper after *The Ego and the Id,* in the new collected volume of Freud's works, he commented that the two classes of instincts are not encountered in their pure form: they are not separate in individuals but occur as "mixtures" (1924/1984, p. 418).

As Figure 2.1 shows, the imagery of being able to become mixed lies in the perforated boundary between Eros and Thanatos and the ego. The ability to mix means that under normal conditions, where *Eros* emigrates, *Thanatos* immigrates (see Carr & Lapp, 2005b, March– April). In this way, *Eros* and *Thanatos* are embroiled in constant instinctual conflict to cancel each other's energies. Freud (1920/1984) referred to the achievement of a balanced mixture and tensionless state as "Nirvana" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988, pp. 272–273).

Freud (1920/1984, 1923/1984) noted a number of important manifestations in which, in these "mixtures", the death instinct, as a class of instincts, becomes expressed in psychological and behavioural terms. One example is the manner in which the death instinct pulls or retards the life instinct in all its guises. A second interrelated example is the manner in which repetitive compulsive behaviours appear to be aimed at producing a conservative effect on what otherwise might be the case if the life instinct were to exert its forms of expression. That is, both classes of instinct are associated with repetitive behaviour, but the death instinct uses repetition as an act aimed at retarding the expression of the life instinct. A third, but compound, example arises from the manner in which the ego is forced to compromise in terms of directing the demands of the id toward the ego-ideal and at the same time meeting the strictures and repressive psychodynamics placed upon it by the super-ego. Synchronistic failure causes the sacrifice of one to obtain another or the necessity to compromise, because the ego must give up part of one aspect to make gains, or at least, not experience wholesale losses, in others. Freud observed earlier in his work:

> Nevertheless, its orders cannot be obeyed at once... They are carried out bit by bit... Why this compromise by which the command of reality is carried out piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain in terms of economics. It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken as a matter of course by us. (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 253)

As we previously noted, compromise, in terms of the super-ego, generates moral anxiety or guilt that may appear to defy any logical explanation or basis. In extreme cases this guilt is manifested in the clinical appearance of neuroticism, and in the melancholic where the super-ego appears "as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 394). Further defensive action can result in destructive effects that may include over-idealisation and dependency, leading, for instance, to uncritical accommodation of dangerous, unacceptable macro-schema. In this way, the death instinct manifests itself initially, as an inwardly directed form of aggression or *masochism*. It attempts to force the ego to reconsider its ego-ideal, diminishing self-love and registering feelings of disappointment and depression (Lind, 1991) or low-level symptoms of "narcissistic rage" (Moore & Fine, 1990, p. 124).

This erosion of self-concept is further characterised by "a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-reviling, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment" (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 252). This process is *Thanatic:* it parallels the pull toward identity dissolution and fragmentation and exemplifies the death instinct's frustration of the life instinct in all its semblances. It is at this stage of the process that the fear of death becomes prevalent.

To defend against further dissolution, the ego turns on the super-ego and the outside world as a means to regain control or protect its ego-ideal or mental model. The death instinct then becomes embodied in *sadism*, a phenomenon in which love and hate are fused and primary *masochism* is outwardly directed (Freud, 1924/1984, pp. 425–426). These behaviours range from subliminal demonstrations of separation and avoidance to overt, aggressive physical acts, such as when narcissistic rage is transmuted into physical violence forced on others (Carr, 2003b).

A fourth example of a behavioural manifestation of the death instinct is where it becomes outwardly-directed and transposed in the form of seeking control over externality. As a control mechanism, the will to power was also noted as an outcome of the ego developing defences against the anxiety of actual death or dying. In this latter context people will develop and maintain illusions to control the environment. Such subliminated Thanatic behaviours can be cases of aggression on a sports playing field, as well as aspects of competitiveness in working relationships.

In these cases when Thanatos prevails, concern for self overrides concern for others: "the more [of] the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted" (Freud, 1914/1984, p. 68). Over time, if the ego is successful at separation from the ego-ideal but reattaches to similar but different aspects of the super-ego, the death instinct assumes the form of repetitive compulsion expressed as reiterations of masochism transposed into outwardly turned sadistic acts.

The case of the death instinct expressing itself as an instinct of destruction

Freud also viewed the death instinct as "expressing itself" as a significant "*instinct of destruction*" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 381). He was drawn to comment further about the death instinct expressing itself in the aggressive and destructive behaviour displayed in World War I.

In his volumes *Civilization and its discontents* (1930/1985) and *Why war?* (1933/1985), Freud expanded upon the relationship of his topographic of the psyche and the expression of the death instinct as an instinct of destruction. He argued that repression, in the form of the reality principle and in the prohibitive aspect of the super-ego, was a *necessary* form of social control to curb primitive sexual and aggressive or destructive impulses. Contrary to many simplified views on Freud's ideas about the liberation from inner repressive regimes, good mental health was not seen as the absence of repression, but rather "the maintenance of a modulated repression that allows gratification while at the same time preventing primitive sexual and aggressive impulses from taking over" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 19). It is the external world and culture, imprinted in the psyche that helps us save ourselves from the excesses of these primitive impulses.

Thus, it must be understood that the death instinct, like the life instinct, while seeking expression is subject to repressive psychodynamics that are culturally shaped. This particular line of argument, as we will note in a later chapter, was to become extremely important for some philosophical and cultural commentators who came after Freud and tried to understand how the psyche was subject to exploitative forms of manipulation.

In what we regard as a singularly excellent commentary that noted many of the contours of Freud's initial notion of the death instinct, Duncan Barford (1999) succinctly summarised Freud's intellectual journey when he said that it was "the compulsion to repeat... (that) put Freud on the trail of a category of instinct that seeks to return all things to the state before which they were alive. This is the death instinct proper – an inherited, genetic tendency within the animate to become inanimate once more" (p. 16). This intellectual journey was one that, as we noted earlier, many within the psychoanalytic community have either ignored or failed to develop further. A significant exception is the work of Melanie Klein. To further understand alternative *clinical* appraisals of the notion of a death instinct, it is to the work of Klein that we now direct our attention.

The notion of a death instinct: The Kleinian turn

Melanie Klein was a psychoanalyst who was born in Vienna in 1882 and died in 1960. Klein, along with Anna Freud, was a pioneer of child analysis in the psychoanalytic community. Klein's work (see for example

Klein, 1944, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d) was extremely influential in the foundation of what has become known as the object-relations school of psychoanalysis. While accepting much of the Freudian orthodoxy, Klein radically departed from it in relation to the assumption that instincts or drives were simply to 'function' as energy to be discharged in some manner. For Klein, a drive always presupposed an object. Freud, of course, also emphasised objects but moreso in the context of them being targets for the discharge of instincts. Klein, however, viewed the object in a much more interactive manner with the psyche such that objects and the fantasies and memories they trigger may, on the one hand, be a source of persecution or, on the other hand, reassurance.

Throughout Klein's collected works (see Klein, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d), her stated vision of human experience was based upon two primitive modes of relating to the world: one is an adoring, caring and loving mode; the other is characterised by destructiveness, envy, spite and hatred. In contrast to Freud, Klein argued that we are born with an ego: the ego is not a later outgrowth of the id but it is responsible for mediating the demands of the id with the outside environment. Freud did not abide the idea of an infant or child having any comprehension of death. However, Klein argued that the primitive developing ego struggles to deal with the ever-present anxiety that seems to come from the threat of fragmentation and disintegration. The fear of total disintegration is seen, synonymously, as a fear of death. Klein viewed the death and life instincts, or drives, as generating conflict that requires the initial defence mechanisms of splitting, projection and introjection. Subsequently the ego seeks to split off death and life drives and projects outward.

In what is a prototypical and figurative instance of object-relations, Klein explained this Manichaean world of the infant in terms of the importance of resolving the ambiguity and conflict posed by the mother's breast. The breast is a good object and bad object at one and the same time. Primal interpersonal relationships are based in paradox or mutual causalities. The infant *idealises* the 'good' breast and projects love onto it because through the transfer of milk (Suttie, 1935), it triggers feelings of contentment that are absorbed or introjected by the infant: these feelings represent the mother's reassurance, which is life sustaining. This 'good' object also confounds the infant because it inspires a degree of *envy* from the emphasis of the infant's need and dependence upon it. During unwanted disruptions of milk or separations from the breast, the infant experiences the good object as being outside its control, because the infant cannot have what it wants, when it wants it.

Because of the undeveloped ability to understand paradox, in the child's mind the breast has become simultaneously, a frustrating, terrifying, omnipotent 'bad' object that is perceived to have the persecutorial power to destroy both the infant and the 'good' object, causing separation anxiety or the feeling of isolation from the life force. This anxiety becomes acute; it threatens to transform isolation into total dissolution, which becomes synonymous with the fear of death. Part of the defence is somewhat schizoid to exaggerate the difference between good and bad objects such that they are more clearly defined. This is a process called *splitting*, and through it the child minimises conflict by attempting to maximise clarity. This early stage of development, characterised by fear and suspicion of the breast, Klein termed the *paranoid-schizoid position*, highlighting "the persecutory character of the anxiety and ... the schizoid nature of the mechanisms at work" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 298).

As early as the third month of life, the infant may come to the realisation that it both loves and hates the same breast, a situation that Klein referred to as the *depressive position*. The infant may, as another defence mechanism for this less developed ego, seek to deny [or as Freud (1940/1986) termed '*disavowal*'] the reality of the persecutory object. It is the good breast that becomes the core around which the ego seeks to develop as if it were the grain of sand that yields the pearl (see Klein, 1975c, pp. 178–180). The experience of envy of the good breast is, however, a potential source of interference in that process. While in normal development we pass through this phase, this primitive defence against anxiety (i.e., the paranoid-schizoid position) is a regressive reaction that, in the sense of always being available to us, is never transcended.[2]

Klein attributed greater significance to the first year of life than childhood as a whole; and the fantasies and feelings from these earlier experiences are considered highly significant in the manner in which we relate psychologically, to the objects that surround us. In this period of the early development of the infant, Klein viewed the death instinct, or drive, as a purely destructive force that induces anxiety about disintegration and imminent annihilation. In this formulation, envy becomes a major psychological expression of the death instinct. In an attempt to remove the cause of anxiety derived from the affective state of persecution, destructive urges such as hate and spite emanate from the id but are not wanted by the infant so they are projected and *contained* in the 'bad' object. In the paranoid-schizoid position, setting perceptual boundaries around the 'bad object' to prevent its escape

from the container, is meant to allow unfettered development of the 'good' object, which is supposed to emerge from the split as a place for refuge or a core for ego development. However, the death instinct is also embodied by envy, that is, the infant is envious of the mother's power to give and take the breast; to have something the infant does not. The feeling state of envy does not allow a nurturing yield to the split so the needed 'good' core cannot materialise because the infant perceives and introjects only 'bad breast' reminders. Klein in fact declared that of the seven 'deadly sins', envy is "unconsciously felt to be the greatest sin of all, because it spoils and harms the good object which is the source of life" (Klein, 1975c, p. 189). Envy is one of the death instinct's destructive impulses that seeks to eliminate the tension created by the split itself – eliminate the good object and one eliminates the discomfort of the tension. The problem is that, in the Kleinian rendering of human development, the aggressive impulses become one-way traffic in a manic defence in which the ego is deprived of the essential core for its development. Thus, envy poses a barrier to the integrative processes that are involved in the depressive position.

Ultimately, the purpose of the depressive position is to resolve conflict from losses of the loved object as the means to reintegrate both the infant and the mother in a reassuring interpersonal relationship:

> The mother-child relationship however (to the child's mind) is a true, balanced symbiosis; and the *need-to-give* is as vital, therefore, as the *need-to-get*. The feeling that our gifts (love) are not accepted is as intolerable as the feeling that others' gifts are no longer obtainable. Yet one or the other of these two feelings may dominate individual life. The former feeling (of unwantedness) plays a dominant part in anxiety and frustration symptoms, the latter likewise contributes to aggression. (Suttie, 1935, p. 40)

As we noted earlier, the experience of the mother-child relationship amounts to a prototypical and figurative instance of object-relations, and for instance, one might ask what happens to those who are not breast fed? Thus, the terminology being used is in relation to the actual experience of the mother-child relationship but can be read into other, early in life, loved object relationships.

The ego's determination to split off 'bad breast' reminders is analogous to allowing the death instinct to emanate from the id without counterbalance, reinforcing paranoid-schizoid behaviours. Residence in the paranoid-schizoid position activates excess protection of 'good

breast' reminders, which is accomplished by projecting or forcing aggressive impulses into and around others. The infant's use and abuse of the breast reflects feelings, which have been introjected from perceptions of the mother's persecutorial actions (Ogden, 1985; Winnicott, 1971). These feelings are then projected onto the representation of the breast or mother. The mother's non-acceptance of the infant's relationship with the breast is synonymous with rejecting the infant's desire to obtain and the need to give love. If this is the case, 'bad breast' memories outnumber and outweigh 'good breast' memories and the depressive position cannot be reached – *Eros* does not have the energy or strength to match that of *Thanatos*.

In the broadest possible conception, if Freud's view of the death instinct could be regarded as a drive discharge theory, Klein's version would be characterised as an anxiety theory: the fear of being separated from the loved object, the mother; and the fear of having given love rejected. It is in the attempt to escape the persecutory anxiety that is generated by the death instinct, Klein argued, that the primitive ego will seek to split off and project these impulses outside the self in an act that 'creates' the bad breast. The projection of these impulses outside the self provides one avenue of escape and in so doing:

> a relationship to the original bad object has been created from the destructive force of the death instinct for the purpose of containing the threats posed by that instinct. There is a malevolent breast trying to destroy me, and I am trying to escape from and also destroy that bad breast. (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 93)

Of course, as we have already noted, the immediate complication from the creation and attempted destruction of the bad breast is the subsequent realisation that the bad and good breast belong to an integrated object, the mother. In the sense of the depressive position that Klein came to describe, the infant experiences others as whole objects and anxiety is fuelled by concern for the impact of any aggressive action toward the loved whole object. Thus:

> The frustrating whole object who has been destroyed is also the loved object toward whom the child feels deep gratitude and concern. Out of that love and concern, *reparative fantasies* are generated, in a desperate effort to heal the damage, to make the mother whole once again. (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 95, italics is our added emphasis)

In any case, the result is the feeling of being separated from the life force and at the same time, being connected to the fear of identity degradations, annihilation or death:

> At the core of Kleinian theory, there is a potential for understanding and resignification of what counts as a psychic and social space where the subject may be able to live. The unending and never quite fully achieved task of integration, in the process of recomposing the subject and setting it free from excessive guilt, is both a personal and a social project. ... The dystopia at the center of the Kleinian account of the child's early aggressive relationship with the mother gives space for thought as to what taking an oppositional stance even to where we most intimately belong may mean. (Sanchez-Pardo, 2003, p. 150)

Adults are non-reflexive and unable to maintain a depressive position when they suffer degradations of self-concept in psychic and social space. As recollected from infanthood, perceptions of persecution may become such that other adults are experienced as only reminders of the 'bad breast' rather than as 'whole' individuals. 'Part individuals' derived from residence within the paranoid-schizoid position are prone to object use or abuse, which minimises cooperative consideration of others. While in normal development we build reflexivity and wisdom to pass through this phase, the paranoid-schizoid position is a constant threat because through memory and fantasy, it is always available to us and so can never be truly transcended in adulthood. The paranoid-schizoid position, that involves the psychodynamic processes of projection, projective identification and splitting, has been noted by many writers as significant, not only at the level of the individual, but also at the level of social movements and that of broader group dynamics. Carr (1997), for example, has noted these dynamics in a 'reading' of the aftermath of the Oklahoma bombing. Swogger (1994) noted the same psychodynamics in an appraisal of the environmental movement and argued:

> As pointed out by Horwitz (1983) and others, projective identification involves another step beyond blaming: inducing the target of the projection to experience the projected feelings. In face-to-face situations this may involve subtle nonverbal communication or various interpersonal ploys. In public situations, projective identification may involve forms of attack or accusation; legal, financial, or

> regulatory threats; or manipulation and exaggeration of guilt. ... Wholesale processes of projection and projective identification lead to 'splitting' at the social level: whole classes of people, groups, or organizations are condemned while others may be idealized. The world is composed of 'us' and 'them'. (p. 71)

In such social movements we may find that the leader/authority figure becomes idealised as, through the process of splitting, the group members collude in their fantasies and simultaneously individually and collectively deny 'bad' parts in themselves and their leader.

Inevitably we have started to stray into the arena of considering the manner in which the psychodynamic processes related to the death instinct are manifested at individual, group and organisational levels. By analysing the case of Devtek (Martin, 2003), it is at this point we consider the manner in which Freud's and Klein's perspectives on the death instinct have relevance to the field of organisational studies.

Organisational studies and Freudian and Kleinian conceptions of the death instinct

This book represents an initial attempt to *specifically* consider the death instinct and to at least acknowledge the concepts of mortality and death, and include them in the theorising about behaviour in organisations.

Inasmuch as organisations are occupied and controlled by human beings, theories about personality and human behaviour are relevant to the field of organisation studies. Theories and issues related to mortality and death would seem important for, as we previously noted in Chapter 1, mortality and death frame life itself. Although our awareness of this 'frame' may be hidden from our conscious, psychodynamic theory suggests it is a significant influence upon everyday human behaviour. Our unconscious motivation can be so strong that we may act in a manner unthinkable to the conscious, yet we remain unaware of the psychodynamics responsible for that behaviour.

Both Kleinian and Freudian perspectives of the death instinct add to our understanding of behaviour in organisations at both individual and collective levels. Separately, Freud and Klein in their different emphases do seem to call attention to different behaviours, yet there are instances where their theories seem to draw attention to the same behaviour. We consider it helpful to discuss the implications of their work under a series of headings.

Organisational control, boundary setting behaviour and ritualism

Freud's rendering of the death instinct emphasised the antagonistic quality of the life and death instincts and, as we noted, the manner in which they become "fused, blended and alloyed with each other" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 381); the death instinct seeks to impede life instincts. One of these conservative effects can be noted in the death instinct assuming the form of repetition compulsion:

> According to Martin (2003), Willem, the CEO of Devtek, restructured his company at least five times:
>
> 1. Devtek had started...organised by function (p. 61);
> 2. As Devtek grew...it established a new structure (p. 62);
> 3. As the firm expanded globally...Willem created a new organisation (p. 62);
> 4. Still dissatisfied, Willem created an overlay organisation (p. 63); and
> 5. There were too many fights for control... It was time to make a change. (p. 63)

In organisations, ritualised forms of control and rules and routines for behaviour are examples where meaning seems to have been inferred from what otherwise might be read as routine organisational behaviour. Therefore, the self-fulfilling prophecy has its roots in repetitive compulsion and the quest to maintain Nirvana. In the workplace, the creation of what one seeks to find (Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn, 2003) is the individual's Erostic binding to Thanatic introjection of blame and shame. For instance, in the vignette, Kenny used projective identification to blame Willem for not being able to win in Asia. Because Willem identified with being a great decision-maker and intuitive manager for Devtek, he also identified himself as being DevTek. Consequently, what Willem introjected was that because part of Devtek was losing, he himself was a loser, that created masochistic, inwardly turned aggression. Willem created the self-fulfilling prophecy that the entire organisation was losing; not just the Asian branch. The numerous restructurings became ritualistic activities because of the death instinct. Therefore, a negative self-fulfilling prophecy is a consequence of Thanatos working over Eros.

Yiannis Gabriel (1999), one of the few to link the death instinct with behaviour in organisations, insightfully captured this in his discussion of Gouldner's (1954) study of organisational dynamics in a gypsum mining company. Gabriel noted:

> Some of the time, employees observed these rules in a ritualistic, resigned manner; at other times, they disregarded them, even with the collusion of management. In other circumstances, they tested them and sought to redefine them. Bureaucratic rules make very different psychological demands from those made by moral laws. To the extent that they are observed, they amount to an acting out of a repetition of routinized behaviour, through which individuals achieve the safety of inertia (see Gouldner, 1954). The same compulsive adherence to routines of behaviour are the hallmark of the mindless administrator and the robotic factory-floor worker immortalized by Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times* (1936). In both cases, behaviour becomes depersonalized and uniform, devoid of meaning and life, an expression perhaps of the death instinct as a compulsion repetition. (Gabriel, 1999, p. 104)

Of course we recognise that rules and other forms of control seek to ritualise some behaviours and in so doing seek to conceal the reasons for such control. If we dare to think of self-responsibility and autonomy as expressions of the life instinct and the sources for pleasure and meaning in work, then rules and ritualised forms of control may represent expressions of the death instinct. This is a very different reading of the rules and forms of control in organisations to that in the mainstream literature of the field of organisation studies.

From a Kleinian perspective, the rules and hierarchies of relations are part of establishing some psychological boundaries and forms of protection against uncertainty and anxiety. As Gabriel and Carr (2002) noted, the problem with establishing such organisational or social defences is that the projections and introjections "seriously distort organisational rationality and task" (p. 356). Organisational and social defences are issues that are particularly apposite in a Kleinian view of the world, for it is the creation of such boundaries that facilitate the differentiation of self and other, helping to relieve the fear of engulfment by the other.

Secure psychological boundaries that act as lines of defences allow the individual to engage with others more confidently. The problem is:

> that in containing anxieties organisations often resort to dysfunctional routines which stunt creativity, block the expression of emotion or conflict, and, above all, undermine the organisation's rational and effective functioning. Just as individual defences immerse the

> individual in a world of neurotic make-belief detached from reality, so too do organisational defences immerse their members in collective delusions, in which they pursue chimerical projects or run blindly away from non-existent threats, while disregarding real problems and opportunities. Like the individual neurotic, the organisation may then find itself at the centre of a vicious circle. Just as a neurotic's personal self-delusions deepen the sufferings for which they ostensibly offer consolation, likewise corporate delusions merely re-inforce the malaise of the organisation. (Gabriel & Carr, 2002, p. 357)

Clearly, the management of psychological boundaries and anxiety are matters to which the field of organisation studies needs to devote considerable attention, whether through the optic of Freud's theory of the death instinct or that of Klein.

The fantasy of control, leader behaviour and organisational culture

Freud's view of the death instinct also raised the issue of seeking control over externality, and the development of the *fantasy* of control over the environment. The difference between fantasy and reality can all too soon become blurred leading to *delusion*. In the organisations we all know, and in theorising about them, one might be prompted to consider the degree to which we feel it necessary to 'feed' this fantasy of control.

In all five of Devtek's restructurings, it was Willem, himself, who spearheaded the changes. The death instinct manifests itself here in high levels of centralisation and specialisation as little or no participation from his managers was used to effect the changes: "Willem worked with organisational design experts within Devtek and from outside to redesign the structure" (Martin, 2003, p. 63). Willem reinforced the ritual of authoritarian management because he allowed Thanatos to impact self-leadership. The irony is that Willem's "single point accountability" (Martin, 2003, p. 63; see also p. 65) ended up creating more stress for him as by not delegating and instead, exerting a will to power, his Erostic behaviours brought on Thanatic behaviours from his staff: "It was this new overlay structure that set Kenny off" (Martin, 2003, p. 63). Alone and unwittingly, Willem became the single point of accountability.

Certainly strategic management tools and some theorists within the field of organisation studies appear to promote the notion that organisation dynamics can be managed as though they are a science and technical challenge (Porter, 1980). Scientific management fuelled such an orientation and ushered in the paradigm of the natural sciences. But, we wonder if many of our MBA and other management education

programmes feed off and into this fantasy to the extent that one is deluded about the degree of control and predictability that can be expected in this foreign creature called an organisation?

Freud noted that the death instinct can be inwardly-directed as self-destructive behaviour.

> Willem was a CEO both quick and skilful at decision-making, an intuitive manager. Kenny, his favorite regional president, was on the line complaining about how the organisational structure of the firm, DevTek, impeded his ability to manage his business and win in Asia. (Martin, 2003, p. 61)

Willem's inability to have his company win in all areas, is as Freud stated, a subliminated aspect of the death instinct that manifests itself as competition. The inability to win with and *for* his favourite employee, Kenny, is inwardly turned aggression, masochism, in the form of guilt. The guilt needed to be projected, and so the sadistic external response was restructuring.

Obsessional neurosis and masochistic behaviours are some of the clinical outcomes that one sees on display and played out by some leaders in organisations. Leader behaviour in such instances is heavily wed to ritual, and obsessional tendencies lead to distrust. One could observe the leader wishing to rely upon procedures and direct supervision rather than trusting the good sense and talents of subordinates.


After the fifth restructuring in DevTek, it: "seemed such a sham that everyone began to question the design team's sincerity" (Martin, 2003, p. 63). This goes precisely to the root of effective leadership that is trust – not of the design team but of Willem who symbolised the design team. The disgruntled managers not only projected but used projective identification that Willem introjected: "When Willem heard the feedback, he became more frustrated than ever" (Martin, 2003, p. 65). Due to the manifestation of Thanatos as negative projective identification, psychological confidence of the Devtek group as a whole was shaken as was its leader, Willem.

The irony is that a leader engaging in self-destructive behaviour in an organisation suppresses the Eros of others and certainly stifles initiatives for change. Often the organisation, or sections of it, becomes a silo. Our *mainstream* discourse in organisation studies has witnessed some accounts of leaders' psychopathologies becoming projected into and taking hold in organisation cultures (e.g. Kets de Vries, 1991, 1993). The work on the death instinct reinforces the need to analyse organisation culture in such a manner.

Intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict in organisations

Figure 2.2 below shows the formation of the depressive position. Both Willem's and Kenny's external worlds are represented as experiences. In turn, each set of experiences is an *experiential line* unique to each individual. Where the experiential lines connect is where Willem's and Kenny's perceptions of DevTek converge and there emerges the parts of the ego-ideal they both share. Simultaneously, the experiential lines also connect Willem's and Kenny's super-egos, including the privilege granting and prohibiting aspects of their external worlds as they have experienced them. In this way experiences are also able to repress appropriately, excessive emissions of their own and each other's Eros and Thanatos.

Figure 2.2 Depressive positions and shared ego-ideal: High-level compromise



Source: Adapted from Ruble & Thomas, 1976.

Figure 2.2 also shows that when individuals reside in the depressive position, they are able to manage intrapersonal conflict because they are able to work with uncertainty, ambiguity, and ambivalence; or they are able to work in 'grey' areas. So, they also understand aspects of each identity, including each ego-ideal, are both 'good' and 'bad'. And, while residing in the depressive position, Willem's and Kenny's

super-egos are connected because, as far as DevTek is concerned, they share the same ego-ideal.


Figure 2.2 also illustrates that as far as their experiences with each other are concerned Willem and Kenny are also more likely to use 'appropriate' forms of interpersonal conflict resolution because, within the context of DevTek, they share the same meaning of 'appropriateness'. During these times, they maintain depressive positions because they do not resort to *extremes* of forcing, avoiding and accommodating that would be manifested from residence in the paranoid-schizoid position. And they trust each other not to move toward these extremes.

Figure 2.2 depicts Willem's and Kenny's conflict resolution process, when they were in a copasetic relationship that is both an affect and effect of the depressive position. As far as DevTek is concerned, their identities are interrelated but still in tact. This means they share similar values and goals and there is conferment of self-concept between them. Conflict resolution is a balance of 'good' and 'bad' and is tempered with appropriate amounts of assertiveness, cooperation, and concern for self and other. In Figure 2.2, they work in an area of high-level compromise with appropriate amounts of Eros and Thanatos being expressed.

From the Freudian perspective, the death instinct emerges in destructive behaviours when the individual cannot simultaneously resolve conflict between what will serve self-interest and what will serve others' interests. Unwanted change increases ambiguity and ambivalence to intolerable degrees. Such change in one's external world affects and effects experiential line changes in self and other that disrupts the constancy of the depressive positions. Failure to synchronise the resolution of conflicting ego-ideals causes the sacrifice of one to obtain the other, or, the necessity to compromise, because the ego must give up part of one aspect of the ego-ideal to make gains, or at least not experience wholesale losses, in others. The ego's inability to manage losses of the ego-ideal occurs because of the *expectation or predicted experience of giving up something valuable without the prospect of achieving equitable return*. The consequence is a continual rebalancing of equity for the purpose of reconstituting the ego-ideal and the ego. When this occurs at the expense of the other such that the ends are to justify the means, the Thanatic process of low-level compromise is achieved (Carr & Lapp, 2005b).

Below, Figure 2.3 depicts the affects and effects of such inappropriate conflict resolution. Through the defence of the paranoid-schizoid position, Thanatic experience becomes less inhibited or uninhibited,

Figure 2.3 Paranoid-schizoid split of shared ego-ideal: The beginnings of low-level compromise




Source: Adapted from Ruble & Thomas, 1976.

flooding the ego with unwanted memories and fears of persecution that were once repressed in the id by self and other's experiential lines. When the ego is threatened by changes to the ego-ideal, the parallel is a pull toward identity dissolution and fragmentation that exemplifies the death instinct's frustration of the life instinct in all its semblances (Carr, 2003a, 2003b).

When Kenny yelled his dissatisfaction at Willem, Willem perceived Kenny's conflict resolution style to shift to the left and up and toward forcing or an authoritarian management style. Kenny perceives Willem to be all bad or at least that is what Willem perceives. Willem shifts to the right and down toward accommodation to protect the libidinal position of winning with and for Kenny. The individual who introjects an other's projective introjective identification resolves conflict through accommodation because of feeling forced to feel guilt and shame, from the willingness to be blamed that are all Thanatic.

Now firmly in the paranoid-schizoid position, as is seen below in Figure 2.4, Kenny perceives Willem to be all 'bad' that induces Willem to perceive himself as all 'bad'. In Willem's delicate state, he perceives

Figure 2.4 Formation of the Thanatic triangle



Source: Adapted from Ruble & Thomas, 1976.

Kenny to be all "good". Therefore, Willem believes he must react to or accommodate Kenny's lead. *Whoever introjects Thanatic projective identification becomes a follower.*

Accommodation is a form of masochism that, as we have already seen, turns into sadism that in this case was manifested as Willem's restructuring without the consultation of key organisational members. Consequently, another manifestation of the death instinct is reaction, jumping to conclusions, or ready, fire, aim – in which *both* Kenny and Willem participated.

From the death instinct then comes what is now classified as the fundamental attribution error and the self-serving bias (Schermerhorn et al., 2003). Willem's stressed psyche compromised situational factors in favour of heightening awareness of Kenny's distress. Had Willem been more reflexive he might have talked longer with Kenny to determine whether or not other factors were also at work. These are shown as Willem's less Thanatic or even Erostic alternatives of remaining in a depressive position and staying in the middle of forcing, avoiding and accommodation as was shown previously in Figure 2.2. Or, as is depicted in Figure 2.4, Willem could have effected the options of a)


moving downward toward avoiding until Kenny 'cooled-off' and was ready to discuss the situation; or b) moving right and up toward assertive accommodation that for example, would be having Kenny not only discuss the situation but also contribute to the decision-making.

In both of these situations, Willem may have found that Kenny's self-leadership was threatened. Now residing in Asia, and being split away from the parent organisation, Kenny could be feeling persecutorial aspects of being isolated. Further, because Willem did not consult one of his 'favourite' employees about the restructuring in the first place, Kenny was in fact isolated from critical decision-making processes, in which at one time he was likely to be deeply involved. By no longer having Willem and DevTek at his side, Kenny was separated from his ego-ideal and felt persecuted. Consequently, Kenny's Thanatic energy was focussed in denying his own contributions to the situation or enacting the self-serving bias. In fact, it has been shown that in the organisational hierarchy: a) blame for failure tends to be assigned to those higher in the organisation; b) success credit is non-differentiable between those higher and lower in the organisation; but, c) when credit is doled, those lower in the organisation are more likely to receive credit than blame for failures (Gibson & Schroeder, 2003).

Willem used the perceptual shortcut of the fundamental attribution error by not considering all situational factors that contributed to Kenny's psychological predicament of not being able to control his own conversion of masochistic shame into a sadistic outburst toward Willem. Lack of support has been found to be the most critical attribution error *on the side of management* (Schermerhorn et al., 2003, p. 96). That is, employees believed managers' lack of performance was synonymous with not providing employees with the support they needed to do their jobs (Schermerhorn et al., 2003, p. 96). On the other hand, managers believed employees do not perform because of other reasons; this being due mainly, to a lack of effort. While Willem's perception of Kenny's outburst had little to do with Kenny's effort, it should have but in deference to Kenny's lack of self-leadership. In the absence of suitable reflexivity, Willem chose accommodation. Thus, in this situation, it is Kenny's Thanatic triangle that dominates.

Since Kenny's ego was not able to manage conflicts in that part of the ego-ideal that was once shared with Willem. Figure 2.5 below illustrates that Kenny's paranoid-schizoid split and the resulting impacts on his ego begin decursive movement around his Thanatic triangle. The projective identification Kenny used was successful at having Willem employ introjective identification.

Figure 2.5 Repetition compulsion: Decursive movement around the Thanatic triangle



Source: Adapted from Ruble & Thomas, 1976.

Each disjunction between Willem's and Kenny's super-egos results in projection and introjection of 'bad' aspects. The results of the splitting defence erode self-esteem and self-efficacy. Willem's defence of introjection of blame and guilt was to split off and project those 'bad' aspects but in new forms of sadism. One of these was manifested by Willem's refusal to spend time in discussion with Kenny; not only to discover the real issues of his problem but also to have Kenny contribute to generation of solutions. Further destruction in the form of learned-helplessness also includes over-idealisation and dependency leading, for instance, to an external locus of control and uncritical accommodation of dangerous, unacceptable macro-schema, such as that related to the toxic manager (Carr & Downs, 2004; Lubit, 2004).

Starting with Kenny, Willem's staff had developed an external loci of control – Willem was to fix all problems, managers' roles were to

> complain without providing solutions: "At first the change was greeted with enthusiasm, especially for the promise of simplification and single point accountability...they quickly became confused and then angry" (Martin, 2003, p. 64).

Klein's work similarly draws our attention to the manner in which the anxiety generated in conflict situations may trigger the regressive behaviour of splitting the world into good and bad objects. In extreme cases it has been noted that individuals and groups enact a form of primitive aggression toward 'bad' (the 'other') objects such that it becomes a "hunger" that takes the form of a fantasy to devour the 'other' who was seen as threatening or persecutory (see Guntrip, 1969, pp. 25–31). The schizoid defence renders the 'us' and 'them' mentality and relations with others become polarised. Actions become misread and minor deficiencies in others become magnified as problem behaviour. Suspiciousness and a guardedness are also engendered and, in some circumstances, can be accompanied by envy. Understanding this realm of psychodynamic processes is one that is capable of engendering a positive contribution to those probing conflict situations in organisations. For example, as has been noted elsewhere (see Carr, 1997), recognising such processes would alert us to how a situation may become polarised and distortions created that may not only inhibit dialogue, but create an environment in which legitimate questions and issues go unaddressed and judgements become impaired. Similarly, such an understanding might alert us to the inclination to idealise leaders that not only carries a set of unreal expectations of them, but, simultaneously, alerts us to the manner in which we seem to relieve ourselves of a responsibility to reflect and consider issues on their merits. It has also been argued that understanding these dynamics might also make us wary of the way language and processes can be used to manipulate interests (see Carr & Zanetti, 1997, 2001), and, in particular, the way in which *guilt* can be unfairly induced in others.

Klein's work draws attention to the manner in which the schizoid defence of splitting leads to conflict situations potentially becoming polarised. If selected choices from splitting prove to be incorrect and ineffectively applied, the severity of the problem increases and cooperativeness and concern for individuals decrease. Consequently, future attempts to resolve the situation will require even more assertiveness, which in turn, may lead to outwardly directed aggression that Freud also highlighted.

Over time, the inability to make gains from low-level compromise pushes the conflict relationship toward iterations of accommodation and avoidance or fleeing (Clarke, 2001) where all parties' interests including those related to task are neglected, especially in response to authoritarian leadership (Grover, 1993; Smith, 1997; Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart & De Cremer, 2003). The death instinct manifests itself through avoidance of conflict by blaming, lying, and misreporting organisational facts (Gibson & Schroeder, 2003; Waung & Highhouse, 1997). Low-level compromise – forcer – accommodator – avoider – conflict resolution relationships are indicative of Freud's take on the death instinct and its embodiment in the repetition compulsion, or circling the *Thanatic Triangle,* which leads of course, to the slow death of relationships but keeps the problem alive (Quinn, 1996).

Figure 2.5 also demonstrates how projection and introjection that are generated and propagated by the death instinct, turned a once libidinal relationship between a CEO and his organisation and favourite manager into a perception where the leader is strictly an authoritarian.

Willem and Kenny's relationship was once based in high-level compromise. However, Kenny's projective identification of fears of not winning in Asia were introjected by Willem. We agree with Xavier and Ramachander's (2000) belief that competition kills an internal loci of control for three reasons: a) competition is a subliminal outcropping of Thanatos; b) in combination with the Thanatic Triangle, competition eliminates time necessary for adequate reflexivity; and, c) inadequate reflexivity leads to unfounded beliefs of inequity. Because competition requires comparison between subject and object, inequity is the foundation upon which feelings of winning and losing are based. In terms of compromise, the death instinct can only achieve part-compromise that is short-term intrapersonal change and short-term interpersonal conflict resolution (Carr & Lapp, 2006d).

In turn the death instinct manifested itself in Willem as masochism that he accommodated by coming to his company's rescue to provide a solution. Out of blame, guilt, and shame for not maintaining the trait of skilled decision-maker his reaction was, to project these unwanted persecutorial feelings in the form of restructuring that was a sadistic response – especially when it seems unlikely that he used employee participation to help with decision-making.

This was introjected by DevTek managers – other leaders with the power to project until the entire company perceived and projected Willem to be an enforcer. Employees felt their leader perceived them to be avoiders. This is the interrelational fuelling of the self-fulfilling

prophecy that is based in projective identification and continual circling of the Thanatic triangle. Studies completed by Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans (1995) and Euwema, Van de Vliert, and Bakker (2003) show that during the same situation, there is evidence of conglomerate behaviour or "*multiple* modes of conflict behaviour" (p. 120). What is more important is that "compromising did not uniquely contribute to relational outcomes" (Euwema et al., 2003, p. 135). "It is the pattern of conflict management styles, its overall shape, and the relationship between the styles that mark the differences with respect to effectiveness, not the extent to which each one of the styles is present" (Munduate, Ganaza, Piero & Euwema, 1999, p. 18). Fundamentally, this means that with integration Freud's and Klein's views on the death instinct, compromise is a combination of behaviours that is forcing, accommodating, and avoiding or low-level compromise that is the Thanatic triangle. This also means that this Thanatic triangle may have actually developed long before Willem's most recent restructuring.

> He issued a flame mail to the entire organisation to tell them they had to forget the past and embrace the new simplified organisation.... There weren't many volunteers brave enough to come forward. (Martin, 2003, p. 65)

When *the rules* change too rapidly, when they are not clearly understood, and when the outcomes are perceived to result as reminders of persecution, self-efficacy is minimised. Expectancy theory reminds us that this affects motivation (Vroom, 1964). The outcome is change that results in regression to the mean, to the state of zero energy such as when *Thanatos* cancels the energy of *Eros*. If motivation to participate in future change is zero then, the expectancy that future change will be successful is also zero.

Klein's assessment of the death instinct also suggests that those who regress to the primitive defence of the paranoid-schizoid position may come to realise that the fate of the 'bad' object might in some manner be tied to that of the 'good' object. In these cases, working through the depressive position would infer some *reparative activity* and may come with some inner feelings of shame in relation to past actions. Kenny's upward feedback may have triggered Willem's memories and feelings of inadequacy in previous restructurings:

> managers who are high performers and have high self-efficacy will continue to increase their performance over time by interpreting

> [upward] feedback effectively, whereas managers with low self-efficacy ineffectively use this information. (Heslin & Latham, 2004, p. 31; see also Brown, Ganesan & Challagalla, 2001)

In the organisation context one might observe preferential behaviour towards others in a manner that may seem to defy ordinary logic or a logic based upon straightforward merit considerations. Part-compromise relates highly to equity theory (Adams, 1965). "*Felt positive inequity* exists when an individual feels that he or she has received relatively more than others have" (Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn, 2003, p. 115). Willem can be attempting to restore inequities but with the death instinct, other perceptual shortcuts such as the halo effect might be in play. Kenny seems to be all 'good' that is a form of changing inequity comparison points. There is also evidence that to re-establish equity, Willem has changed inputs and outputs – but not those of his employees as equity theory suggests (Adams, 1965). This is perhaps why Willem and Kenny's relationship was a libidinal tie in the first place – because Willem was feeling guilty about sending one of his best people away. With Thanatic influence of guilt and shame, this means Willem is doing more; compromising more time and effort than at least Kenny and perhaps other employees that led to Willem's sadistic closing comments. Employees who expect inequity, will experience Thanatic feelings of promise breaking that create perceptions of untrustworthiness and diminished "behavioural integrity" (Simons, 2002, p. 20).

Close relationships

One's ability to maintain close relationships minimises death-fear anxiety surrounding that relationship and this is precisely what Mikulincer, Florian, and Hirschberger (2003) found in their study. Many organisational behaviour, management researchers and authors continue to teach that participative management in change processes requires employee involvement so as to minimise resistance to change (Ancona et al., 2005; Daft, 2001; Dessler, Starke & Cyr, 2001; Drafke & Kossen, 2002; Francesco & Gold, 2005; Goltz & Hietapelto, 2002; Lichtenstein, 1997; Schermerhorn et al., 2003; Schneider & Barsoux, 2003; de la Torre, Doz & Devinney, 2001). Employee involvement is instrumental in effecting organisational change: "... employees are also capable of modifying their working world so that they can express some of their frustrations, decrease them, or partially avoid them" (Argyris, 1964, p. 59). Implementation of employee decision-making is an essential component of buffering the individual from feelings of *too much* or

total identity dissolution, which trigger reminders of mortality, and leads to harmful defensive reactions (Becker, 1973/1997; Carr, 2003a, 2003b; Freud, 1920/1984, 1923/1984; Solomon et al., 1998; Webb, 1998). By risking identity dissolution, employee participation reinforces attachment to the organisation: "...they increase their risks as the adaptive activities become more antagonistic" (Argyris, 1964, p. 59). The more risks are taken, the more individuals require support from close relationships "... as an additional death-anxiety buffering mechanism" (Mikulincer et al., 2003).

> When Willem's savvy secretary read the e-mail; she knew she would not have to set aside much time for meetings on the subject. And she was right. There weren't many volunteers brave enough to come forward and challenge the new structure. (Martin, 2003, p. 65)

It is no wonder that leaders' non-commitment translates into non-support (Livingston, 2003; Sull, 2003). Low-level compromise is based on using the wrong conflict resolution styles for the wrong reasons. Consequently, low-level compromise results only in short-term resolution. As a matter of fact, as long as one starts looking in the middle rather than the true origins of intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict, one never knows exactly where it begins. Therefore, conflict is never wholly satisfied for long or in a manner that maintains self and other esteem – low-level compromise is only part-compromise. On the other hand, decursive movement generated by purely Thanatic motivations always has the same ending – eventually people and their organisation fall off the conflict resolution map into the terrain of chaotic isolation or engulfment.

Summary

The importance of the synthesis of Freud's and Klein's works is that they both viewed the death instinct as purely an instinct of destruction. Consequently, Thanatos itself had no 'good' within it. It is because of this reason that people have such an aversion to Thanatos and its related death-fear anxiety that brings only pain without gain. In this sense, intrapersonal and dyadic interpersonal conflicts are part-compromises because there are mutual exchanges between leader and followers but they are perceived to be inequitable, persecutorial, and therefore, do not lead to meaningful change or transformation. The death instinct in intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict resolution

highly relates to transactional leadership that "involves leader-follower exchanges necessary for achieving *routine* performance agreed upon between leaders and followers" (Schermerhorn et al., 2003, p. 301). Thanatos in partnership with transactional leadership is a decursive process that results in management-follower relationships; not leader-follower relationships. Most important, part-compromise is the Thanatic result of minimised self-leadership without which, other-leadership is perilous for both leader and followers.

Having now detailed the work of Freud and Klein in relation to a death instinct and the manner in which their work has relevance to our understanding of leadership and organisation behaviour, the chapter that follows details some of the work of Sabina Spielrein. She presented a 'slightly' different rendering of a death instinct, and as we previously noted, that pre-dates the work of Freud on the topic and has a number of other implications for our understanding of leadership and transformation in organisational studies.

3

Expanding on the Death Instinct: Sabina Spielrein and Destructive Reconstruction

In Chapter 2 we noted that both Freud and Klein viewed Thanatos as purely an instinct of destruction. Certainly, this can be the case when Eros is repressed to the extent that it cannot and never arises to match and therefore, balance Thanatic energy. Such is the case of repetitive compulsion to travel round and round the Thanatic triangle that is only part-compromise and temporary conflict resolution at best.

In this chapter we explore the paradox of the requirement for death without which, our organisations and perhaps even our selves would die. That is, we now turn to the work of Sabina Spielrein who believed that compromise is required not only to be proactive in meeting change but also to enact creativity in the endeavour for positive transformation. Yet, creativity can cause interpersonal conflict when others do not want and or are not ready to change. In this chapter, we look at leadership for the creativity of 'new' people in 'old' organisations.

In the previous chapter we noted that the use of the term "death instinct" in psychodynamics is often associated with the work of Freud, but his work on this topic was pre-dated by that of Sabina Spielrein, Theodor Reik and Wilhelm Stekel. While Spielrein appears to have introduced the phrase "death instinct" to psychodynamics, it was used more in passing and certainly not in the same manner as Freud came to use of the phrase. The neglect of the work and influence of Spielrein is partly understandable when one considers that Freud himself only mentions her work three times, all by way of 'minor' footnotes (see Freud, 1900/1986, p. 210, footnote 2 [added 1914 in relation to children and their dreams]; Freud, 1913/1986, p. 50, footnote 1 [on myths and fairy tales in dreams]; Freud, 1920/1984, p. 328, footnote 2 [this footnote is the only citation to her work explicitly in relation to

Pracademic reflections on Eros and Thanatos working in organisations:

Look out! There are Erostic people in your organisation!

W. Kirk, a Protestant clergyman, held radical views on the nature of the Deity, the efficacy of the sacraments, the second coming of Christ, and life after death – views sharply opposed to the official doctrines of his sect. Technically, then, Kirk was incompetent to give his parishioners the spiritual guidance they expected. He received no promotion, of course; nevertheless he retained his post for several years. Then he wrote a book which condemned the stodgy church hierarchy and propounded a reasoned argument favoring taxation of all churches.... and [then] was promptly dismissed. (Peter & Hull, 1969, p. 48)

Probationer-teacher C. Cleary's first teaching assignment was to a special class of retarded children. Although he had been warned that these children would not accomplish very much, he proceeded to teach them all he could. By the end of the year, many of Cleary's retarded children scored better on standardized achievement tests of reading and arithmetic than did children in regular classes.

When Cleary received his dismissal notice he was told that he had grossly neglected the bead stringing, sandbox, and other busywork which were the things that retarded children should do. He had failed to make adequate use of the modeling clay, pegboards and finger paints specially provided by the Excelsior City Special Education Department. (Peter & Hull, 1969, pp. 44–45)

the death instinct]). There were also few citations to her work in the psychodynamic community until more recent times. And, even though Jung (1912/1916, 1912/1956) himself stated it was Spielrein who originated the term, it was not until the publication of the *Freud/Jung letters* in 1974 (McGuire, 1974/1991), that we get a glimpse of her significance to psychodynamic theory. Many documents related to her life, work and relationship with Jung and Freud, were only recently discovered and have led to scholarly tomes from Aldo Carotenuto (1980/1982) and John Kerr (1994) and a film directed by Elisabeth Márton (2002).

Spielrein: The Jung-Freud machinations

The aforementioned documents, and the works of Carotenuto and Kerr, told us that Spielrein was born into a Russian Jewish family on 7 November 1885 in Rostov-on-Don. Her mother was a university graduate and her father, a businessman. In August 1904, she was admitted as a patient to the Burghölzli Hospital in Zurich – a psychiatric hospital. At this hospital she became *Carl Jung's* first analytic case. Jung diagnosed her illness as hysterical psychosis. Spielrein was discharged from this hospital in June 1905, but continued analysis with Jung. She also enrolled in the medical school at the University of Zürich. Jung and Spielrein had a 'romantic' involvement during 1908 and into 1909. It was Jung who broke off the relationship, ostensibly because Spielrein had declared to Jung that she wanted his child. Jung and Spielrein had both advised Sigmund Freud of their relationship. Jung, at this time, was a disciple of Freud's and was seen as Freud's anointed successor to lead the psychoanalytic community. The 'inappropriateness' of the affair between Jung and Spielrein is speculated as being one of many compounding reasons for the professional and personal split between Jung and Freud in 1913.

After graduating from medical school in 1911, Spielrein moved to Vienna and joined Freud's psychoanalytic group. Spielrein married a Russian Jewish doctor, Pawel Scheftel, in 1912. In 1913 they had a daughter named Renata and in 1925, another daughter they named Eva. After spending time in Germany and Geneva, Spielrein returned to Russia in 1923 and taught at the North Caucasus University, Rostov-on-Don. Her husband had suffered from a progressive disease that, reputedly, drove him insane and eventually resulted in his death in 1938. In 1941 Spielrein, along with her daughters and a group of other Jews, were herded into a synagogue and shot by German troops who were occupying Rostov at that time. Apart from her influence on the work of Jung and Freud, in her lifetime she also influenced many other prominent social scientists including; Jean Piaget, who "underwent didactic analysis with her" (McGuire, 1974/1991, p. 150; Vidal, 2001; Wehr, 2001, p. 141); Alexander Luria and Lev Vygotsky.[3]

Spielrein: The death instinct and Wagnerian love

In what is described as a "pioneering" paper (Gay, 1988, p. 396), entitled *"Destruction as the cause of coming into being"*, Spielrein indicated she was puzzled by the question: "Why does this most powerful drive, the reproductive instinct, harbour negative feelings in addition to the

inherently anticipated positive feelings?" (1912/1994, p. 155). Spielrein had previously presented this question in 1911 to one of the regular Wednesday-night meetings of physician-students and psychoanalysts held at Freud's home – meetings that had been held as early as 1902 and was variously described as the "Wednesday Psychological Society" or the "Psychological Wednesday Society" or simply the "Wednesday Society" that in April 1908 was renamed the *Vienna Psychoanalytic Society* (see Breger, 2000, p. 179; Brome, 1984, p. 65; Freud, Freud & Grubrich-Simitis, 1978/1998; Gay, 1988, p. 177; Molnar, 1992, p. 117; Newton, 1995, p. 244). This was a Society in which she became the only woman member following resignation of the first woman member, Margarethe Hilferding. Hilferding resigned after a protracted dispute with another member, Alfred Adler. Spielrein's election to membership of the Society actually occurred coincidently on the same day as Hilferding submitted her resignation, the 11th October 1911.

At this presentation of her 'destruction' paper, Theodor Reik, who had two weeks earlier presented a paper "On death and sexuality", was reported to have commented "on the fusion of Eros and Thanatos" (Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, p. 216; Brabant, Falzeder & Giampieri-Deutsch, 1993, p. 311).

Spielrein, along with her contemporary psychoanalytic colleague Wilhelm Stekel (1909, 1911), noted that sexual wishes that appeared in dreams, myths and stories were often associated with images of death. In an entry into her diary, Spielrein (1906–7/2001) noted "*apparent contradictions in sexual life* ... because associations to death are sexual associations" (p. 159). She discussed the notion of a "sexual complex" in which an "instinct ... of death" – "the destructive instinct" is involved; along with the idea of "the transformation instinct which every isolated complex possesses!" (1906–7/2001, pp. 160–161). In her 'Destruction paper', Spielrein cited the following passage from Stekel on interpreting dreams:

> Just as the dream generally is unaware of denial, it also does not recognize denial of life. Death in a dream denotes as much as life and even the most intense of life's pleasures may express itself in a wish for death. A similar psychological viewpoint is also valid for suicide. Specific erotic fantasies even influence the choice in the manner of death. Poets had repeatedly discussed such ideas and philosophers often have illuminated the relationship between Eros and Thanatos. As in life, murder in a dream is often sexual and represents an extreme sadistically tinged sexual act. (Stekel, 1909, cited in Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 165)

In a footnote, Spielrein also discussed a work of Stekel's (1911) that, at the time of her writing, had yet to be published:

> In his work, the author (Stekel) shows, through numerous dreams that we have a wish to die associated with a wish to live. He perceives the former as the antithesis to the wish to live that lies within the essence of the sexual instinct. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, footnote 1, p. 184)

One can note here that Stekel referred to the wish for death as *Thanatos* and its relationship to Eros that was later contemplated by Freud. Indeed, as an important contextual issue, Stekel, in his autobiography, later charged Freud with adopting:

> some of my discoveries without mentioning my name. ... I had defined anxiety as the reaction of the *life instinct* against the upsurge of the *death instinct* (which is) not mentioned in his later books, and many people believe that the death instinct is Freud's discovery. (Stekel, 1938–1940/1950, p. 138; see also Stekel, 1930, p. 25 and footnote 6)

Stekel had been a member of the *Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society* and was a co-editor of the journal *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse* (trans. the *Central Journal for Psycho-Analysis*). It was a dispute with Freud that was related to the editorship of this journal that saw Stekel 'leave' the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, in November 1912, and 'enjoy' the wrath of Freud who voiced his disgust with Stekel's "personal qualities – usually described as character and behavior – which made collaboration with you impossible" (Freud, 1960/1992, p. 348).[4]

It was against this backdrop of what became some very divisive tension in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, that Spielrein contemplated her aforementioned, puzzling question. In her paper she commenced the expression of her thoughts with a summary of what she took to be "biological facts" and then specifically linked that summary with an argument about "destructive-reconstruction events". She argued that at conception:

> The male component merges with the female component that becomes reorganized and assumes a new form mediated by the unfamiliar intruder. An alteration comes over the whole organism; destruction and reconstruction, which under usual circumstances

> always accompany each other, occur rapidly. ... The joyful feeling of coming into being that is present within the reproductive drive is accompanied by a feeling of resistance, of anxiety of disgust. ... this (latter) feeling directly corresponds to the destructive component of the sexual instinct. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 157)

Paraphrasing a colloquial observation, the death of the chrysalides is necessary to give new life in the form of a butterfly. Spielrein's *emphasis* may not have been on death *per se*, but it did strongly implicate the essentialness of the destructive/dissolution component within the sexual instinct in the service of allowing the emergence of something new. Spielrein thought that the destructive component of the sexual instinct was in fact "an expression of a sexual wish for dissolution" (Kerr, 1994, p. 300). For Spielrein, the requirement for death in life is to say, potentially – *the aim of all death is life*. In making this argument, Spielrein had in mind the work of Élie Metchnikoff, an expatriate Russian who became head of the Pasteur Institute in Paris and was a Nobel Prize winner in 1908. Metchnikoff, in his 1903 book *The Nature of Man*, had suggested that there may indeed be a natural desire to die which becomes most evident in later life. However, in contrast to Metchnikoff, rather than being separate from a 'life' (sexual) instinct, Spielrein came to the conclusion that thoughts about death and destruction were an ever-present component in the sexual instinct itself: "the reproductive drive also consists psychologically of two antagonistic components, a destructive drive as well as a drive for coming into being" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 184). Moreover, Spielrein viewed this destructiveness as not simply fueled by, or an act of, hatred, but may be a necessary requirement to allow the emergence of something new. "Close to our desire to maintain our present condition, there lies a desire for transformation" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 163).

Drawing upon mythology, Spielrein found further illustrations of how destruction is a cause of "coming into being". Spielrein bridged the gap between the psychological and the mythological spheres through what might be taken as Wagnerian love, where the act of procreation requires self-destruction (see Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, p. 218; Spielrein, 1906–7/2001, p. 161). Using the mythological examples of *The Flying Dutchman*, *Tristan und Isolde*, *Siegfried* and *Götterdämmerung* as well as reference to Adam and Eve, Spielrein argued for the inevitability of love leading to destruction as a *transformational* act. She concluded that: "Death is horrible; yet death in the

service of the sexual instinct, which includes a destructive component, is a salutary blessing since it leads to a coming into being" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 183). In laying the ground for this conclusion, Spielrein (1912/1994, p. 174) suggested the two components of the sexual instinct are such that "the impulse of the positive component simultaneously summons forth the impulse of the negative component and opposes it". More broadly, she drew upon Freud's work to assert that: "In seeking the *causa movens* of our conscious and unconscious self, I believe that Freud is correct when he accepts striving for pleasure and suppression of displeasure as the bases of all psychic productions" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 159). For Spielrein, the whole notion of the individual should first and foremost to be conceived as "dividual" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 160). That is, consciously we may seem different but in the unconscious we are at the same time, the same – *dividual*. Many drivers of human behaviour are characterised as having, often simultaneously, two antagonistic tendencies. The two components of the sexual instinct are a case example.

On the 26th November 1910, Spielrein noted in her diary that she was worried "that Jung may steal her idea on the death instinct" (Kerr, 1994, p. 313). It seemed that Jung wished to appropriate the idea to add to a review he had already prepared on an address by Eugen Bleuler that was to be given to a meeting of Swiss psychiatrists. The topic of Bleuler's address was a theory about ambivalence where he was to argue that there was an intrinsic balance between every specific emotion and its specific opposite. The address was to be published in the journal *Jahrbuch* with a response from Jung. It seems that Jung felt that Spielrein's two-component notion of the sexual instinct – destructive/dissolving and transforming – would add nicely to explain what Bleuler had neglected in his explanation of ambivalence, namely the relationship to the realm of the sexual. However, it appears that at Spielrein's insistence, Jung's review did not include any reference to Spielrein's notion of the sexual instinct.

Three days after making this entry into her diary, Spielrein presented the 'transformation' section of her 'Destruction' paper to the Vienna Psycho-Analytic Society, and, as was noted earlier, Reik[5] was one of those who responded favourably to this address. Others saw it as an excuse to restate their own ideas, and yet another saw the presentation as enacting a metaphysical tone to psychoanalysis. Freud, surprisingly, seized upon one aspect of the presentation, the use of mythological material, to launch a criticism of the work of Jung (Kerr, 1994, pp. 367–372). The paper "did not

strike many chords with her audience, with the exception of Freud and (Victor) Tausk" (Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, p. 216). The next day, whilst impressed with her intellect, Freud wrote to Jung and said: "I have misgivings about the way in which Frl. Spielrein tries to subordinate the psychological material to biological criteria" (Jones, 1955, p. 501). The report on Spielrein's address in the minutes of the Society, written by Otto Rank, noted that:

> Taking as her point of departure the question of whether a normal death instinct exists in Man [Metchnikoff], Dr. Spielrein endeavors to prove that the component of death is contained in the sexual instinct itself; inherent in that instinct is at the same time a destructive component which is indispensable to the process of coming into existence. The fact that we do not customarily take note of this tendency toward self-destruction is explained in terms of Jung's scheme, according to which two opposing components are the root of all volition; and it is always by very little that one of them prevails. Thus, it usually seems to us that the instinct for becoming prevails; yet, on the basis of a slight shift in the other direction, we see in the sexual instinct only a destructive force. (Kerr, 1994, p. 68)[6]

Spielrein's conception of the two components of the sexual instinct was significantly more subtle than Rank's 'blunt' reductionism would suggest. It was not so much a death instinct *per se*, but an ever presence within the sexual instinct such that "*sexuality* brought with it such themes as that of dying in the arms of the beloved. Which is a different thing" (Kerr, 1994, p. 501; see also Spielrein, 1906–7/2001, p. 161; Spielrein, 1912/1994, pp. 173 & 178). To be fair to Spielrein, the *emphasis* was on noting the destructive component of the sexual instinct rather than 'death'. Spielrein clearly viewed the destructive component of the sexual instinct as something that is implicated in the service of allowing the emergence of something new. At this time, and indeed even later, the subtlety of this conception and of its *co-presence, dialectic and coalescence* appears to be unappreciated by many within the psychodynamic community (see Kerr, 1994, pp. 501–502).

Spielrein's insights, coupled with current biological research, are important for at least two reasons. First, communication between the body and mind takes on a new meaning when we speak of the value of death. Because of apoptosis (Carey, 2003, p. 3; Clarke, 1996; Kerr, Wyllie & Currie, 1972), it could be that the body continually prods the

psyche to want to or need to transform as a means to generate life through death, which strengthens the argument that death may be more necessary to the framing of life than once was thought. Second, and in conjunction with this expansionist view, some humans may have both biological and psychological drives to keep going; to continually live and die in the quest for and achievement of escalating degrees of newness that might at some time, even exceed adaptation to their surroundings. Some people may already be 'practised at death' and it is these who are perhaps, more likely to endure change, which might lead to transcendence. It is also these who might enact change for the sake of change.

The act of sex, whether real or metaphorical, is to invoke the death of that which is no longer needed or beneficial in the service of creating something that could not otherwise be achieved through independent activity. Paradoxically, the ability to let go of a loved object is synonymous with partial dissolution of self-concept. As discussed earlier, the process of dissolution is at the same time both a pleasurable and unpleasurable activity, regardless of nobility of purpose. The pleasure of transformation parallels the pain of compromised esteem because self-preservation is threatened and it makes one feel like dying:

> Pain certainly is damaging to the individual's instinctive struggle for self-preservation. In our depths, there is something that, as paradoxical as it may sound, wills self-injury while the ego counteracts it with pleasure. A wish for self-injury, a joy in pain, is, however, thoroughly incomprehensible if we believe merely in the existence of an ego that only desires pleasure. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 160)

This is not to say that the ego desires unpleasure. It is to say that the ego wishes to divest itself of dead objects and in so doing, the requirement for suffering through total detachment of some objects must occur before attachment to others can. This then speaks again to compromise. Compromise is the means by which maximisation of pleasure is achieved with investment into unpleasure. The death of something valued occurs so that something of at least different or more value can be obtained. The process of compromise is creative-thinking because the ego must determine what to relinquish; for whom or for what to suffer pain in order to maintain memories of reassurance during the primal relationship. Yet, there is also the desire to become independent so reassurance and persecution are variables of mutual causation causing ambivalence and destruction. In adulthood, the need to fix

ambivalence is the reconstructive aspect: "Analogous unconscious thoughts or images accompany every conscious thought or image and transform the products of conscious thought into a specific language" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 157):

> *Example No. 1:* *'I think I am looking at a rough spot that needs to be repaired.*
> *Symbol:* *I see myself smoothing a piece of wood with a plane.* (Silberer, 1909, cited in Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 157)

It is not surprising that Spielrein chose this analogy. In the first place, the planing of wood removes that which is no longer needed, destruction, to construct a new form. In consideration of transformation, for Spielrein it may be that the undeadliest of all sins is greed because without some form of it there would be no need to have or to want change. All we do is ameliorate the term greed and turn it into more acceptable desire. This also begs the question of whether or not the infantile narcissistic self can ever be loved enough; meaning that no matter what, the individual will try to smooth out rough spots of childhood through the feeling tones that are attached to thought processes in adulthood:

> Pleasurable sensation thus is transferred to the object that brings relief....Freud has not investigated what pleasurable feeling is and how it originates. He begins with the stage in which pleasurable feeling already is established and, therefore, we see that infantile pleasurable sensations are the precursors of late pleasurable sexual sensations. It is in exactly this manner that one grows fond of the nurse's comforting hand; it satisfies our need to be nurtured. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 159)

The question remains as to whether this smoothing is for self or other or for self and other. If it is the former, there is potential for negative transformation as care for conflict resolution or the planing of the primal relationship will be Erostic for self and Thanatic for other that in its dialectic means death for self.

Partial dissolution may result in the creation of something that is indeed new, but because of the pain it causes, can result in behaviours that are harmful to the self or others, which as discussed above, have been noted in both the Freudian and Kleinian literature. These are Thanatic defences related to the inability to release that which has

already been introjected but require projection. In other words, the desire and greed for transformation is the ego's unending task to unlearn so as to minimise its inability to meet all aspects of the ever changing super-ego without total loss of the ego-ideal.

Spielrein ascertained that the ego's goal of self-preservation or the minimisation of individual expense is an important measure of maintaining pleasure. That is, individuals first seek out situations that are not so different to cause unwarranted unknowns or unpleasure. Therefore, the tendency is to gravitate toward least change environments and agents to mitigate uncertainty and risk. However, even under conditions of similarity, not all change is avoidable. In order for the ego to survive, it must also conform to the choices and aspirations of wider society; meaning causation of recalibration of mental models is due to repeated acts of real or metaphorical sex with many aspects of the outside world, which is at the same time a pleasurable painful experience. Once again, paradigmatic change is a result of a form of partial death through which individual differentiation falls and assimilation or identity dissolution rises but in a larger group setting. Thus, the act of identity creation is also culturally shaped, simultaneously, but in a destructive-reconstructive event:

> The collective psyche wants to assimilate the more recently developed personal psyche while the ego – indeed every part of the ego – strives for self-preservation in its present form (inertia). The collective psyche denies the present ego and, directly through this denial, creates anew. The floundering ego-particle, inundated with new, more richly adorned images, begins to re-emerge. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 163)

This is perhaps the basis for Freud's (1917/1984) posits on mourning that was re-read as reality testing by Klein (1940, p. 126). The need to transform to minimise fears of engulfment and isolation is what Klein eventually called the depressive position. Psychodynamic creativity is the ability to reach different depressive positions through continual destruction of feelings of grief and fear through mourning to allow for the reconstruction of new schema. Mourning is thus a precursor, if not the foundation, for creative-thinking. The inability to mourn creates the inability to accept creativity and the losses it at once also achieves:

> ...the person who fails in the work of mourning, though their defenses may differ widely from each other, have this in common, that they have been unable in early childhood to establish their internal 'good' objects and to feel secure in their inner world. They

> have never really overcome the infantile depressive position. In normal mourning, however, the early depressive position, which had become revived through the loss of the loved object, becomes modified again, and is overcome by methods similar to those used by the ego in childhood. (Klein, 1940, p. 153)

This is precisely what Spielrein suggested in the first place.

Spielrein: Freud, Klein and points of departure

Many within the Vienna Psycho-Analytic Society read Spielrein's argument as particularly related to the sado-masochistic components of sexuality (see Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, pp. 218–19). Indeed, as we have previously noted, Freud's footnote acknowledgement of Spielrein's concept of the 'death instinct' was one in which he also read into her work "the sadistic component of the sexual instinct as 'destructive'" (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 328, footnote 2). As others have also observed, this reading of Spielrein's work amounted to a significant "distortion" (Appignanesi & Forrester, 1992/1993, p. 220), completely ignoring the transformative principle that was linked to the destructive component of the sexual instinct.

Spielrein accepted much of Freud's work and, as we also previously noted, in particular believed "Freud is correct when he accepts striving for pleasure and suppression of displeasure as the bases of all psychic productions" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 159). However, Spielrein did not accept Freud's dual-instinct theory involving two classes of instinct. Instead she preferred considerations of death as part of the destructive/dissolution component of the sexual instinct and as being implicated in the facilitation of the birth of something new.

From an interpretation of Jung's (1912/1916; see also 1912/1956) work on fear of trusting in fate, Spielrein concluded that with the instinctual needs to reproduce and for self-preservation, there also came the dread of creating something that could not be entirely predicted or known. To reiterate, in one regard Spielrein believed that the sexual act fused male and female germs cells such that the partners are forced into one another (Spielrein, 1912/1994). This sensation of engulfment simultaneously leads to the *partial dissolution* of both individuals in biological and psychical terms. Partial dissolution is analogous to invocation of the death instinct because parts of each identity have been sacrificed, thereby, transforming the progenitors, but in ways that cannot be assessed at the time of or even soon after transformation. Another consideration is that the result of the sexual act

creates a new being who is also an unknown and who will bring with it, other and more unknown and uncertain qualities and affects. For the parents this triggers another lamina of uncharted egoistic sacrifice, which again parallels the emergence of the death instinct:

> A new, perhaps more beautiful, form of the content appears; however, it still is not the original ego-particle. It is another content, originating at the expense of the former. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 163)

Spielrein also concluded that during the sexual act, there were immanent feelings of doubt and trepidation about the quality of life risked for transformation. Ostensibly, to mask the disappointment of the cessation of the pleasurable event there is uncertainty about the benefit of the sexual act relative to the painful costs of self-worth such as; for the present and the future, was there an acceptable value exchange? Spielrein intimates that to varying degrees, these doubts may turn into fears of identity dissolution at every occurrence of pleasurable conquest, which increases both the quantity and intensity of positive and negative transformations.

Williams (1958), who did not cite Spielrein's (1912/1994) work, came to the same conclusions, almost 50 years later:

> I will now make the assumption that there are two main ways of avoiding the fear of death, one related to sadism and the other to masochism. I say related, because the aim goes beyond the idea of sexual orgasm through physical or mental pain, deliberately inflicted or deliberately sought, to the idea of death in ecstasy. The ecstatic condition is itself a denial of death, that is, a denial of the possibility of the loss of bodily sensations and mental images. (p. 160)

In the context of commenting upon Freud's idea that sexual pleasure for an adult is derived early or are infantile sources of pleasure, some writers (see Carr, 2003b, p. 804; Covington, 2003, p. 8) have argued that Spielrein seems to have anticipated an object-relations orientation to instinct when she said:

> I should note that we could just as readily derive everything from the nurturing instinct rather than from sexuality. Here I might mention the views of a French author who derives all psychic impulses from the instinct of self-preservation. Essentially, he pro-

> poses that the mother loves the child because sucking relieves the mammary glands; one loves a man or a woman because coitus releases the organism's bothersome excretions innocuously. Pleasurable sensation thus is transferred to the object that brings relief. (1912/1994, p. 159)

In the nurturing aspect of mother as an object and source of pleasure, Spielrein also positioned this experience in its pre-Oedipal context.

> The statement that we psychically experience very little in the present strikes as paradoxical and yet it is correct. An event is feeling-toned for us only to the extent that it can stimulate previously experienced feeling-toned contents that now lie hidden in the unconscious.... In this sense, 'all passing things' are only allegories, perhaps of unknown primal experiences, that seek analogues in the present. Thus, we experience nothing in the present since we project a feeling-tone onto a current image. (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 157)

The object-relations theorist Christopher Bollas (1978), in his extension of some of the ideas of Winnicott, argued similarly to Spielrein that the first experience of the infant serves a potentially *transformational process*. Specifically, Bollas (1978) stated:

> The infant's first experience of the object is as a process, rather than a thing in itself, but he perceptually identifies his experience of the object (an experience of psycho-somatic transformation) with the maternal object. For this reason I have termed the first object the transformational object, as I want to identify it with the object as process, thus linking our notion of the object with the infant's subjective knowing of it. Before the mother is personalized to the infant as a whole object she has functioned as a source of transformation, and as the infant's own nascent subjectivity is almost completely the experience of the ego's integrations (cognitive, libidinal, affective) the first object is identified with the alterations of the ego's state. This ego experience remains as an unconscious memory in the adult who relives it through his adamant quest for a transformational object: a new partner, a different form of work, a new material acquisition, an ideology or a belief. (pp. 105–106)

However, in contrast to the object-relations perspective of Klein, a key issue for Spielrein is that the destructive character of the death

instinct was not simply inflamed by or was an act of hatred, but, again, that it may be a necessary requirement to allow the emergence of something new: "Close to our desire to maintain our present condition, there lies a desire for transformation" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 163). Most important, this transformation is not complete until the work of mourning is done: "The fact is, however, that when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again" (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 253). Such inhibitions can include the embrace of new and different super-ego aspects that change the ego's management of the id and therefore ensuing behaviours. As such, mourning is a process related to creative acts that are transformational (Szekely, 1983). The conjunction of Klein's and Spielrein's posits is that the death 'instinct' is a process by which the infant, through experience of separations from the breast or iterations of object loss, gains confidence and self-esteem and self-efficacy to successfully reach the depressive position or to gain independence, maturity and wisdom. Freud's and Klein's work has more to do with identity change; and Spielrein's with identity transformation.

Spielrein's points of departure from the theories of Freud and Klein on the matter of a 'death' instinct give rise to a number of implications in understanding organisation behaviour, leadership and for the field of organisation studies more generally. In this context, Spielrein's conceptualisations on identity have their parallel in organisational transformation and development.

Organisational studies and Spielrein's destructive reconstruction

In the previous chapter we noted that Kleinian and Freudian perspectives of the death instinct call attention to both similar and different behaviours and issues in organisations. The work of Spielrein appears to resonate with some of the same issues but, at the same time, may place a different emphasis in the manner in which those issues should be addressed.

The psychodynamics of instinctual influences and organisational change


The following section seeks to explain reasons for organisational change resistance and facilitation in defence of mental models or worldviews that in psychodynamic terms are due to exchanges between life and

death instincts. In the previous chapter, we concluded that impediments to organisational change first occur within the psyche because of part-compromise that does not lend itself to long term or paradigmatic change that is transformation. To guide this discussion, we employ what arguably might be one of the most well-known change models, Lewin's (1951) unfreezing, changing, and refreezing process as is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. It may be that this process has more to consider in terms of paradigmatic transformation that is a lever for long-term organisational change. One reason Lewin's process usually does not work is because it is not given the support of time to work:

> Time use includes not only activities which are readily observable and measurable, such as completing tasks, but also those that are not readily seen, such as thinking and reflecting on problems. Time use of activities is directed to the economic advantage that it can gain for an organization. The speed of any system is restricted to by its slowest process and the ability of its least able members.
>
> Time as viewed in the traditional way, then, does not gain long term advantage for the organization. (Goddard, 2001, p. 2)

To maintain the health and welfare of change leaders and followers, it is time to look at organisational change in a non-traditional way and that is through the lens of Erostic and Thanatic influencers.

Figure 3.1 Three phases of planned change




Source: Adapted from Lewin, 1951.

Reinforcing the first current state

As depicted in Figure 3.1 above, Lewin's (1951) change process model begins with unfreezing the current state, moves to change in the transitional state, and then to solidify the new state, ends with refreezing (Hunsaker, 2001). However, what is not fully explained is the degree to which the individual has become attached to various super-ego aspects or what is a full description of the personal ego-ideal *before* the individual enters the organisation. Since the life instinct is classified by self-preservation, Freud's posits pointed out that the first stage of organisational change is a frozen state, but one that has been constructed in and by parental figures outside of the organisation's boundaries. In Figure 3.2 below, we remind ourselves of the provinces of the psyche by sketching, as examples, the topographies of an organisational administrator or Cleary, the probationary school teacher and one of Cleary's students, who were introduced in this chapter's starting vignette.

Figure 3.2 The topographies



Employees such as Cleary bring with them pre-hire constructions of both the super-ego and the ego-ideal, for which they try to find situations of conformity or at least as near to conformity as possible to maintain a comfort zone or a least worst risk change scenario.

The meeting of minds

Employees think they are hired by organisations that will share their worldviews. In fact, it is more likely that the organisation will not disrupt their worldviews, which is an entirely different matter. Through

transference,[7] such as in orientation programmes or internships, the pairing becomes stronger. The longer the life of the transference, the longer the projector is able to induce introjection by the other.

In the case of W. Kirk, an organisation built upon the foundations of trust and forgiveness is precisely where a 'radical' is most likely to be protected from disruption of his worldview (Peter & Hull, 1969). For C. Cleary, the organisation was one supposedly entrenched first, in helping students learn. By introjecting this aspect of the super-ego, Cleary strengthened his ego through an Erostic promise that learning would occur. The "warning" Cleary received acted as a trigger for Thanatic competition and together Eros and Thanatos helped fashion the ego-ideal of ensuring the children would learn, especially when competition triggered Thanatic energy with the School's use of the words "he had been warned" (Peter & Hull, 1969, p. 44).

From a Freudian perspective, identification with the organisation's values as espoused in mechanisms of centralisation and formalisation and being rewarded for this identification leads to both change facilitation and then resistance, which may only be of short interval but is a noteworthy occurrence, especially in consideration of the ego's attachment to the organisation as an ego-ideal.

On the one hand, the organisation has reinforced the individual's self-esteem and self-efficacy by hiring her or him into the organisation based on those advertised qualities. This means that the individual has more likely formed a strong attachment to organisational aspects at the very beginning of the relationship. Figure 2.2, in the previous chapter, can be carried forward here to remind ourselves of such high-level compromise, of which we again speak. Consequently, the use of hiring tests such as values matching exercises (Jaffe & Scott, 1998) are attachment mechanisms that reinforce that which the employee already is *and that which he or she thinks the organisation is*.

Spielrein's conceptualisation of death in sex is a metaphor for the relationship between the employee and the organisation. The post-hire frozen to unfreezing state is the first time the individual and the organisation share Erostic values and the first time they share risking the unknown. When both parties engage in co-support of a common worldview, they are in a libidinal process of creating a special bond that will result in a partially new ego because both have projected love onto each other and both have introjected each other's love.

Spielrein's posits also indicate that individuals who have risked partial dissolution have questions about the value of that risk. Individuals need to be reassured that their expectations of being treated equitably will be balanced. When individuals perceive that their world-

views are lionised, the tendency is to support the protecting agent (Solomon et al., 1998, 2003). This would reinforce the depressive position of the shared ego-ideal between employee and organisation. In this case, death in sex has resulted, hopefully, in a good match between the new employee and the organisation that is more likely to lead to positive transformation. Positive transformation means projective identification and introjective identification of 'good' or at least contemporaneous 'good' and 'bad' aspects arising from the paranoid-schizoid split.

On the other hand, if the exchange does not bring value, negative transformation will occur and in two ways. The first is recalled through the formation of the Thanatic triangle and repetitive circling around it that was due to projective identification and introjective identification of the 'bad' resulting from the schizoid split (i.e. see Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in the previous chapter). Through organisational change events, the organisation as ego-ideal also expects the individual to relinquish parts of that worldview. Consequently, it is not surprising that the individual feels confused when told by the ego-ideal that in effect, the organisation requires only a part of rather than the whole person, which of course triggers identity dissolution and change resistance. Such is the case when 'using' the paranoid-schizoid position as a defence to work so very hard to gain acceptance but only to achieve low-level part-compromises. These may take the form of losing employees soon after the hire has occurred such as during probationary periods. Synthesis of death in sex with repetitive compulsion could lead to patterns of high, early turn over rates, as manifestations of sadistic tendencies.


A second way negative transformation can occur is by remaining in the same depressive position even though aspects of the ego's external world and experiential lines are changing. Death in sex with organisational masochism can be manifested in the halo effect (Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn, 2003). Since the organisation hires in its own image, and reinforces that vision by projecting love onto new employees and introjecting their love by hiring them, the predisposition will be to feel 'bad' if the hire is unsuccessful. To feel 'good', the corollary is to assume all employees must always be 'good'. Consequently, some employees may pass the probationary stage when in fact, they cannot perform, or there is no fit. The current state of maintaining a comfort zone or one, which is not fraught with de-hiring conflicts, is indicative of *Thanatic* negative organisational transformation and avoidance. This is the situation of remaining in the same area of high-level compromise.

High-level compromise

High-level compromise is predominantly comprised of a depressive position, where splitting from low-level compromise does not occur. This is 'good' and 'bad'. The problem with high-level compromise is that once the split between 'good' and 'bad' is completed, it remains as the status quo regardless of changes in the surrounding environment: "The depressive mode is one of integration, resolution, and containment, and if unopposed, leads to certainty, stagnation, closure, arrogance, and deadness" (Eigen, 1985, cited in Ogden, 1989, p. 30). High-level compromise indicates a movement toward and then stabilisation in accommodation of old decisions to resolve conflicts. The relationship between the School Administrator and a representative of Cleary's students is indicative of this and is shown in Figure 3.3 below.

Before Cleary came on the scene, the school as represented by one of its leaders, the Administrator, had a forcing-avoiding relationship with

Figure 3.3 Thanatic depressive positions and shared ego-ideal: High-level part-compromise



Source: Adapted from Ruble & Thomas, 1976.

the handicapped students. This can be seen by the Administrator's projective identification of all 'bad' that the student, who is forced to accommodate, introjects. This type of relationship has been reinforced for so long, that the student's experiential line is really mostly that of the school's. That which is the student's alone, the short grey line is indicative of engulfment. There was a set teaching plan for 'these types' of students that according to the school should not be changed.

> When Cleary received his dismissal notice he was told that he had grossly neglected the bead stringing, sandbox, and other busy-work which were the things that retarded children should do. He had failed to make adequate use of the modeling clay, pegboards and finger paints specially provided by the Excelsior City Special Education Department. (Peter & Hull, 1969, pp. 44–45)

Without a way to create a disjunction between the Administrator's and the student's super-ego's to dissolve part of the ego-ideal, eventually the student would be totally engulfed through accommodation. In this case, this means two things. The student learns only what she or he is told to learn and more important, the student does not learn how to learn. The implications for training and development of employees and organisation are clear.

Figure 3.2 illustrates that the potential to overcome Thanatic low-level compromise and conflict resolution through high-level compromise can become another form of repetition compulsion that over time, transmutes high-level compromise into the Thanatic triangle of low-level compromise. That is, in the face of change, consistent residence in the same depressive position is death and so high-level compromise is still only part-compromise. With Spielrein's influence, what was Erostic and reparative in Chapter 2, is in Chapter 3 Thanatic, *because change that is inappropriately mourned, stifles creativity that is part of paradigmatic change.*

Euwema, Van de Vliert and Baker (2003), stated that compromising alone, did not necessarily make gains in dyadic conflict resolution, likely, because it related so highly to problem-solving. This means that during conflict situations, the effectiveness of compromise is highly related to the effectiveness of problem-solving because through splitting, they are treated as one and the same thing in comparison to totally different resolution styles such as avoiding. Iterative processes of projective identification and introjective identification also indicate the application of old conflict resolution methods to solve new prob-

lems, which means problem-solving may not have been experienced more than once, if at all.

By applying Freud's view (1920/1984, 1923/1984), resistance to change is generated by *Eros* and self-preservation to cancel *Thanatos'* energy as it threatens to dissolve self-concept. The more fear generated from *Thanatos*, the more the individual attempts to secure self-preservation. On the one hand, Spielrein believed that individuals have a propensity for compromise. On the other, organisations do not:

> It is generally easier to acquire a new identity during growth than to divest an identity during a time of retrenchment (Albert, 1984). Organizations tend to become committed to what they already have been and seldom substitute new identifying characteristics for old ones. (Albert & Whetten, 1985/2004, p. 101)

Lewin's model is based upon the organisation's demands for employees' to compromise when the organisation may not. Instead, organisations are likely to have at least two or more identities (Albert & Whetton, 1985/2004). Employees may feel as though their identities may also have to diverge; that of course triggers death-fear from a decentring of the ego that is ontological insecurity (Laing, 1960/1969):

> The individual...may experience his [sic] own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated from the rest of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy are never in question; as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness and worth; as spatially co-extensive with the body; and, usually, as having begun in or around birth and liable to extinction with death. He thus has a firm core of ontological security. (Laing, 1960, pp. 41–42)

The suggestion here is more than one of maintaining a worldview or other belief systems. What Laing proposes is an intra-constancy, a consciousness that is identity achieving so as to: a) maintain some centre; b) use bravery to maintain this centeredness; c) go away from this centeredness to 'be' in and with others; and d) through self-consciousness, be aware of this centeredness and the need to 'be' in and with others (Rycroft, 1968/1995; see also May, 1968). Ontological security has in its definition the need to be courageous enough to defend that worldview or belief system while at the same time considering those of

others; to enter the world of others in a caring yet assertive manner (Carr & Lapp, 2005b; see also Glass, 1993, p. 24). Ontological insecurity is linked to death-fear when the self sees the outside world as a constant threat and such insecurity leads to isolation. It is more likely that employees are looking for the reassurance of organisations to change in the same way and at the same pace as employees. The organisation is actually asking that their employees 'kill off' parts of the ego-ideal and therefore the request is akin to self and organisational suicide that is not likely to happen.

In the Peter and Hull (1969) vignette, Harkin's organisation, the church, was perceived to remain stable and not change its views. And, of course, this is precisely what Harkin wanted. Otherwise, he would not have been able to reach as many people as he did over so many years of employment or non-erosion of the ego-ideal.

Again, from Peter and Hull's (1969) vignette, the same can be said for Cleary, who believed he was an educator who would be allowed to educate and especially when the organisation 'challenged' him to do so. This reinforced Cleary's perception that if he did not do well in educating the children, it would be then that he would be dismissed. For both Harkin and Cleary, much time passed before any meaningful feedback was provided to indicate that a change was needed. Being in the clergy, it is likely that promotion or similar competition was not expected by Harkin and therefore, inequity not felt. For Cleary, the opposite was likely to be true. That is, if he did not do well, he would not be allowed to teach. Since he was allowed to teach until the end of the school year, every day of success meant being promoted past probationary level.

Isolation from aspects of the ego-ideal or that which the employee believes is Erostic, is conducive to change resistance. Such is the case when the organisation isolates the employee from meaningful feedback. In other words, using only summative feedback asks the employee to change the ego-ideal retroactively, which of course cannot be done. Formative feedback has a better chance of facilitating change. Yet feedback itself is Thanatic to the individual because it is meant to ask the person to stop loving part of the ego-ideal. This explains why feedback and communication are perceived to be ineffective (Argyris, 1994; Perlow & Williams, 2003). That is, results of providing feedback are ineffective when they threaten the ego-ideal without giving appropriate time and support to make required changes that are being communicated in the first place. Meaningful feedback is also timely feedback that, depending upon its *timing,* blocks *and* facilitates change.

High-level compromise provides the perception that problems are being solved but this might not be the case. Instead, the same outdated ego-ideal is maintained. Consequently, one example of Spielrienian 'emphasis' is the need for low-level part-compromise that is recurrence of the paranoid-schizoid position so high-level compromise is enacted more than once, and especially so one can be proactive to change. Death in the form of true compromise or partial dissolution is required to transform stagnation into life.


Unfreezing

Employees are frozen when they are first hired into an organisation, but because they value finding and keeping a job, most are more likely to shift to the organisation's wishes and, in effect, are more willing to adjust their worldview or ego-ideal and then stay there (Marcia, 2002). So, when the individual's worldview is disrupted, there is experienced a feeling of identity dissolution and heightened death-fear anxiety because self-concept is in the process of erosion (Arndt et al., 1997; Crocker, 2002; Solomon et al., 1998, 2003; Webb, 1998). However, if dissolution is ameliorated through incremental positive projective and introjective identification, *to replace some of the 'bad'* that was also projected and introjected during the depressive position, death-fear is minimised.

Spielrein's different 'emphases' can be noted in respect to differentiating between organisation change and organisational transformation. In the previous chapter we noted that, in relation to intrapersonal and dyadic interpersonal conflict in organisations, leadership might seek to enact what we termed a *high-level compromise* position – to try to transform destructive conflict resolution into constructive compromise. Much of this type of leadership behaviour is encountered in periods of organisation change. A Kleinian perspective draws attention to the notion that 'destroying' the good object (e.g. the previous ways of doing things) may engender the paranoid-schizoid position and the fears of persecutory object ascendancy. For example, when some trusted and revered bosses leave the organisation the subordinates may become anxious about the replacement – perhaps it is to be someone from within the organisation that they have previously demonised. A Freudian perspective would note that the 'death' in this process requires the release of the previously loved object so that attachment to some new object may occur.

Yet, using Spielrein as the guide, the organisation facilitates change resistance by asking its employees to stop loving it or at least parts of it

Figure 3.4 Partial dissolution of ego-ideal: Paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position



Source: Adapted from Ruble & Thomas, 1976.

that is unfreezing of the ego-ideal. In the first phase of unfreezing the current state, what Lewin's (1951) theory does not fully explain is this dialectic between "creating a felt need for change" and "minimizing resistance to change" (Hunsaker, 2001, pp. 376–377). Below, Figure 3.4 illustrates the need for part-compromise to enact *full-compromise*.

The more the ego-ideal changes, the more it is likely that less and less of what was originally loved will remain. This is exactly the point of full-compromise.

> Probationer-teacher C. Cleary's first teaching assignment was to a special class of retarded children. Although he had been warned that these children would not accomplish very much, he proceeded to teach them all he could. By the end of the year, many of Cleary's retarded children scored better on standardized achievement tests of reading and arithmetic than did children in regular classes. (Peter & Hull, 1969, p. 44)

When Cleary first started with the children, he basically forced them to learn by not using the School's teaching plan; by doing things differently that the children introjected. In turn, a student's success or 'good' was projected to Cleary, who introjectively identified with this 'good'. The key to Cleary's and the student's 'good' results was that the paranoid-schizoid position was used partially. That is, it was a defence used to establish partial dissolution of the depressive position. Figure 3.4 shows that Cleary maintains a forcing stance that in comparison to the School Administrator, is perceived by the student to be assertive. The student has less fear and is willing to give up part of that which was introjected from the School Administrator in order to introject Cleary's projective identifications. There is mutual causation of Cleary's positive projective identifications, the student's introjective identification and their subsequent, respective movements away from forcing-avoiding and accommodating-avoiding. Each shift slowly changes both Cleary's and the student's teaching and learning paradigms through disjunctive-conjunctions of their super-egos. The result is recursive movement beyond the Thanatic triangle and for the student, into an unknown quadrant. Today's research calls this quadrant collaboration and problem-solving. Spielrein's research would call it positive projective and introjective identification of new 'good' and 'bad' to replace old 'bad'.

This has occurred because both Cleary and the student decided to trust one another – they risked dissolution for the potential of becoming something different than when they started. One could say that a 'retarded' person could be less afraid to trust in the first place. However, by virtue of the fact that the students were so embedded within the School system, Cleary's appearance could have been more fearful. Notwithstanding, Cleary and the student's use of Thanatic defences *but in a timely manner* (i.e. over the entire school year), resulted in positive transformation. One could say that through this *creative* process, the student became less retarded or perhaps even 'unretarded'.

The inclusion of high-level compromise with low-level compromise is needed to enact *full-compromise*. Low-level and high-level compromise can be converted to *full-compromise* that is characteristic of a balancing of cooperation, concern, and assertiveness, if the paranoid-schizoid position is *synthesised* with the depressive position while both parties still help themselves and each other adequately repress or recognise the release of instinctual impulses:

> The paranoid-schizoid mode provides the necessary splitting of linkages and opening up of the closures of the depressive position, thus re-establishing the possibility of fresh linkages and fresh thoughts. The integrative thrust of the depressive mode in turn provides the necessary antithesis for the paranoid-schizoid mode in limiting the chaos generated by the fragmentation of thought, the discontinuity of experience, and the splitting of self and object. (Ogden, 1989, p. 30)

Full-compromise is a cooperative consideration of an other's paradigms that are assertively being projected and *reflexively* being introjected; not Thanatically introjected or reactionary or assumptive. In other words, one learns to appropriately identify and live with the 'good' and the 'bad' consequences of conflict resolution simultaneously, in that space and time, without resorting to destructive behaviours only in the space of the *Thanatic triangle.*

Full-compromise is the sacrificial balancing of cooperative concern for self and others while accepting the assertiveness of self and others to maintain identity during times of change. The synthesis of full-compromise and problem-solving leads to collaboration or the willingness to partially dissolve one's identity in order to achieve something that cannot yet be fathomed, or what is the paradox of "negative capability" (French, 2001):

> negative capability [that] indicates the capacity to live with and to tolerate ambiguity and paradox, to "remain content with half-knowledge" (Ward, 1963, p. 61) and, therefore, to engage in a non-defensive way with change, resisting the impulse merely to react to the pressure inherent in risk-taking. It implies the capacity to integrate emotional and mental states rather than dissociating oneself from emotional experience or attempting to cut oneself off from such experience altogether. (p. 482)

Full-compromise is the *synthesis* of the depressive position and the paranoid-schizoid position and its purpose is to ensure that if one ventures something that is valued, something of equal or perhaps greater value is gained. Full-compromise has the potential to transform destructive conflict resolution into constructive compromise because, if the individual or group is able to integrate the depressive position with the paranoid-schizoid position, paradigmatic, partial dissolution takes place. Full-compromise is the dialectic of conflict resolution: inter-

personal conflict is needed to effect intrapersonal conflict that is needed to resolve interpersonal conflict.

According to the Peter and Hull (1969) vignette, by their respective organisations, both Kirk and Cleary were seen to go outside of organisational boundaries or rules and regulations and complete what they thought were to be their tasks but in a different way. For Kirk, being a radical was something that he may have thought would have been accepted nowhere better than the church. Kirk and the church were engaged in high-level part-compromise.

For Cleary, there could be no better place to be a teacher than in a school that actually allowed handicapped children to be enrolled in it in the first place. The children needed to learn to survive; and Cleary needed to teach to survive. Cleary and his students were engaged in full-compromise – especially when it seems they did not have the school's support. Through full-compromise, they learned to thrive. On the other hand, the school and Cleary lived only in part-compromise that turned purely Thanatic for both.

Finally, Kirk and Cleary were dismissed by the organisation rather than leaving on their own. This indicates that whoever attempts full-compromise where it is not wanted or understood is perceived to be the forcer or ego-ideal dissolver and therefore the entity to whom sadism is likely to be applied.

Paradigmatic transformation is needed for organisational change but the former requires more time than the latter. It is possible to understand resistance to change only if one understands what is at risk of being changed, in both the short and the long term. Thus to be effective, change leaders need to predict, recognise, and work through ambiguity (Sheard & Kakabadse, 2002). The implication here, also, is that contingency leadership theory melds with the trait of being able to understand situations that invoke positive and negative Thanatic behaviours. In other words, leaders may have to learn Thanatospraxis (Sievers, 1999). Full-compromise is the transformation of old people in old organisations to 'new' people in 'old' organisations. These 'new' people can be seen as being too creative. When the organisational leadership cannot keep pace with followership progress, the tendency is to revert to old ways as the means to regenerate the depressive position.

Inasmuch as rules of conduct are modified during organisational change, there are impacts to varying degrees on the individual's super-ego, which may be in opposition to the ego's view on managing the id. Learning to conform to rules and regulations are akin to instrumental values used to secure the super-ego's, ego-ideal's or organisation's

reassurance of continued employment and remuneration. Lewin's (1951) model is based in this and many other tasks rather than on relationship. Consequently unfreezing, change, and re-freezing are transactional leadership objectives. Because it is based on recognition of other and therefore, relationship, transformational leadership, on the other hand, would provide the time and support necessary to release what has been compromised in exchange for what is promised – a partially new identity:

> Such congruence of feeling and thought, subject and object, awareness of inner anticipations and memories that find their dialectical counterpart in the outer world of people and of things is the stuff from which a sense of identity is formed. (Lynd, 1958, p. 140)

In turbulent times, the need is to generate creativity and critical thinking (Beeson & Davis, 2000; Meuser & Lapp, 2004) rather than stereotyping and dogma that can lead to groupthink (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999; Schwartz, 1990). The consequences of the death instinct not at work at the right time are diminutions of differentiation and organisational diversity, which minimise contemporaneous awareness and respect of multiple worldviews, thus uncovering an example of restrictions posed by the organisation's paradigm on itself (Beaver, 2003). Without experiencing the pain of partial dissolution, once again, organisational leaders revert to developing followers into 'old' employees that re-establishes the 'old' organisation. The organisation quickly ages and dies because by accommodating only what it already knows, it engulfs itself.

Mourning is Erostic

The notion of 'death' in this process would appear to imply a degree of grieving or mourning. Spielrein's work implies we can be attached to the old yet look forward to the new. If the analogue to organisation change, at least in part, involves the process of grieving, then the field of organisation studies should expect to see grieving behaviour and make provision for it as a 'natural' cycle within the change process.

Organisations need to be able to take their cues from people's reactions to change. Similarly, Spielrein's imagery of death in the interests of new life – the Wagnerian love we noted earlier with themes like dying in the arms of the beloved. It is acknowledged that organisation change is all about destruction, and/or deconstruction, of the present

and 'construction' or birth of the new. In our models of organisation change we do not include the psychodynamics of grieving. Moreover, our models of change in organisations fail to appreciate the manner in which the change process itself is not simply a 'rational' process or a process that can be thought to simply involve the 'cognitive' domain. An appreciation of the domain of the unconscious allows us to better 'read' (see Carr, 1999) the emotional and the emotionality that often is on display in times of change. It needs to be carefully understood how the organisation has encouraged the employee to identify with the values, attitudes and attributes of the organisation and changes in such identification can spark very deep-seated dynamics. In a similar manner to how, in the previous chapter we noted, the ego-ideal acts as a positive guide for the ego, the organisation attempts to encourage employees to identify with the organisation and its' values, attitudes and attributes. Freud actually viewed the ego-ideal as being generated in an individual to try to recover some of the narcissistic perfection enjoyed in childhood: "What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal" (Freud, 1914/1984, p. 88). It is by the process of identification that this ego-ideal is formed and re-formed. Laplanche and Pontalis defined the term identification as:

> a psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. *It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified.* (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988, p. 205, italics is our added emphasis)

The organisation and its leaders, through symbolic, material and other means, represent a powerful entity that can satisfy narcissistic needs of employees and at the same time offering them a sense of meaning and purpose as well as a partial protection against the vagaries of life. Howard Schwartz (1987, 1990) has coined the term *organisation-ideal* to convey the imagery of the collective values and attributes the organisation is seeking to implant as part of the ego-ideal. The organisation-ideal, like the ego-ideal, is really a fantasy that is seldom achieved. However, narcissistic satisfaction is achieved from efforts to reduce the degree to which the ego and the ideal differ. It is in the context of an organisation seeking to change – 'destroy' – previous aspects of the organisation-ideal that it can be appreciated how not only resistance to change arises but the need to carefully manage the Spielreinian

potential of 'destruction' as a transformational act. The notion of mourning the 'old' to give rise to the 'new' needs to be carefully planned – if employees' reactions are to be appropriately interpreted and leaders' effectively responsive. Failure of the organisation to provide resources of time and support to allow for grieving and especially for the loss of aspects of the ego-ideal is akin to forcing employees or egos to accept change or a 'super-ego's' commands before attachment to a new loved object can take place. In the meantime, both inwardly and outwardly projected destruction occur. Spielrein's notions of partial dissolution or identity compromise have the potential to shed light on:

a) the necessity to consider identity as something other than an enduring, reified concept;
b) how organization members adapt to frequent information that suggests reconsideration of their organization's identity; and
c) interrelationships among different projections of identity and the feedback received by organisation members. (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2004, p. 369)

The psychoanalytic literature (see Moore & Fine, 1990, pp. 122–123; Rycroft, 1995, pp. 105–106) suggested that mourning seems to have three inter-related and successive phases: first, denial or rejection of the idea of the loss and often clinging to the mental representation of the lost "object"; second, resignation, despair and acceptance of the loss, which involves withdrawal of attachment and identification with the lost object; and third, adapting to life without the object, which also often involves establishing new relationships and attachment to a new object. According to Kubler-Ross (1969/2003) and Elrod and Tippett (2002), it is likely that at their own pace and using unique patterns of movement, individuals in mourning will eventually transition from shock, denial and isolation to anger, bargaining, depression, and finally acceptance but not necessarily in a linear process (Roger, 1995; Zell, 2003). This means the implementation of a strictly linear model including but not limited to Lewin's, does not conform to psychodynamic release and attachment to new objects. It also means that within Lewin's model, mourning is required more than one time and to greater and lesser degrees, each time change is experienced. Lewin's model shows "coping with loss" or mourning as a one time addition to a change recipe. This is likely another reason for this model to have limited use. Since mourning occurs only once, only that portion which

was appropriately mourned will change. Therefore, the re-freezing state really is of little importance as most of that which required change never unfroze in the first place. Mourning losses are part of a recursive process. They are Erostic endeavours that are needed to make gains.

In the work organisation and group setting some have noted that members of a group may exhibit a variety of behaviours with respect to the "death" of a leader (or colleague):

> Within the group there will be a modest division of labor, some acting as mourners, some as murderers, and others as the dead consultant-leader himself. Still others may seek to raise the dead. In general, however, the tone of this drama is dominated by the experience of deadness, the group's identification with the dead leader. (Alford, 1994a, p. 62)

Again, to acknowledge the psychodynamics of grieving as part of the change process may help all within organisations understand and *interpret* this behaviour rather than only wonder about its influence on identity (Curry, 2002; Hyde & Thomas, 2003). Also implied is that the change process in organisations needs to be re-thought to have an underlying theoretic that explicitly assists and *gives time* for mourning. Instead of the "beltway bandits" of organisation reform simply encouraging organisations to replace one set of structures and processes with new ones, a more acute understanding of the psychological meaning of change would seem to be in order. For instance, let's make some Erostic changes to the first paragraph of this first section:

Reinforcing the first current state

As depicted in Figure 3.1 above, Lewin's (1951) change process model begins with unfreezing the current state, moves to change in the transitional state, and then to solidify the new state, ends with refreezing (Hunsaker, 2001). However, what is not fully explained is the degree to which the organisation has become attached to various super-ego aspects or what is a full description of its ego-ideal before 'new' employees emerge within the organisation. Since the life instinct is classified by self-preservation, Freud's posits pointed out that the first stage of organisational change is a frozen state, but one that has been constructed in and by parental figures outside of the organisation's boundaries. Organisations have pre-hire constructions of both the super-ego and the ego-ideal, for which they try to find situations of

conformity or at least as near to conformity as possible to maintain a comfort zone or a least worst risk change scenario. Organisations 'think' they hire people that share their worldviews. In fact, it is more likely that 'new' people are not likely to not disrupt their worldviews, which is an entirely different matter. Through transference, such as in orientation programmes or internships, the pairing becomes stronger. The longer the life of the transference, the longer the projector is able to induce introjection by the other.

The problem with Lewin's (1951) change model is that it means very different things when considered by the employee or when considered by the organisation because each has a separate identity that is being protected – by its self. The death of organisational change models comes about when it tells people how to live at what really is the expense of identity dissolution. Without being given time to mourn partial losses of identity, individuals and it would seem organisations alike, perceive they are dying from giving more than they are getting. The paradox is that part-compromise establishes fears of full out death. On the other hand, full-compromise includes mourning time for partial dissolution: "a strategic concern for organizations might be the management instability on identity, rather than the more frequently touted idea of trying to maintain and identity perceived as fixed" (Gioia et al., 2004, pp. 369–370). Without a fundamental basis of psychodynamic knowledge to show the paradoxical mutability of change, a change model is really a model of stagnancy that reinforces external loci of control (Saka, 2002). It is a concrete example of the same problems within the same problem:

> First, the leader must be able to perceive the problem, to have insight into the culture and its dysfunctional elements. Such boundary-spanning perception can be difficult because it requires one to see one's own weaknesses, to perceive that one's own defences not only help in managing anxiety but can also hinder one's efforts to be effective. Successful architects of change must have a high degree of objectivity about themselves and their own organisations.... (Schein, 2004, pp. 414–415)

In other words, what leaders require is objectivity about their own subjectivity. Deep change requires deep examination of unconscious-turned-conscious responses that first occur inside psychical organisations. Leadership for the creativity of new people in old organisations is the *Death of the Organisation Man*:

> As for the old Organization Men themselves, in the end, those who made out the best and were happiest, were those who were able to put aside any bitterness and to become independent of the organisation – whether or not they actually left it. (Bennett, 1990, p. 256)

So far, the works of Freud, Klein and Spielrein particularly focus upon the clinical implications of a 'death' instinct. Yet, Eros and Thanatos can also be perceived as being linked to broader societal processes and agendas. This is an important contextual matter that considers independence from work organisations and their leadership. The next chapter examines such linkages through the work of Herbert Marcuse.

4

Moving Graveyards: Herbert Marcuse and the Death Instinct

In the previous chapters, it was noted that while seeking expression both the life and death instincts are subject to repressive psychodynamics that are culturally shaped. We noted, for example, that Freud (1923/1984) clearly acknowledged the cultural milieu as being incorporated in unconscious psychodynamic processes when he put forward the notion of the super-ego (both the repressive and ideal aspects) and in his description of the operation of the ego that, he argued, acts in accordance with a 'reality principle'. These acknowledgements were a significant clue for some social commentators in their quest to understand the manner in which the unconscious was "so easily subject to social management" (Marcuse, 1965/2001, p. 88). It also held the clue to how individuals become willing participants in their own subservience. The manner in which the energy of Thanatos is amenable and open to social and cultural influence is also a significant contextual issue in the reading of leadership and management behaviours that are enacted in work organisations.

The work of Herbert Marcuse is instructive in the aforementioned context even though some of his conclusions represent a departure from the fundamental dual-instinct theory, in the sense that he was to suggest that ultimately, a death instinct could cease to exist. Even if we do not necessarily agree with his conclusion about the demise of the death instinct, to engage with the work of Marcuse and the disputes that surrounded his arguments about the death instinct, adds significantly to our understanding of the socio-cultural dynamics in which the dual-instinctual 'nature' of human kind is played out.

Pracademic reflections on Eros and Thanatos working in organisations:

12,000 degrees of corporate stupidity: Feeling hot! hot! hot!

Motivational training...team building...corporate retreats – doncha just love 'em? Burger King did, until 2001, when a group of BK employees went on a corporate retreat to Key Largo, Florida. The trip was a team-building exercise for the fast-food chain's marketing department, and the highlight of the training was a firewalking exercise. Each of the 100 people in attendance was to walk barefoot across an eight-foot length of hot coals while co-workers cheered. Alas, the corporate ritual didn't have quite the intended effect, unless by 'team building' the company meant the bonding of the dozen or so employees who had the first- and second-degree burns on their charbroiled soles treated on-site. One of their co-workers, showing little team spirit, was hospitalized.

'Some people just have incredibly sensitive feet,' said...the motivational coach who organized the firewalk.

This would be enough, you'd think, to put the fast-food industry off of corporate-mumbo-jumbo retreats forever, but in early 2002, a group of Kentucky Fried Chicken managers found themselves at a similar conference; 20 employees were hospitalized with foot burns and 10 more were treated at the scene. One KFC manager said, 'We're exploring what went wrong,' but just as a precaution, the company banned firewalking adventures at future retreats. Grateful employees would have rushed to thank their bosses, but, well, it's difficult to put much weight on oozing wounds. (Athitakis & Lasswell, 2004, pp. 30–31)

Herbert Marcuse: Freudian orthodoxy and revisionism

Herbert Marcuse was a member of the critical social thinkers known as the 'Frankfurt School'. The Frankfurt School included scholars such as Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, Walter Benjamin, Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Eric Fromm and Jürgen Habermas. Broadly speaking, much of their collective aim involved critical theory. For Frankfurt scholars, critical theory is a particular process of critique, the origins of which owe multiple allegiances; and particularly to the

work of Kant, Hegel and Marx. Critical theory aims to produce a particular form of knowledge that seeks to realise an emancipatory interest, specifically through a critique of consciousness and ideology. It separates itself from both functionalist/objective and interpretive/practical sciences through a critical epistemology that rejects the self-evident nature of reality and acknowledges the various ways in which reality is distorted (see Carr, 2000, 2005; Geuss, 1981; Held, 1980/1995; Jay, 1973/1996; Rasmussen, 1996; Wiggershaus, 1994). Interestingly, in the context of this book, Raymond Geuss (1981) argued, correctly in our view, that:

> members of the Frankfurt School think that Freud ... was a conceptual revolutionary in more or less the sense in which Marx was, and that the theories of Marx and Freud exhibit such strong similarities in their essential epistemic structure that from a philosophical point of view they don't represent two different kinds of theory, but merely two instances of a single new type. The general name given to this new type of theory of which Marxism and psychoanalysis are the two main instances is 'critical theory'. (p. 1)

We will revisit the issue of critical epistemology later in this chapter, but at this point it needs to be appreciated that the Frankfurt School scholars viewed the work of Marx and Freud as a critical epistemology and particularly as a critique of consciousness. Freud's emphasis on the constant struggle between the individual's desire for instinctual gratification and the dynamics of social repression was a crucial starting point for Marcuse, who wanted to understand the psychological embeddedness of the antagonistic character of society and the manner in which this was reproduced both *within* and *over* the individual. For Marcuse the quest for such understanding held the promise of emancipation.

As a fundamental starting point, Marcuse embraced Freud's typographical depiction of the mind with its id, ego, super-ego, conscious and unconscious realms but, in a more overt Marxian twist, linked the typography to broader (repressive) institutions:

> ... parental influence remains the core of the superego. Subsequently, a number of societal and cultural influences are taken in by the superego until it coagulates into the powerful representative of established morality ... now the "external restrictions" which first the parents and then other societal agencies have imposed upon the individual are "introjected" into the ego and becomes its "conscience". (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 31–32)

The super-ego, *as both an ego-ideal and as a censor*, was conceived as being fashioned to accept the systematic social restraints as though they are 'needs' that are to be realised. This psychological embeddedness of restraint and the particular nature of that restraint, Marcuse argued, has to be understood in a specific historical context "and judged as to whether such systems of domination exceeded their bounds" (Giroux, 1983, p. 26). Similarly, in the case of one of the central conflicts identified by Freud – between the reality and pleasure principles – Marcuse did not agree that the antagonistic relationship was either a 'natural' or a necessarily permanent feature of civilisation. Diverting pleasure in the face of 'reality' need not continue.

Using Freud's terminology and some of the same conceptual framework, Marcuse argued that each society has material conditions that operate as a *reality principle*. The reality principle can take a different form in different societies. In capitalist societies, the specific reality principle that applies is one based on a *performance principle* – under whose rule "society is stratified according to the competitive economic performance of its members" (Marcuse, 1955, p. 44). This performance principle, Marcuse believed, had outstripped its historical function. Moreover, as Luke (1994) observed, this performance principle, like many of the performance principles "of advanced industrial societies have been based on the destructive energies of Thanatos" (p. 194). Scarcity is no longer a universal feature of society and therefore, it is no longer 'necessary' to submit individuals to the demands of alienating labour that were engendered through the application of this principle. In Western societies, scarcity is historically outdated and is in need of replacement. In this context Marcuse noted that a degree of repression was 'necessary', in that it was socially useful but in this case it was excessive – "surplus repression". Marcuse captured the relationship of these notions when he argued:

> ... while any form of the reality principle demands a considerable degree and scope of repressive control over the instincts, the specific historical institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of domination introduce *additional* controls over and above those indispensable for civilized human association. Those additional controls arising from the specific institutions of domination are what we denote as *surplus-repression* ... the modifications and deflections of instinctual energy necessitated by the perpetuation of the monogamic-patriarchical family, or by a hierarchical division of labor, or by public control over individual's private existence are

> instances of surplus-repression pertaining to the institutions of a *particular* reality principle. (1955, pp. 37–38)

In his further examination of the dynamics of the process of repression, Marcuse extended Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex (using a male child in his example):

> The revolt against the primal father eliminated an individual person who could be (and was) replaced by other persons; but when the domination of the father had expanded into the domination of society, no such replacement seemed possible, and the guilt becomes fatal ... The father, restrained in the family and in his individual biological authority, is resurrected, far more powerful, in the administration which preserves the life of society, and in the laws which preserve the administration ... there is no freedom from administration and its laws because they appear as the ultimate guarantors of liberty. (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 91–92)

The replacement of the parent by society, and the laws which preserve its administration, ensures obedience. The same psyche that hindered the revolt against the parent similarly discourages revolt against society. Atkinson (1971) incisively captured the essence of what Marcuse suggested:

> The individual wants to conform with them because he has internalized the values that legitimize them. But he also has to conform with them, for to break them would involve the powerful psychological constraint of guilt.
>
> It is only in this sense that the individual is seen as determined and his nature is being infinitely manipulable by the structure of pre-existing society. The individual does not know he is determined, openly coming to want to behave in ways demanded of him. His basic instincts are, in the process, manipulated and repressed to the extent that he may actually disown or fail to recognize them. Should he consciously wish to act at variance with himself, mechanisms inside his personality make sure that such action fails. (Atkinson, 1971, p. 39)

Freud saw repression as necessary for society to survive. Marcuse was to highlight how such repression was not only reproduced within the individual but how, simultaneously, individuals unwittingly become

participants in the continuation of their own servitude. Repression is reproduced both *in* (i.e., through the super-ego as both an ego-ideal and as a censor) and *over* (i.e., through the reality principle of the ego that takes note of the institutionalised repressive agencies in society) the individual (see Carr, 1989). For Marcuse, repression should be viewed as both a psychological and political phenomenon. Marcuse suggested that there would be a transformation of the current performance principle as contradictions continued to emerge from the operation of the specific reality principle in the various institutions. Citizens would no longer tolerate what was in fact surplus repression. Transformation and emancipation of the individual will thus occur through changes to repressive agencies in society.

At this juncture we can briefly pause and readily appreciate how in our vignette related to firewalking, notions of a reality principle and surplus repression are evident. Clearly, the individuals at Burger King and Kentucky Fried (feet) had absorbed the corporate message of competitive strength through teamwork and that they were all being challenged by the task of firewalking as a sign of their team spirit. The fact that, in the case of Kentucky Fried (feet) 20 people needed to be hospitalised and 10 needed treatment at the scene, leads one to ask: "Why did 30 people even have to attempt this ridiculous feat (sic)?" When one person was obviously 'burnt', why did others continue to attempt the exercise? The inherent yearning of wanting to belong was clearly being abused as a motivational force. Here, we witness the inordinate repression of others' sensible fear in the interests of belonging and increasing the competitive edge of the company.

Marcuse mounted a critique of neo-Freudian revisionism and what he saw as "the mutilation of the instinct theory" (1955, p. 273) – particularly in the work of Karen Horney. In his rebuff to Horney, Marcuse said that Freud:

> did not assume that we live in order to destroy; the destruction instinct operates either against the life instincts or in their service; moreover, the objective of the death instinct is not destruction *per se* but the elimination of the need for destruction. (Marcuse, 1955, p. 271; see also Horney, 1939/1966, pp. 120–132)

In making this 'correction', Marcuse was highlighting the manner in which the death instinct had a capacity to act in the service of the life instinct. Marcuse engaged in some 'revisionism' of his own by going beyond Freud's assumption of the natural/biological continuance of the dual-instinct nature of human kind. Marcuse argued that:

> The death instinct operates under the Nirvana principle; it tends toward that state of 'constant gratification' where no tension is felt – a state without want ... If the instinct's basic objective is not the termination of life but of pain – the absence of tension – then paradoxically, in terms of instinct, the conflict between life and death is more reduced, the closer life approximates the state of gratification. Pleasure principle and Nirvana principle then converge. At the same time, Eros, freed from surplus repression would be strengthened, and the strengthened Eros would, as it were, absorb the objective of the death instinct. The instinctual value of death would have changed; if the instincts pursued and attained their fulfillment in a non-repressive order, the regressive compulsion would lose much of its biological rationale. As suffering and want recede, the Nirvana principle may become reconciled with the reality principle. The unconscious attraction that draws the instincts back to an "earlier state" would be effectively counteracted by the desirability of the attained state of life. The "conservative nature" of the instincts would come to rest in a fulfilled present. Death would cease to be an instinctual goal. (1955, pp. 234–235)

Thus, although it might take that form, the aim of the 'death' instinct was not in fact destruction as such, but "the tension that was life" (Jay, 1973/1996, p. 110). In changed social circumstances the two instincts could, potentially, become one.

Marcuse shifted the ground somewhat by suggesting that in a large part, liberation resided in the changing of socio-economic conditions. Indeed, in a passage reminiscent of Freud's explanation of the recurring traumatic dreams of soldiers that he argued were due to the absence of "binding" of the original experiences, Marcuse, in continuing his rebuff of Horney's revisionist view of the death instinct, also argued that:

> the energy of the death instinct does not necessarily "paralyze" the efforts to obtain a "better future"; on the contrary, such efforts are paralyzed by the systematic constraints which civilization places on the life instincts, and by their consequent inability to "bind" aggression effectively. The realization of a "better future" involves far more than the elimination of the bad features of the "market", of the "ruthlessness" of competition, and so on; it involves a fundamental change in the instinctual as well as cultural structure. (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 272–273)

In an earlier passage in the same work, Marcuse similarly argued:

> Strengthened defense against aggression is necessary; but in order to be effective the defense against enlarged aggression would have to strengthen the sex instincts, for only a strong Eros can effectively 'bind' the destructive instincts. And this is precisely what the *developed civilization is incapable of doing* because it depends for its very existence on extended and intensified regimentation and control. The chain of inhibitions and deflections of instinctual aims cannot be broken. (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 80–81)

Marcuse actually concluded this paragraph with a sentence from Freud saying: "Our civilization is, generally speaking, founded on the suppression of instincts" (Freud, 1908/1985, p. 38 cited in Marcuse, 1955, p. 81).

Alford (1985) nicely summarised the Marcusean logic that is inherit in this issue on effective binding when he said:

> Why are the erotic instincts currently incapable of "binding" the aggression expressed by science and technology? ... Repression under high levels of technological progress not only weakens eros but also calls forth even more aggression, as individuals unconsciously recognize that this progress eliminates the need for repression. However, there is an even more fundamental reason. Eros loses its power to bind aggression unless it is free from social control. Eros stems from resistance to the reality principle, from resistance to the demand that pleasure be postponed. This is why, according to Marcuse, the controlled, or repressive, desublimation of eros does not work to bind aggression. Contemporary sexual liberation, which can be seen not only in the relaxation of morals but also in such things as "sexy clothes" or "sexy cars", simply serves the prevailing social order. Real eros rejects such controlled, socially sanctioned pleasures. For eros to be able to penetrate the "dialectic of civilization" and thus stabilize technological aggression, nothing less than total transformation of society is necessary. (p. 41)

The Marcusean analysis of a death instinct draws attention to the manner in which Eros is constrained by repressive apparatus that are superimposed in the individual psyche by particular social interests that are best served by the current performance principle (see Marcuse, 1964, p. 5). Moreover, Marcuse also pointed out the manner in which

the energy of the death instinct is socially channeled into destructiveness. Indeed, the relative balance between Eros and Thanatos is significantly a social contrivance that can be altered but, as he argued in a preface to the 1966 reprint of *Eros and civilization*, this balance is ultimately a political fight in which the meaning of the simple slogan that emerged during the protests against the Vietnam war said it all – MAKE LOVE NOT WAR (see Marcuse, 1955/1966, pp. xi–xxv). In his work *One dimensional man*, Marcuse used a logic that obviated the 'need' for the death instinct when he said:

> Assuming that the Destruction Instinct (in the last analysis: the Death Instinct) is a large component of the energy that feeds the technical conquest of man and nature, it seems that society's growing capacity to manipulate technical progress also increases its *capacity to manipulate and control this instinct*, i.e., to satisfy it "productively". The social cohesion would be strengthened at the deepest instinctual root. (Marcuse, 1964, p. 79)

Rather than two classes of instincts being dualistic and antagonistic in character, Marcuse thus came to regard them as what Alford also nicely described as "displaceable energy that is able to join forces with either the erotic or destructive impulses" (1994b, p. 134). Summarily, when the ego invests in excessive amounts of Thanatic energy from self, diminished Erotic energy and negative returns or losses occur for other. But most important for Marcuse, was that in the short term, excessive Erotic energy introjected by the ego from super-ego/ego-ideal generates positive returns for other; but for self, the investment actually conforms to the principles of diminishing returns and Thanatic results. The location of the destructive energies of Thanatos in the current performance principle and the repressive forms that this energy may take, pushes Freudian orthodoxy on the dual-instinct theory in a different direction. In other words, Marcuse spoke to Freud's theories but in terms of object relations or reiterations of perhaps, object use and abuse (Ogden, 1989).

In his examination of liberation of Eros, Marcuse placed before us a detailed analysis of the socio-cultural and economic forms of repression and why they have become so potent as 'constituencies' in psychodynamics. *Whereas Freud, Klein and Spielrein clearly resonate on the matter of how Thanatos is energy that can be inwardly directed in psychopathologies, such as depression, Marcuse directs our attention to the manner in which Eros is diverted in the face of the performance principle to*

join this destructive energy of Thanatos and produce a society characterized by dehumanizing, explorative and alienating forms of labour.

We interpret Marcuse to show that it is both the super-ego and ego that draw energy from the ego's id but in an iterative process. Threatening aspects of others' ego-ideal or others' Eros, summon forth the self's Thanatos that is fear of isolation from the ego-ideal that must be repressed through the ego's pulling of Eros from the id. The more Eros the ego pulls, the more production follows that feeds the super-ego's Eros and so on and so on. Others' escalating Eros increases the self's inability to perform to spiraling standards and amounts of demanded production that in turn, generates spiraling self Thanatos or memories of isolation from the primal ego-ideal. Perceived factors of isolation are repressed to minimise tension and avoid unpleasure. The consequence is engulfment by the ego-ideal to the extent that its Eros replaces self-Eros. Self invests its Thanatos to increase Eros only to experience diminishing returns. The result is a dominating performance principle that is Thanatic because it represses the individual's ability to minimise displeasure, which is one critical aspect of self-Eros. The other critical aspect is of course, the maximisation of pleasure. Marcuse believed that it is the external world and culture, imprinted in the psyche that prevents us from realising excesses of primitive impulses.

Briefly interrupting: Marcuse, dialectics and the conflict with Fromm

Before we move on to further describe the significance of the work of Marcuse for the field of organisation studies, we think it apposite to discuss a little further the point of departure from Freudian orthodoxy in which Marcuse contemplated the demise and absence of a death instinct. This departure is one of the matters that brought him into conflict with one of his fellow Frankfurt School scholars and, in our view, also brings him into conflict with the foundational logic of his own argument.

In 1955, Marcuse's volume *Eros and civilization* was published and with the exception of Erich Fromm, did not draw public comment from any of his fellow Frankfurt School scholars. This critique was contained in the last chapter of Marcuse's *Eros and civilization* (1955) and was entitled "Critique of neo-Freudian revisionism", but this text had appeared in the journal *Dissent* earlier in 1955 as an article entitled "The social implications of 'revisionism'". The text was a particularly savage criticism of

both Horney and Fromm. It was the pages of the journal *Dissent* (see Fromm, 1955, 1956; Marcuse, 1956) that subsequently carried the exchanges between these two Frankfurt School scholars. We agree with one commentator's assessment that Fromm's effort to defend himself and other neo-Freudians was "rather feeble" (Robinson, 1969, p. 196). In this 'robust' exchange, Fromm (1955, p. 349) accused Marcuse of "nihilism" and irresponsible hedonism with "callousness towards moral qualities". We would agree with Robinson's (1969) summary that:

> Marcuse showed that the revisionists had arrived at their ameliorative conclusions by abandoning the hard, unpleasant facts of Freud's depth psychology: the preponderant role of sexuality in human psychology, the function of the unconscious, the primacy of childhood, the death instinct, and the theory of the primal crime. They were thus guilty of both intellectual cowardice and theoretical shallowness. ... In particular Marcuse objected to the revisionists' claim to have "added" a sociological dimension to Freud's psychology: he objected both because of their apparent ignorance of the profoundly sociological character of Freud's thought and because of their unsystematic notion that a social dimension could be tacked on an individual psychology. (pp. 196–197)

In his volume *The crisis of psychoanalysis* (1970), Fromm again took up his critique of Marcuse, albeit some 15 years later (see also Fromm, circa 1970/1993). Fromm (1979/1982), in his book *Greatness and limitations of Freud's thought,* also indirectly 'critiqued' the Freudian foundationalism of Marcuse, through his direct critique of "Freud's instinct theory" (pp. 102–132). This is one of the criticisms that Fromm continued to make of Marcuse in his reading of the death instinct. In the course of a critique of what Fromm deemed to be Marcuse's advocacy of a return to an infant-like existence, Fromm succinctly put his critique of Marcuse's rending of the death instinct by way of a footnote:

> While there are many other instances of Marcuse's misunderstanding or distorting Freud's theory, I want to mention only one more – the way in which he represents Freud's death instinct. Freud speaks of death instinct and destructive instinct often synonomously and sometime in terms of the destructiveness being rooted in the death instinct. But whatever the terminology, death instinct has as its aim to destroy, and this destruction operates either against man himself or against the outer world. By an act of mental juggling, Marcuse

> constructs a new interpretation of the death instinct. 'If the instinct's basic objective is not the termination of life but of pain – the absence of tension – then paradoxically, in terms of the instinct, the conflict between life and death is the more reduced, the closer life approximates the state of gratification' (Marcuse, 1955: 235). This interpretation of Freud's death instinct goes beyond the limits of legitimate interpretation since it negates the very essence of the Freudian concept. (Fromm, circa 1970/1993, p. 206)

Interestingly Martin Jay (1973/1996) also pinpointed this same reasoning by Marcuse to suggest that "most orthodox adherents of Freud would agree, Marcuse was as much a revisionist as Fromm or Horney, albeit in a different direction" (p. 110). It is our view that in metatheorising the operation of the death instinct at the level of society, Marcuse has overlooked the manner in which Freud construed the death instinct as a *class* of instincts. Marcuse reduced the death instinct to being one of destruction and in so doing severely overlooks the manner in which the death instinct also acts in the service of the individual. The death instinct, in its expression as aggression, may serve to sustain life as well as enable the individual to undertake life-affirming activity. Similarly, the assumption that freedom and relief from alienating forms of labour is enacted from the defeat of the conservative expression of the death instinct in the guise of repression and sublimation is an assumption that overlooked the manner in which repression and sublimation function in the service of the ego's good stewardship of Eros. The ego will seek to satisfy the expression of the drive Eros, but needs to do so when appropriate opportunities present themselves. In this manner the conservative expression of the death instinct acts in the longer-term interests of Eros.

Another objection we have to Marcuse's argument that the death instinct can be abolished, is in the contradiction to the form of logic that has guided his argument to that point. Earlier we noted that the Frankfurt School scholars championed a process of critique called critical theory. This form of critique presupposes, and is imbued, with dialectic logic. Indeed, Marcuse, in *Eros and civilization*, argued that "Freud's metapsychology comes face-to-face with the fatal *dialectic of civilization*: the very progress of civilization leads to the release of increasingly destructive forces" (1955/1966, p. 54, italics added emphasis). As we noted, it was Marcuse's view that the performance principle was curtailing Eros. One commentator argued that: "In true Hegelian fashion, Marcuse's reinterpretation was thoroughly dialectical

(pp. 200–210) ... Marcuse viewed civilisation as a dialectical struggle between the forces of Love and Death, in which the defeat of Thanatos could be assured only through the liberation of Eros" (Robinson, 1969, pp. 200–210 & 213). However, we find the positing of the abolition or disappearance of the death instinct distinctly undialectical. To understand this objection we need to clearly be appraised of what we mean by the use of the term dialectic.

In *Notes on Hegel's Logic,* it was Lenin who wrote: "Dialectics may be briefly defined as the theory of the unity of opposites" (cited and translated in Guest, 1939, p. 51). 'Opposites' are viewed not as existing as being in stark contrast to each other, but existing in unity. Hegel expressed this relationship by arguing that:

> Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. The two however are at bottom the same; the name of either might be transformed to the other. ... The North Pole of the magnet cannot be without the South Pole and *vice versa.* ... In opposition the difference is not confronted by *any* other, but by *its* other. (cited and translated in Wallace, 1975, p. 222)

The co-existence of opposites is viewed as the essential contradictory character of reality. It was this contradictory character that provided the evidence of the manner in which things developed. Lenin was to describe contradiction as "the salt of dialectics" and argued that "the division of the one and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the *essence* of dialectics" (Guest, 1939, p. 48, italics is original emphasis). Hegel viewed dialectical thought as akin to "dialogue" in which the conflict of opinion results in the emergence of a 'new' viewpoint. The dialectic, as such, was conceived as a "motion" involving three 'moments': thesis, antithesis and synthesis. McTaggart (1896) captured this dynamic when he noted:

> The relation of the thesis and the antithesis derives its whole meaning from the synthesis, which follows them, and in which the contradiction ceases to exist as such ... An unreconciled predication of two contrary categories, for instance Being and not-Being, of the same thing, would lead in the dialectic ... to scepticism if it was not for the reconciliation in Becoming ... [Thus] the really fundamental aspect of the dialectic is not the tendency of the finite category to negate itself but to complete itself. (pp. 9–10)

One "moment" of the dialectic process gives rise to its own negation. The process is comparable to tragedy in which the protagonist is brought down as a result of the dynamics inherent in her or his own character. What emerges from the dialectic of affirmation and negation is a transcendent moment that at once negates, affirms, and incorporates all the previous moments. Thus, the thesis should be understood to have possessed the seeds of its antithesis all along. If thought focuses appropriately on the reciprocal relationship between the thesis and antithesis, a synthesis emerges. The synthesis is the understanding of the unity that holds between the two apparent opposites, and which permits their simultaneous existence (see Lapp & Carr, 2006).

The familiar triadic structure of Hegelian (1807/1977) thought is, thus, not simply a series of building blocks. Each triad represents a process wherein the synthesis absorbs and completes the two prior terms, following which the entire triad is absorbed into the next higher process. Hegel himself preferred to refer to the dialectic as a system of negations, rather than triads. His purpose was to overcome the static nature of traditional philosophy and capture the dynamics of reflective thought. The essence of the dialectic is this ability to see wholes and the conflict of parts simultaneously. As Adorno (1956/1984, p. 38) expressed it, "Dialectics is the quest to see the new in the old instead of just the old in the new. As it mediates the new, so it also preserves the old as the mediated". Rather than viewing matters in linear cause-and-effect terms, dialectical thinking calls attention to the ongoing reciprocal effects of our social world (See Carr, 2000, 2005; Carr & Zanetti, 1999; Horkheimer, 1935/1993, 1937/1976).

In its invoking of the examination of "opposites", one needs to be clear that the Frankfurt School scholars were not suggesting that one could simply see the world through an optic of dualism or that in some distorted form of logic dialectics could be reduced to a world of dualisms. Indeed, Adorno (cited in Arato & Gebhardt, 1982/1993, p. 396) noted: "Dialectical thought is the attempt to break through the coercive character of logic with the means of logic itself." Dialectical thought steps within the framework of an argument to offer its critique. Juxtaposition, static opposition, and simple divisions certainly exist, but these are, by definition, undialectical and simple dualisms, since dialectic thinking requires that the conditions and circumstances of the whole be taken into consideration as well. The pervasiveness of binary oppositional thinking often finds the term dialectic mistakenly used to denote a simple binary of opposites where the dialectical contradiction (the thesis-antithesis) is in some fashion conceived as an absolute.

Dialectical relationships do not express simply existence and non-existence; they also recognise the other possibilities available in the whole. As Arato and Gebhardt (1982/1993, p. 398) thoughtfully noted by way of an example: "the dialectical contradiction of 'a' is not simply 'non-a' but 'b', 'c', 'd', and so on – which, in their attempt at self-assertion and self-realization, are all fighting for the same historical space." Horkheimer (1935/1993) gave other examples of such dialectic logic and suggested we need to think in terms of substantive opposites rather than formal/logical positivist/logical empiricist ones to help in understanding our assumptions. He gave an example of the contradiction to "straight" which formal logic might seem to suggest is "non-straight", but Horkheimer offered other negations: "curved"; "interrupted"; and "zigzag". Another example might be to recognise that there are multiple negations to power: resistance, powerlessness, and quiescence, all of which have different relationships to power and consequently different dialectical resolutions. Thus, "true logic, as well as true rationalism, must go beyond form to include substantive elements as well" (Jay, 1973/1996, p. 55).

While Marcuse did add significantly to the thinking of Adorno and Horkheimer in relation to the concept of dialectics (see for example Marcuse, 1960/1993) and used dialectic logic as a critical logic, his argument that the death instinct would disappear is contrary to dialectical thinking. To assert the concrete, or the current reality, is also to simultaneously deny an other. To assert the realm of life instincts or Eros is to simultaneously bring forth its opposite(s) (i.e., it is defined in large part by what it stands in contrast). The opposition is inherent in the totality, in the same way death is implicit in birth. Similarly, to say that water is 'hot' is to simultaneously speak of what it is not (i.e., cold). The consideration of other possibilities appears to have eluded Marcuse as an outcome of not considering his argument in a dialectical manner.[8]

Organisational studies: Marcuse, Spielrein, Freud, and Klein

The work of Marcuse certainly brings to the forefront the manner in which the life and death instincts, in 'normal' psychodynamic processes, are open to culturally derived manipulation. In the course of making such an argument, Marcuse raised a number of issues that the field of organisational studies may wish to consider.

In revealing the manner in which repression is reproduced both within and over individuals, the extent to which that repression is

"surplus" is an important issue to consider. To what degree is the field complicit in helping to legitimise or justify what is surplus repression? Similarly, to what degree does the field seek to act as part of the repressive regime and in what aspects does the field generate 'guidance' that is little more than justifying political servitude? As we alluded to in an earlier chapter, it can certainly be argued that many of our University courses that 'teach' leadership, management and administration, and certainly many MBA courses, impart a 'technical' orientation to the would-be leaders, managers and administrators. In such an orientation, social relations are conceived in a positivistic manner as being 'technical problems', which instill an ill-founded level of confidence in the 'tool kit' for fixing the problems – feeding the fantasy of control we discussed in an earlier chapter – and removes areas of social relations from political debate (see Carr, 1989). This technical orientation has a tendency to abstract the organisation from its environment and predominately embrace behaviourist assumptions of human behaviour.

Whilst Marcuse was to inspire a more dialectical view of organisations, in his consideration of the repression of Eros, we are drawn to consider the degree to which our organisational theories are fundamentally about control. The notion of surplus repression is one that challenges us to reflexively consider the degree to which bureaucratic rules and other forms of control are indeed 'surplus'. In chapter two we made a similar point arising from the implications of Freud's notion that some forms of compulsion and repetition were expressions of a death instinct.


In the previous chapter, we noted the manner in which an organisation may impart its values and attitudes in a psychological phenomenon of an organisation-ideal. The process of identification, and the rewards that flow from seeking to meet such an ideal, may result in a degree of employee compliance and commitment. Marcuse, with his pinpointing of the current reality principle as a performance principle, provided us with an insight as to how the broader socio-cultural context becomes psychologically embedded and, in so doing, provided us with the basis for an explanation of why organisational structure and processes are typically based upon hierarchy and competitive performance. This is not to reify such arrangements, but to beg the reflexive questions regarding the degree to which work organisations 'feel' a need to continually reinforce and largely derive their motivating and controlling 'regimes' from what amounts to the destructive energies of Thanatos.

An example in which motivating and controlling 'regimes' linked to the psychodynamics of identification has been clearly articulated in the field of organisation studies can be noted in the notion of a psychological contract. Those conversant with the field of organisation studies may recall that the notion of a psychological contract was coined by Edgar Schein (1970) who argued:

> The notion of a psychological contract implies that the individual has a variety of expectations of the organization and that the organization has a variety of expectations of him. These expectations not only cover how much work is to be performed for how much pay, but also involve the whole pattern of rights, privileges, and obligations between worker and organization. (p. 12)

For Schein, the psychological contract is a reciprocation dynamic where contributions and inducements are involved as depicted below, in Figure 4.1. The dynamic was thought to be an unfolding interactive process of mutual influence and bargaining between employee and employer. The name "reciprocation" was originally used by Levinson (1963) and employed by Schein in an attempt to convey the give and take that is implied.

Figure 4.1 The psychological contract: Contribution-inducement exchange process



Source: Adapted from Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn, 1988, p. 38; see also Carr, 1996, p. 71.


According to Schein (1970), in this contribution-inducement dynamic the organisation was primarily seeking compliance of the employee, using authority as leverage. Barnard (1938) and Simon (1957) conceived compliance in organisations to be a balance of "inducement-contribution" (their terminology). In their discussions, they also included notions of the "zone of indifference", or as in Simon's case, the "zone of acceptance". Both Barnard and Simon viewed the inducement-contribution issue as one of ensuring acceptance of authority. Interestingly, Schein conceived authority as simultaneously a part of the psychological contract and an instrument to enforce the psychological contract. Schein argued:

> The organization expects the employee to obey its authority; the employee expects the organization to be fair and just in dealing with him. The organization enforces its expectation through the use of whatever power and authority it has. The employee enforces his expectations through attempts to influence the organization or by withholding his participation and involvement, as when he goes on strike or becomes alienated and apathetic. (1970, p. 51; see also Carr, 1996)

To reinforce the contention that employee involvement was a natural outcome of the rewards and kinds of authority used in an organisation, Schein was also drawn to the work of Amitai Etzioni (1961, 1964). Etzioni suggested that the type of involvement displayed by an employee was closely related to the forms of power and authority used in the organisation, of which there are three types: a) coercive – e.g. threat and physical sanctions; b) utilitarian – e.g. material and economic rewards; or c) normative – e.g. symbolic rewards and intrinsic value rewards. Concomitantly, employees would exhibit three ranges of involvement: a) alienative – e.g. related to degrees of hostility; b) calculative – e.g. to maintain long-term relationships; and c) moral (i.e. pure and social) – e.g.:

> Pure moral commitments are based on internalization of norms and identification with authority...; social commitment rests on sensitivity to pressures of primary groups and their members... Pure moral involvement tends to develop in vertical relationships, such as those between teachers and students, priests and parishioners, leaders and followers. Social involvement tends to develop in horizontal relationships like those in various types of primary groups. Both pure moral and social orientations might be found in the same relationships, but, as a rule, one orientation predominates. (Etzioni, 1961, pp. 10–11)

Figure 4.2 Etzioni's compliance types



Source: Adapted from Etzioni, 1961.

By taking the three types of power and the three types of involvement, Etzioni produced the now familiar typology with nine possible relationships. This typology is shown in Figure 4.2, Etzioni's compliance types.

While all nine were possible, Etzioni argued that three types of power and involvement were congruent: coercive-alienative; utilitarian-calculative; and, normative-moral. He argued that these congruent types were the most effective relationships and that the non-congruent relationships would place an organisation under a natural strain towards congruence (p. 87).

By arguing that the three congruent types constituted "workable and 'just' psychological contracts" (Schein, 1970, p. 53), Schein incorporated Etzioni's positivist, structural functionalist and naturalistic version of the world:

> Actors are means to each other in alienative and in calculative relations; but they are ends to each other in "social" relationships. In pure moral relationships the means-orientation tends to predominate. Hence, for example, the willingness of devoted members of totalitarian parties or religious orders to use each other. But unlike the means-orientation of calculative relationships, the means-orientation here is expected to be geared to needs of the collectivity in serving its goals, and not to those of an individual. (Etzioni, 1961, p. 11)

This naturalistic and structural functionalist orientation was also an aspect of the psychological contract that was seriously questioned. For example, Salaman (1979) argued:

> (W)hat is seriously wrong with the classification is the causal mechanism which Etzioni argues achieves these interrelationships ... . Its main and basic drawback is that it removes observed features of organizations, and interrelationships between organizational attributes, from the realm of discussion and choice (and alteration) and presents them as universal laws, as 'functional imperatives'. (p. 60, italics is added emphasis)

While the Schein-Etzioni vision is highly descriptive, what goes unexplained is not only the 'why' of such congruency occurrences but also the origins of the 'how'. An explanation of the psychological underpinning of the typology is conspicuous by its absence. Are we to presume that this is a natural order of things and leave it at that? Schein's notion of the psychological contract was devoid of any dynamic causal mechanism other than being a *mutually* bargained outcome. In establishing the psychological contract, although issues of 'fairness' and 'choice' are implied, they are addressed only as conscious phenomenon. Additionally, the degree of 'mutualness' of the contract goes largely unexamined. These problems seem to be partially acknowledged by Schein (1970) when he stated:

> Ultimately the relationship between the individual and the organization is interactive, unfolding through mutual influence and mutual bargaining to establish a workable psychological contract ... The two interact in a complex fashion, requiring us to develop theories and research approaches which can deal with systems and interdependent phenomena.
>
> Furthermore, we must develop concepts which can deal with the process by which the psychological contract is initially negotiated ... and the process by which it is renegotiated during the employee's organizational career. (pp. 77–78)

The absence of psychodynamics within the language of organisational studies has negated the intrinsic 'hows' of compliance behaviour that are implicitly stated but explicitly recognised in Schein's and others' definitions on the psychological contract. The work of Marcuse

and some of the psychodynamic processes that we have already described, explained not only the manner in which a psychological contract is 'transacted', but gives us a clear understanding of how such contracts can assume a life of their own that are counter to the psychological health of the individual's themselves.

As a starting point, it needs to be recognised that the psychological contract exists in a space that is in the middle of the two parties; it is used and abused by both parties to transition wants into needs and to communicate their terms to each other. Used to bridge the organisation's fantasy of the employee's total compliance with the employee's reality and the employee's fantasy of the organisation's total compliance to that of the organisation's reality, the psychological contract is a textual, contextual transitional object (Winnicott, 1971; see also Carr, 2003a). As long as the psychological contract is not breached, both parties are seen to be mutually compliant.

Instrumentally, psychodynamic theory would lead us to conclude that 'idealised' compliance is established in childhood: "The awareness of various levels of meaning of our memories, our symptoms, our dreams and our stories is extremely important for understanding the meaning of the re-enactment of the past in the present" (Steuerman, 2000, p. 54). Through the process of identification, compliance results from the unending process of having normal narcissism served through others' recognition of self that confers self-esteem and love (Alford, 1988, 1994a; Kernberg, 1995; Laing, 1961/1969). It is in childhood that the first psychological contract has been drawn.

When the child first realises parents' attempts to minimise the child's dependence upon them, within the child are triggered feelings of isolation from their reassurance (Klein, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d). So, it is also in childhood that the first psychological contract has been broken. To ease this alienating transition toward independence, the infant finds and uses substitutes to reconnect its self with aspects that symbolise parental presence (Carr & Lapp, 2006a, 2006c). These substitutes are transitional objects with which the child plays (Winnicott, 1971).

The child creates a set of rules for the transitional object's use and abuse (Ogden, 1982, 1989) that seem like forms of play but is really the child's first serious job. Since each child has a unique, narcissistic view of how and why the transitional object is required, it is the child who must be allowed to treat the object as though it is solely in her or his power. Although the child may be too young to articulate these rules, other forms of language are used to corroborate this power. When these rules are not followed, the child perceives this non-compliance as

punishment. It is also learned that its contrary, compliance, is non-punishable. Thus compliance has its genesis in childhood psychological *contracting* that is quite different from, but instrumentally integral to, the objectified psychological contract that seems to be the foundation for the cognitive discourse on this topic in the field of organisation studies (Carr & Lapp, 2006a, 2006b).

Clearly, interactions between organisation and employee trigger repressed childhood memories of compliance and non-compliance. We would also contend that the psychological contract is a transitional object with which the organisation and each individual employee 'plays' to fulfil both normal and excessive narcissistic needs. The psychological contract is not only intra-subjective, but also inter-subjective with emphasis "on the fully contextual interaction of subjectivities with reciprocal, mutual influence" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 167). From our earlier chapter and other work (see Carr, 1989, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001; Hocking & Carr, 1996; Mason & Carr, 1999, 2000) it should be readily understood that in the psychodynamics of identification the employee is 'encouraged' – induced – to absorb and espouse the values and attitudes of the organisation as an 'ideal'. In a sense a significant part of the ego-ideal is 'replaced' by an organisation-ideal. In circumstances where identifications are continually reinforced through various forms of gratification or inducements, the narcissistic pleasure for the ego in being able to move toward the achievement of the ego-ideal is such that the prohibitive aspect of the super-ego may be disregarded or corrupted into acceptance of such values. It is in such a context that the psychological contract can be seen as a process heavily laced with unconscious psychological seducement rather than a conscious mutual-bargaining. This said, it is the work of Marcuse that suggested the possibility that being drawn to an ego-ideal (organisation-ideal) that itself is premised on 'false' needs or contrived needs not in the best interests of the employee, is more than possible when narcissistic pleasure and identity are involved. Thus, the 'inducements' are not necessarily the overt pay and conditions that are on offer but the psychological 'rewards' for compliance. A 'regime' of overt inducements that are founded upon Thanatic influences such as competitive performance, become recycled as an ideal to be achieved in order to gain psychological pleasure and simultaneously avoid the psychological pain of isolation and no-recognition by this 'powerful' symbolic entity called the 'organisation'. It is in this sense that the 'carrots' simultaneously become 'sticks'. In a previous work we used the words from a popular song to capture this psychodynamic: "Bend me, shape me, anyway you want me, as long as

you love me it's alright" (see Carr, 1993). It is the work of Marcuse coupled with an understanding of some psychodynamic processes that highlights our aforementioned 'hows' of compliance behaviour and simultaneously sheds light on how individual employees can be accepting of attitudes, values and practices that would otherwise be deemed as unethical, inhuman and/or abhorrent.

Resonance

The work of Marcuse, whilst it does in some aspects represent a different position on the existence and continuance of a death instinct, does have a resonance with the work of Freud as, for example, we just noted in respect to organisational preoccupation with forms of control (Carr & Lapp, 2006b). There is also a resonance with some aspects of the work of Klein and Spielrein particularly in the explanation of behaviour that makes employees feel as though they are in some way, too inadequate. Such persecutorial affectation calls excessively upon their Thanatos to overcome their own Eros, repressing it so as to have enough to invest in the Eros of the organisation-ideal. The result is a dominating performance principle that is Thanatic because it represses the individual's ability to minimise displeasure that is one aspect of self-Eros – the other being the maximisation of pleasure. Self-Eros represents the investments we make in our organisations in such a way that we can no longer separate good from bad work interests or experience the differences between life and death.

The separate and collective voices of Freud, Klein and Spielrein are instructive in revealing the various ways and means in which we harden ourselves against our own libidinal energy. In so doing, organisations and employees neglect the dialectic of self and other in which they are both inducers and contributors. With such recursive exchanges of Erostic and Thanatic energy, surplus repression then becomes a phenomenon 'over' and 'within' the workplace itself. The consequence is that the organisation becomes an unwitting contributor to its own servitude of maintaining 'old' methods in 'new' situations. It is in the wake of disabling the potential to adapt to environmental change that surplus repression eventually results in having to move graveyards.

5

Turning into One Another: The Death Instinct in Group Study

Individuals are influenced by introjected aspects of the super-ego, including the ego-ideal that we have shown are parental representatives. So, you would be dead right if you said that really, we have been talking about groups all along. What we have not yet explored are Erostic and Thanatic influences upon the self when interrelating with the group 'self' that has a competing but much less compromising identity of its own. The primal relationship is also the basis for discussion here – because when people of all ages are highly disturbed from group participation, it is memories of the primal relationship that prick the adult ego to release Erostic and Thanatic defences.

In this chapter, we look to the work of C. Fred Alford (1994a) and especially to his rendition of projective identification used by the de-developing individual that contributes to the dedeveloping group *and vice versa* (Alford, 1994a). We will find that when it comes to psychodynamic group theory, projective identification has its roots in a defence that is even more sinister and that is the *schizoid-compromise* (Alford, 1994a; Ogden, 1989). As we see it, varying degrees of the schizoid-compromise and its phases underscore most, if not all psychodynamic group theory that in turn, strongly influences leadership and followership and especially in 'new', 'bad' and 'new-bad' groups.

The following chapter also seeks to establish connections and highlight differences among our aforementioned and foremost theorists on the death instinct while adding posits from Le Bon (1895/1974), Bion (1961/2001) and Nitsun (1996). These postulates are also linked with those researchers and writers who speak more recently and more directly to identity dissolution, deindividuation, and dedifferentiation (Bradley & Marcia, 1998; Erikson, 1979; Marcia, 2002). Conclusions they have drawn also highly relate to instinctual drives that influence,

simultaneously, both individual and group identity dedevelopment that can be the deadly freefall from wisdom in maturity – with a crash! – back into mistrust and hopelessness of infancy:

> *Wisdom*, in whatever way it may be expressed, *is the detached and yet active concern with life itself in the face of death itself, and that it maintains and conveys the integrity of experience in spite of the Disdain over human failing and the Dread of ultimate non-being....* I have postulated that that the first and most basic human strength of Hope emerges from the conflict between Primal Trust and Primal Mistrust. Here the formulation goes: *Hope is the enduring belief in the attainability of primal wishes, in spite of the dark urges and rages which mark the beginnings of existence and leave a lasting residue of threatening Estrangement.* (Erikson, 1979, p. 60; see also p. 61)

The death instinct and its constituents contribute to adult *dedevelopment* or psychological regression that has as its parallels, reflexive mortality and identity dissolution. As this chapter unfolds, a question to contemplate is: Why can even the thoughts of being in a group "recall the earliest stage of individual development?" (Alford, 1994a, p. 52). The purpose of this chapter is to discuss why and how the group's Eros triggers both Erostic and Thanatic behaviours of its members.

Reflections on Eros and Thanatos working in organisations:

I want to be loved by you, just you and nobody else but you...

At the core of your company, there is a group of people who seem to call the shots. More precisely, all the shots seem to be called for their benefit.... The core group won't be found on any formal organization chart. It exists in the people's minds and hearts....This group generally (but not always) includes the people at the top of the hierarchy. But it may also include people who – because they are respected, popular, successful, or manipulative, or because they control access to some critical bottleneck – have gained the loyalty and attention of others throughout the company.

> ...Smart leaders are quick to sort out who belongs to this in crowd. They recognize that an organization can be led only in a manner that is consistent with the perceived attitudes of the core group. Anything considered to run contrary to the group's interests will be resisted (because employees will assume that their jobs require them to resist it) – even if the group members themselves say otherwise....
>
> Consider Lothar, a senior manager and innovative researcher at a consulting firm that had recently split off from a much larger electronics corporation. The new board was still working out the details of the separation when Marianne, the CEO, made an exultant speech at a company celebration, thanking all the people who had helped launch the new firm. Brad, the head of human resources, followed her...During their toasts, neither Marianne nor Brad mentioned Lothar; they honestly forgot him.... Only a few months [later] Lothar had learned he had been passed over for the job he had been promised as the head of research and he had to scramble quickly to find another position at his old corporate parent....
>
> Even in the most authoritarian organizations, the people in command know they can't rule through the power of their positions alone. Young U.S. Army lieutenants, fresh from West Point, discovered this during the Vietnam War when they tried to pull rank. The veteran troops razzed these new guys, openly disobeyed them, and sometimes even killed them. In most organizations, the stubborn fact is that we can confer legitimacy on anyone but ourselves. Indeed, what people conventionally call leadership is, at bottom, the ability to get people to confer legitimacy on us – and thus to get others to put us in the core group.
>
> There are powerful dynamics at work....Recent psychological research has shown that children are uncannily in sync with their mothers' moods and expressions and even their unconscious wishes. In a similar way employees tend to pick up on the unspoken true interests of core group members....
>
> This has a positive side....Core group members' attendance at a design meeting, even if they don't say anything, matters enormously in stimulating participants' creative output.... Unfortunately, it's not just creativity that can be rewarded this way. Deceit, inefficiency, moral cowardice, and general unaccountability can be rewarded too. The core group reinforces whatever it pays attention to. (Kleiner, 2003, pp. 86–89)

Symbiotic transcendence: Painful pleasure in groups

Individual psychology is really based upon group psychology (Bion, 1961/2001; De Board, 1978/2002) but group psychology cannot replace the need for individual psychology – they are not interchangeable (Alford, 1994a). "This means that we could know all about the individuals in the group, including all about how they are transformed in their relationships with others, and still be unable to explain the behaviour of the group" (Alford, 1994a, p. 15). Yet it is intrasubjectivity that is needed to explain intersubjectivity with emphasis "on the fully contextual interaction of subjectivities with reciprocal, mutual influence" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 167; see also Marcuse, 1955; Ogden, 1992a, 1992b). Intrasubjectivity of the group has its foundations within synchronous interrelationships among group members, the group itself, and the group's legitimate leader. One Erostic or Thanatic twist within any one or any combination of identities has an impact on all others, inside and out.

At a basic level, the group is comprised of one self or subject and one other or object, in physical or perceptual contiguity, who believe they are in a group (Alford, 1994a). Perceptual contiguity means having the perception, the belief, or the feeling that one is or will be close to or in proximity to an other. This vision, or the resultant predicted experience of being in a group, is proleptic: it is something that is believed will occur before its historical time. It is the projected past.

> Experience, as I want to employ the term, does not exist without an experiencer. An experiencer does not exist without experience. However, one human being experiences different things in different ways, at different times, and even at the same time. (Laing, 1961/1969, p. 16)

Contrary to what some believe, the past does indeed need to be "part of the explanation" (Yalom, 1970/1985, p. 182). To understand psyches within the group, complexities among the group of provinces within each psyche also need to be understood. The entire process of ontological and existential instrumentality is essential if one is to convince others that "anxiety is a *natural* consequence of being in a group situation in which one's expected behaviour, the group goals, and their relevance to one's personal goals are exceedingly unclear" (Yalom, 1970/1985, p. 297, italics our emphasis). The future can stand on its own when no one can remember their pasts.

The aspect of perceptual contiguity and the proleptic experience is important because even though people physically may not be in the group, they are thinking about what it will be like to be in that group – *even though they may not be conscious of these thoughts* – in terms of what that group situation will or will not offer: a) in comparison to the 'good' or 'bad' of the primal experience itself; and, b) in comparison to 'good' or 'bad' results experienced with real or imagined participation in other groups. *It also means that as long as people perceive they are in a group, a group is formed.* For every group experience, there is this *prolepticality*.

It does not matter how prolepticality is created; or through what combination of psychodynamics, sociologies, and senses. The importance of prolepticality is that: a) by virtue of individuals having a past, it influences present and future interrelationships; b) it is different for each individual; and, c) it is a reaction for which there is no proactive solution because one must first experience the experience or make conscious the unconscious.

The synthesis of past experiences creates a proleptic Erostic or Thanatic group identity and experience with this group identity because every group is first created through the projection of self-experience; much of which lies in the unconscious. But, if there is this potential to suffer losses from risked self-esteem, then why do people, even when they are not 'forced', remain in and join 'bad' groups in the first place? What might be more important is to answer are the questions of why and how 'good' groups become 'bad'.

Why and how group?

For many people, joining a group is one way to enact the pleasure of minimising the pain of isolation that is an exemplification of the pleasure principle at work (Freud, 1900/1986, 1920/1988, 1933/1988). One of the group's greatest contributions to the individual is recognition of self by other for the conferment of self-esteem that is highly, if not most highly valued (Alford, 1994a; Carr, 2003d; Hegel 1807/1977; Lapp & Carr, 2005a; Solomon, Greenburg & Pyszczynski, 1998, 2003). Each group member uses each other and the group to satisfy the primal urge to reinstate reminders of mother's reassurance, from which independence and self-esteem originated: "It may be hoped therefore that he will achieve his freedom from his mother by the proper path, that is, by the choice of an object resembling the mother-imago" (Klein, 1923, p. 471). To seek and to maintain abundant, tender-loving-care of

self-esteem and self-efficacy are paramount objectives of narcissism that through memory and fantasy creates an idealised mother substitute.

While we have, in past chapters, broached the topics of narcissism and identification, it is within the study of group psychodynamics that these defences are particularly apposite Erostic and Thanatic leadership and followership. Psychodynamically, narcissism is 'love of the self' that within cognitive and organisational studies has been translated into self-respect, self-esteem, self-efficacy and other identity preserving aspects connected to self-concept (Alford, 1994a; Johnson & Johnson, 1975/2004; Napier & Gershenfeld, 2004; Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn, 2003; Solomon et al., 1998, 2003). Self-love or self-Eros propels the need to *identify* with a self-preservation mechanism that in the group are idealised aspects of the group, including and especially, the group leader.

Identification and narcissism

Laplanche and Pontalis captured the essence and importance of the notion of identification when they defined it as a "psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified" (1967/1988, p. 205). In the context of describing the Oedipus complex, Freud (1921/1985) suggested that: "Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (Freud, 1921/1985, p. 134).

Freud argued that the ego is *narcissistically* drawn to the ego-ideal – "The target of the self-love" (1914/1984, p. 88). In using the term "narcissism", Freud posited that an individual "is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood (and) ... seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal" (1914/1984, p. 88). It is the recognition, approval and love from the early experiences with parents that leaves the individual in a situation where the capacity for self-love is enhanced, if not largely dependent upon significant others, approval of her or his behaviour. "It means that because men and women are born and reared in groups, those aspects of their psychologies that respond to the presence of others in groups will be of paramount importance" (Alford, 1994a, p. 14). This is a quest for *normal* narcissism; and not the pathological condition that is an ongoing, exaggerated concern 'only'

for self. Normal narcissism, in its healthy progressive sense, is a quest for wholeness and perfection the ego seeks to maintain through transference that can only be accomplished through the self's recognition of an other.

Transference is "a process of actualisation of unconscious wishes. Transference uses specific objects and operates in the framework of a specific relationship established with these objects" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988, p. 455). Objects act as triggers to remove repressive aspects and allow unconscious ideas to enter the pre-conscious and conscious (Freud, 1900/1986, 1933/1988). The paradox of transference is that the maximisation of pleasure and minimisation of displeasure are wishes that need to be fulfiled by the object but are also likely to go unsatisfied because of contemporaneous needs for independence from that same object:

> Freud reveals how it is the subject's relationship to parental figures that is once again lived out in the transference – a relationship still characterized, notably, by instinctual ambivalence. (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988, p. 458)

The combination of transference and narcissism influences the ego to reconcile intrapersonal conflict of needing and rejecting the ego-ideal with strategies and processes already experienced, regardless of previous effectiveness. Of course, alongside this quest to maintain the ego-ideal is the prohibitive aspect of the super-ego and therefore, the fear of punishment.

Alford (1988) thoughtfully summarised Freud's contention that narcissism is:

> never overcome, but rechanneled, because it represents an especially complete and profound mode of gratification, and man is loath to abandon a pleasure once experienced. If the ego ideal is immature ..., this rechanneling will be ineffective and will lead to perversion: the quest for immediate gratification regardless of the appropriateness of the setting or the object. If the ego level is mature, on the other hand, narcissism may serve as a stimulus for the achievement of the highest ideals. For in striving to realize socially valued ideals, the ego moves closer to becoming one with its own ego ideal, thereby recapturing something of the perfection that the individual knew when he was the source and object of all the good in the world. (p. 27)

It is through the process of *identification* that narcissism is transformed into a 'dependence'. This dependence is not necessarily centered upon self, but through an ego-ideal, it can be centered upon the object that represents the ego-ideal. As a result of paranoid-schizoid splitting along with the compulsion to repeat, the process terminates in compliance with the best representation of the ego-ideal: the group, the group member or the group leader. However, it is not always the case that all three are constituents of the same group. And, if they are, it is also likely that one or a combination of two will be less Erostic than that which is perceived to be Thanatic and non-esteeming.

As we have learned, the need for Erostic dependence also turns into a call for Thanatos. When instinctual impulses drive egoism, individuals never really leave the primal relationship they think they had:

> Just now when I went too fast I was exactly like your mother at her worst, or at any rate as you felt her to be at some critical early time. The present was the same as the past and implied in it all is anger with me. (Winnicott, 1972/1986, p. 165)

Influences from the primal relationship are so strong that through transference, individuals seek to re-enact similar group relationships. Thus, the satisfying of normal narcissism may be derived by identifying with alternative objects similar but different to that experienced within the parental relationship: "The individual invents himself or herself but only within the constraints of the structural features that become embedded in his or her psyche" (Carr, 1989, p. 37).

People join groups with the hope that others in the group and the group itself will satisfy the need for recognition. To be accepted into a group is to have self-esteem in identity conferred. Acceptance by the group is symbolic of experienced parental reassurance and identity stabilisation *provided that the transference is allowed to be established and maintained* (Czander, Jacobsberg, Mersky & Nunberg, 2002). Identification, narcissism, and transference establish psychological contracts among group members, between group members and the group, and between the group's legitimate leader and group members.

Normal narcissism also allows the individual to recognise and accept different aspects of the other without being threatened; without summoning purely destructive and excessive Thanatic behaviours. Being in a group is at the same time an exercise in *partial identity dissolution* (Spielrein, 1912/1994) or *identity full-compromise* to concede some self-important aspects so as to acknowledge those of other group members;

those of the group itself and those of the legitimate leader to create something new that is positive. Among group members and between members and the group, Erostic influencers such as hope and trust lend themselves to the *development* of interrelationships that are symbiotic and transcendental:

> Symbiosis means interaction between two organisms to the mutual benefit of both.... Much of the current dialogue concerns the present or potential symbiosis of people and intelligent machines, perhaps leading to the emergence of new being with a much different sense of self, identity, and personal boundaries.
>
> Transcendence means 'going beyond'... about how people may go beyond present identity boundaries to become parts of a larger, perhaps global, entity. (Anderson, 2003, p. 3)

Bion stated matter of factly that, a healthy group is one embodied with 'good group spirit' (1961/2001, p. 25) or one that has interconnections based in transference. For Bion, normal narcissism, identification, and transference in the group are manifested in the following characteristics:

a) a common purpose;
b) members sharing a similar view of the group's boundaries, responsibilities, class, and functions in respect to other collectives with which it interacts;
c) the ability to yield to both the losses and gains of past and new group members without being threatened by identity dissolution;
d) the existence of sub-groups that work toward the main group's goals; that do not meet the needs of only itself or those of an individual group member;
e) generally accepted codes of conduct and rules to allow all group members' contributions to be valued and to permit or restrict each group member's access to sub-groups;
f) the means and ways to work through discontent in the group; and,
g) having no fewer than three members – since two people are likely to isolate themselves in a dyad – so as not to minimise diversity of interpersonal relationships.

The importance of these elements is that they are one set of uniting factors of which a 'good' group can be comprised. We also attend to

Bion's list because it, itself, is an embodiment of projective identification that can be used for good: "I shall suppose there is a normal degree of projective identification, without defining the limits within which normality lies" (Bion, 1959, p. 103). In a true, positive case, the defence is used for making the other feel better without making the self feel worse; and there may be no positive, no negative, or very positive influences on self or other esteem: "Projective identification can be benign, even richly rewarding, allowing people to share their innermost feelings. It is the medium of almost infinite closeness, how one can feel what it is like to be another person" (Alford, 1994a, p. 51). All of the above mentioned characteristics may not be remembered equally; nor may they be equally amenable to every group member. Yet, from generational remnants of experience, the instinct for self-preservation drives individuals' needs to participate in combined efforts to accomplish something that could not otherwise be completed through individual performance alone.

If Bion's list is one indicative of narcissism for the group, meaning that group members are normal narcissists, what is missing is its contrary or opposite that is thanatissism. We define normal thanatissism to be constituted by self-displeasure (i.e. being unhappy with aspects of self; having imperfections and being imperfect) and self-doubt (i.e. uncertainty of competencies). Pathological thanatissism is self-loathing and self-hatred. Where degrees of narcissism are leveraged by Erostic energy, thanatissism is leveraged by Thanatic energy. Human beings are at the same time, narcissists and thanatissists.

If the group truly is one predisposed to development, the members within it are able to dedifferentiate between rational needs (e.g. work with others to raise money for charity) to be served by the group in comparison to those driven by either Eros (e.g. absolute conferment of self-esteem) or Thanatos (e.g. compete and use immoral tactics to raise the most money to be most esteemed). When group members are not driven mainly by one or the other of the instincts, a level of sophistication is achieved (e.g. group members devise strategy to build a long-lasting benevolent fund that purposefully excludes all types of recognition for 'best' and 'worst' fundraisers) that positively transforms the group members into a 'working group':

> Certain ideas play a prominent part in the work group: not only is the idea of 'development' rather than 'full equipment by instinct' an integral part of it, but so is the idea of the value of a rational or

> scientific approach to a problem. So also, as an inevitable concomitant of the idea of 'development', is accepted the validity of learning by experience. (Bion, 1961/2001, p. 99)

In addition to showing valence for learning experientially, other aspects of the work group are that its members have a firm grasp of reality including but not limited to normal narcissism. The problem with the working group is that 'normality' is defined by the superego and ego-ideal with which the group works. As we discussed in previous chapters, the working group may in fact be in high-level part-compromise. So it might seem like the group is developing when in fact, it is only working and doing the same things over and over again (e.g. benevolent fundraising group asks the same people for more and more money until resources run dry).

For Spielrein (1912/1994), to (re)generate a developing group meant time was needed for some of one's external world and experiential lines to meld with some of those of the other to create the future. The combination of *only* those 'somes' created synthesis with results that could not be totally predictable. For Spielrein, transformation was the means to an unknown end that hopefully, would be positive. For others, transformation had more of a systemic grounding.

Highly influenced by general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1957), Durkin (1983/2000) believed that developing groups were open (i.e. permeable boundaries), autonomous (i.e. having controllability of permeable boundaries) and active (i.e. interrelating with environment) (p. 85).

> Bringing the unconscious processes to consciousness is no longer the goal but a means of increasing the exchange of energy and information within the personality subsystem. Analysing the transferential and defensive exchanges between two or more group members becomes but one way of opening boundaries and stimulating change and growth (Durkin, 1983/2000, p. 88).

Pines (1983/2000) agreed when he stated that 'one of the most important functions of the [legitimate] leader is to use this tendency for progressive integration of the group to allow aggressive energies to be set free in order to serve constructive ends' (p. 272). Nitsun (1996) also believed that groups engaged in transformation used aggression to kick-start development (pp. 199–200). His studies of his own therapeutic groups led him to apply a derivative of apoptosis, autopoesis

(i.e. self-creation, see Maturana, 1988; Maturana & Varela, 1980) and "structural coupling: the relationship between a structurally determined system and the medium in which it exists" (Nitsun, 1996, p. 201). Drawing from Piaget (1952), Nitsun (1996) concluded that "maturation proceeds on the basis of assimilation and accommodation" (p. 202). The major difference between Nitsun's (1996) research and that of Durkin's (1983/2000) and Pines' (1983/2000), is that Nitsun worked with the death instinct.

Together, general systems theory, autopoesis and structural coupling echo Spielrein's (1912/1994) destructive-reconstruction. However, general systems theory has with it the belief that the psyche's permeability is or can become *always* controllable. With consideration of the dialectical relationship between life and death instincts, for Spielrein and Nitsun, there are possibilities of transformational endings being positive and negative. In the group, inducements and contributions are an ongoing exchange of life and death *at the same time*. The process is one of psychological *contracting*. To join a developing group requires the pain of mourning lost ego-ideal aspects, time and time again: "A personal image content, derived from times past, blends with a similar content and comes into being as a typical collective wish at the expense of the individual.... And what does this merger signify for the ego-particle? Is it not death?" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 163). It is then that for the developing group, some feelings of partial identity dissolution must occur in order for symbiosis to be learned – *and trusted* – for transcendence to occur.

There is perhaps nothing more fundamental – in the group, individual development and group development are different but they occur at the same time with varying effectiveness and efficiency of compromise. The paradox of group development is that it must survive individual dedevelopment to facilitate individual development. Our definition of a positively developing group is: *a proleptically contiguous collection of esteemed individuals who believe they share a common purpose by enacting full-compromise in symbiotic and transcendental interrelationships with each other, the group itself and the group's legitimate leader.*

As we will see, the chances of our definition coming to life may be remote: "a major need of any group or organisation is to cope with the anxieties which inevitably arise (fear of losing one's identity, fear of incompetence or failure, threat to self-esteem, etc)" (Singer, Astrachan, Gould & Klein, 1979/2002, p. 23). Unfortunately, much of the time, the group and its strongest representatives are *parasitic* and therefore, purely Thanatic. It is to these Thanatic representations in group dynamics that we now turn.

Parasitism

Gay briefly summarised Freud's position on this relationship by describing group psychology as "parasitic on individual psychology" (1933/1988, p. 405). In becoming members of a group, individuals surrender some of their individuality. In groups, this means that there is unpleasure in pleasure or the spirit of death in 'sex' where sex is a metaphor for general interrelationships and the creativity they produce (Spielrein, 1912/1994). People allow themselves to be hosts to such pain because they are afraid of being isolated from an idealised group, which means that part of their identity will be put at risk. To be rejected from an idealised group is to realise that one was not astute in joining it in the first place, and what is worse, to have others know that being in the group was a mistake.

The ego-ideal generates a group ideal that is extremely powerful: "(the group members) put one and the same object in place of their ego-ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (Freud, 1921/1985, p. 161, see also p. 147). One's whole life is wrapped up in the ego-ideal through introjection of past, present and future super-ego aspects of the outside world (Spielrein, 1912/1994). Through identification and excessive, even pathological narcissism, the individual may come to believe that it is the group and only the group that can and must satisfy self-love requirements:

> This mechanism for intensification of affect is favoured by some other influences which emanate from groups. A group impresses the individual as being an unlimited power and an insurmountable peril. For the moment it replaces the whole of human society, which is the wielder of authority, whose punishments the individual fears, and for whose sake he had submitted to so many inhibitions. (Freud, 1921/1985, p. 113)

In these cases, the group gains unwarranted and even dangerous omnipotence and omnipresence upon which group members become totally dependent for their very lives that ultimately may also bring forward their deaths. "Something is unmistakably at work in the nature of a compulsion to do the same as others, to remain in harmony with the many" (Freud, 1921/1985, p. 113). Actually, there are some things at work and these are once again, projective identification and introjective identification.

Resultant behavioural changes from projective identification ensures that only the strongest of projectors will be acknowledged; so in the group, not all individuals' experiences are equally recognised or esteemed. Within the group, narcissists use projective identification to establish an Erostic, symbiotic environment for some and a parasitic, Thanatic, environment for others:

> Any psychoanalytic theory that makes projective identification central is *already* a group theory, in so far as it is concerned not only with an individual's mental state but with the way that state is communicated to others, causing them to either act out the projector's fantasy or reject it. (Alford, 1994a, p. 49)

It was also Alford's contention that the strength of projective identification is positively correlated with the other's ability for introjective identification. From a Thanatic perspective, projective identification is most powerful because it is reinforced when group members are schizoid-compromised; or when they try to turn themselves inside out.

Turning inside out

The schizoid-compromised self is the result of attempts to maintain total identity while trying to feed narcissism and supply recognition to others, simultaneously. A summary of Alford's (1994a) definition of the schizoid-compromise is as follows. In a process of mutual causation, the person splits its self into three parts:

a) as the group's or more likely the group leader's target for their uncaring or careless natures;
b) as part of the group's or more likely the group leader's power and other redeeming qualities, that through narcissism and identification, become idealised parts of the self; and,
c) as an isolated, hidden, and protected part that is fearful of any meaningful investment in the group. (p. 52)

In other words, so as not to be totally identity committed to the group, the individual becomes part-compromised in attempts to be inside and outside of the group at the same time.

To further confound the situation, there are times when the individual feels and knows being alone within a group is a better remedy for self, and perhaps for other, but through projective identification there is still forced participation. Not only is this another threat to self-

esteem, it is also the paradox of forced immaturity. The ability to be alone among others is a factor of maturity and wisdom: "The capacity to be alone is a highly sophisticated phenomenon and has many contributory factors. It is most closely related to emotional maturity" (Winnicott, 1958, p. 419). If the group does not offer these aspects of understanding and solace, isolation and engulfment apprehension reinforce the schizoid-compromise.

As we detail below, attempts to be inside and outside the group at the same time, also have the tendency to turn the individual inside-out through *proleptic splitting* and *primordial splitting* that occur prior to projective identification. This is the case because in order to use projective identification, "he must split off part of himself in order to locate it in another" (Alford, 1994a, p. 52).

Proleptic and primordial splitting occur because it is fantasised that the legitimate group leader will not be able to hold members in a reassuring manner similar to that in the primal relationship. That is, it is believed the legitimate group leader will not be able to keep members from being isolated or engulfed by the group. This is synonymous with the part-individual's fantasy of the leader's predicted refusal to lead. Such a fantasy has its parallel in the proleptic splitting of the breast into its 'bad' components – so participation in the group is predicted to be 'bad'. Yet, to eliminate the fear of rejection and isolation, the group member still wishes to maintain the idealised relationship formed with the leader, so awareness of the 'good breast' is also heightened that in turn causes acute anxiety from ambiguity. At the same time, primordial splitting has the individual isolate identity parts and hide them so they are not engulfed by the group. There is a synchronistic 'having to be in the group to be mothered' and 'wanting to be out of the group to be free from mother'.

Nightmares and daydreams of both extreme isolation and engulfment occur and proleptically integrate memories of persecutorial identity dissolution and death-fear from the unconscious into the conscious. Feelings of identity dissolution are injurious to narcissistic beliefs including the fantasy of immortality; with the group comes the inability to live forever as the individual was before the group. To protect the adult-turned-infant mental model, the instinctual reactions are forcing, avoidance and accommodation.

To avoid death-fear and simultaneously accommodate the group's needs, the defensive phase of *primordial splitting* ensues. Fantasies of becoming dedifferentiated or falling too much toward the pole of complete submergence within or engulfment by the group induces the individual to put into "cold storage" (Alford, 1994a, p. 55) some of

the best parts of the self, or some of that identity that is most valued and therefore, most protected. Primordial "splitting off the true self is an alternative to suicide" (Alford, 1994a, p. 55). The result is the "experience of one's skin becoming a sieve through which one's insides leak out and fall into endless, shapeless, space devoid of surface or definition of any sort" (Ogden, 1989, p. 39). Primordial splitting is a manifestation of avoidance that is instrumental in protecting the individual from identity annihilation and total fragmentation. The fragmented self is one that is in an identity diffuse state:

> when the current identity structure is being disequilibriated, the person may feel confused and scattered, behave impulsively, look for support in inappropriate places, become 'irresponsible,' 'unreliable,' and 'unpredictable'. (Marcia, 2002, p. 15)

Thus, primordial splitting is of particular significance because it helps determine why and how gaps in individual development, not in existence prior to the process of proleptic participation in the group, suddenly appear at the mere thought of being involved in such interrelationships. The holding pattern collapses, at the same time the part-individual collapses from proleptic and primordial splitting.

Primordial splitting generates reflexive mortality. If past experience with the group and its leaders was persecutorial in reality, then future interactions with the group will share the same prolepticality. Primordial splitting is dangerous because it eliminates that which is needed to remember and understand that diversity or differences or changes to the ego-ideal may be needed. Primordial splitting reinforces abnormal narcissism.

At the same time, and by using projective identification, the individual needs to divest itself of "bad" prolepticality.

> Experiences of separation, for example, are felt to be catastrophic, persecutory and annihilatory because the individual 'requires' the other to provide and support a benevolent sense of being (the other is a self-regulating other) as there is no ego-functioning to provide a solid sense of self within the individual. It is for this reason that beliefs/phantasies/experiences of the other as a cruel sadist, for example, are held with such conviction and vehemence. I see immediate, felt experience playing the most important role then, with phantasy being an elaboration and 'explanation' of that experience. (West, 2004, p. 524)

The residuals of primordial splitting from the schizoid-compromise are only 'bad breast' reminders that the adult ego wishes to eliminate. Projective identification goes beyond blame as noted in primal relationships (Horwitz, 1983). Its power is in its ability to virtually spear ego parts into others' containers; to purposefully influence them subliminally or in what is unconsciously felt to be a coercive process of being the host to parasitism; of being used and abused (Ogden, 1989). The results of projective identification are seen in the behaviours of the introjector. Yet, 'forcing' makes introjective identification only partially successful.

Inasmuch as primordial splitting creates holes in the ego to allow instinctual impulses to escape, the gaps also allow persecutorial aspects to penetrate. Spatial proximity to instability (Ogden, 1989) creates the feeling that one is virtually *rubbing off* on and by others and thus, the perception is one of being erased. The primordially split individual craves re-construction of collapsed identity *even if this restoration is all 'bad'*. Based in introjective identification, this defence mechanism, especially early in the group development lifecycle, seems to be unavoidable because adults "would rather be 'bad somebodies' than 'weak non-entities' – to be human and weak is felt as if it were on the way to loss of identity" (Holbrook, 1971, p. 199). In a Thanatic environment, introjective identification is the easiest way to have others do the thinking for the self.

By not bringing the full-self to the group, the part-self cannot "contain its fear, rage, and desire [and] these emotions get released into the group in a terrifying fashion" (Alford, 1994a, p. 53). Unfortunately, all other members in the group, save the legitimate group leader, may have arrived in the same condition:

> The schizoid compromise doesn't work. Not only does the group recreate in itself the lack of harmony (indeed, the terror) that it seeks to escape, but the cost is great for both individual and group. The split self is not enough for either the group or the individual. (Alford, 1994a, p. 52)

Alford (1994a) and Ogden's (1989) group is a collection of digressed, regressed, split-apart individuals ready to force introjective identification from others through projective identification.

So far, reflexive mortality or the *temporary* inability to think critically has occurred through mutual causation of proleptic splitting, primordial splitting, projective identification and introjective identification.

In a downward spiral, another Thanatic defence related to the schizoid-compromise is regression to the "autistic-contiguous position" (Ogden, 1989, p. 199). The autistic contiguous position is embodied by behaviours of part-compromise that mimic the reassuring proximity of surface and the rhythm of the mother's holding of the infant. Before the individual is completely drained, a "second skin" (Bick, 1968) is regenerated to re-harden the egoistic surface that has been polished off during persecutorial projective identification, as a means to protect against further dissolution.

The ego's boundaries are fortified as a stop-gap measure to protect the "unstable entity within, albeit at the cost of learning from without: from experience and from the consultant" (Alford, 1994a, p. 29 commenting on Ogden, 1989, pp. 47–82). The consequence is that the individual goes through a process of psychic embalming or numbing (Gregory, 2003). The more the individual feels attacked and persecuted, the deeper the "bad" breast reminders are embedded and the thicker the embattlement that stonewalls "good" breast reminders and reassurance:

> This represents a superordinate defense in which psychological pain is warded off ... The outcome is a state of "non-experience" (Ogden, 1980, 1982b) in which the individual lives partly in a state of psychological deadness – that is there are sectors of his personality in which even unconscious meanings and affects cease to be elaborated. (Ogden, 1989, p. 199)

The consequences of the schizoid-compromise are that the individual does not enter, remains in or leaves the right group for the wrong reasons. When Thanatos prevails, the individual becomes a part-member who is in the right group but as we will see, for the wrong reasons.

In the wrong position at the right time

Individual egoism to self-preserve becomes a constant driver toward protecting first, that which comprises self-interest, namely that of identity and its major constituent, self-esteem that can only be conferred by idealised others. Therefore, it is that idealised others are those who will always be protected with the self:

> which means to accept that within each individual is the desire to be an autonomous individual, the desire to submerge oneself in the

> group, and a perpetual conflict between these two desires. It is a conflict so intense that it frequently leads the individual to try to do both at once.... The attempt to achieve a solution results not in the best, but generally the worst, of two worlds. (Alford, 1994a, p. 5)

Alford believed that it is precisely at this point that group members and the group can be saved from total dissolution – if they are willing and able to recapture those most valued parts of themselves, including but not limited to reflexivity and values. If this can occur, then at least the group can be refilled with a "full" self rather than a "part" self. Full-compromise cannot occur with part-selves. The group member who is able to provide this aspect of self-preservation for the group and those within it becomes the group leader; and a group leader always emerges. There is individual and group development, or dedevelopment, "and they don't just happen" (Alford, 1994a, p. 11). To emerge one way or another, the individual and the group depend on a leader.

Follow the leader

Proleptic contiguity is also linked to imagining, to dreaming, and that aspect of wish fulfilment (Freud, 1900/1986) for reassurance that was first experienced in the primal relationship. Even though individuals may not be in the group physically, "each member must be in contact with someone, usually a leader, who is in contact with every other" (Alford, 1994a, p. 13). Prolepticality triggers group members' memories of not only the primal relationship, but also the remembered qualities of its leadership. Most important in the group is that, as in the remembered parental relationship, protection against isolation and engulfment is sought from the perceived group leader: "I cannot think of any need in childhood as strong as the need for a father's protection" (Freud, 1930/1985, p. 260; see also Bowlby, 1961, p. 490).

When one begins to feel engulfed, there is a need to be led toward isolation and *vice versa*. In this way, the tension between the maximisation of pleasure and minimisation of unpleasure is maintained. It was also Freud's (1921/1985) view that through the process of identification the individual surrenders the current "ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader" (p. 161). It is perceived that only the leader can take them in that direction; and hopefully, by being somewhere between overly kind and helpful and brutal and sadistic. Being able to hold group members and the group between these poles minimises feelings of, respectively, engulfment and isolation. "Maximum leaders" (Alford, 1994a, p. 73) are experienced

generations of 'maximum mothers' who are created through both positive projective and introjective identification – providing the leader is willing to use introjective identification and make group members' wishes for transference come true. But transference also comes at a cost:

> *Group development requires leadership, a fact that political theory has worked hard to ignore, evidently because the need for leadership is experienced as humiliating and dangerous.* Humiliating because the need for leadership questions the freedom and autonomy of individuals, and dangerous, because leadership so often seems to connote the *Fuhererprinzip*.[9] (Alford, 1994a, p. 5)

As only 'bad' parts of selves have immigrated, participation of schizoid-compromised individuals automatically puts the group deeper in psychological debt then would result from primal splitting alone. 'Part' members are not reflexive enough to avoid neither a 'bad' group; nor willing to further accommodate a 'good' group. This is also true of one, some or all group members. In both cases, the individual is in the wrong group when primal splitting and projective identification continue as part-compromise. When the individual cannot keep from falling apart, or keep from being pulled apart, there arises an inability or dedesire to identity commit to the group. Such feelings are related to intrapersonal conflict resolution through forcing (i.e. other forces self to participate in unwanted way, in unwanted group), avoiding (i.e. proleptic splitting), and accommodating (i.e. primordial splitting).

The more diffused the others' containers, the easier and faster the penetrations of the negative reminders of the "bad" breast because memories of the good breast have been hidden as a result of primordial splitting. Receivers allow persecutory dumping because they are in fragmented states and are not in a reflexive position to minimise any anxiety from fear of group rejection, which would further disintegrate self-concept. The transition to larger group status includes interpersonal interactions with many others who seem to be desirous of invading each psyche's empty spaces, thereby, perpetuating overlapping fantasies of identity assassination, creating a situation:

> in which the group itself, through pervasive projections, embodies a process akin to the death instinct. Here, the group as a whole becomes a poisonous container, acting as a siphon for the self-destructive process. (Nitsun, 1996, p. 151)

Another reason for allowing others to control the situation is the defence of reaction formation, a process in which the individual manipulates information and experience to change "black" into 'white' or 'bad' into 'good' reminiscent of disavowal or repression of the persecutory aspects of the 'bad' breast. The fear of separation from the group translates into extreme aversion of libidinal loss or an obsession with acceptance. The defence is to moderate the untenable by exaggerating its opposite (Moore & Fine, 1990; Rycroft, 1968/1995). Instead of feeling controlled, the fantasy is one of control: "On the one hand, a strong fixation to the loved object must have been present; on the other hand, in contradiction to this, the object-cathexis must have had little resistance" (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 258). Part-compromised individuals manufacture legitimate power, to deny or justify egoistic projective identification and introjective identification where none may have existed before Thanatic influence. In the absence of adequate amounts of reflexivity, receivers fantasise they are in control of allowing others to control them. There is always enough blame and shame to go around because these are two primary "bad" properties that effect psychological bruising and especially by the "aggressive imaginer" (Alford, 1994a, p. 45).

The aggressive imaginer: The worst best projective identifier

Within the group setting, the maintenance of identity is paramount and the fear of deindividuation is tantamount to death or annihilation unless defence mechanisms are able to resurrect the mother image as the means by which the fragmented individual fantasises are being held between isolation and engulfment. The aggressive imaginer is the most whole group member, who is the least vulnerable member in the group relative to other group members and is, therefore, perceived as master. Yet, this individual is still also in a regressive state and so uses the death instinct in an aggressively inward manner. The aggressive imaginer seeks to eliminate the embarrassing aspect of self that requires other to live:

> Birth confronts us with the experience of needs. In relation to that experience there can be two reactions and both, I think, are invariably present in all of us, though in varying proportions. One, to seek satisfaction for the needs: that is life-promoting and leads to object seeking, love, and eventually object concern. The other is the drive to annihilate the need, to annihilate the perceiving experiencing self, as well as anything that is perceived. (Segal, 1993, p. 55)

The needs of the aggressive imaginer are synchronistically, threefold. First, is the need to join the group. Second, is the need for the group to sustain the aggressive imaginer's self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-concept or to reduce anxiety from perceived identity dissolution. Third, and perhaps most important is the aggressive imaginer's need to identify with the legitimate group leader to end the longing for the dyadic relationship once experienced in the primal relationship between infant and mother. The aggressive imaginer must continually find creative ways to be alone and with someone in a group.

The aggressive imaginer's identity is unstable because of the perception that the legitimate leader will not adequately suspend this "narcissistic child" between the identity poles of autonomy and engulfment. This leads to psychological instability, intrapersonal chaos, and death-fear that must be divested as quickly as possible.

> In the sadistic method, the individual forms a counter-phobic identification with death as the destroyer. (See Anna Freud, 1937.) The victim is then the mortal who must die in fear and pain while the destroyer experiences the ecstasy of immortality. The adherents to the sadistic method who aim to kill themselves, savagely kill the mortal in them in order to remain immortal.
>
> The masochistic method derives from the sadistic method and must be understood in terms of the latter, for masochism is a counter-phobic reaction to unconscious sadism. The sadist identifies with the invulnerable destroyer and projects his mortality on to his victim. The masochist identifies with the mortal victim and projects the invulnerable destroyer, thus, the destroyer is sought as the saviour who will rescue him from his mortality. To be destroyed is the ultimate ecstatic aim, the destroyer bestowing the gift of immortality. If the masochist aims to kill himself, the instrument chosen is endowed with this good intent. (Williams, 1958, p. 160; see also Williams, 1962)

It is the aggressive imaginer who, in a sado-masochistic twist, attempts to engulf other members by killing off an integral part of their super-ego or even ego-ideal. By using blame and shame to reinforce part-compromise of forcing-accommodation with the aggressive imaginer and forcing-avoiding with the legitimate leader, the aggressive imaginer pushes and pulls other part-members around the Thanatic triangle. The paradox of projective identification is now clearly evident – the projector takes and the introjector gives.

All of these conflict resolution strategies are identity dissolving. Identity dissolution results in individual dedevelopment from the feeling state of wisdom all the way back to the state of early childhood and infancy, at which point only mistrust and hopelessness prevail (Erikson, 1979). The regression to infancy also triggers abnormal narcissism and the arrogance of being against or "anti" anything that did not fuel self-love that was tolerated in infanthood. In adulthood, this regression is connected to being *anti-group* (Nitsun, 1991).

The anti-group

Nitsun (1996) concluded that the group's inability to develop was because of instinctual aggression directed toward the group by those who disliked the group itself such that generally speaking: a) participation resistance resulted from a fear of the group; b) anger and hostility were directed at individual group members and toward the group; and c) participation resistance, anger and hostility spiralled out of control even with the most capable of leaders also proficient at group management (see p. 43). Nitsun went on to say that feelings of anti-group persisted because of group members' perceptions that:

a) a new group is a collection of strangers who are neither trustworthy nor trusting;
b) if the group does not have direction or guidance, the group has no purpose;
c) group members do not have the capabilities to create structure and facilitate leadership;
d) others will not understand personal problems; nor will they maintain confidentiality of these problems;
e) too many people with too many issues interfere with personal development; a dyadic relationship with the legitimate group leader is what is needed but can never be obtained because there are so many others in the group;
f) being in a group causes interpersonal conflict that can become very painful to self and to others;
g) changing membership creates unpredictability and fear of the unknown;
h) a group is not functional unless it develops against some linear model; making mistakes and reiterative development is a waste of time; and
i) personal goal achievement and personal problem-solving are not priorities when in the group. (see pp. 47–54)

The importance of Nitsun's (1996) research are his conclusions that individual, proleptic fears result in regression, survival anxiety, failures of communication, projective identification, and envy (pp. 108–131). These are all manifestations from perceiving the leader could not or would not hold the group and its members against engulfment and isolation (Alford, 1994a). Together Alford's (1994a) and Nitsun's (1996) works also confirmed an Erostic and a Thanatic manifestation discovered by Bion (1958); that of pride and arrogance: "in the personality where life instincts predominate pride becomes self-respect, where death instincts predominate, pride becomes arrogance" (p. 144). Self-respect is a result of Erostic reflexion in normal narcissism that disallows introjective identification of 'bad' projections from the group.

Arrogance occurs when individuals and the group are not successful at using projective identification to create a link between their truths and those of idealised others. When the legitimate leader refuses to introject a group member's reality, the member must believe that he or she is in some or many ways better than the leader and that the leader is in some or many ways much more deficient. Being anti-group can be the result of being ignored and isolated from recognition of others, as was first experienced in the primal group. Arrogance is a defence for not wanting to re-risk rejection that is the same as having projective identification turned against the self. Individuals and the group itself never may have experienced or have forgotten what it is like to have been cared for and loved (Erikson, 1979). In other words, these are the Thanatic symptoms of those who do not feel they will be esteemed in the group and therefore, cannot confer esteem: "Out of fear of the group, individuals undermine its effectiveness and so destroy the one arena in which they might truly recognize their individuality" (Alford, 1994a, p. 17). The concept of anti-group demonstrates the dialectic of self and other: without being in a group one cannot experience pride from being esteemed. If group members' perceptions are that the legitimate group leader will drop them into the chaos and uncertainty of isolation or engulfment, they show their anti-group.

Anti-group and its constituents are Thanatic reflexes from false negative projective identification of minimum leadership. The anti-group is that part of the individual that is denied the status of "special child" (Nitsun, 1996, p. 135). Since the individual is in a regressed, childlike and even infant-like state, destructive response to leadership is another form of 'suicide': "The dominance of part-object relationships, the confusing criss-cross of communication, the problems about sharing and competing may all intensify the desire for a relationship with one other

person" (p. 135). Nitsun (1991, 1996) provided adults' arrogant terminal values that are really attacks on the group through attacks on the leader, the linchpin of group development.

Attacks on linking

In this and its original sense, projective identification is Thanatic for group members and the group because eventually, it triggers masochistic tendencies of feeling guilt and shame from hating and being envious of the projector who caused one to feel this way in the first place. To eliminate hate, envy, guilt, and shame, through splitting the individual attacks any aspects that are linked to these persecutorial feelings. As was shown in Figure 2.3 the Thanatic shift of the depressive position is where the attack on the link occurs. Aspects of 'good' group spirit are some of these links and thus, Bion's (1961/2001) characterisations become 'bad' means to justify the terminally valued ends of self-preservation:

> In Kleinian theory the instincts are conceived of as biologically determined organisations that utilize actual experience to link a 'preconception' with is 'realisation' (Bion, 1962b), e.g. the linking of the preconception of danger with a facet of reality that can be experienced as dangerous. The preconception is not an idea, but a potential for an idea. It is only in the linking of the preconception with the real that conception (a thought) is generated. (Ogden, 1984, p. 506)

The attacks on these links diminish if the mother figure introjects the other's conceptions of danger without showing either too much strength (i.e. brutality and sadism) or too much weakness (i.e. excess kindness and helpfulness). The attacks become especially ferocious when the mother figure champions battles the infant could not; and the "infant is overwhelmed with hatred and envy of the mother's ability to retain a comfortable state of mind although experiencing the infant's feelings" (Bion, 1959, p. 105; see also Ogden, 1991). The instinctive reaction becomes an aversion to groups because arrogance contributes to an inability to bind (Freud, 1920/1984; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1988). Attacks on linking are really attacks on thinking when individuals do not wish to risk feelings reminiscent of primal persecution: "patients may have a need to attack, which covers a layer of dependency wishes that they do not express less they be rejected" (Yalom, 1970/1985, p. 182). The only way the aggressive imaginer can

be inside and outside the group at the same is to be arrogant enough to attack the legitimate leader. However, the aggressive imaginer is not brave enough to do this alone. These attacks can only be completed with the help of group members who are without enough self and other respect to stop these battles of transference.

When the legitimate leader refuses to elevate the aggressive imaginer to 'special child', the aggressive imaginer tries to recapture infantile narcissism through other weaker, less aggressive and minimally creative group members. Now, we have discovered whose projections are being introjected. Remembering that residence in the paranoid-schizoid position means *all* group members are compromised, it is the sickest-healthiest, weakest-strongest group member to whom other 'part' members acquiesce. The aggressive imaginer is abnormally narcissistic and therefore is most Thanatically creative and aggressive relative to others in the group. Why? Because of persuasion from the schizoid-compromise, other 'part' members are willing to introject the aggressive imaginer's fantasy of being the most important person in the group. Yet, the aggressive imaginer is merely an adult who is a schizoid-compromised 'part' leader. 'Part' followers allow themselves to be led to believe that the legitimate leader is incapable of holding even the strongest of them. And so, as lesser 'infants', part-followers feed the fantasy that they will most certainly be dropped on their heads and thus, also sacrificed by the legitimate leader.

It was Freud's view that through the process of identification the individual surrenders the current "ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader (p.161)... (the group members) put one and the same object in place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (Freud, 1921/1985 pp. 161 & 147). Alford believed that since the legitimate group leader provides a more tangibly evident identity or container in comparison to that of the group, the legitimate group leader represents the group and members' fears of the group, so it is usually into her or his container that the 'bad' is first projected. So, it is the legitimate leader who is replaced with the 'illegitimate' leader.

In order for group members to develop, the leader must lead the group through its dedevelopment stages that the aggressive imaginer is not equipped to handle:

> Needs felt in relation to the conductor are potentially manifold: for the symbolic integration of the various personae in the group, for

> dependence, for the elevated pleasure of 'special child' status, and for the fantasised fulfilment of romantic and erotic longings. But these desires entail a large measure of frustration: the conductor is there to understand dependency, transference, and other longings towards him, not to gratify them. (Nitsun, 1996, pp. 135–136)

Through reaction formation, the group allows the aggressive imaginer to finally bury individual reflexivity and experience that is the final decursive swing into groundings of only basic assumption and contagion that are the fundamentals of the *premature group*:

> And on the seventh day we hope that he is pleased and takes a rest. This is when things go reasonably well, as, in fact, they usually do; but someone has to be there in that which is created is to be realised, actual. If no one is there to do this, then in the extreme, the child is autistic – creative into space – and boringly compliant in relationships.... (Winnicott, 1970/1986, p. 49)

In the premature group, part-subjects are part-objects that are permeated egos; all missing segments of the boundaries that keep impulsive, instinctual behaviours from leaking out. The *premature group* now enters the "autistic-contiguous position" (Alford, 1994a, p. 29). This position is a disabler to the group's ability to use the legitimate group leader's guidance to regenerate the reflexivity lost in part-members' primordial splits. Alford's theory is a fragmented-group theory that speaks to the premature group, a group that does not have the power to self-determine whether it will live to survive infancy. Neither group members nor the group itself are differentiable whole objects as Bion's (1961/2000) basic assumption work suggested (Alford, 1994a; De Board, 1978/1991). Bion's theoretical framework was to depict a more mature version of the group than that proposed by Alford (1994a, pp. 16 and 58). But, as we will see, Bion's groups are fundamentally autistic-contiguous groups because they allowed introjective identification of the wrong depressive positions for the wrong reasons.

Autistic-contiguous groups are basic assumption groups

Here we attend to aspects of group regression that are similar, but different to individual regression and that occur at the same time. As a result of the group-mind that has now been co-constructed by the aggressive imaginer, common group regressions are to performance by

"basic assumption" (Bion, 1961/2001, p. 105). The basic assumption group is one that functions by reacting to emotions generated by instinctual drives, thus the term 'assumption' rather than for instance, 'rational' or 'scientific'. In Bion's theory, there are three types of basic assumptions upon which groups rely: a) basic assumption dependence; b) basic assumption pairing; and c) basic assumption fight or flight. The basic assumption held by the group is also its psychological contract. To break the contract is to risk isolation from the group.

Basic assumption dependence means the group fears experiential learning and all activities related to it and so "the group is met in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection" (Bion, 1961/2001, p. 147). He also noted that given the nature of assumption, the leader might not be "real" but may be based upon the history of that group or other group experiences. Followership is constituted by behaviours related to avoidance of work, claims of incompetence, and fears of inadequacy and immaturity. They act as if the leader is "omnipresent and omnipotent" (De Board, 1978/2002, p. 39). Since no leader can ever maintain these Erostic expectations, the group colludes to replace the faulty leader with one they fantasise will protect the group and its members. The splitting of the leader into an all 'good' or all 'bad' entity means the 'good' is introjected from the legitimate group leader and projected into the leader elect who we now know is the aggressive imaginer. All the group's 'bad' is projected into the legitimate group leader, thereby giving psychodynamic votes of confidence to the aggressive imaginer and votes of non-confidence to the legitimate leader.

Of course, no leader can maintain such an idealisation so the Thanatic process is repeated to resuscitate the legitimate group leader: out with the bad, in with the good, over and over and over again. This type of repetitive compulsion behaviour continues until the basic assumption of dependency is replaced by one of the other two assumptions or if group members realise their folly and become rational. Clearly, individuals of basic assumption dependency have regressed to infantile egoistic defences (Erikson, 1979).

In basic assumption pairing, the group behaves 'as if' a dyad within the group will produce a saviour to protect the group. So, this is really a variation on basic assumption dependency for the purpose of creating a leader who can maintain omnipotence and omnipresence. The major difference between basic assumption dependence and basic assumption pairing is that the latter causes ambiguity because of a dialectical relationship within it. In the dedeveloping group, the vision

of the saviour or the thing that will happen to save the group is an embodiment of hope. This aspect of wish fulfilment acts against itself, for as soon as the group creates this fictitious leader or aspects of it, hope vanishes as it does when the pair fails to produce. So, hope is replaced by despair and destructiveness or masochism and sadism. De Board (1978/2002) said it just right when he commented that basic assumption pairing "prevents the group from coming into contact with reality by keeping it a closed system" (p. 41). External influences including different leadership style, trait, and management can never bring this group any relief. Consequently, each group member sits in denial of contributing accountability for such irrational thought and action. And as one may recall, Bion (1961) stated that a group should be comprised of more than three people so such pairing would have less chance of succeeding.

With basic assumption fight or flight, the group is seen to come together to fight against or to flee something or someone. This can be the most dangerous of assumption groups because it takes on the role of mother to its infantile members and to the child within itself. This group works under the assumption that it can self-protect itself in all facets and so its Erostic endeavours are multiplied. Basic assumption fight or flight ignores or openly retaliates against any group activity that does not relate to the destruction, or the escape, of the common enemy that the leader must co-create and help destroy, or evade. Out of the three basic assumption groups, basic assumption fight or flight requires a leader the most, to keep the group from destroying itself and unsuspecting, weak others at the same time. A group situated in basic assumption fight or flight personifies repetitive compulsion to fear, so a constant symptom is paranoia. Until group members realise they have nothing to fear or that they can be courageous enough to meet challenges in the group, they will always be preoccupied with some type of enemy.

One of the 'good' things about basic assumption groups is that only one of the three assumptions will be operationalised at any one time with the other two being repressed. This means they are waiting for the right trigger at the right time. Depending upon the situation, the group moves among the three so within even a short period of time, all basic assumption group minds can present themselves.

The legitimate group leader of the group must therefore, be prepared to recognise the fantasy and then use the appropriate technique to attempt to coach individuals and the group back to reality. In all basic assumption groups, members' regressions to infancy occurs, so the

leader can expect masochistic behaviours embodied as mistrust and hopelessness (Erikson, 1979). However, if we try to assess the meaning of having power in numbers, it is obvious that many versus few group members will exacerbate the situation. If we take Erikson's work further and match these readings with those of Bion's, individuals and therefore the group itself can gain the strength of as many school age children as there are group members. In other words, Bion's research demonstrates egoistic weaknesses of shame, guilt, incompetence, inferiority, and the inability to dedifferentiate reality from fiction, and Erostic from Thanatic battles (Marcuse, 1964).

One of the most important things for the legitimate leader to do is to diffuse the aggressive imaginer, the group member who really is refereeing the groups' plays among the basic assumption states. The greatest folly for the legitimate leader is to attempt the development of many basic assumption groups at the same time – and in one form or another naively expect not to be sacrificed, positionally and perhaps even personally. In group psychoanalysis theory, the single legitimate leader: multiple group scenario is implied but not formally reported or analysed, perhaps because of the fear it conjures for experienced leaders and followers alike. Among Thanatic groups, the legitimate leader does not have the safety in numbers the group members possess. Therefore, if the right resources are not available to the right legitimate leader at the right time, resistance to overwhelming autistic-contiguousness and contagion of basic assumption groups may be futile. It might even be that the leader turns outside in and becomes one of disillusioned many instead of the needed enlightened few. Thanatic influence is dispiriting; it makes the group anti-individual and parts of all individuals, anti-group.

Basic assumption groups are contagious: Enlightening Le Bon

Le Bon (1895/1974) did not fully ascribe to Freud's psychodynamic conceptualisations, yet he and Freud (1921/1985, 1930/1985) shared conclusions that most of our behaviour in groups occurs because of what we do not know and that 'unknowledge set' of course, resides in the unconscious:

> Organised crowds have always played an important part in the life of peoples, but his part has never been of such moment as a present. The substitution of the unconscious action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal characteristics of the present age. (Le Bon, 1895/1974, p. 3)

Within the unconscious, generations upon generations of super-ego aspects have been assimilated, but they do not surface until one is placed in a situation where:

> particular acquirements of individuals become obliterated in a group, and that in this way their distinctiveness vanishes. The racial unconscious emerges; what is heterogeneous is submerged in what is homogenous. As we should say, the mental superstructure, the development of which individuals shows such dissimilarities, is removed, and the unconscious foundations, which are similar in everyone, stand exposed to view. (Freud, 1921/1985, p. 100)

In the group the *average person* (Freud, 1930/1985) unfolds as reliance on instincts causes regression to infantile responses remembered from the primal group. This is perhaps the pivotal point between adherence to the pure group science Le Bon tried to achieve as a self-professed, objective observer of crowd or large group behaviour. Le Bon stated:

> To combat what precedes, the mental quality of the individuals composing a crowd must not be brought into consideration. This quality is without importance. From the moment that they form part of a crowd the learned man and the ignoramous are equally incapable of observation. (1895/1974, p. 42)

From what we have learned, Le Bon may have a point. Yet, to dismiss the instrumentality of an occurrence because it has already occurred is to acquiesce to the power of destructive as well as constructive crowds and the aggressive imaginers within them. These include the Hitlers and the Mother Theresas, whose powers we are trying, as the case may be, to be proactive in resisting or supporting. Relative to the infant, the group is so powerful that valence for maintaining difference is seen to be futile – it is easier to follow than to uphold self-leadership and identity that, in the long run, is likely to be for naught. So, the group ego supplants the individual ego (Freud, 1921/1985). The linchpin then, is the dissolution of repression, a last remaining filter of unconscious behaviours that erodes individual consciousness where reflexivity occurred. Minimal individual reflexivity, coupled with residence in the autistic-contiguous position reduces the number of behavioural alternatives thus inviting contagion and crowd behaviour. It would seem the absence of psychodynamic reflexivity in Le Bon's enlightenment has proven Freud's and others' points quite nicely.

Contagion is the result of becoming proficient at *introjective identification* that is the ability to absorb projective identification and the guilt, blame, shame, and threats of isolation it spears into others. Since transference to the same new mother image has occurred and by all in the group, the emergent group ego repeats its mission to follow the new collective super-ego's script in managing the group's id. As a result of individual identity dissolution and homogeneity, contagion then is the result of the group's super-ego's collapse into the individual ego that has folded into the id: "In a group every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest" (Freud, 1921/1985, p. 101). Since there is now little difference between aspects of the super-ego, the ego, and the id, the emergent ego is really that of the new group super-ego – fully introjected aspects of others' ids. Intrapersonal conflict transmutes itself into group membership Nirvana and the perceived tensionless state, equilibrium and "group spirit" (Bion, 1961/2001) that are signs of the individual's inability to differentiate between changing 'good' and 'bad' group spirit. Perhaps Le Bon meant to say this here:

> The memorable events of history are the visible effects of the invisible changes of human thought. The reason these great events are so rare is that there is nothing so stable in a race as the inherited groundwork of its thoughts. (1895/1974, p. 13)

That is, being in a healthy group can be unhealthy for the individual: "This differentiation, of course, serves the practical purpose of enabling one to defend oneself against sensations of unpleasure that one actually feels or with which one is threatened" (Freud, 1930/1985, p. 255).

There is perhaps nothing more disappointing and more frightening than the feeling that the group and especially its mother image, the leader, is on the warpath to dissolving the fantasy of the special *inter-identity* between the individual and the group:

> 'If you want to be loved and recognized by the group,' the group seems to say to its members, 'then you must give up your individual distinctiveness. Further you must do so willingly, for the love of the group.' Most members pay the price and are doubly disappointed, as it doesn't work. They sacrifice a part of their individuality to the group and fail to receive the recognition from the group upon which love depends. (Alford, 1994a, p. 35; see also Freud, 1930/1985, p. 24)

So, if you are not for the group, then you must be against the group – if you are not Erostic for the group; then you must be Thanatic for the group. Concomitantly, the group can perceive even one dissident, including and especially the legitimate leader or mother image, to be especially dangerous because "the group seeks first of all its own security. The creation of a less threatening environment is the group's paramount task. Everything else, including the recognition of its individual members, is subordinated to it" (Alford, 1994a, p. 27). This is of course, is the group's projective identification against its members. As far as the psychological contract between the surplus repressed society and individual are concerned, once again, there is little or no difference between inducements and contributions.

Without differentiation, the individual ego becomes the group ego that defends itself from the unpleasures of the outside world but now as a unique collective: "In order to fend off certain unpleasurable excitations arising from within, the ego can use no other methods than those that it uses against unpleasure coming from without..." (Freud, 1930/1985, p. 255).

Since the ego is in conflict because it cannot meet the needs of all super-ego aspects simultaneously, mismanagement of the id results in inwardly directed destructive energy that is masochism and guilt. The collapse of the super-ego into the ego into the id is the same as allowing excessive Eros or Thanatos unfettered escape from the ego, intrapersonal conflict is not managed appropriately and this is the condition for inappropriate *self-leadership* (see also Chapter 2). Because nothing has been learned or nothing learned has been applied, proleptic participation in any group results in the regression from mature, differentiated adult, downward toward immature responses remembered from infanthood and the relationship with "his mother's breast" (Freud, 1930/1985, p. 254; see also Bion, 1961/2001; Klein, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d). In the absence of the ability to dedifferentiate that is the core of wisdom in maturity but not in infancy (Erikson, 1979), through transference, egos seek out and introject the projections of the group member who is best able to provide the aspects of reassurance remembered from the primal relationship. Le Bon's "collective hallucination" (1895/1974, p. 43) is prolepticality. As Freud (1930/1985) similarly noted:

> The fact remains that only in the mind is such a preservation of all the earlier stages alongside of the final form possible...
>
> Perhaps we ought to content ourselves with asserting that what is past in mental life *may* be preserved and is not *necessarily*

> destroyed.... It is possible but we know nothing about it. We can only hold fast to the rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in mental life. (p. 259)

The synthesis of intrapersonal interdependent and interpersonal interdependent psychodynamic processes might create positive and negative transformation (Spielrein, 1912/1994) of each individual in the group and the group itself; but it is never neutral. This is to say that mature, reflexive individuals will not necessarily form a productive group; and a productive group will not necessarily maintain or transform some, all, or even any members into productive group members regardless if the spirit is used for good or for evil. So, it also has not escaped our attention that shared spirit can also be common to the most abhorred and the most destructive of groups.

According to Spielrein (1912/1994), the group mind is one that had already developed in the individual:

> I have come to the conclusion that the chief characteristic of an individual is that he is 'dividual'. The closer we approach our conscious thoughts, the more differentiated our images; the deeper we penetrate the unconscious, the more universal and typical the images. The depth of our psyche knows no 'I', but only its summation, the 'We'. It considers the ego to be an object observed and subordinated to other similar objects. (p. 160)

This alongside Thanatic influences of repetition compulsion mean that individuals within groups can be generalised to be a certain type – the group mind is already in the mind and successive groups are really those which are already known: "Other people exist for us only when they are compatible with our own psyche; only suitable people exist for us" (Spielrein, 1912/1994, p. 161). From a Thanatic perspective, the ego attacks objects that remind us of our dependency, but also acts as a predator to seek them out and destroy them as the means to become independent (Hanly, 1978; Ostow, 1956). The paradox is that we seek groups that keep us from individual development, yet, individuals within groups self-protect against their dedevelopment that causes group dedevelopment. This is the aspect that is needed to enlighten leaders and followers alike. What is more important is that by understanding the psychodynamics of Eros and Thanatos working in group behaviour, we also understand that the leadership of one individual can make a difference for many followers – whether they know it or

not (Alford, 1994a; Spielrein, 1912/1994). The reason this may not be known is because it is rarely that the legitimate leader is the group's "real" leader.

Eros, Thanatos and group leadership and followership in organisational studies

Rudimentarily, projection of 'good' and 'bad' is 'basic human nature' (Francesco & Gold, 2005, p. 22). For example, a new department manager is to replace one who has retired. Some department members will believe the new manager is 'good', others will perceive the new manager is 'bad', and still others will have the view that the new manager is neither 'good' nor 'bad'. These perceptions are based upon whether or not the new manager will be able to provide the reassuring aspects the department members thought they had in each of their own, unique primal relationships. For those who believe the manager will reinforce reassurance, that manager becomes leader. If proleptically establishes that the new manager will not complete such transference, the department members will view the new manager to be 'bad'. Psychodynamically, department members fantasise that the 'new' manager is 'bad' because he or she has forced his or her way into and disrupted the ego-ideal. By virtue of this power, the new manager represents the 'maternal' omnipresence to make the entire department seem unaccommodating and isolating and so *it becomes* all 'bad'. In adulthood, participation in an 'unknown' group due to but not limited to leadership change, triggers release of infantile experiences that are projected by the followership.

There are three main tenets of group leadership and followership: a) individuals' behaviours influence each other and the group; and the group influences each group member; b) group potential is fully realised if and only if its members understand that their irrational feelings and emotions will and do affect the group and when; and, c) problems with managing a group are problems with synchronistic intra and interpersonal conflicts occurring in the group (De Board, 1978/2000, pp. 36–37; see also Bion & Rickman, 1943 in De Board, 1978/2000, pp. 35–36).

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 share similarly labelled regions of the mind's topography that have been discussed. Yet, here (and in previous chapters), we really have three different but esteemed identities. The solid lines symbolise whole individuals that when brought together are able to withstand each other's diversities to create something that

Figure 5.1 Normally narcissistic self





Figure 5.2 Normally narcissistic other




can be positive – a whole, non-threatening group. Normally narcissistic individuals experience partial identity dissolution that is *full-compromise*.

By reminding ourselves of Figure 2.2 it is the individual's shared ego-ideal comprised of each other's experiential lines that establish the foundations of the group's identity. And the group is to work according to the strictures imposed by the individuals' conjunctions of their super-egos and ego-ideals. Below, Figure 5.3 depicts three esteemed, identities because Eros and Thanatos are suitably repressed for both individual identities.

Also in Figure 5.3 is a group identity that is Erostically different from self and other but not so Thanatically different that it generates death-fear. Even though the individuals are different they accept this divers-

Figure 5.3 Self, other, and group identities



ity to invest in creating a new group with new potential, the outline of which is a proleptic vantage of what the group might look and feel like and what the individuals will have to turn into to become a part of the group. Group identity is difficult to sense because it is a mutual causation of self and others' symbiotic transcendence that is based within the remembered primal relationship.

> There are powerful dynamics at work....Recent psychological research has shown that children are uncannily in sync with their mothers' moods and expressions and even their unconscious wishes. In a similar way employees tend to pick up on the unspoken true interests of core group members. (Kleiner, 2003, p. 89)

For better and for worse, when group identity is similar to individuals' identities, it can be an *impossible container* to discern.

> Man's *being* (I shall use 'being' subsequently to denote simply *all that a man is*) can be seen from different points of view and one or other aspect can be made the focus of study. In particular, man can be seen as a person or thing. (Laing, 1960/1969, p. 19)

When our definition of the developing group is operationalised, through full-compromise, positive transformation is possible. In terms of organisational studies, this is really the wish for *teams*. The word team has been defined in many ways and each one is a projective identification of what a group is supposed to become. Team has also become associated with such reified colloquialisms as 'there is no I in team' and 'there is no I in team, but there is in win'. It is this loss of individuality and identity that teams in Western society expect, and that the individual fears. For many leaders and followers, the me in team cannot be seen; and nor does it want to be found. And this is precisely what individuals introject. In consideration of the need for self and other leadership, examples of definitions that include the *holding* of all group members accountable for their *reactions* come closest but are still only remotely connected to integrating psychodynamic theory with that of organisational behaviour (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969/1982; Katzenbach & Smith, 1993/2003; Lencioni, 2002; Robbins & Hunsaker, 2003; Schermerhorn et al., 2003). Otherwise, many curricula authors, generally succumb to Bion's (1961/2001) characteristics of the working group that merely hint at the need for co-accountability. Thompson (2004) recognised the need to differentiate between the working group

and the team. Hersey and Blanchard (1969/1982) spoke directly, albeit in strictly scientific terms, to the parental relationship in their model leadership model of team development (p. 163). And finally, Robbins and Hunsaker (2003) determined that to be in a team, group members and the group have to be intra and interaccountable for reactions brought about by "teaming" (pp. 181–268). Tuckman's (1965) model of small group development, that most recently includes the five stages of "forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning" (Hunsaker, 2001, p. 294; see also Whetten & Cameron, 2002/1998, p. 469) is a linear model. However, when used with the action of teaming there is indication and rightly so, that to be a team, psychodynamic movement in the group is required. Teaming is not linear. Teaming is comprised of continual destructive-reconstruction among group members and between them and the group. It functions with unpredictable recursive and decursive periods so at any specious moment in time it may be a point of negative or positive transformation. Teaming starts with a group but it has no ending.

It takes some work to note the similarities among what is being taught to existing and up and coming *teamers*, more work to determine their differences, and much more work to find that they have some link to psychodynamic theories. None of these consider aspects of the death instinct or any of its implications when organisational members are really in the throes of psychodynamic development and dedevelopment.

It is also interesting to note that out of the many examples of curricula we have reviewed, most belong to few publishing groups. But, in order to belong to a team, one must first find acceptance from the group. Acceptance and rejection is based in the positives and negatives of projective identification and introjective identification that normal narcissists use to identify and create transference with their leaders.

> This has a positive side.... Core group members' attendance at a design meeting, even if they don't say anything, matters enormously in stimulating participants' creative output. (Kleiner, 2003, p. 89)

Fear of rejection by the group, that is death-fear from isolation, places members in the schizoid-compromised position as the defence against dedifferentiation. If group members and the group do not get past this stage, the concept of team, at least in Western society, may be only a myth (Skrabec, 2002).

> Unfortunately, it's not just creativity that can be rewarded this way. Deceit, inefficiency, moral cowardice, and general accountability can be rewarded too. The core group reinforces whatever it pays attention to. (Kleiner, 2003, p. 89)

Some perceptions of team were the projected past that skipped the group life stage altogether: "Most human work is carried out in teams; hermits are exceedingly rare" (Drucker, 1994, p. 86). There is a need to be aware of life and death of groups in order to gain better understanding of team and teaming.

The real team is more elusive than its concept, largely, because the higher the degree of narcissism, the lower the desire for full-compromise that calls for partial identity dissolution. From a Thanatic perspective, projective identification is forcing introjective identification that is accommodated so to avoid the discomfort of feeling death-fear from isolation or engulfment. This is what we call *paraesthetic persuasion.* Paraesthetic persuasion is the feeling that someone or something is being too evasive or too invasive yet there does not seem to be tangible reason for it or evidence of it. If it could be anthropomorphised it would resemble the feeling of having the mind pricked. Consequently, and especially in a conflict-ridden group, members may feel a general malaise of discomfort. But since anxiety and ambiguity are present, they may not be able to reflexively diagnose the cause, and cannot prescribe the correct antidote. Negative change and transformation also means reifying and perhaps even deifying current worldviews that are reinforced by introjecting the death instinct's subliminal effects. The more one is reminded of her or his own death, or the more mortality salient she or he is, the stronger is the need to self-protect (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1997). In self and other leadership and followership, there is a dialectical relationship between projective and introjective identification and it is both 'bad' and 'good'. If paraesthetic persuasion is to be positively transformational, it requires generativity.

Bradley and Marcia (2004) explained that the adult development stage of generativity:

> challenges adults to engage effectively in multiple social spheres, to provide leadership and guidance, to extend themselves to others, and to establish the next generation in ways that foster the new generation's development of trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, and identity. (p. 40)

> *Generative* individuals are highly involved in their work and the growth of young people, and are concerned about broader societal issues. They are tolerant of different ideas and traditions, and able to strike a balance between care and consideration for the self and for others. (p. 42)

Generativity is associated with high levels of ego maturity allowing greater acceptance of diversity integrity and intimacy attainment (Bradley & Marcia, 2004; Erikson & Erikson, 1985/1997). The opposite of generativity is rejectivity. Rejectivity is the extent to which others are not included.

> But here I must continue the account of those other sets of phenomena characteristic of every stage of life that are of fateful consequence for group life and for the survival of mankind itself. If care (as all other strengths cited) is the expression of a vital *sympathic* trend with a high instinctual energy at its disposal, there is also a corresponding *antipathic* trend. In old age, we called such a trend disdain; in the stage of generativity, it is rejectivity; that is, the unwillingness to include specified persons or groups in one's generative concern – one *does not care to care* for them. There is, of course, a certain logic to the fact that in man the (instinctual) elaboration of (instinctive) caretaking tends to be highly selective in favor of what is or can be made to be most 'familiar.' In fact, one cannot ever be generative and care-ful without being selective to the point of *some* distinct rejectivity. (Erikson & Erikson, 1985/1997, p. 68)

Obviously, the passage above speaks to the individual. Yet, it is also applicable to the group 'self' as well.

Erostic and Thanatic impulses are triggered by past and present group members that are outside of the present and future group because vestiges of these members are inside the psyche as part of the super-ego. The groups to which we belong or from which we have been excluded are represented, respectively, by group members we included or rejected. It is possible then that adults exclude others both purposefully and in error. The reasons for this are explained in the following passage, originally authored by Otto Kernberg (1995) that to explain our point has been altered by us. These alterations are indicated by what is enclosed in [ ].

> The [group] that is able to maintain its [identity commitment], to protect itself against invasion by third parties, is not only maintaining its obvious conventional boundary but also reasserting, in its

> struggle against rivals, its unconscious gratification of the fantasy of the excluded third party, an oedipal triumph and a subtle oedipal rebellion at the same time. [Thanatic] fantasies about excluded third parties are typical components of normal [group] relations. The counterpart of [identity commitment] that permits the enjoyment of polymorphous [group relations] is the enjoyment of secret fantasies that express, in a subliminated fashion, aggression toward the loved object. [Identity commitment] thus presents us with one more discontinuity: discontinuity between [group relations] in which [all members] are completely absorbed in and identified with each other and [other group] encounters in which secret fantasised scenarios are enacted, thus carrying into the relationship the unresolved ambivalences of the oedipal situation. (Kernberg, 1995, p. 88)[10]

This means that as long as instinctual influences exist, generativity cannot be a lifestage. It can however, be a temporary state of becoming in a specific time and situation where reflexivity is present. In the absence of reflexivity, Thanatic behaviours may ensue because we need them.

To have a group life means to have group members who have feelings and emotions that originate from prolepticality and reality of group participation. And these groups can be parasitic. Group identity feeds off of members' identities in order to establish to maintain an identity of its own. In our unconscious, a hierarchy of groups and subsequent group membership exists that continually nurse from groups of which we are conscious. The group needs to ensure its established identity is not dissolved to feed unwanted individuals *that are known about but are not cared about at all or as much as others*. Prolepticality has its roots in projective identification that works when it is perceived that others allow it to be introjected. Normal parasitism can be part of the super-ego's wanted censorship to ensure Eros and Thanatos are repressed properly. The paradox is that to enact positive transformation, full-compromise requires the dialectic pairing of parasitism and symbiosis.

Alford (1994a) addressed intrapersonal conflict that is generated by prolepticality of known or group experiences in the consciousness – *of two worlds*. An expansion of this thought includes memories of past group participation to influence present group participation through prolepticality. Consequently, the attempt to achieve a solution results not in the best, but generally the worst of more than two worlds as group members compete to be recognised and included in past, present and future groups. Negative prolepticality that simultaneously influences

Table 5.1 The dialectics of leadership and followership

OTHER	SELF Leadership Followership	INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION	
	TRANSFERENCE Transformation	Positive, Erostic Behaviour	Negative, Thanatic Behaviour
PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION	**Proleptically Negative Group**	Productive Narcissists: Low-high-level part-compromise: Temporary regression to infantile state to reassess and reconstitute trustworthiness; experience participation in all types of groups for some period of time: Leave right group and stay in wrong group for the right reasons	Pathological Narcissists: Low-level part-compromise: Remain in infantile state; perpetually identity dissolving: Stay in wrong groups and leave right groups for wrong reasons
	Proleptically Positive Group	Generative Thanatissists: Full-compromise; Negative capability; stay in right group and leave wrong group for the right reasons: **Teaming**	Productive Thanatissists: High-level part-compromise: Remain in state that is more than infantile but less than wise; stay in right group and leave wrong group for the wrong reasons; repetitive compulsion: **Working Group**

negative transformation is regression to infantile behaviour that brings about both positive and negative, Erostic and Thanatic conscious thoughts and behaviours, as shown in Table 5.1. Additionally, Table 5.1 provides a partial scope of how narcissism or excessive Eros can be Thanatic to self and other leadership that are dialectically dynamic.

In Table 5.1, we show that projective identification and introjective identification are dialectic pairings, where as projection and introjection are not. One can fantasise projection (i.e. belief that other is incompetent) without the other introjecting that fantasy. This concept is of utmost importance. In the premature group, when self projects something toward an other, that which is projected is what the narcissist believes is unworthy about self – it is one aspect of the 'bad' self. Introjection only takes place if the thanatissist other introjects this

'bad' aspect. For example, if the narcissist feels incompetent, to protect self-esteem, Erostic energy is used to project incompetence into other containers. If the other is at that time, feeling self-doubt, it is the thanatissist part of other that comes forward to use Thanatic energy to introject that feeling of incompetence. Such introjection is now introjective identification that is first, aggression directed at the self. It is only when the productive narcissistic aspect of self comes forward that through sadistic retaliation, incompetence is once again projected into another container. If the release of Thanatos is manifested in purely destructive behaviours, the group in Figure 5.3 can also be the result of negative transformation from part-compromise.

Individuals stay out of or remain in the wrong groups because they risk losing the esteem and recognition of those idealised others who think entering and leaving is wrong:

> One does not relinquish a hard-won identity easily. There are external pressures from friends, family and colleagues, as well as internal pressure from one's expectations of oneself, to remain the same, to be consistent....
>
> Although the reformulated identity is to some extent a new one, it is continuous with and has similar qualities to, the identity that preceded it. 'Transformation' may be possible for a few individuals, but for most of us, identity change looks more like a gradual evolution of previous forms.... (Marcia, 2002, pp. 16–17)

This would bring in a call for the *productive narcissist*. "Productive narcissists are wired for periods of rapid and disruptive change" (Maccoby, 2003, p. 10).

> Smart leaders are quick to sort out who belongs to this in crowd. They recognize that an organization can be led only in a manner that is consistent with the perceived attitudes of the core group. Anything considered to run contrary to the group's interests will be resisted (because employees will assume that their jobs require them to resist it) – even if the group members themselves say otherwise. (Kleiner, 2003 p. 87)

When the group and its leaders are perceived to be unwilling or unable to satisfy even the rudiments of normal narcissism, too much of individuals' Eros is compromised with only the return of group Thanatos.

There is a call for negative emotions such as disappointment and anger to protect the self from a non-compromising group (Nitsun, 1996; Strayer, 2002). In these cases, the paranoid-schizoid position is required to resplit the 'good' and the 'bad' of the group that is in Thanatic high-level compromise (Alford, 1994a; Ogden, 1989; Spielrein, 1912/1994). However, if no leader emerges to facilitate this process, the group remains deficient.

Managerial support in the forms of time to be reflexive and to mourn creates the generative thanatissist. Generative thanatissists are similar and different to normal narcissists. Generative thanatissists introject 'bad' to make it 'good' that is projected by the normal narcissist. Normal narcissists can become generative thanatissists.

If the generative thanatissist aspect of self introjects incompetence, then that part of self that is causing incompetence is repaired through a reparative activity such as learning to change behaviour and actually making the change. If the productive thanatissist comes forward, all aspects of the reparative activity will be introjected and eventually, that which was Thanatic turns Erostic. Productive thanatissists continue to use variations of the same aspect that was first introjected because there is not enough productive narcissism to project the feeling of other aspects of incompetence. The narcissistic self projects bad and the thanatissist self introjects 'bad'. Introjective identification triggers accountability and responsibility that which is introjected is repaired without harming self or other. The normal narcissist-thanatissist respectively, projects and introjects good and bad *without hurting other*. Productive narcissist-thanatissists introject good and use projective identification to make the other feel guilty or bring forward the thanatissist aspect of self-doubt and self-displeasure to trigger Thanatic energy that results in radical change (Daft, 2001; Maccoby, 2003). Radical change is destabilising because it does not allow time to mourn or work through loss that is required to break the transference so reattachment to a new libidinal object can occur. Radical change only works if those who accept it do not care about what the old change was or what the new change will be. Radical change creates productive thanatissists.

Excessive Eros leads to excessive narcissism, identification with the group, and the inability to be independent at all (Marcuse, 1955, 1964). Such a lack of independence impacts the dedevelopment of self-directed groups and the development of self-directed teams (Brodbeck, 2002; Rogers, Metlay, Kaplan & Shapiro, 2002). Productive thanatissists are identities stuck in the same depressive position. They ignore

relevant other super-ego aspects when it is inappropriate. Productive thanatissists believe that their ego-ideals are one and the same with the group. Consequently, the group is solidly differentiated from other groups and group members are dedifferentiated. At its most extreme, it is pure contagion where the group and individual egos are no longer discernable (Freud, 1921/1985, 1930/1988; Le Bon, 1895/1974). These are autistic-contiguous groups (Alford, 1994a) – they are *dividualised* (Spielrein, 1912/1994). Dividualised groups require transformative properties to pry at their autistic-contiguous coffin constructs.

Kolb (1998) agreed with the notion that emerging groups are in need of emerging leaders. And, of course, these may or may not be the legitimate leader: "unofficial leaders emerge and perform many of the same functions as traditional leaders" (p. 1). Yet it can be that the wrong leader is in the wrong group at the wrong time. Abnormally high degrees of narcissism leads the aggressive imaginer to use Thanatos as the means to project the inability to be independent that other part, schizoid-compromised, group members would introject. This is an example of the paradox of self-reliance – the more one learns to be dependent the more one can become independent, if the holding environment is adequately characterised as being among others, trustworthy, empathetic, and enabling (Kahn, 2001, p. 269). The feature of enabling means that dependency is warranted but only to a certain point, which was our point in Chapter 4. That is, purely Erostic behaviour for self will eventually cause Thanatic consequences for others.

If the aggressive imaginer is allowed to misuse these elements, the group's holding environment for other members including the legitimate leader will be disrupted. Pathological narcissism is purely Thanatic for others. So neither group, nor team, nor self-directed team will develop – *even where there may have been one before.*

> Even in the most authoritarian organizations, the people in command know they can't rule through the power of their positions alone. Young U.S. Army lieutenants, fresh from West Point, discovered this during the Vietnam War when they tried to pull rank. The veteran troops razzed these new guys, openly disobeyed them, and sometimes even killed them. In most organizations, the stubborn fact is that we can confer legitimacy on anyone but ourselves. Indeed, what people conventionally call leadership is, at bottom, the ability to get people to confer legitimacy on us – and thus to get others to put us in the core group. (Kleiner, 2003, p. 89)

If projective identification is knowingly being used by either the pathological or the productive narcissist, then leadership reflexivity regarding projective identification including the manipulated operationalisation of followers' introjective identification is present rather than instinctual impulse. In both cases, the difference is the number of times change is introduced in short periods of time without allowances for the mourning of losses. This is the problem with projective identification. It is especially dangerous when it is purposefully used by an aggressive imaginer who is a pathological narcissist.

The slope between productive and pathological narcissist is slippery, indeed. However, the psychodynamics surrounding excessive self-Erostic behaviours may also be perpetuated by the aggressive imaginer's charisma. One must remember that the aggressive imaginer is always searching for ways to be inside and outside of the group at the same time. Such is one of the main characteristics of the charismatic leader to whom many followers are 'naturally' attracted (Dumas & Sankowsky, 1998; Sosik, 2001). If the instinct is to surround oneself with a force-field of independence, others introject this power as the means to be *held* away from their own struggles with isolation and engulfment. In the form of repetition compulsion, Thanatos reveals itself in the anxiety-ridden individual's need to once again have reassuring feelings triggered. Transference is the means by which 'new' ambiguity is minimised when one must follow a 'new' leader; one who is perceived to disrupt the current ego-ideal. Or put another way, 'old' paranoid-schizoid splits and high-level part-compromise positions are used to eliminate the unknowns of 'new' experiences. 'Bad' productive narcissists and pathological narcissists can use this referent power to build their other power bases (Schermerhorn et al., 2003; see also Carnegie, 1938; Laird, 1946). Introjection of false *mothering* to perpetuate evil is the autistic contiguous position of surplus repression of the performance principle that should be highly disturbing (Marcuse, 1955, 1964).

Other aspects of the schizoid-compromise can be found wherever new projects require new meetings with new people and especially where it seems 'new' is 'old' or there is the putative need for change (Mallinger, 1993). Transformation occurs at glacial speed because of the inability to resolve intrapersonal conflict regarding interpersonal conflict. Organisations' preoccupations with high speed require changes to the physicality of groups much faster than psychological change can occur (Carr, in press). Autistic contiguous groups can be found wherever repetitive compulsion has been introjected to minimise diversity, chal-

lenge and skill (Sell, Knotterus, Ellison & Mundt, 2000). As such group character development and dedevelopment occurs in the most structured of environments and in the most benign places – from around the water cooler to around the boardroom table (Kloppenbog & Petrick, 1999). Consideration of the death instinct with matrix management is something yet to be explored but as the psychodynamic theory suggests, single leaders with multiple "unknown groups" can be particularly frightening. The same can be said for the interrelationships of competing informal and formal groups within the same organisation *whether they know they are competing or not.*

> Consider Lothar, a senior manager and innovative researcher at a consulting firm that had recently split off from a much larger electronics corporation. The new board was still working out the details of the separation when Marianne, the CEO, made an exultant speech at a company celebration, thanking all the people who had helped launch the new firm. Brad, the head of human resources, followed her...During their toasts, neither Marianne nor Brad mentioned Lothar; they honestly forgot him.... Only a few months [later] Lothar had learned he had been passed over for the job he had been promised as the head of research and he had to scramble quickly to find another position at his old corporate parent. (Kleiner, 2003, p. 88)

Narcissism makes us believe that the group cared about our self-esteem when it did not. Normal narcissism is Erostic for self, however, it can be Thanatic for other because 'normal' is a relative term. By the same token, others' normal narcissism may be Thanatic for self. This is usually hidden in the Erosticism group members may share.

In many cases, the resources to help groups work through these aspects are simply not available: "Frequently, however, leaders fail. They can't be found because they are not there. Leaders fail out of fear, boredom, and depressive anxiety, the fear that they are not good enough to do the job" (Alford, 1994a, p. 76). Leaders cannot connect with followers and followers who refuse to engage in self-leadership, disconnect with the leader. Eventually, the group will come to be *unmotherable* or *unleadable* by anyone or anything. Such persecutory feelings will become so overwhelming that the group's identity will dissolve leaving its members to become isolated or engulfed by another because without group development, there can be no individual development (Alford, 1994a; see also Bion, 1961/2001; Nitsun, 1996). The

connection between the death instinct and the group is "that the importance of the concept of the death instinct ... remains as a critical principle that reminds us of the regressive and disintegratory aspects of human behaviour and guards against therapeutic over-optimism and idealization" (Nitsun, 1996, p. 151). The corollary of Bion's and Nitsun's works tells us what will happen in instinctually driven groups. What perhaps is extraordinary is that when it comes to the need to be esteemed (Hegel, 1807/1977) and the study group dynamics from LeBon (1974/1895) to Nitsun (1996), the more things have changed; the more they have stayed the same:

> The group mentality is the way in which members attribute to the group impulses and desires for which they do not wish to take responsibility. The reification of the group is a defence against individual responsibility. (Alford, 1994a, p. 14)

In Thanatic groups, Eros works in self-preservation of infantile individuals and the aspects of the first group experience they think they had. One of these experiential aspects is the fantasy and assumption that it is *only* the legitimate leader who drives the group. Thus, through projective identification and introjective identification occurring in transference among narcissistic group members, the group and its leader, group failures become legitimate leadership failures. Shared accountability in a team would magnify degrees of an external locus of control so failures would be magnified as could be successes.

To ameliorate guilt and shame from the inability to first self-lead, the death drive is to turn one into the other. Through narcissism, identification, projection, identification, and transference it can seem to be impossible to separate the group container from its memberships' containers. However, to ensure the stability of the group and the members within it, it needs to be remembered that there are me's in teams. They may not be exactly the same as the individuals would look when outside of the group but each one exists; each one is a similar but different. Such is the paradox of psychodynamic defences related to the team of Eros and Thanatos. They are desperately needed by each other so each other will not be needed – but only to a point.

> At the core of your company, there is a group of people who seem to call the shots. More precisely, all the shots seem to be called for their benefit.... The core group won't be found on any formal organization chart. It exists in the people's minds and hearts....This group

> generally (but not always) includes the people at the top of the hierarchy. But it may also include people who – because they are respected, popular, successful, or manipulative, or because they control access to some critical bottleneck – have gained the loyalty and attention of others throughout the company. (Kleiner, 2003, p. 86)

Team members are to remember to turn to one another for mutual support to benefit the present and the future – but are they turning to the right people or turning into the wrong people?

Chapter 6 uses case study analysis to place our discussion framework on the life and death instincts into context. We will see that Alford's (1994a) conceptualisations further synthesise past theories on Eros and Thanatos that we use to analyse leader-follower interrelationships when all group members are deeply engaged in *acting out the missing leader.*

6

Leadership Is a Matter of Organisational Life and Death

> Notwithstanding the evidence of team performance all around us, the importance of teams in managing behavioural change and high performance, and the rewards of team experiences in everyday lives, the many people undervalue, forget, or openly question the team option when confronting their own performance challenges. We cannot fully explain this resistance; there are probably as many reasons and emotions as there are people. Moreover, we do not suggest that such resistance is either "bad" or "good." We do, however, think that it is powerful because it is held in deeply held values of individualism that neither can nor should be entirely dismissed. (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993/2003, p. 20)

We use this quotation to open further discussions on reasons for the scarcity of 'true' teams in and outside of our organisations. One of these reasons is that group psychology could be called individuals-in-the-group psychology for which Chapter 5 provides an outline. We have found that working groups and teams especially, are left wanting because of mutual causation of paradoxical development. Eros and Thanatos in the group cause individual development that causes group dedevelopment that causes individual dedevelopment.

Syntheses of Alford's (1988, 1994a) and Ogden's (1989) theorising with Spielrein's (1912/1994) founding conceptualisations on death in life substantiate a foundation for positive and negative, individual and group transformation. Projective and introjective identification from the schizoid-compromise, including proleptic, primordial and primal splitting are both 'good' and 'bad'. When there is more 'bad' than 'good', excessive instinctual energy underscores various degrees of narcissism and thanatissism that result in various consequences for the

group, its members, and its legitimate leader. High degrees of instinctual Thanatic deployment are followed by group member dedifferentiation and group differentiation. These opposites work together to cause more ambiguity, anxiety, death-fear, and yes, even death itself. Yet, to remember only these cases is to reinforce the fallacy that Thanatos is wholly destructive.

Where Thanatissism could have been used for positive transformation, sole reliance on Thanatos to reject and otherwise punish groups and their members, summons excessive Erostic energy that elevates narcissism to pathological levels. Alford's (1994a) work afforded deeper consideration of psychodynamic processes of identity dissolution and their beneficial and deleterious effects on self, and then other, leadership. We have uncovered aspects of Erostic and Thanatic psychodynamics in leadership and followership workplace behaviours.

In previous chapters, we have provided vignettes that were to remind us of 'real' life and death situations at work for which psychodynamic theory had explanations. Similar to case study analysis, we used those vignettes to work through the theories including those related to organisational studies. Here we take a slight variation to our previous approach for three specific reasons. The first has to do with qualitative research tenets. Instead of a vignette, for this chapter, we provide an actual case study. The case is necessarily rich in description and as can be seen, is therefore substantial in size. There is much to be reflexive about, and to remember. We will also continue to strengthen triangulation of our death-instinct research inquiry, through further application of Terror Management Theory and Thanatic influence of mortality salience on self-esteem (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997; Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986; Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997; Mikulincer, Florian & Hirschberger, 2003; Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1998, 2003). The use of this case is intended to study the psychodynamics of death awareness, death-fear and grieving in one health care organisation, in the categorical framework of Alford's (1994a) research on *acting out the missing leader*. The context of this study is particularly valuable for four reasons. First, we have introduced this book by speaking to the immortality society seems to expect from organisations and especially those that are perceived to extend our lives – such as the plastic surgery industry's relationship to notions of immortality. Although not related to plastic surgery, the organisation in this case is in the field of mental and physical health care that is still strongly linked to self-preservation. Second, mortality salience, or awareness of one's own death and constant awareness of others' deaths,

are ever present in the organisation due to the services it provided. Defence mechanisms seen in this case study are phenomenologically relevant. Third, the psychodynamic literature review told us there are various interpretations of the death instinct in individual, group and political psychology. All of these are evident in this case study. Finally and fourth, there is actually a missing, dead leader that links the theory specifically to organisational studies on changes that impact leadership and followership interrelationships.

The second reason it is beneficial to read the case study first, is to remember the past when working through the theory. This is the pracademic aspect of Thanatospraxis. The art of synthesising practical application with academic theory on the death instinct is to discover aspects of self and other that are greater than merely the sum of their parts. Third, in the interest of minimising repetitiveness while capitalising on recursiveness of psychodynamics with organisational studies theory, we discuss Alford's (1994a) findings and conclusions and analyse the case study at the same time.

The case study: When a leader dies

A study of leadership death through the lens of the death instinct has parallels in the loss of any libidinal tie and subsequent needs to suffer pains of transference disconnects. The case study, *When a leader dies* (Hyde & Thomas, 2003), is the result of amalgamating qualitative research data collected and reported by Paula Hyde (1999) for her doctoral thesis in conjunction with a paper she and her co-author, Alan Thomas (2003), had originally published in the journal, *Human Relations*. One difference between that which has already been published and what is seen here is that by reporting all relevant data, we have expanded upon the published case study. Another is that we reanalyse the case specifically in light of theories pertaining to Eros and Thanatos in the workplace. Such an analysis provides insight into potential consequences of the displacement and replacement of organisational leaders. The conclusions drawn here have application to organisational studies in regard to human resources deployments as they pertain for example, to strategic planning, re-engineering, restructuring, and downsizing. Here, Thanatospraxis reveals that there are many who can be perceived to be leader by some, but not all followers. And, it certainly can be the case that the legitimate leader is really not the "real" leader at all. When followers believe leaders move away at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons, Thanatos is likely to gain

psychological dominion and provoke behaviours that are purely destructive to self and other.

The construction of the case study has its foundation in data only. We have eliminated any interpretation that may have been attached to previous reporting to achieve higher degrees of Thanatospraxis truth value (Guba, 1981). More specifically, we check for correspondence between group dynamics in therapeutic settings and organisational groups that suffer from reflexivity loss due to death-fear of psychological identity dissolution and physical death. Alford's (1994a) findings were that in group settings, Eros and Thanatos are continual energy exchanges, which he argued can be organised into five different dramas that culminate in the group's *Acting out of the missing leader* that we will discuss shortly. This is the first time that Alford's (1994a) theory has been applied to case study data from a workplace. All this we do to achieve higher degrees of correspondence such that: "if the proper procedures are applied, the subjectivities (e.g., opinions, ideologies) of the knowing subject would be constrained and the knower could thereby gain an accurate and objective depiction of reality" (Smith & Hodkinson, 2005, p. 917).

The case study will be followed by our own analysis. Data taken directly from the case study should be considered to be Paula Hyde's contributions. We would like to avoid unnecessary repetition of traditional in-text referencing. To that end, we will differentiate between case study data and our analyses with the former being denoted in italics. The actual page numbers from where data were obtained are listed next to the relevant excerpt. To introduce the reading, we present an overview of the case study.

Case study overview

> *Northern CMHT*[11] *(NCMHT) was established five years before the study took place, mainly from ward staff and a small number of existing community staff. It was created in response to complaints from general practitioners about long waiting times for services from community psychiatric nurses (CPNs) and social workers.* (p. 168)

The Northern Community Mental Health Team (NCMHT), which Anne Evans created was one of five Community Mental Health Teams (CMHT), all sub-units of the parent health care organisation. Marjorie, one of the parent organisation's service directors, was Anne Evans' superior. Marjorie charged Anne with the restructuring project from

which the NCMHT was constructed. The NCMHT team (unless otherwise noted) were, in order of their appearance:

Directors:	parent organisation board of directors and service directors
Marjorie:	service director; Anne's superior
Anne Evans:	NCMHT service manager; CMHT restructuring project manager
Andrea:	NCMHT first line manager; direct report to Anne
Jackie:	NCMHT nurse
Penny:	NCMHT occupational therapist
Maxine:	NCMHT nurse
Paul:	CMHT service manager; Anne's peer
Stella:	Anne's personal assistant
Susan:	Marjorie's assigned replacement for Anne; Paul's peer; one of the community psychiatric nurses Anne split off from the NCMHT

In the months before this study began, a further restructuring led to the merger of the local mental health services (p. 169). In effect, this reversed all of Anne's restructuring efforts.

In the five months prior to the formation of this larger trust Anne Evans was admitted to the hospital in which she worked and was diagnosed with a terminal, degenerative condition. She died within three months of hearing her diagnosis. (p. 169)

Pracademic reflection on Eros and Thanatos working in organisations:

When a leader dies

The research materials reported in this article are drawn from a wider study that explored the nature of mental health work through a process of observation, conversation and interview with mental health teams. The wider study involved five mental health teams who worked in contrasting contexts. Paula Hyde obtained permission to access the community mental health team (CMHT) through negotiations with directors, managers and team members.

During negotiations for research access, the directors of the organisation suggested this team [i.e. the Northern CMHT] as the first place for study and intimated that the team were difficult to manage. It became evident that the directors hoped the researcher would return with a list of instructions about what to do to improve the mental health services or achieve something for them, which the researcher could not do.

Contact with the team covered a period of five months and included six weeks of intensive observation. The team were observed at work in their office and individual staff members were accompanied on work tasks outside the office. They were interviewed, using 'probing questions' followed by 'psychodynamic interpretations', about their experiences of work (Gabriel, 1999). Many conversations also took place whereby experiences and interpretations were discussed as the opportunity arose. Attempts to discuss the conditions of the working staff with some of the directorship were met with disinterest and impatience so toward the end of the study, potential interactions were avoided.

Initially, the staff treated the researcher as they might a student or trainee nurse, by demonstrating work practices and discussing their purpose and meaning. The research method involved reflecting back to staff impressions and interpretations and after initial consternation some of the staff sought out the researcher to test their own ideas. Ultimately, she was treated as confidante or counsellor to some of the staff. This occurred as a result of her being present through the working day and being available for, and interested in, conversations about the nature of the work. The staff were aware of her background as an occupational therapist and for this reason they treated her as an 'insider' expecting her to understand their reactions and difficulties in working (Bartunek & Louis, 1996; Hunt, 1989). This process had the unanticipated effect of enabling the staff to acknowledge and/or explore difficult emotions.

Although the work with the team was aimed at understanding their experience of working life, it was not a therapeutic intervention. The team had not invited an intervention to effect a change. Instead, they allowed the observation of their work and took part in interviews intending to facilitate understanding from outsiders, of their world, psychodynamic understandings were achieved by

constantly reviewing the researchers' own feelings and emotions and by living with the uncertainty of the experience, resisting the drive to give answers and advice and by containing the anxiety of 'not knowing' (Cardona, 1999). This process along with regular supervision, enabled the uncovering of core issues with which the staff were attempting to deal.

The death of the leader, Anne Evans

Northern CMHT (NCMHT) was established five years before the study took place, mainly from ward staff and a small number of existing community staff. It was created in response to complaints from general practitioners about long waiting times for services from community psychiatric nurses (CPNs) and social workers. Anne Evans was well known by her superior and service director, Marjorie, who before being promoted from service manager, had worked alongside Anne. Marjorie was located in an administrative office in the centre of the city and about five miles away from NCMHT. Knowing that the staff was generally seen as difficult to handle, as well as being unkind or neglectful of the patients, Marjorie appointed Anne to deal with the perceived service problems at that hospital. Staff had been regarded, by service managers, as militant because of their resistance to organisational change and their willingness to involve unions in disputes. Anne Evans led the new team and spearheaded a radical restructuring of services that resulted in the CPN service being exported to a community health trust. This separation caused great resentment among the CPNs. Hospital social workers were transferred to social services control and both groups were unfavourably compared with the new NCMHT service.

The NCMHT won two service quality awards in the three years following its formation. These awards were displayed above reception. In other parts of the city, two new CMHTs had been created to replicate NCMHT services. Anne Evans had been the driving force behind these developments and was both feared and respected by her staff. She was known for enforcing disciplinary procedures against staff and for her hard-headed approach to her work.

In the months before this study began, a further restructuring led to the merger of the local mental health services and reintroduced the CPN and social work staff to the organisation forming a large mental health trust. In the five months prior to the formation of this larger trust, Anne Evans was admitted to the hospital in which she worked and was diagnosed with a terminal, degenerative condition. She died within three months of hearing her diagnosis and in the interim she reduced her interest, solely to the working of NCMHT and she spent increasing time in the work office. Stella, her personal assistant, reported caring for her at work as she grew increasingly incapacitated. Some staff helped Anne to maintain her garden at home and some of the men on the NCMHT carried the coffin at her burial. Anne was replaced shortly after her death with a social worker, Susan, from the alienated group.

Task and organisation at Northern CMHT

The primary task of NCMHT was to maintain people in the community who were already identified as having a severe mental illness. The NCMHT administered medication, offered social activities and alerted doctors in the event of any decline in the patient's condition. Their task was to contain threats of violence from the patients to themselves or to others. Their patients had long-term illnesses that meant success was judged by an absence of violence or by the avoidance of readmission to hospital. Such 'failures' in mental health care may, in extreme cases, lead to widespread media exposure and public inquiry.

Although the team was based in the hospital, the majority of their work was in patients' own homes. The patients had conditions that required regular monitoring and they were expected to be involved with the community team for long periods. One worker was expected to provide most of the care for one patient giving the opportunity for personalised care and the development of long-term working relationships. In reality, patients were regularly passed from one worker to another or referred out to other services.

The team's immediate manager was Andrea, who was based in the team office and had her own case-load of patients as well as immediate managerial responsibilities. She had been appointed by Anne. Andrea's desk was behind a filing cabinet out of sight of the office door. She had been promoted over other members of the team (some of those members had been demoted).

There were fifteen nurses on the team, one social worker, one occupational therapist and eight support workers. Eight of the twenty-five were men, four of whom were nurses and four support workers. The nurses were all the same grade. The majority of the nurses had been promoted from the wards to the NCMHT within two years of qualifying. Three more experienced members of the hospital staff had been moved to the team but were demoted in the process. The staff had little discretion and were checked upon and disciplined regularly for minor infractions of the rules. Dress codes that included the wearing of shirts and ties for the male staff were imposed. The team was known elsewhere in the hospital as 'Evans Angels' and there was considerable resentment among other staff about the high profile of the team and their quality awards.

Responses to Anne's death

Anne had alienated other people in her promotion of this team. After her death she was replaced by a social worker. The team continued to protect their flat grading structure and promoted group action and decision-making.

> The flat management structure makes everybody equal except for one sort of person who's steering it and I would imagine that people are so sort of used to it that if we changed it now that'd put the cat among the pigeons. It'd be hair-raising.
>
> (Jackie, NCMHT nurse)

Although the older and more experienced members seemed to like Andrea, she carried little authority in the team. With Andrea, team members behaved like children, testing the boundaries and drawing her into telling them off for wearing jeans, arriving a few

minutes late, or making challenges to her in meetings by moving away from the point, joking or making light of her efforts to improve behaviour on the team. Their behaviour didn't escalate or annoy Andrea. She did not respond in the way Anne was reported to have done (i.e. by taking formal disciplinary action). Rather, Andrea made somewhat ineffectual attempts to get the team working. In effect, her attention was often diverted to those team members who were grieving the most or those who had been most attached to Anne. During data collection after Anne's death, Andrea was applying for other jobs. At the point of research completion, Andrea had just been appointed to a similar position in a neighbouring service but in a different organisation and borough.

As an observer, the researcher felt that Andrea had a very difficult job to contain emotions in the team and as the new leader operated at some distance, this role fell to Andrea.

Three additional team members had been employed since Anne's death. Two were support staff employed from within the hospital and the third was Penny, an occupational therapist (OT) from outside the local area. Members of the team encouraged me (Hyde) to spend time with Penny although they emphasized she was unpopular and isolated.

Although Anne had been mentioned before, the following conversation was the first indication of how influential to the team she had been.

> Anne set up these teams and died last year. She was held in great esteem. She seemed to rule with a rod of iron and there was a blame culture. If you didn't write your name and date and who you were [in the patient notes] you'd get a letter to discipline you. It was all about getting the quality award. More time doing paperwork – ridiculous! Anne said 'if you're qualified over five years you're over and done with', so a lot [of staff] are recently qualified and it reflects in clinical judgements, people aren't confident.
>
> (Penny, occupational therapist)

Penny arrived after Anne's death, yet she recognized the effects of Anne's leadership style upon the remaining team.

Projection and emotional containment

This team protected itself from the anxiety of work and team members distanced themselves both physically and psychologically. The back office provided a space where they were locked in and safe. Communications could then be controlled over the telephone. Direct contact often involved the use of an assessment form that structured the conversation and prevented spontaneous interactions. In the period following Anne's death, nurses and support workers on the team reported spending more time in the back office or doing assessments.

> What we've become very good at is assessment. Assessing patients – we've got an unbelievable amount of paperwork involved in assessing the client that goes into everything, every detail. You might see the client's relative. You might see their doctor with them. You might go through a whole rigmarole of assessment work, risk assessment, assessment of symptoms but the thing that we're not particularly great at, I think, is intervention work.
>
> (Maxine, nurse)

In spite of the paperwork involved in assessments, the support workers were often sent to meet new patients with little information or guidance as to what they were expected to do. The paperwork aimed at reducing risks was, in effect, used as an avoidance strategy. In this way the paperwork was self-defeating. Conversely, Stella had stopped collecting client feedback questionnaires as she felt that no one was interested in reading them.

Where paperwork substituted for emotional work, it was used increasingly to facilitate withdrawal from wider society. In the back office the staff were able to engage themselves in note writing and form filling that provided an alternative to 'real' contact with the patients, to the extent that assessment forms were used as barriers to emotional engagement with the patients when face-to-face contact did occur.

A series of extramarital affairs sprung up between members of staff who had formed the loyal core of original team members.

> One of the problems I think with this team is that firstly everybody's about the same age. Secondly, there's a lot of cliques in these teams. Thirdly, a lot of people are friendly in this team. Their best friend in the world works in the same team. About Christmas time, there were several affairs going on in the team, which are now public. People are now living together openly but that was causing a lot of an undercurrent to a certain degree. Certain people were having affairs and it got to the point to me where it was like being in the playground. If you say something about somebody or you have a professional disagreement that everybody takes their bat home or they're all sort of, well you know, you're talking about my mate. It's all sort of really difficult.
>
> (Penny, occupational therapist)

Scapegoating

This particular team was involved in scapegoating the occupational therapist who was isolated and excluded. She was held responsible for bad feelings experienced by the group. She joined the team after the death of the leader and was not involved in the shift system. She was prevented from joining the integrated work system (where everyone else was called a care manager) by common agreement within the team. She was then criticized for working outside it. The researcher was also an occupational therapist and was encouraged by the other staff to offer support to Penny, the occupational therapist.

> Partly because I'm an OT, partly because there is only one of me and partly because or even mainly because I'm quite a strong, in some ways I'm quite a strong person. People can have a go at me and it does hurt but it just makes me more determined sometimes. All of that has compounded to make me the scapegoat.
>
> (Penny, occupational therapist)

The patients were also treated in a disciplinary manner, being discharged for 'bad behaviour' or constrained in what they could say or do. They had to abide by narrow rules or be passed on to another service. These actions reflected Anne's disciplinary style. Several of the newer staff recognized these practices and attempted to arbitrate on behalf of the patients.

> The CPNs who are a good service, clinically they're a lot more experienced. But when Anne was setting up this team, this happened to the social workers as well, instead of trying to integrate them they were just farmed out to another trust and sidelined. Naturally this group of staff is completely resentful. They are completely resentful of that team in an irrational way that they have come to symbolize everything that they hate and Anne Evans is the pariah figure.
>
> (Paul, service manager)

Perhaps the staff member most affected, and with most to lose, following Anne's death was her personal assistant, Stella. She spoke in idealized terms of Anne's achievements at the hospital and denigrated the place and the staff, before and after Anne's death.

Before: It was a huge disgusting place with more disgusting staff. It was the norm to sit with a fag in their hand, drinking coffee and doing nothing all day. Everything was a chore, especially if patients asked for anything.

Under Anne: I did the last one [application for quality award] myself completely. I'm lucky Anne just left me to get on with it. She'd ask you to do a job and expect you to do it. Anne used to tell me to write my own [appraisal] that's how I got on the MBA, I could order anything.

After: [about reapplying for the quality award] What's the point now? I want to be here, it suits me for childcare. Before it was always changing, now I'm bored. I don't prompt anyone, anymore to send out questionnaires. I haven't had any for weeks. I used to remind everyone but now I've given up.

(Stella, personal assistant)

Team reactions to Anne's death differed in relation to their attachment to her. Stella, Anne's personal assistant, had been promoted alongside Anne and had been allowed considerable freedom such as filling in her own appraisal. In addition, Anne supported her funding on an MBA course in recognition of her contribution to achieving the quality awards. Other members of the team had gained by Anne's preference for newly qualified staff. They had achieved early promotion from the wards to the CMHT. Anne was said to prefer people who had been qualified less than five years and Jackie, a nurse on the team had been promoted from the wards shortly after qualifying.

> The community mental health team was like her sort of baby, so to speak. I know that she had loads of ideas about it. I had quite a lot of respect for her and I think she cared for what happened to the team. She liked the fact that we had the service quality awards to our name. We were really quite client-centred and there was so much of a comparison between our team and the CPN's and the social services. But now it's like with Anne dying, from my point of view, we have a new manager who maybe doesn't really understand the nature of the service that was created. She maybe wants to mould it into something completely different and doesn't care that you know this work was done and this was achieved. We're becoming moulded into something else. We're the same people, and it's fine in principle, but you can't just get people that have been working in one model successfully and expect them not to say anything when something else, that isn't founded in research-based practice at all, is given to them.
>
> (Jackie, NCMHT nurse)

There were two other small groupings of staff. The first were made up of the staff appointed after Anne's death who found the strong attachments of the core group of staff, to the past and the service quality awards, perplexing. The second group consisted of people who had not necessarily gained from Anne, such as staff who were disciplined or demoted by her. Both these groups felt less threatened and more optimistic about the future.

Anne's replacement

The NCMHT really stood out in contrast. One of the nurses described Anne, jovially, as a 'ball-breaker' and another said 'it used to be autocratic hellfire'. All of this was said in a spirit of admiration for the successes achieved by such an approach. There was a core group of staff who had been there from the start and considered Anne to be a caring, accessible, omnipotent and legitimate leader.

Others outside the NCMHT did not think the development of the team and their idealisation was good for the team or the organization. In fact, there was evidence that others in the wider organization including some of the directorship spoke in derogatory terms about Anne and her achievements. Managers were critical of the way in which Anne had run the team because of the effects on surrounding services and were keen for things to change now that she had gone.

Anne's replacement was considered by the team to be indifferent, distant, fallible and an imposter from the enemy camp. Susan, a social worker from one of the staff groups that had been alienated in the past, became the team's leader. In contrast to Anne, Susan was less authoritarian and spent little time with the NCMHT as the management role covered many other mental health services. Marjorie, who suggested the team for study and who appointed Susan to replace Anne, later said of the new management arrangements:

> Susan's got a really tough job there, even she's wondering why I put her there. Anne sat in her wheelchair in the office waiting to die and making sure that her legend lives on.
>
> (Marjorie, service director)

Another manager who had worked alongside Anne and took a parallel appointment in the trust said:

> That team though, because her office was physically next door to them, were her special team and they all turned out for her funeral they were all absolutely destroyed by her going and that was why I would never have wanted Susan's job ... Anne had a particular style and I think it's taking a while for people to come out from living under her shadow.
>
> (Paul, service manager)

Susan recognised that she had a different leadership style. She felt that her being known to the team previously would facilitate her acceptance as a replacement. Here she contrasts her and Anne's approaches to work:

> I knew Anne which I think helped. I was a social worker here when Anne was on the wards. I knew her style and I had always got on OK with her. But I'd go into a ward round and you would decide that something should be done. And Anne would have been in the ward round with you. And you finish the ward round at twelve and at two before the hand over, she would be on the phone 'is that sorted out now?' My style both personally and in management has always been much more reflective. But because I knew her ... and I've seen her on and off at different planning groups and so on ... I found it easier. I knew in a way I suppose what act I was following.
>
> (Susan, service manager)

Anne's loss was felt particularly acutely because she had brought the team positive recognition in the form of the service quality award in a work environment in which the only recognition normally available was negative. The loss of this award threatened a return to negative measure such as lack of violence, suicides or admissions to hospital of their patients. The staff team were aware that Susan was not intending to work towards regaining the award and were unsure what this meant about her estimation of them. They were either ambivalent or antagonistic towards her as a replacement. They were used to being closely managed and that was no longer happening. The team appeared to be torn between feelings of disloyalty if they accepted any benefits of the new regime, and wanting to preserve the positive acknowledgements of their work. They were having difficulty resolving this conflict. Susan was attempting to work on this conflict but was finding the process difficult.

> I'm trying to talk to people to pick out what is good about the service and needs to be continued. I mean Stella [personal assistant], is fine now, but she has tremendous loyalty to Anne and to the original service and has been very upset at the thought of

> changing it. [She is] enormously proud of the service quality award and all the work that was put into it. I'm not terribly impressed by any of these awards. I have always felt if they think we have to put a carrot like that to make us do the right job, they must think we are idiots.
>
> (Susan, service manager)
>
> Members of the team had difficulty adjusting to the new manager in the wake of such a dominant leader. The flat team structure promoted a homogenous view of the staff team. They had become dependent and no longer trusted their own abilities for individual decision-making. (Hyde, 1999; Hyde & Thomas, 2003)

Acting out the missing leader: The setting

Alford (1994a) realised that as a result of the schizoid-compromise, other consistent, group dynamics of *acting out* occurred. In psychodynamic terms, to act out is to "engage in an activity which can be interpreted as a substitute for remembering past events" (Rycroft, 1995, p. 1). Acting out replaces reflexivity; it is taking action before thinking things through. Alford organised his group behaviour research on *acting out the missing leader* in five dedifferentiating, regressive and dedevelopment stages or dramas of: a) the sacrificial leader; b) despair, deadness, and hopelessness; c) sex and death; d) leadership and individuality; and e) tribal warfare and superficial ideologies (1994a, pp. 26–76). While conducting our own research of the death instinct's continued emergence, we found that even though Alford's conceptualisations did not explicitly target the death instinct, they were an invaluable framework for recognising death instinct manifestations that can lead to the identification, diagnosis and perhaps the cure of some group development ailments derived from feelings of identity dissolution.

It should be restated that individual and group defence mechanisms occur simultaneously. However, to add to Alford's narrative and for the purpose of clarity, we do begin with a review of the schizoid-compromise as it affects the prima-donna primal individual, the aggressive imaginer and then move toward resultant and decursive group behaviour manifestations of the death instinct.

Leadership and individualism

Within the context of a group situated in the depressive position, group members, including the aggressive imaginer, are likely to be productive thanatissists and normal narcissists trying to protect self-Eros while conferring and maintaining others' self-esteem. However, when the group becomes unstable, the schizoid-compromise becomes apparent and self-protection becomes paramount.

Before restructuring was contemplated, Anne, an experienced middle manager, was likely in the "feeling state" of wisdom (Erikson, 1980). Contiguousness of the individual/group relationship precipitated proleptic fantasies of joining an unstable collective long before reaching physical proximity to any others; especially if negative experiences were carried forward from past, non-esteemed interrelationships (Napier & Gershenfeld, 2004). It is likely Anne experienced high-levels of separation anxiety, while intuiting or understanding that she would also be creating unstable groups in which she would have to survive. This was the start of Anne's engagement in proleptic splitting.

> *Anne Evans was well known by her superior and service director, Marjorie, who before being promoted from service manager, had worked alongside Anne. Marjorie was located in an administrative office in the centre of the city and about five miles away from NCHMT. Knowing that the staff was generally seen as difficult to handle, as well as being unkind or neglectful of the patients. Marjorie appointed Anne to deal with the perceived service problems at that hospital.* (p. 168)

This is evidence that Anne was isolated from one group, the directors, and needed to ensure she would not be engulfed by those she did not care for in the new group. To stay in the mind's eye of her employers for promotions, and to ensure she would not lose her job, Anne needed to remain a group member of the parent organisation. However, to stay in this group she would have to be outside of it to accommodate her superior's demands. Although Marjorie was in electronic communication's distance, her physical proximity to Anne's new location (i.e. five miles away) was rather remote. Conflicts that occurred before, during and after Anne's restructurings were resolved using forcing (i.e. directors), accommodating (i.e. Anne) and avoiding (i.e. directors and Anne).

On the one hand, to the frazzled aggressive imaginer, the legitimate leader is the omnipotent and omniprescent "mother" representation.

On the other, the legitimate leader is automatically at a disadvantage because he or she is also not the 'real' mother. Consequently, the aggressive imaginer has more 'play' (Winnicott, 1971). Here, 'play' means an ability to treat the legitimate leader in the manner the persecutorial 'real' mother was perceived to treat the aggressive imaginer. Because the legitimate leader and the 'real' mother are not one and the same, the aggressive imaginer allows him or herself to feel and to be less accountable and to take less responsibility for proleptic and for real-time behavioural consequences.

The aggressive imaginer is much more afraid of the 'real' mother than the legitimate leader. Yet, in comparison to others, the legitimate leader is perceived to have the most power, so the aggressive imaginer also believes the legitimate leader is the most persecutorial. Psychodynamic defences are the protective shields of, simultaneously, the schizoid-compromise, projective identification and introjective identification.

Even in prolepticality, the legitimate leader is the group member through whom all group members are connected to the group. Chapter 2 reminds us that the aspects all members share is the conjunction of their super-egos that tells them they all must be in the group. What makes aggressive imaginers the most different is their super-ego's influence on the perception of the 'size', importance or relevance of the ego-ideal. When every last vestige of egoistic interest in the ego-ideal requires protection within complete accordance with the super-ego and at the exclusion of all else, productive to pathological levels of narcissism ensue – there seems to be so much to protect from so many. According to one of the nurses, Anne had a very strong attachment to her NCMHT creation:

> *The community mental health team was like her sort of baby, so to speak. I know that she had loads of ideas about it.* (p. 175)

In comparison to others in the group, so highly self-regarded is this aspect of identity that all those who are fantasised to want to change it in any way, shape or form are life-threatening and must be eliminated. Excessive Erostic energy or maximisation of pleasure and minimisation of displeasure in the form of self-protection (i.e. having to be in this particular group when it is not wanted), brings forward equal or greater Thanatic responses in an attempt to restore balance. It is more likely then, that employees with external loci of control are more likely to feel guilty as a masochistic response to the inability to control the environment. Here, high degrees of external loci control needed to be tempered with high degrees of internal loci of control.

Anne was schizoid-compromised because she was chosen to restructure: a masochistic task seen to feed a narcissistic need to do a good job, while simultaneously building perceptions of mortification, terror and mortality salience. True to Alford's theory, Anne perceived Marjorie to be too "brutal and sadistic" (Alford, 1994a, p. 73) because by selecting Anne to complete the restructuring, she was alienating Anne from the larger group without giving Anne the time or support to mourn this loss (Gabriel, 1999; Kets de Vries, 2001; Carr, 2003a, 2003b; Hyde & Thomas, 2003). Her self-esteem was deflated more than inflated, which induced primordial splitting and putting into "cold storage" (Alford, 1994a, p. 55), some of the best parts of herself. Anne became restructured or rather destructured, into a psychologically downsized, fragmented self (Marcia, 2002). During radical organisational change such as restructuring, the productive narcissist becomes even more productive and perhaps even pathological:

> *Anne Evans led the new team and spearheaded a radical restructuring of services that resulted in the* [community psychiatric nursing] *CPN service being exported to a community health trust.* Susan was one of the CPN nurses who was split off from the NCMHT. Anne allowed the entry of three, experienced outside hospital staff but to join the team, they paid the price of demotion. *This separation caused great resentment among the CPNs. Hospital social workers were transferred to social services control and both groups were unfavourably compared with the new NCMHT service.* (p. 181)

From proleptic splitting, Anne migrated to primordial and primal splitting. Anne was becoming dissociated (Kets de Vries, 2001). Instead of being able to use conceptual skills to understand the bigger picture, she became more attached to parts of process and task while sacrificing aspects of relationship (Schermerhorn, Hunt & Osborn, 2003). In mortality salient situations, diminutions of self-esteem enhance death-fear anxiety, which lead to punitive, outward acts of aggression toward transgressors that are severe (Solomon et al., 1998).

Alford told us that in clinical appraisals of group relations, the first drama in acting out the leader is the sacrifice of the legitimate leader who refuses to lead. The refusal to lead in this case has occurred because, unfortunately, Anne has died leaving both her loyal followers and her less than adoring employees behind to act out in her absence. It is still important and necessary to discuss prominent aspects of Anne's personality in as much as it is these that will eventually be paraded by various people who were under her influence.

Anne Evans could be considered to be what Alford classified to be the aggressive imaginer or charismatic, the latter being an interpretation that comes from the discourse in organisational behaviour. Anne demonstrated three charismatic trait sets: "distant (persistent, courageous, social courage to express opinions and a non-conformist); close-up (sociability, expertise, humor, setting high standards, originality); and a combination of distant and close-up traits (self-confidence, authoritativeness, sacrifice)" (Schermerhorn et al., 2003, p. 301). In line with Freud's first posit, some of Anne's behaviour is seen to be inwardly directed or masochistic.

As far as narcissistic tendencies are concerned, Anne was perhaps so involved in her own malady that she did not recognise she was killing off other people in the organisation, which is an example of pathological narcissism. There is also a connection to surplus repression and the performance principle (Marcuse, 1955, 1964). Even though Anne was so ill, she continued to work.

> *She died within three months of hearing her diagnosis and in the interim she reduced her interest, solely to the working of NCMHT and she spent increasing time in the work office.* (p. 182)

The conjunctions of splitting, pathological narcissism and surplus repression and the performance principle (Marcuse, 1955, 1964) is that one is unable to cast off the shroud of having an external *or* an internal locus of control (Schermerhorn et al., 2003). Over or under-accountability for control of the environment induces Thanatic guilt and shame that are two costs of maintaining self-esteem (Crocker, 2002). With such negative projective and introjective identification not held in check to minimise surplus repression, there becomes an organisational culture and perhaps even a societal culture consisting of the 'working dead'.

That Anne became outwardly aggressive leaves little doubt as descriptions of her behaviour clearly point to sadistic tendencies in the form of alienating others from the new core group. Anne was instrumental in keeping down and out, those who did not initially 'fit'. For example, Anne made Susan, a social worker, an outcast of the NCMHT group. It was not until after Anne's death that Susan was promoted. Susan obviously had the skills and abilities to be a first line manager of the NCMHT. Instead and seemingly out of no where, Anne promoted Andrea into the position. Sublimination of the death instinct is splitting 'bad' from 'good' that underscores the perceptual distortion of the halo effect (Schermerhorn et al., 2003).

Solomon et al. (1998) stated that when faced with mortality salience, conservatives or those who were less open-minded and more dogmatic were more likely to be punitive and to assign more severe punishments to those who did not conform to their worldviews – conclusions, which are supported by this case. Anne defended against death-fear by separating perceptions of good aspects of both distal and proximal group experiences from the bad. Anne split and projected "bad breast" representations so community psychiatric nurses and social workers were exiled because they were perceived as untrustworthy incompetents. The community psychiatric nurses' militancy was threatening and powerful giving rise to competitive authority. Fear and envy were particularly evident in Anne's decisions to demote new members, although their service experience could have helped NCMHT's development. Outwardly expressed sadistic acts, among other harmful death instinct manifestations, had ensued to protect the "ordinary masochist" (Lind, 1991).

This also supports the Kleinian view that the death instinct encourages splitting those who are loved from those who are hated or envied who in this case, respectively, were those who conformed to Anne's value set and those who did not. Additionally, the core group had seen what Anne did to employees who did not fit in her value set – Anne exiled them to other departments. Those who did fit were lauded, and their self-esteem built, or at least that is what they perceived.

We interpret act one, scene one of *The case of the missing leader* to be indicative of the individual's loss of self-leadership, or what is akin to the leader's self-mutilation of identity. Alford's therapeutic group setting presupposed that the formal leader has a healthy psychological organisation and is thus capable of mentoring the newborn group to become at least a working group. This may not always be the case when self-leaders allow themselves to be schizoid-compromised – the new manifestation of the death instinct. Consequently, the drama of sacrificial leader occurs because of struggles with leadership and individuality:

> In this position, the autonomy of the leader is especially humiliating, evoking large amounts of envy, rage, and resentment, as his individuality is a constant reminder of the member's sacrifice. Ignoring the consultant-leader or seeking to identify with him and his power become dominant strategies. In fact they become a single strategy: to ignore the consultant-leader in reality, so as to more completely identify with him in fantasy. This theme, part of the

> schizoid compromise...There is no more important group phenomenon than this, as it unites and explains so many others. (Alford, 1994a, p. 37)

There is mutual causation of dramas, underscored by identity dissolution that triggers mortality salience and death-fear.

As was introduced in the previous chapter, the aggressive imaginer is the weakest-strongest, healthiest-sickest group member who is the least schizoid-compromised. Because of having higher degrees of narcissism in comparison to other group members, less 'good' was put into cold storage. However, the 'good' the aggressive imaginer brings to the group is a relative construction. To others who are most schizoid-compromised, fantasies of group and legitimate leader persecution is so great that the aggressive imaginer looks 'better' and provides 'better' alternatives than what others can think to do. Other group members are psychically more fragile because they do not have enough self-Eros to refrain from introjecting Thanatic projective identification or the aggressive imaginer's 'bad'.

Excluding the legitimate leader, the aggressive imaginer has a stronger super-ego than other group members; even after proleptic and primordial splitting by all. Except for the legitimate leader, all other group members have unrepressed experiential lines with the aggressive imaginer being most instinctually volatile. The result of the schizoid-compromise as a defence, means becoming deindividuated and de-differentiated. Through their own self-leadership, or lack there of, their identities are dissolving. This is one reason why Alford (1994a) and Ogden (1989) stated that the schizoid-compromise was a form of suicide. This supports Freud's and Klein's contentions that Thanatos is purely destructive from both inwardly directed aggression and then outwardly turned aggression. It is also clear that 'bad' aspects of being in this group have been projected into the group. In so doing, the group is filled only with the poisons of which Nitsun (1996) spoke. Additionally, the group's boundaries are now part-boundaries so the group itself is schizoid-compromised. Of course, here we are also talking about the group of directors as well as other hospital groups affected by their relationships with Anne. In their studies, Mikulincer, Florian, and Hirschberger (2003), revealed that close relationships minimised mortality salience. Mikulincer and Florian (1995) found that different causes of mortality salience resulted in different death-fear coping mechanisms. In this case study, relationships sinking to depths of constant mistrust, use and abuse resulted in exacerbation of mortal-

ity salience. 'Good' and 'bad' close relationships seem to have opposing affects on mortality salience. More to the point, it is more likely that mortality salience has the ability to change 'good' relationships into 'bad'.

Such sadistic control is instrumental in preventing dedifferentiation that is synonymous with psychical movement of individuals toward the pole of submergence or engulfment where group members fear they will turn into one another. The consequence is: "If all can't be leader, then none shall be an individual..." (Alford, 1994a, p. 63). Retaliation against the legitimate leader takes shape in the form of projecting self's 'bad' aspects into the legitimate leader and fantasising that the legitimate leader has introjected them. Fundamentally, this again is the concept of attacks on linking (Bion, 1959) that the aggressive imaginer convinces the other group members to use. At the same time, productive and pathological narcissists fantasise they are 'good' because they have introjected 'good' from the legitimate leader. The 'good' from the legitimate leader is required to offset that which was hidden through primordial splitting.

Whether conscious of this or not, pathological narcissist aspects of self use projective identification to divest self of 'bad' with the intention of hurting the other. Productive and pathological narcissists trade their 'bad' for an other's 'good'. They make self feel good at the expense of other – at the cost of others' identity dissolution that means to attack their ego-ideals. A productive thanatissist introjects 'bad' with the view to making it 'good' but then, not necessarily better. The pathological thanatissist is one who introjects 'bad' and makes it worse, which means the pathological narcissist, to protect self, will eventually have to project the 'worst'. The pathological narcissist introjects or takes the 'good' from an other and projects 'bad' into the other, until the other seems to be 'all bad'. The 'good' that is taken is meant to replace the 'good' that was put into cold storage during primordial splitting, while fantasising proleptic participation in the group. It is also meant to replace the 'good' the aggressive imaginer 'guilted' out of other group members. In order to stop their own dissolution, group members need to refill their schizoid gaps with 'good' aspects of the legitimate leader. People act out what they no longer have but are in dire need of recapturing *even if they themselves have committed psychological suicide.* This is Thanatic arrogance (Bion, 1958) that divests one of accountability and responsibility in the group and sets the stage for the drama of the sacrificial leader.

Act 1, Part 1: The Sacrificial leader

In the schizoid-compromised group, only low-level part-compromise is practised. All group members need to self-protect against dissolution. In so doing, they reinforce their punctured boundaries with the 'good' introjected from the legitimate leader. This is an effect from transference because the group members believe the legitimate leader must be the best as he or she is able to be inside and outside the group at the same time. This is also what all of the group members want and in order for it to happen, the legitimate leader must no longer exist. Through paraesthetic persuasion, the legitimate leader's identity is slowly but surely dissolved. The leader's reaction is the paradox of participative control. To control the feeling of being dissolved while being in the group, there is a need to control the situation through conflict resolution of avoiding the group members' and the group's projective identification.

To be inside and outside the group at the same time, the aggressive imaginer must camouflage her or himself as the legitimate leader. So that which is 'taken' from the legitimate leader makes the aggressive imaginer appear most like the legitimate leader but better, since there is now much less 'bad' in the aggressive imaginer in comparison to the skeleton-like appearance of the 'eaten' (Guntrip, 1969), *sacrificed* legitimate leader. Now, the legitimate leader looks like the grim reaper! – when really he or she may have been a productive narcissist or perhaps even a generative thanatissist. The first missing leader is the first legitimate leader. Unfortunately, in this case, this is also one whose preference is to act out as a productive thanatissist.

After reading the case study, like us, you may have determined that the first missing legitimate leader is the board as represented by Marjorie.

> *One of the authors (Hyde) obtained permission to access the community mental health team (CMHT) through negotiations with directors, managers and team members. During negotiations for research access, the directors of the organization suggested this team as the first place for study and intimated that the team were difficult to manage. It became evident that the directors hoped the researcher would return with a list of instructions about what to do to improve the mental health services or achieve something for them, which the researcher could not do.* (p. 186)

> *Initially, the staff treated the researcher as they might a student or trainee nurse, by demonstrating work practices and discussing their purpose and meaning. The research method involved reflecting back to staff impressions and interpretations and after initial consternation some of the staff sought out the researcher to test their own ideas. Ultimately, she was treated as confidante or counsellor to some of the staff. This occurred as a result of her being present through the working day and being available for, and interested in, conversations about the nature of the work.* (p. 167)

At the start of the case study, it was Marjorie and her peers, the other service directors who really wanted the researcher to fix the problems in the NCMHT. It was also reported that during the study, the directors did not want to speak with the researcher in terms of the NCMHT's performance. In regard to Marjorie, this is especially salient as she was the NCMHT's first legitimate leader and Anne's direct superior. Marjorie used conflict resolution techniques of forcing-avoidance that threatened Anne's and the NCMHT's identities with isolation. In these circumstances, their group became unstable as part of the organisational-ideal eroded in light of the need to restructure. The result was that Anne was literally competing for her life:

> *The NCMHT won two service quality awards in the three years following its formation. These awards were displayed above reception. In other parts of the city, two new CMHTs had been created to replicate NCMHT services. Anne Evans had been the driving force behind these developments and was both feared and respected by her staff. She was known for enforcing disciplinary procedures against staff and for her hard-headed approach to her work.*[12] (p. 168)

The fear of being isolated resulted in Anne's regression or dedevelopment all the way back to memories of early childhood and infancy constituted by mistrust, hopelessness (Erikson, 1980). Envy of the 'bad breast' or Marjorie's alienating personality (Klein, 1975c, p. 189), hung the backdrop for Anne's sadistic actions. There was also other evidence of prolepticality. That is, Anne is likely to have believed that no matter what she did, Marjorie would not really care for her. As can be seen in Marjorie's statement below, Anne was before and after her death, an object to be used and abused (Ogden, 1989).

> *Anne sat in her wheelchair in the office waiting to die and making sure that her legend lives on.* (p. 178)
>
> (Marjorie, service director)

The willingness to risk identity loss or partial dissolution in the wake of creating something new may be based on the ambivalent relationship between *Eros* and *Thanatos*. However, if the personal sacrifice is perceived to come at too great a cost, *Thanatos* expresses itself as an "instinct of destruction" (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 381).

This now becomes a matter of whether or not the used and abused likes, feels obligated to, and is thus dependent upon the user and abuser. Anne allowed herself to be used and Marjorie took advantage of it until Anne became just as or even more toxic than Marjorie. Among other stigmas, to believe that: a) destructive behaviours cause no harm; b) people deserve to be treated badly; c) because something is part of one's personality, it cannot be changed and thus should be accommodated; and d) one can make allowances for the misdeeds of only those in the core group – are all toxic managerial behaviours that create the toxic follower (Lubit, 2004; see also Kleiner, 2003). Toxic followers are afraid of being ignored by their perceived leaders, and will sacrifice those who threaten these libidinal ties. Toxic leaders and followers are those who rely on impersonal rather than personal communications as a means to control other lower-level followers with one-way communication. They act in only their own best interests and if their behaviours are challenged, they plead ignorance, give poor excuses or worse, expel perfunctory, plastic apologies. They are the back-stabbers who say 'good' things to the follower but 'bad' things about the follower to others. However, the most toxic are those who subliminally try to use and abuse others. In the workplace, toxic managers are those who minimise others' self-esteem. They treat somebodies like nobodies (Fuller, 2003). Toxic managers are want-to-be leaders who protect only those who fulfil abnormal narcissistic needs at the psychological and physical cost of others. It is from toxic managers that coercive power and negative politics in workplace relationships are generated (Daft, 2001; Lerner, 1986; Robbins & Hunsaker, 2003). Toxic managers are pathological narcissists to whom transference needs to be broken.

Thanatos can hide within an Erostic, but terminal group identity. As such, transference can be broken only when the one being used realises that he or she is being used. Otherwise, the spirit the group shares is instrumentally destructive. The terminal group is one that precipitates having the ends justify the means, which is what group members have learned from the sacrifice of the legitimate group leader. This is why Marjorie is the first missing leader. Before and after Anne's death, Marjorie wanted to be a leader, but without undertaking accountability or responsibility of leadership:

> *Attempts to discuss the conditions of the working staff with some of the directorship were met with disinterest and impatience so toward the end of the study, potential interactions were avoided.* (p. 167)

It stands to reason that if the leaders of a team are incapable of leading, then there is no team. The refusal to be accountable and responsible for the consequences of one's decision-making is to fail followership. To fail followership is to fail at leadership. Leadership and followership cannot be delegated – they are integral parts of one's identity. It is then that one should be leery of those whose primary *desire* is to lead without also understanding the simultaneous and more important, the dialectic need to follow.

Through reaction formation, Anne may have attempted to control the situation of Marjorie's inability to "hold" (Alford, 1994a; Winnicott, 1971) by maintaining the libidinal connection. Anne not only did what Marjorie demanded, Anne did it efficaciously and perhaps just as, or even more, quickly than Marjorie isolated Anne. To sacrifice effectiveness for efficiency is another manifestation of the death instinct as task takes priority over relationship and transactional management becomes the norm (Schermerhorn et al., 2003). One problem with overly narcissistic leaders is that they can never really care for anyone because they will never care about their own destructive tendencies. The paradox of the toxic narcissist is that they never reflect upon their own toxicity. At the same, time toxic narcissists become productive thanatissists, so eventually the group itself dies.

Schizoid-compromised followers perceive legitimate leaders to be aggressive and sadistic because legitimate leaders have the power to 'force'. "In this drama, the group is enacting the conflict between its fantasy of the legitimate leader as aggressive, intrusive sadist to whom all must submit and its fantasy of the legitimate leader as one whom the group must destroy to save itself" (Alford, 1994a, p. 62).

In Alford's sacrificial drama, individuals in a group act out what they do not have, but need to control – a missing leader. In the first drama of the first sacrificial leader, there are three roles of the missing leader to be filled; the aggressive; the sadist; and, the scapegoat. These roles can be filled by three different group members or by the same group member, the latter being a more efficient yet just as an effective choice. In the group, Alford believed it was the director of the first sacrifice who is most likely to become the next sacrifice. To the rest of the board members, Anne seemed most like one of them, Marjorie. Subsequently, Anne was first, Marjorie's and the board members' scapegoat. Scape-

goats are those who stand out because they are too much or too little like those who are directing the sacrifice. The scapegoat is also the one who most resembles that which has already been sacrificed. What the board really wanted to be rid of, was the militant group of individuals in the original organisation. In the psychological contract between the hospital and its employees, Anne was the hospital's contribution and inducement to force others to obey. Even if she knew this, surplus repression (Marcuse, 1964) allowed Anne to continue to act as 'carrot and stick'. For the more powerful group, the legitimate leaders including Marjorie, Anne was an aggressive, sadistic scapegoat.

The director of the sacrifice is the container that most resembles that which has already been sacrificed. In effect, the life or the spirit of the legitimate leader is poured into the group's next best-worst aggressive imaginer's container. To protect her individual egoism, we see Marjorie defending her attachment to her mother, the organisation, by using projective identification to not disallow Anne from further continuance of destruction.

Those who were alienated by Anne, the community psychiatric nurses and social workers who were not allowed in the new NCMHT, Anne was perceived to be too brutal and sadistic and a minimum leader who went missing long before her somatic death. Consequently, those on the outside of the NCMHT were schizoid-compromised and also wanted Anne's sacrifice:

> *The team was known elsewhere in the hospital as 'Evans Angels' and there was considerable resentment among other staff about the high profile of the team and their quality awards.* (p. 170)
>
> *Anne had alienated other people in the promotion of this team.* (p. 170)
>
> *The CPNs who are a good service, clinically they're a lot more experienced. But when Anne was setting up this team, this happened to the social workers as well, instead of trying to integrate them they were just farmed out to another trust and sidelined. Naturally this group of staff is completely resentful. They are completely resentful of that team in an irrational way that they have come to symbolize everything that they hate and Anne Evans is the pariah figure.* (p. 174)
>
> (Paul, service manager)

Anne was sacrificed from above and from below so the following bears repeating:

In the months before this study began, a further restructuring led to the merger of the local mental health services (p. 168). In effect, this reversed all of Anne's restructuring efforts.

In the five months prior to the formation of this larger trust Anne Evans was admitted to the hospital in which she worked and was diagnosed with a terminal, degenerative condition. She died within three months of hearing her diagnosis. (p. 169)

Act 1, Part 2: The sacrificial leader in Anne's group

To her own group, Anne was perceived to be a maximum leader, one who was able to hold group members between the poles of isolation and engulfment – and especially in light of others' persecutorial judgements. To avenge their feelings of guilt and shame from their inabilities to keep Anne and thus parts of their ego-ideals alive, the group members needed to sacrifice one of their own.

It is clear that neither the group nor its group members were experiencing generativity (Erikson & Erikson, 1997). Alford argued that aggressive imaginers are most able to use projective identification to influence others because others who are dependent upon the leader are more likely to accept these subliminal and overt signals to avoid rejection. Anne had this type of relationship with Andrea.

The staff had little discretion and were checked upon and disciplined regularly for minor infractions of the rules. Dress codes that included the wearing of shirts and ties for the male staff were imposed. (p. 170)

Andrea's super-ego was so similar to that of Anne's that at the risk of being alienated by the core group and outsiders, Andrea mirrored Anne's management paradigm. This shows that throughout the restructuring and especially in having to prove the success of the NCMHT, Andrea had developed some of the same masochistic tendencies as Anne. While Anne was alive, Andrea upheld Anne's rules and values. This could be why Andrea's character seems not only to be similar to that of Anne, but also a remembered amplification stemming from her courage to be like Anne. Andrea used transference to identify with Anne so as not to be rejected by Anne. After all, Anne appointed or perhaps, anointed Andrea:

The team's immediate manager was Andrea, who was based in the team office and had her own case-load of patients as well as immediate man-

> *agerial responsibilities. She had been appointed by Anne. Andrea's desk was behind a filing cabinet out of sight of the office door. She had been promoted over other members of the team (some of those members had been demoted).* (p. 170)

After Anne died, Andrea no longer had anyone to protect her authority. The group shifted up and toward forcing that Andrea could have fought against, accommodated or avoided. First, Andrea chose accommodation:

> *Although the older and more experienced members seemed to like Andrea, she carried little authority in the team. With Andrea, team members behaved like children, testing the boundaries and drawing her into telling them off for wearing jeans, arriving a few minutes late, or making challenges to her in meetings by moving away from the point, joking or making light of her efforts to improve behaviour on the team. Their behaviour didn't escalate or annoy Andrea. She did not respond in the way Anne was reported to have done (i.e. by taking formal disciplinary action). Rather, Andrea made somewhat ineffectual attempts to get the team working.* (p. 171)

It was likely Andrea was scapegoated and sacrificed because she once seemed like Anne but was not as effectual as Anne. The transference between other group members, the group and Andrea had been broken because *the group broke Andrea.*

Despair, deadness, and hopelessness

No matter whom the group sacrifices, the missing leader is not likely to return. Yet, the sacrifice of one of them has created a class of feeling states consisting of despair, deadness, and hopelessness that all need to be contained to control shame and guilt. One group member may take on all roles or as in the previous act, each may be incorporated by different group members. In general, smaller groups have a tendency to mourn, which is the first sign of reparation or the core group's awareness that something less destructive might be done to act out the missing leader (Alford, 1994a). The member most likely to despair, or the one who seems to have lost the most, becomes the mourner:

> *Perhaps the staff member most affected, and with most to lose, following Anne's death was her personal assistant, Stella. She spoke in idealised*

terms of Anne's achievements at the hospital and denigrated the place and the staff, before and after Anne's death.

Before: *It was a huge disgusting place with more disgusting staff. It was the norm to sit with a fag in their hand, drinking coffee and doing nothing all day. Everything was a chore, especially if patients asked for anything.*

Under Anne: *I did the last one [application for quality award] myself completely. I'm lucky Anne just left me to get on with it. She'd ask you to do a job and expect you to do it. Anne used to tell me to write my own [appraisal] that's how I got on the MBA, I could order anything.*

After: *[about reapplying for the quality award] What's the point now? I want to be here, it suits me for childcare. Before it was always changing, now I'm bored. I don't prompt anyone, anymore to send out questionnaires. I haven't had any for weeks. I used to remind everyone but now I've given up.* (p. 174)

(Stella, personal assistant)

As long as Stella remained in the group for the wrong reasons, she would never be able to attach to another libidinal position even though after Anne's death, she perceived the group to become all 'bad'. Florian and Mikulincer (1997) stated that those who experienced recent losses were more likely to suffer from diminished self-fulfilment (p. 17). Stella will continue to mourn as a productive thanatissist.

"In general, however, the tone of this drama is dominated by the experience of deadness, the group's identification with the dead leader" (Alford, 1994a, p. 62). The one who identifies most with the group member sacrifice and is best able to role play deadness becomes the murderer. Hopelessness is acted out by the one who most identifies with the dead legitimate leader. In mortality salient situations, strong interpersonal relationships are more likely to diminish death-fear anxiety (Mikulincer, Florian & Hirschberger, 2003). When these relationships dissolve, hopelessness prevails. Andrea was no longer one of the group's leaders and she was also not accustomed to working with someone like Susan. In effect, Andrea felt murderous because she could neither help the group, nor Anne:

In effect, her attention was often diverted to those team members who were grieving the most or those who had been most attached to Anne.

> *As an observer, the researcher felt that Andrea had a very difficult job to contain emotions in the team and as the new leader operated at some distance, this role fell to Andrea.* (p. 171)

Consequently, Andrea was also the container for deadness and real hopelessness. Unlike Bion's (1961/2001) basic assumption group of dependence, when the leader actually dies there is no hope of resurrection.

The sacrificed scapegoat now realises the role in which she has been placed. For a brief moment, it seems Andrea becomes a generative thanatissist and leaves the group for the right reasons. Andrea realises that those who sacrifice, those who are scapegoats, and those who have created them are all lost causes:

> *During data collection after Anne's death, Andrea was applying for other jobs.* (p. 171)

Andrea left the group because she perceived it to be and to remain all 'bad'. She thought she was going to a 'good' group:

> *At the point of research completion, Andrea had just been appointed to similar position in a neighbouring service but in a different organisation and borough.* (p. 171)

If mourning is to be truly reparative and results in the group's ability to reach the depressive position, all group members need to pass through the process (Kubler-Ross, 1969/2003), otherwise the paranoid-schizoid position is never transcended.

Sex and death

Although the group can by no means be considered to be developed here or in the previous act, it is obvious that in essence, Spielrein's theory of death in sex has application. In both cases, the group shifts, even if ever so slightly, toward the notion of transformation resulting from moderate to extreme acts of destruction or the framing of death in sex in the service of creating something new (Spielrein, 1912/1994).

Real and metaphorical sex are the means to seek a "'good' substitute for the 'bad'" (Suttie, 1935, p. 31). The group may resort to having real or metaphorical sex split into life-giving and life-taking potential: positive revivification or further destruction. This resonates with Bion's (1961/2001) basic assumption group of pairing. Alford entitled this act "sex and death" (Alford, 1994a, pp. 62–63).

> *A series of extramarital affairs sprung up between members of staff who had formed the loyal core of original team members.* (p. 173)

The attempt to positively transform the group is a more reflexive and creative event that is acted out by the non-abusive lover. Alford likened this part of the act to the potential move toward the depressive position or at least the potential to move out of the paranoid-schizoid position. It is potential space (Winnicott, 1971). Other positive aspects of this act include projection of love or at least less hatred, resulting in the containers of the chaste and the beloved (Alford, 1994a, p. 63).

The chaste and the beloved

Solomon et al.'s (1998) conclusions state that in high mortality salient situations, it is more likely that heroism will be rewarded with greater rewards than in low mortality situations. We notice that no where in the case study, do those outside of Anne's group, Anne's group or Anne for that matter, ever think about Marjorie's and the other board members' contributions to the restructuring or the extent of its negative effects. Not being held accountable for negative consequences is positive reinforcement at best. If something positive can be generated, there is hope, which exemplifies the basic assumption of pairing (Bion, 1961/2001).

At worst, wily leaders can purposefully create crisis situations and then help to feed fantasies that it was they who were the heroes that 'saved' their followers. These same 'scruples' can also be manipulated to seem as though they were non-contributory factors. Marcuse (1955, 1964) and Becker (1973/1997) take special care in warning us against these 'hollow heroes'.

> *Others outside the NCMHT did not think the development of the team and their idealisation was good for the team or the organisation. In fact, there was evidence that others in the wider organization including some of the directorship spoke in derogatory terms about Anne and her achievements.* (p. 176)

Since Anne's group was not in a reflexive position to consider these factors, it continued to consider Marjorie and her peers to be promethean heroes or at least, not Sisyphean protagonists.

The persistence of persecution: Negative outcomes from death in sex and death

In keeping with the death instinct's ability to be expressed as repetition compulsion, Alford's theme of *sex and death*, is just as likely to result in

negative transformation. Past and present restructurings held all hospital members in various states of rejectivity (Erikson & Erikson, 1997). Followers did not think of other alternatives because they did not have to. Positive potential space cannot be created if the group's and group members' boundaries have been fortified to the extent that no one can ever escape their fantasy: "there is evidence that our attitude toward sex is not all approach but also avoidance" (Goldenberg, Cox, Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 2002, p. 13).

Alford found that negative transformation was generally directed by the male abusive lover's dominance using "sex as a tool to dominate or control others..." (Alford, 1994a, p. 63). Although not always gender specific, traditional containers of males as abusers and females as the abused are generally upheld (Alford, 1994a, p. 63). The abuser is the incorrect mother substitute who has no desire to 'hold' the group or any of its members. The consequence is that group members become engulfed and dedifferentiated as the will to power forces them to conform to the abuser's wishes. On the other hand, the group itself becomes differentiated from other groups – schizoid-compromised groups 'look' like their abusive lovers. Abusive lovers are abnormally narcissistic, aggressive imaginers.

> A related fear is that sex will lead to violence. One form of violence commonly feared is that of men against women: rape. In addition, women frequently resent the fact that men in the group do not seem prepared to protect them against other men. ***Rape itself never occurs in the group***. But terms like 'mindfucking', 'psychological rape', and 'psychological assault' are common. (Alford, 1994a, p. 37, italics, bold and underline our emphasis)

The abusers are of course, the hospital's 'real' leaders. The 'real leaders' 'sex' is symbolised in the Erostic activities of restructuring. Yet, persistent fantasies of the chaste and the beloved containers mean abusers become or remain protective 'mother' substitutes. Such is the case in the autistic-contiguous group. Its contagion can become contagious, so toxic leaders are protected for much longer than is healthy for followers.

> *There were two other small groupings of staff. The first were made up of the staff appointed after Anne's death who found the strong attachments of the core group of staff, to the past and the service quality awards, perplexing. The second group consisted of people who had not necessarily gained from Anne, such as staff who were disciplined or demoted by her.*

> *Both these groups felt less threatened and more optimistic about the future.* (p. 175)

Case study evidence also supports the influence of the persistent abuser to all hospital group members – *including the patients*:

> *The patients were also treated in a disciplinary manner, being discharged for 'bad behaviour' or constrained in what they could say or do. They had to abide by narrow rules or be passed on to another service. These actions reflected Anne's disciplinary style. Several of the newer staff recognized these practices and attempted to arbitrate on behalf of the patients.* (p. 174)

There is also a network of abused group members who hide in potential space to remove themselves from potential abuse:

> *This team protected itself from the anxiety of work and team members distanced themselves both physically and psychologically. The back office provided a space where they were locked in and safe. Communications could then be controlled over the telephone. Direct contact often involved the use of an assessment form that structured the conversation and prevented spontaneous interactions. In the period following Anne's death, nurses and support workers on the team reported spending more time in the back office or doing assessments.* (p. 172)

However, the goal to revive the dead leader has not yet been achieved because the one who has been sacrificed still does not reappear. Frustration resulting from this realisation links this act back to despair, deadness, and hopelessness that indicates continued cycling through these two acts may be indicative of group tendencies toward repetition compulsion.

> *Where paperwork substituted for emotional work, it was used increasingly to facilitate withdrawal from wider society. In the back office the staff were able to engage themselves in note writing and form filling that provided an alternative to 'real' contact with the patients, to the extent that assessment forms were used as barriers to emotional engagement with the patients when face-to-face contact did occur.* (p. 174)

Sex and death can also further split the group as some will be involved in the act and others will not. The group becomes *tribal* in nature or its

"world is composed of 'us' and 'them'" (Swogger, 1994, p. 71). The foundation for further intragroup and intergroup conflict is reinforced.

Tribal warfare and superficial ideologies

Even if sex and death do result in positive transformation, the next drama of "tribal warfare and superficial ideologies" (Alford, 1994a, p. 63) is a fall back to the paranoid-schizoid and perhaps, even the autistic-contiguous position. This act is characterised by the splitting of the group into good and bad tribes as posed in *Totem and Taboo* (Freud, 1913/1985). "Recall that the real enemy is one's own group and the demands on the member's individuality it makes" (Alford, 1994a, p. 64).

> *The staff team were aware that Susan was not intending to work towards regaining the award and were unsure what this meant about her estimation of them. They were either ambivalent or antagonistic towards her as a replacement. They were used to being closely managed and that was no longer happening. The team appeared to be torn between feelings of disloyalty if they accepted any benefits of the new regime, and wanting to preserve the positive acknowledgements of their work. They were having difficulty resolving this conflict. Susan was attempting to work on this conflict but was finding the process difficult.* (p. 177)

As a result of asking members to split between Anne's 'good' and 'bad' Susan was perpetuating transference and identification. Since all of Anne's group had neither mourned Anne's death nor the loss of the NCMHT concept appropriately, group members were still in the schizoid-compromised position. It is not surprising then that they were not ready to finally split away Anne's embodiment in their ego-ideals. Losing every vestige of Anne would mean the loss of all the identity that was reinforced by Anne. Transformation requires time, otherwise it is perceived to be no different than another radical change. As in Bion's (1961/2001) basic assumption group of fight or flight, the group chose to fight Susan.

> *Susan's got a really tough job there, even she's wondering why I put her there. (Marjorie, service director).* (p. 176)

Tribal warfare can be seen as the primordial regressive state of leadership and individualism and sacrificial acts – "...warring tribes are not just fighting each other; they are fighting each other to sacrifice them-

selves" (Alford, 1994a, p. 64). The more time that goes by without adequate mourning, the more recent losses from death become early losses. The combination of recent and early losses has an additive effect on perceptions of diminished self-fulfilment (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997, p. 17). For the group, it would be particularly painful for the recent and early loss to be one and the same. Without group development, there can be no individual development, so the "depressing thing about these dramas is that they just go on and on" (Alford, 1994a, p. 64).

Acting out the missing leader: The sacrificial leader

Susan is the next, new missing leader. In Susan, the group has someone they can all love to hate, someone who has the opposite management paradigm to Anne. Anne's group sacrifices Susan by not ascribing to her wishes. But because the group still needs a leader, once again, the it seeks a resurrecting sacrifice. This time it is Penny. It is Penny because she is so much like Anne, she is so different from Susan. It is also Penny because even though she seems most like Anne, Penny does nothing but denigrate Anne. Penny is an easy mark for becoming the aggressive, sadistic, scapegoat.

> *Three additional team members had been employed since Anne's death. Two were support staff employed from within the hospital and the third was Penny, an occupational therapist (OT) from outside the local area. Members of the team encouraged me (Hyde) to spend time with Penny although they emphasized she was unpopular and isolated.* (p. 171)

> *Partly because I'm an OT, partly because there is only one of me and partly because or even mainly because I'm quite a strong, in some ways I'm quite a strong person. People can have a go at me and it does hurt but it just makes me more determined sometimes. All of that has compounded to make me the scapegoat.* (p. 174)
>
> (Penny, occupational therapist)

Penny gained the reputation of being strong and courageous. This was especially evident in her open derogation of Anne's management practises. Anne's promotion strategy was to hire and promote recently qualified employees or those who had fewer than five years of experience.

> *Anne set up these teams and died last year. She was held in great esteem. She seemed to rule with a rod of iron and there was a blame culture.*

> *If you didn't write your name and date and who you were [in the patient notes] you'd get a letter to discipline you. It was all about getting the quality award. More time doing paperwork – ridiculous! Anne said 'if you're qualified over five years you're over and done with', so a lot [of staff] are recently qualified and it reflects in clinical judgements, people aren't confident.* (p. 171)
>
> (Penny, occupational therapist)

Whereas Andrea became a sacrificial scapegoat because she was like and liked Anne, the group was trying to be rid of Penny because Penny was like Anne but did not like her. In Penny, the group found someone who loved to hate as much as the group hated Susan. The group could not be rid of Susan, but they could rid themselves of Penny.

What Alford's theory does not cover are multiple groups in different hierarchal positions that are influenced in different ways by the same missing leader. That is, groups located higher in the organisational hierarchy, such as the one headed by Marjorie, also seems to be offering up their own sacrifice – one who stands out as being different. This of course would be Susan. Marjorie purposefully put Susan in a position where she would stand out as her management style was in diametric opposition to that of Anne. It would seem Susan may eventually become the next hospital group sacrifice. It is Alford's theory that the *perceived, the remembered* director of the first sacrifice (i.e. Susan replaced Anne), Susan, will eventually be 'killed'. Additionally, case evidence shows that Marjorie and the directors are seen to perpetuate the Thanatic triangle of forcing (i.e. Marjorie and other directors), accommodating (i.e. Susan) and avoiding (i.e. directors and schizoid-compromised hospital group members). Susan is now in the middle between employees and directors. This puts her squarely in the sights of the hospital's leaders' compulsions to repeat:

> *During negotiations for research access, the directors of the organization suggested this team as the first place for study and intimated that the team were difficult to manage. It became evident that the directors hoped the researcher would return with a list of instructions about what to do to improve the mental health services or achieve something for them, which the researcher could not do.* (p. 167)

> *Managers were critical of the way in which Anne had run the team because of the effects on surrounding services and were keen for things to change now that she had gone.* (p. 176)

By choosing someone with diametrically opposed leadership values and management style, the parent organisation is serving up Susan for the good of the larger organisation.

> *Anne's replacement was considered by the team to be indifferent, distant, fallible and an imposter from the enemy camp. Susan, a social worker from one of the staff groups that had been alienated in the past, became the team's leader. In contrast to Anne, Susan was less authoritarian and spent little time with the NCMHT as the management role covered many other mental health services. Marjorie, who suggested the team for study and who appointed Susan to replace Anne, later said of the new management arrangements:*
>
> > *Susan's got a really tough job there, even she's wondering why I put her there. Anne sat in her wheelchair in the office waiting to die and making sure that her legend lives on.* (p. 176)
> >
> > (Marjorie, service director)
>
> *Another manager who had worked alongside Anne and took a parallel appointment in the trust said:*
>
> > *That team though, because her office was physically next door to them, were her special team and they all turned out for her funeral; they were all absolutely destroyed by her going and that was why I would never have wanted Susan's job ... Anne had a particular style and I think it's taking a while for people to come out from living under her shadow.* (p. 174)
> >
> > (Paul, service manager)

Since Susan took the job, she is actually showing herself to be the next willing sacrifice. And since Anne's group perceives Susan to be part of the enemy camp, it is also that the group itself is schizoid-compromised.

> *Anne's loss was felt particularly acutely because she had brought the team positive recognition in the form of the service quality award in a work environment in which the only recognition normally available was negative. The loss of this award threatened a return to negative measure such as lack of violence, suicides or admissions to hospital of their patients. The staff team were aware that Susan was not intending to work towards regaining the award and were unsure what this meant about her estimation of them. They were either ambivalent or antagonistic towards her as a replacement.* (p. 177)

> *They were used to being closely managed and that was no longer happening. The team appeared to be torn between feelings of disloyalty if they accepted any benefits of the new regime, and wanting to preserve the positive acknowledgements of their work. They were having difficulty resolving this conflict.* (p. 177)

One reason may be that Susan, in trying to fight to get out from under Anne's shadow is really calling her new staff idiots:

> *Susan was attempting to work on this conflict but was finding the process difficult.*
>
> > *I'm trying to talk to people to pick out what is good about the service and needs to be continued. I mean Stella [personal assistant], is fine now, but she has tremendous loyalty to Anne and to the original service and has been very upset at the thought of changing it. [She is] enormously proud of the service quality award and all the work that was put into it. I'm not terribly impressed by any of these awards. I have always felt if they think we have to put a carrot like that to make us do the right job, they must think we are idiots.* (p. 176)
>
> (Susan, service manager)

Susan's comments indicate that she is competing with Anne by trying to be her opposite: "Most of all, what people don't want is to be in a position of weakness, humiliation, and incompetence (even if this claim requires qualification)" (Alford, 1994a, p. 37). Susan is clearly the next aggressive imaginer that Anne's group is trying to sacrifice; and Susan is also being sacrificed by Marjorie. Freud's work also suggested that the death instinct may be sublimated, as in the case of one's competitiveness in working relationships. Arndt et al. (1997) concluded that subliminal reminders of mortality salience were indeed more powerful than those recognised overtly: "Although many people are unaware of, or seem to deny, their concern with death, the evidence from these and other recent studies suggests that it is precisely when people are unaware of this fear that it has the strongest impact on their behaviour" (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997, p. 379). In Solomon et al. (1998), it was shown that defence mechanisms manifested themselves after some period of time had elapsed between the inducement of mortality salience and the manifestations of its effects. Some groups may never develop or stop dedeveloping:

> ...the outcome is much the same, as the group remains stuck in a type of perpetual civil war. Necessary for group development is a

> leader who can interpret to the members the way in which each projectively alienates large parts of himself in others, including the leader. This too is holding, what leaders are for. Only then is group development possible – possible, but not probable, and certainly not guaranteed. (Alford, 1994a, p. 61)

Through projective identification and introjective identification, all group members become aggressive imaginers. It is just that some are more 'aggressive imaginer' than others. In Thanatic workplace environments, demotions of the best employees and promotions of the worst employees are more likely to occur. Sacrifices are promoted to their next level of incompetence (Peter & Hull, 1969) – they think they are loved by the organisation so they stay in the wrong groups for the wrong, right reasons. The fantasy of symbiotic transcendence is really a nightmare of parasitism. On the one hand, we can conclude that it is very likely that at the time these data were collected, the hospital's real leader, whether it is the CEO or not, was an authoritarian, productive thanatissist. On the other, we wonder if Marjorie is still a board member and if Susan has survived the new, old premature group.

Summary

Alford's conceptualisation of group dynamics included Freudian and Kleinian perspectives on the death instinct's manifestations on the individual group member's psyche, but his renditions are primarily based on the influence of the schizoid-compromise interrelationship with projective identification, or a synthesis of splitting, projection, introjection, projective identification and transference. Alford's view of the group is that of the dedifferentiated, premature group based on part-object relations theory or fragmentation of individual and group. This view is in contrast to Klein's whole object relations theory and Bion's whole group theory. Whereas Freud and Klein's renditions of the death instinct are grounded in destruction, Alford's depiction of the "sex and death" drama resonates with a Spielreinian influence as group members engage in real or metaphorical sex that leads to something new but with the potential of positive or negative transformations as results. Spielrein's and Alford's theories are both destructive and expansive in nature. Finally, Alford's interpretation of mortality and death in the micro group and the defence mechanisms it uses to protect or defend individual's identity and self-esteem have political application to Marcuse's macro view of death instinct manifestations in society.

When faced with dissolution, the individual and group seem driven to move toward some form of transformation or change potential moving toward an expansionist view of the death instinct. The Freudian context suggests that transformation occurs after treatment, the Kleinian view portrays movement toward the depressive position and the maturity Marcuse speaks of to realise and minimise co-dependence between individual and society. Finally, Spielrein's theory is accidentally, yet prominently showcased in the acts of sex and death as the means to revive the despairing, dying, and hopeless group. As far as critical theory regarding the death instinct is concerned, one could interpret the contiguous interplay among the theorists highlighted here, to be a metaphorical group sex that is a continual fight for status of master rather than slave (Hegel, 1807/1977). Parts of their mental models have gone through destructive-reconstruction in the service of creating something new that is the interpretation of the death instinct in group relations. When synthesis among seemingly disparate subjects occurs, no whole one is left out. This is particularly salient in regard to leadership and followership. In the group, every individual influences, and is therefore accountable for, self-leadership and followership and other-leadership and followership. Leadership of self and other is the life and death of teams, working groups, and group. Unlike Katzenbach and Smith (1993/2003), we suggest that the death instinct in group dynamics makes the team seem more 'bad' than 'good'. The death instinct and its influence on self and other leadership is precisely why resistance to teams is either 'bad' or 'good.'

7
Conclusions

In our organisations, theories and issues related to the death instinct are important to consider because we behave in ways to protect our own lives, which paradoxically, can negatively affect ourselves as well as those around us. The major intent of our book was to know more about what is unknown to know more. Every safari into the unknown creates another recursive loop. Yet, there must be a beginning and so it was in the field of psychodynamics that we started.

Alford's rendering of the death instinct in clinical groups translates into the acting out of the missing leader. The consequence of acting out the missing leader is the dedevelopment of work groups into fragmented, non-reflexive (Chessick, 1989; John, 2000) premature groups that are more likely to project destruction onto others (Alford, 1994a; Klein, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d; Nitsun, 1996). The result is an organisation filled with zombies, which supports Kets de Vries' (2001) findings that implementing organisational change sometimes feels like trying to move a graveyard. This implies that investments in human resource development, and especially those related to teambuilding, are wasted if the organisation does not take the time to maintain employees' self-esteem (Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1998, 2003; Webb, 1998) during change processes. Freud's view of the death instinct also, more broadly, raised the issue of not only seeking control over externality, but the development of the *fantasy* of control over the environment. The difference between fantasy and reality can all too soon be blurred and become *delusion*. In our organisations, and theorising about them, one might be prompted to consider the degree to which we feel it necessary to 'feed' this fantasy of control. In this regard, conceptualisations of bounded instability and self-organisation or self-directed work

teams with complexity theory (Carr & Lapp, 2005e; Stacey, 1992, 2003) can be tempered with *Thanatospraxis* (Sievers, 1994).

In a somewhat ironic twist, a leader engaging in self-destructive behaviour in an organisation suppresses the Eros of others and certainly stifles initiatives for change. Often the organisation, or sections of it, becomes a silo. Our *mainstream* discourse in organisation studies has witnessed some accounts of leaders' psychopathologies becoming projected into and taking hold in organisation cultures (see Kets de Vries, 1991, 1993). The work on the death instinct reinforces the need to analyse organisation leadership and followership within subcultures that are parts of the overall culture of the organisation and that affect and are affected by society.

Changing values, or breaking promises, that were assumed to be permanent in the original relationship between the organisation, as ego-ideal, and the individual are seen to invoke thoughts of death. The experience of diminished self-esteem with the loss of these values is analogous to separation anxiety and thoughts of annihilation. The survivor syndrome (Noer, 1993) that becomes prevalent in downsized organisations is fundamentally based in this fear, which is supplanted by the *incomplete* dialectic of the master-slave relationship (Hegel, 1807/1977). Delusions of the ego-ideal and organisation-ideal are then over-protected so that self-Erostic behaviours highly relate to the use and abuse of others who do not share the same idealisations (Ogden, 1989). Apart, Eros and Thanatos are likely to be harmful. Together, Eros and Thanatos substantiate each other's needs to exist: "mutually constituted self-consciousness, co-conscious, is the foundation for master's recognition of self in slave *and* slave's recognition of self in master" (Lapp & Carr, 2005a, in press). Adorno stated that that such a relationship would bring about periods of 'rest':

> In its proper place...the relationship of subject and object would lie in a peace achieved between human beings as well as between them and their other. Peace is the state of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other. (Adorno, 1963/1998, p. 247)

Within the dialectic of Eros and Thanatos, such peace would facilitate the opportunity to mourn idealised losses – with Eros representing the mourning process and Thanatos, the lost other. The mourning of losses means to use the paranoid-schizoid position to re-split polarised aspects of 'good' and 'bad' to reach new depressive positions that

include assertive, caring, cooperation with others. "Being both master and slave in a world of others means *halving to have* a subject to subject relationship rather than a subject to object relationship" (Lapp & Carr, 2005a, in press). Eros and Thanatos are our masters. The more we learn about them the more "the slave's self-consciousness is forced back on itself. The deeply meaningful paradox illustrated here is the master's failure to see that he needed the other to recognize the fact that he does not need the other at all" (Carr, 2003d, p. 121; see also Carr & Zanetti, 1999). Such recognition needs time for reflexivity that works to minimise differences between 'us and them' (Solomon et al., 1998, 2003). It is through learning more about the unconscious that the conscious becomes privileged. Learning is the continual splitting of the depressive position that is comprised of Eros and Thanatos – together.

Without re-splitting, Schwartz believed that workers' will follow the organisation as a function of their denial of vulnerability as was discovered through his analysis of the Challenger space shuttle disaster; "the organizational ideal moves because of its own internal causes" (Schwartz, 1990, p. 97). In an analogous situation, the organisation and the survivors need each other's support or to keep the production line moving, regardless of impending or real loss of workers through downsizing – especially the ultimate downsizing or death of a charismatic leader. The more the organisation protects the survivors of downsizing from fantasising about the death of their own jobs, the more likely it is that survivors will "search for reasons to remain involved and committed to their organizations" (Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997). The downside of downsizing is that it still causes surplus repression (Marcuse, 1955, 1964). Surplus repression creates even stronger ties between the organisation and remaining workers making the masters all the more powerful and all the more immortal at the expense of the slaves:

> At the same time, those at the bottom, the workers, even seem to be defrauded of their immortality as they increasingly are converted into production means, tools, cogs, dead-wood or scrap. And to the extent that workers are perceived and treated like things, they are also regarded as non-mortals. (Sievers, 1990, p. 32)

Spielrein suggested that the death instinct was an ever-present destructive component of the sexual instinct. This destructiveness was largely conceived as being in the service of facilitating new birth. Organisations seem to have to constantly deal with the tension of

maintaining the status quo and the putative need for change. In this context, similarly relevant here, Freud's rendering of the death instinct suggested that it assumes the form of repetition compulsion with an intended conservative effect on the life instinct. What would cause even higher levels of anxiety is an organisation's repetitive compulsion to constantly effect changes that do not result in positive transformation or expansion. Destruction of the sexual instinct (e.g., pleasure; reality) coupled with negative transformation that results in the complete loss of identity could create terror conditions similar to those described in group relations.

The art of dying

We also would like to take a moment to speak to the number of illustrations used to diagram the many ways in which we die while living. Inasmuch as life imitates art and art imitates life, our interest in writing this book was also to explore life's interpretations, but in a way that connected our beliefs to that of destructive reconstruction that is needed to foster creativity and change (Spielrein, 1912/1994). "It is instead the very willingness to face death that gives rise to our creative powers" (Moraglia, 2004, p. 340). May (1960/1968) also stated:

> Confronting death is necessary for creativity; indeed, artists have proclaimed to us all down through the ages that creativity and death are very closely related...; the creative act itself, from human birth on, is the capacity to die in order that something new may be born. (p. 56; see also May, 1975)

On the one hand, readers may believe the use of our diagramming is the reductionist horror Freud predicted. On the other, it is precisely that we take Freud's view to show that the death of reductionism is also the death of expansionism (Connelly, 2003; Eigen, 1974, 1985). And if you can imagine, on yet another hand, our unassuming sketches are meant to represent the *art of dying*.

To study the end is to know the beginning

Consideration of psychodynamics is fundamental to understanding cognitively measured behaviour in the first place. This is an especially important aspect to understand and to implement to understand complexity theory and its relevance to leadership, followership and organisational studies as a whole. To concentrate only on modernist theory

and models is to start the knowledge base somewhere in the middle, which means current theory and models seem to be preoccupied with not considering origins of cognition:

> A problem shared by both personality and leadership theory is one of finding *mid-range theoretical perspectives* – theories that are broad enough to generalize across situations yet are specific enough to yield reasonably accurate predictions or guides to behaviour. (Lord & Brown, 2004, p. 193)

Consideration of the death instinct from many perspectives or from many containers gives new shape to life, so as to perpetuate potential: to better understand that our unconscious motivation can be so strong that we may act in a manner unthinkable to the conscious:

> In the future, however, self-leadership advances will need to travel beyond the level of our current conscious awareness capability into the largely unconscious processes and powers of the mind. The purpose is not so much to use the mind as a window to our 'true personalities,' as Freud and other psychologists have done in the past, but instead as a resource for gaining advanced self-leadership capability and personal effectiveness. Preliminary journeys have begun into this exciting new frontier. The ultimate in personal effectiveness of the future will likely be and advanced state of integration of harmony of our world, our behavior, our conscious thought processes, and the deeper recesses of our mind. (Manz & Neck, 2004, p. 146)

To a very large degree, we remain unaware of the psychodynamics responsible for both negative and positive behaviours in the service of protecting organisational life precisely because we risk knowledge by ignoring the influences of death. To review the death instinct in the context of self and other development is to consider death in life: "Tell me how you die and I will tell you who you are" (Paz, 1961, p. 54).

Although our cosmetic makeup is to ignore death, the purpose of this book is to demonstrate that human life requires death for its framing because we are living and dying at the same time – we are at the same time masters and slaves; leaders and followers. Expansion of our psychological and organisational boundaries is the means to allow in more of what we could value, rather than what we do value. It is to

enact full-compromise and break into a labyrinth of solitude, to be able to break out toward new possibilities that we once thought were only in our dreams:

> If we restrict ourselves to a minimum of new knowledge which has been established with certainty, we can still say this of dreams: they have proved that *what is suppressed continues to exist in normal people as well as abnormal, and remains capable of psychical functioning.* (Freud, 1900/1986, p. 768)

Our book is the preliminary forage into the exciting, old, new frontier of the unconscious lives of Eros and Thanatos at work:

> As depicted in the Ben Casey television shows, depending upon only the organisation and its leaders to be too symbolic of ontological security is an excessive undertaking. X-ray eyes will see that their abilities to ensure immortality are figments of one's imagination. The number and severity of life instinct misrepresentations remembered and experienced from these procedures means excessive follow-ups are required to excise the death instinct. This means that symbols of Eros could outweigh and outnumber Thanatos a thousand to one, yet no matter after how many operations from serious illness or even from play, no one will ever be free of death. From birth to infinity, the death instinct remains an integral ontological aspect, regardless of how deep it is buried. The more things change, the more they stay the same – the doctor says you're going to die. (Lapp & Carr, 2005b, p. 134)

To know how and why self and other leadership is a matter of life *and death* is instrumental in achieving our terminal value of potential:

> The poet reminds us that a civilization that denies death ends by denying life. (Paz, 1994, p. 139)

Notes

Chapter 2 The Death Instinct and Destruction: Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein

1. The mind's topography is comprised of interdependent realms in interrelationship with levels of consciousness that are indicated in Figure 2.1 by all perforated lines. Eros and Thanatos are influenced by and can influence the super-ego. The repressed area resides in the unconscious and eventually, non-repressed aspects of Eros and Thanatos will affect the ego, directly, and or through the super-ego. If the ego mismanages the id's emanations that which is currently in the pre-conscious will become conscious, first thereby being the first to interact with the outside world.

   Those most familiar with Freud's work may be aware that he did provide more than one "unassuming sketch" of the mind. In a letter to his friend Wilhelm Fliess dated 6 December 1896 (see Masson, 1985, pp. 207–215) and in his work *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud, 1900/1986, pp. 686–690) he provided what he called a "schematic" picture that was a series of straight lines that depicted psychical processes. It was later that he depicted the structural/topographical relationship between the realms, or provinces, of the mind (see Freud, 1923/1984, p. 363; also Freud, 1933/1988, p. 111). Each "schematic" and "unassuming sketch" differed from each other. We take his 1933 sketch as the basis for our figure. However, we have made one modification that seems more in keeping with both how he described the actual psychodynamics in that paper and more in keeping with the words of the reflections of Ernest Jones (1964), who was Freud's official biographer and arguably his closest friend.

   The modification to Freud's original 1933 sketch is the manner in which we have drawn the boundary of the super-ego. Freud had the boundary drawn such that half of the realm of the super-ego was shown as being in the id. The manner in which we understand the relationship between these two realms is such that the super-ego abuts the id but fundamentally remains "a department of the ego" (Badcock, 1988, p. 189). Freud himself argued that:

   > We have been obliged to assume that *within the ego itself* a particular agency has become differentiated, which we name the super-ego. This super-ego occupies a special position between the ego and the id. It belongs to the ego and shares its high degree of psychological organization; but it has a particularly intimate connection with the id. It is in fact a precipitate of the first object-cathexes of the id and is the heir to the Oedipus complex after its demise. This super-ego can confront the ego and treat it like an object; and it often treats it very harshly. It is important for the ego to remain on good terms with the super-ego as with the id. (1926/1986, p. 324, italics is our added emphasis)

   (also)

> In the course of an individual's development a portion of the inhibiting forces in the external world are internalized and an agency is created *in the ego* which confronts the rest of the ego in an observing, criticizing and prohibiting sense. We call this new agency the super-ego. (1939/1990, pp. 363–364, italics is our added emphasis)

Thus, both before and after the sketch in 1933, Freud clearly conceived of the super-ego being structurally derived from and contained within the ego but in intimate contact with the id.

In Jones' (1964) chapter *Psycho-analysis and biology*, we find that the purpose of this intimate relationship is for the super-ego to protect and defend the ego from the outside world's unpleasant projections as well as from unwanted impulses emanating from the id:

> Those of the rejected ones which emanate from the *id*, and which, therefore, are part of the individual organism although they are denied union with the sense of personality that characterizes the ego, are by definition incompatible with the ego, and have to pursue their future path on lines independent of it or even in opposition to it. They are "ego-dystonic". A further complication comes in through the building out of the ego of a third institution, the "super-ego", which performs special functions such as the warning and guarding of the ego against the dangers arising to it from activity on the part of the repressed id. The id is essentially unconscious, though not entirely so; the super-ego is mainly unconscious; and even a large part of the ego itself belongs to the region of the unconscious. If this description is correct it will be seen that the region of the mind of which we are aware, *i.e.* consciousness, plays a much more modest part in our total mental activities than has previously been suspected. (pp. 141–142)

The depiction of the structural relationship between these three principal realms of the mind does not undermine the way in which we discuss Eros and Thanatos, but it is the manner in which the ego is 'caught' in the middle of the demands of the id and the super-ego that we would wish to particularly highlight and reinforce at this early juncture.

2. A good example of the continuance of this defence in a most literal manner can be noted in the Renaissance poetry in France. One type of poetry, called 'blazon', celebrated the breast as an object of desire and indeed as a source of male desire and creativity – in regard to the latter, it was considered that, in an act of creativity, it was the male's seed that transformed the female into a milk-bearing creature. However, while the blazon "presented a pretty side of Renaissance eroticism" (Yalom, 1997, p. 63; see also Carr, 2003) there was, at the same time, a form of poetry that expressed a violent and misogynistic "other" side. This was called "antiblazon". In one poem, the breast was described as follows:

> Breast, that is nothing but skin,
> Flaccid breast, flaglike breast
> ...
>
> Breast with a big, ugly black tip
> Like a funnel,
> ...

> Breast that's good for nursing
> Lucifer's children in Hell.
> ...
>
> Go away, big ugly stinking breast,
> When you sweat, you could provide
> Sufficient musk and perfume
> To kill off a hundred thousand.
> (Marot, "The Beautiful Breast", 1535–6, cited in Yalom, 1997, p. 63)

At a macro level, in an act of splitting in the manner advanced by Klein, one writer noted that:

> Whereas the blazon honored the female body, the antiblazon tapped into men's more negative feelings about women's essential "otherness". Men projected onto women's bodies not only their erotic longings, but also their fears of old age, decay, and death. The antiblazon gave men an opportunity to express, through women's breasts, thighs, knees, feet, stomach, heart and genitals, their own unconscious anxieties concerning mortality. Far better to dismember and deride the female body than to examine the anatomy of one's own ugliness and decomposition. (Yalom, 1997, p. 63)

Chapter 3 Expanding on the Death Instinct: Sabina Spielrein and Destructive Reconstruction

3. Those wishing to read more about Sabina Spielrein are advised to read the volumes by Carotenuto (1980/1982) and Kerr (1994). Most of Spielrein's work has not been translated into English – a volume of her collected works in English, with a contextual commentary, is something that is currently occupying the authors of this book.
4. Freud also called Stekel an "impudent liar", a "swine" and in a letter to Jones made reference to "that pig Stekel" (Gay, 1988, p. 214). It was Stekel who tried, in vain, to convince Freud that one could derive a universal dictionary or codebook of dream symbols that had a fixed meaning – Freud insisted that one had to interpret dreams in terms of the individual's unique life experiences and in that context the same "symbol" may have a different meaning, thus the symbols can only ever serve as a guide (see Freud, 1900/1986, pp. 171–172, 466–470; Carr, 1991, 1998).

   Peter Gay (1988) in his biography of Freud, in commenting upon Stekel's contribution to the meetings of the Wednesday Psychological Society asserted:

   > Though entertaining company, he alienated many with his boastfulness and unscrupulousness in the use of scientific evidence. Avid to comment on whatever paper was being presented to the Society, he would invent a patient who fit into the discussion. "'Stekel's Wednesday patient'", Ernest Jones recalls, "became a standing joke". It seems that Stekel's imagination was too luxuriant to be kept in check. In one of his papers, he advanced the startling theory that names often have a subterranean influence on people's lives, and "documented" his contention by offering several of his analysands' names in evidence. When Freud remonstrated with him for violating medical discretion, Stekel assured him: the names were all made up! (pp. 213–214)

5. Theodor Reik has a number of 'claims to fame' in the world of psychodynamics. In 1912, while studying at the University of Vienna, he completed the first PhD dissertation in psychoanalysis. Urged by Freud not to undertake a medical degree, Reik practised as a lay analyst. Reik had been a member of the *Vienna Psychoanalytic Society* since 1910. It appears it may have been Wilhelm Stekel who, in 1925, reported Reik to local authorities and led to Reik being charged with "unauthorised pursuit of medical practice". The magistrates required him to desist from being an analyst. The verdict of the case was overturned on appeal with Freud being a conspicuous supporter for Reik in the appeal process. Reik resumed his practice only to be soon after sued by an American patient for a breach of the Austrian law against "quackery" – this was a law that made it illegal for a non-medical person to treat 'patients'. This patient had originally wished to see Freud, but Freud referred him to Reik. In 1927, the charges against Reik were eventually dropped. In the course of supporting Reik, Freud wrote the work *The question of lay analysis* (1926/1986; see also Freud, 1926–7/1986, *Dr Reik and the problem of quackery*; Gay, 1988, pp. 489–492). In 1927, in a postscript to his volume on lay analysis, Freud noted that his American colleagues had passed a resolution against lay analysis that he dubbed as an act "more or less equivalent to an attempt at repression" (p. 362). Reik moved to the United States in 1938 and founded the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis in 1948.
6. Rank's reference to Spielrein citing "Jung's scheme" is a curious one, inasmuch as the two opposing components that constitute the "scheme" was in fact very much in keeping with Bleuler's more general theory of ambivalence, which Jung had denounced as being a "biological straitjacket" (Kerr, 1994, p. 369). As we noted earlier, Bleuler suggested that from the same impulse one could simultaneously have contradictory attitudes or feelings toward an object. Although Bleuler believed this was a symptom of schizophrenia, he did also suggest ambivalence could be noted in normal individuals. The simultaneous feeling of love and hate toward the same object, or individual, is one commonly cited example of such a condition. Ambivalence is, however, not to be confused with having mixed feelings toward an object or individual. When one has mixed feelings, a realistic conscious appraisal of the object or individual is generally involved, whereas in ambivalence, the contradictory feelings appear to arise from the same or single impulse. Freud (1915/1984) used the term in relation to instincts having both an active and passive alternative that are ever-present in an oppositional relationship to one another. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973/1988) noted:

   > Ambivalence is exhibited above all in certain pathological conditions (psychoses, obsessional neurosis) and in certain states of mind such as jealousy and mourning. It is characteristic of certain phases of libidinal development in which love and destruction tendencies towards the object are to be found alongside each other: namely, the oral-sadistic and anal-sadistic stages. (p. 27)

   The fact that Spielrein cited Jung in the manner that she did, leads one to the reasonable conclusion that Jung had his own ambivalence theory, the

origins of which were left unacknowledged. Kerr (1994) suggested that it appears "as though he (Jung) had simultaneously been preaching the very same idea (as Bleuler's theory) to his protégée – and claiming it as his own innovation" (p. 370).

7. A detailed psychodynamic description of transference begins on p. 119.

Chapter 4 Moving Graveyards: Herbert Marcuse and the Death Instinct

8. That Marcuse was undialectical in his consideration of the death instinct is curious inasmuch as this undialectical position is in sharp contrast to much of his argument in *Eros and civilization* (1955). This said, it is also noteworthy, in relation to the last chapter in this work, that Fromm (1955) argued:

> It is amazing that Marcuse should neglect his own dialectical position to the extent of drawing a black and white picture, and forget that the alienated society already develops in itself the elements which contradict it. (p. 348)

Indeed, Jay (1973/1996, p. 111) commented on this debate and noted that Fromm "chided Marcuse for being undialectical in his insistence that absolutely no integrated personalities could be produced under present conditions".

Chapter 5 Turning into One Another: The Death Instinct in Group Study

9. *Fuhererprinzip* is Alford's (1994a) connection to past experiences of identification and transference followers have had with Adolf Hitler as leader of the Nazi party.
10. The original quotation is as follows:

> The couple that is able to maintain its sexual intimacy, to protect itself against invasion by third parties, is not only maintaining its obvious conventional boundary but also reasserting, in its struggle against rivals, its unconscious gratification of the fantasy of the excluded third party, an oedipal triumph and a subtle oedipal rebellion at the same time. Fantasies about excluded third parties are typical components of normal sexual relations. The counterpart of sexual intimacy that permits the enjoyment of polymorphous perverse sexuality is the enjoyment of secret sexual fantasies that express, in a subliminated fashion, aggression toward the loved object. Sexual intimacy thus presents us with one more discontinuity: discontinuity between sexual encounters in which both partners are completely absorbed in and identified with each other and sexual encounters in which secret fantasised scenarios are enacted, thus carrying into the relationship the unresolved ambivalences of the oedipal situation. (Kernberg, 1995, p. 88)

Chapter 6 Leadership Is a Matter of Organisational Life and Death

11. All names have been replaced with pseudonyms.
12. These views represent those expressed by service directors and members of the CMHT.

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Index of Authors

Adams, J. S. 53
Adorno, T. 91, 103, 104, 206, 217
Albert, S. A., & Whetten, D. A. 217
Alford, C. F. 11, 16, 17, 87, 97, 98, 110, 113–119, 122, 126–133, 136, 138, 139, 144, 145, 147, 153, 156, 157, 159, 160–165, 178, 181–185, 189, 191–205, 215
Anderson, W. T. 121
Appignanesi, L., & Forrester, J. 19, 21, 59, 61, 63, 67
Arato, A., & Gebhardt, E. 103, 104
Argyris, C. 53, 54, 78
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. 79, 151, 163, 202
Athitakis, M., & Lasswell, M. 91
Atkinson, D. 94

Badcock, C. R. 29, 211
Bakan, J. 3
Barford, D. 24, 33
Barnard, C. 107
Bartunek, J. M., & Louis, M. R. 167
Beaver, G. 84
Becker, E. 3, 54, 195
Bedell, G. 4
Beeson, I., & Davis, C. 84
Bennett, A. 89
Berg, B. L. 15
Bertalanffy, L. von 123
Berzonsky, M. D., & Adams, G. R. 84, 218
Bick, E. 130
Bion, W. R. 113, 116, 121–123, 136–149, 159, 160, 185, 193–195, 198, 203
Bogdan, R. C., & Biklen, S. K. 15
Bollas, C. 69
Boodman, S. 5
Borbely, A. A., & Tononi, G. 26
Bowlby, J. 131
Brabant, E., Falzeder, E., & Giampieri-Deutsch, P. 60
Bradley, C. L., & Marcia, J. E. 113, 151, 152
Breger, L. 59
Brenner, C. 27
Brodbeck, P. W. 156
Brome, V. 59
Brown, S. P., Ganesan, S., & Challagalla, G. 53

Cardona, F. 168
Carey, J. R. 63
Carnegie, D. 158
Carotenuto, A. 11, 57, 58, 213
Carr, A. N. 2–5, 24, 28, 29, 32, 38, 46, 51, 54, 68, 85, 92, 95, 103, 105–107, 110–112, 117, 120, 158, 181, 207, 212, 213
Carr, A. N., & Downs, A. 49
Carr, A. N., & Gabriel, Y. 5
Carr, A. N., & Lapp, C. A. 30, 45, 51, 78, 110, 112, 206
Carr, A. N., & Zanetti, L. A. 51, 103, 207
Chessick, R. 205
Clack, B. 1
Clarke, S. 51
Clarke, W. R. 63
Coldiron, B. 4
Connelly, R. 208
Cotterell, A. 7, 8
Covington, C. 68
Crocker, J. 79, 182
Curry, B. K. 87
Czander, W., Jacobsberg, L., Mersky, R. R., & Nunberg, H. 15, 120

Daft, R. L. 53, 156, 188
Day, S. 4
De Board, R. 116, 139–141, 148
De la Torre, J., Doz, Y., & Devinney, T. 53
Dessler, G., Starke, F., & Cyr, D. 53
Drafke, M., & Kossen, S. 53

Drucker, P. F. 151
Dufresne, T. 27
Dumas, C., & Sankowsky, D. 158
Durkin, H. E. 123, 124

Eigen, M. 75, 208
Elrod, P. D., & Tippett, D. D. 86
English, H. B., & English, A. C. 23
Erikson, E. H. 113, 114, 135, 136, 140, 142, 145, 179, 187
Erikson, E. H., & Erikson, J. M. 152, 191, 195
Etzioni, A. 107–109
Euwema, M. C., Van de Vliert, E., & Bakker, A. B. 52, 76

Federn, P. 27
Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. 193, 199
Francesco, A. M., & Gold, B. A. 53, 147
Fraser, J. T. 3
French, R. 82
Freud, A. 30, 131
Freud, E., Freud, L., & Grubrich-Simitis, I. 59
Freud, S. 9, 16–18, 22–70, 72, 77, 85, 87–98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 112, 117–119, 125, 131, 133, 137, 138, 142–145, 157, 182, 184, 187, 198, 202–205, 208–214
Fromm, E. 91, 99–101, 215
Fuller, R. W. 188

Gabriel, Y. 13, 40, 41, 167, 181
Gabriel, Y., & Carr, A. N. 6, 41, 42
Gall, M. D., Borg, W. R., & Gall, J. P. 15
Gay, P. 22, 58, 59, 125, 213, 214
Geuss, R. 92
Gibson, D. E., & Schroeder, S. J. 48, 51
Gillespie, W. H. 19
Gioia, D. A., Schultz, M., & Corley, K. G. 86, 88
Giroux, H. A. 93
Goddard, R. 71
Glass, J.M. 78
Goldenberg, J. L., Cox, C. R., Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. 196
Gouldner, A. 40, 41
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. 163
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. 163
Gregory, R. J. 130
Grover, S. L. 51
Guba, E. G. 15, 165
Guest, D. 102
Guntrip, H. 50, 186

Hamilton, E. 26
Hanly, C. 146
Hegel, G. W. F. 92, 102, 103, 117, 160, 204, 206
Held, D. 92
Hersey, P., & Blanchard, K. H. 149, 150
Heslin, P. A., & Latham, G. P. 53
Hewett, E. 5
Hocking, J., & Carr, A. 111
Holbrook, D. 129
Horkheimer, M. 103, 104
Horney, K. 95, 96, 100, 101
Horowitz, L. 38, 129
Hunsaker, P. L. 72, 80, 87, 150
Hunt, J. C. 167
Hyde, P. 164–166, 171, 178, 186, 199
Hyde, P., & Thomas, A. 87, 164, 178, 181

Jaffe, D. T., & Scott, C. D. 73
Jay, M. 92, 96, 101, 104, 215
John, K. 205
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, F. P. 118
Jones, E. 26, 28, 63, 211–213
Jung, C. G. 10, 57–67, 214, 215

Kahn, W. A. 157
Katzenbach, J. R., & Smith, D. K. 149, 162, 204
Kernberg, O. F. 110, 152, 153, 215
Kerr, J. 21, 57–63, 213, 215
Kerr, J. F. R., Wyllie, A. H., & Currie, A. R. 63
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 43, 181, 205, 206

Klein, M. 11, 12, 15–56, 66–70, 89, 98, 104, 110, 112, 117, 124, 145, 184, 187, 203, 205, 211, 213
Kleiner, A. 115, 150, 151, 157, 159, 161, 188
Kloppenbog, T. J., & Petrick, J. A. 159
Kolb, J. A. 157
Kubler-Ross, E. 86, 194

Laing, R. D. 77, 110, 116, 149
Laird, D. A. 158
Lamas, D. 4
Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J. 10, 24, 27, 29, 35, 85, 118, 119, 137, 214
Lapp, C. A., & Carr, A. N. 3, 117, 206, 207, 210
Le Bon, G. 113, 142–145, 157
Lencioni, P. 149
Lerner, M. 188
Levinson, H. 106
Lewin, K. 71, 72, 77, 80, 84, 86–88
Lichtenstein, B. M. 53
Lifton, R. J. 3
Lind, L. 22, 31, 183
Livingston, J. S. 54
Lord, R. G., & Brown, D. J. 209
Lubit, R. 49, 188
Luke, T. W. 93
Lynd, H. M. 84

Maccoby, M. 155, 156
Mallinger, M. 158
McGuire, W. 57, 58
McTaggart, J. 102
Manz, C. C., & Peck, C. P. 209
Marcia, J. (2002) 79, 113, 128, 155, 181
Marcuse, H. 11, 12, 16, 17, 90–112, 116, 142, 156, 158, 182, 190, 195, 203, 204, 207, 215
Martin, R. 18, 21, 40, 42, 43, 50, 52, 54
Márton, E. 57
Mason, S., & Carr, A. N. 111
Masson, J. M. 211
Maturana, H. 124
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. 124
May, R. 77, 208
Meuser, E. A., & Lapp, C. A. 84
Mikulincer, M., & Florian, V. 184
Mikulincer, M., Florian, V., & Hirschberger, G. 53, 163, 184, 193
Mitchell, S. A., & Black, M. J. 33, 37, 111, 116
Molnar, M. 59
Moore, B., & Fine, B. 31, 86, 133
Moraglia, G. 208
Moser, J.E. & Penn, L. 2
Munduate, L., Ganaza, J., Peiro, J. M., & Euwema, M. 52

Napier, R. W., & Gershenfeld, M. K. 118, 179
Newton, P. M. 59
Nitsun, M. 113, 123, 124, 132, 135–139, 156, 159, 160, 184, 205
Noer, D. 206

Ogden, T. H. 37, 75, 82, 99, 110, 113, 116, 128–130, 137, 156, 162, 184, 187, 206
Ostow, M. 146

Paz, O. 209, 210
Perlow, L., & Williams, S. 78
Peter, L. J., & Hull, R. 57, 73, 76, 78, 80, 83, 203
Piaget, J. 58, 124
Pines, M. 123, 124

Quinn, R.E. 51

Rasmussen, D. 92
Reinhold, M. 8
Roazen, P. 26
Robbins, S. P., & Hunsaker, P. L. 149, 150, 188
Robinson, P.A. 22, 100, 102
Roger, S. 86
Rogers, E. F., Metlay, W., Kaplan, I. T., & Shapiro, T. 156
Ruble, T., & Thomas, K. 44, 46, 47, 49, 75, 80
Rycroft, C. 9, 19, 23, 27, 77, 86, 133, 178

Saka, A. 88
Salaman, G. 109
Sanchez-Pardo, E. 38
Schein, E. 88, 106–109
Schermerhorn, J. R., Hunt, J. G., & Osborn, R. N. 40, 53, 74, 106, 118, 181
Schneider, S. C., & Barsoux, J-L. 53
Schwartz, H. 84, 85, 207
Segal, H. 133
Sell, J., Knotterus, D. J., Ellison, C., & Mundt, H. 159
Sheard, A. G., & Kakabadse, A. P. 83
Sievers, B. 2, 12–14, 83, 206, 207
Simon, H. 107
Simons, T. 53
Singer, D. L., Astrachan, B. M., Gould, L. J., & Klein, E. B. 124
Skrabec, Q. R. Jr. 150
Smith, J. K., & Hodkinson, P. 165
Smith, M. B. 51
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. 3, 118, 163, 205
Sosik, J. J. 158
Spielrein, S. 10, 11, 15–18, 21, 56–89, 98, 104, 112, 120, 123–125, 146, 147, 156, 157, 162, 194, 203, 204, 207, 208, 213, 214
Stacey, R. 206
Stake, R. E. 15
Stekel, W. 10, 11, 21, 56, 59, 60, 213, 214
Steuerman, E. 110
Strayer, J. 156
Sull, D. N. 54
Suttie, I. D. 34, 36, 194
Swogger, G. Jr. 38, 197
Szekely, L. 70

Thompson, L. L. 149
Tuckman, B. W. 150

Van de Vliert, E., Euwema, M. C., & Huismans, S. E. 52
Van Vugt, M., Jepson, S. F., Hart, C. M., & De Cremer, D. 51
Vidal, F. 58
Vroom, V. H. 52

Wallace, W. 102
Waung, M., & Highhouse, S. 51
Weatherill, R. 21, 22
Wehr, G. 58
West, M. 128
Whetten, D. A., & Cameron, K. S. 150
Wiggershaus, R. 92
Williams, M. 68, 134
Winnicott, D. W. 37, 69, 110, 120, 127, 139, 180, 189, 195

Xavier, M. J., & Ramachander, S. 51

Yalom, I. D. 116, 137, 212
Yalom, M. 213

Zell, D. 86

Index of Subjects and Terms

Note: The following terms are used throughout this volume and hence do not appear in this index: Thanatos; Eros; death; death instinct; life instinct; ego; ego-ideal; super-ego; leader; and, leadership.

Accountability 21, 42, 50, 115, 141, 149, 151, 156, 160, 182, 185, 188
Acting out 41, 161, 163, 165, 178, 199, 205
Acting out the missing leader 178, 199
Aggression 10, 11, 19, 31, 32, 36, 40, 43, 50, 96, 97, 101, 123, 135, 153, 155, 181, 184, 215
Aggressive imaginer 133, 134, 137–143, 157, 158, 178–186, 190, 191, 202, 203
Alone 126, 127, 134
Ambiguity 20, 34, 44, 45, 82, 83, 127, 140, 151, 158, 163
Ambivalence 44, 45, 62, 64, 119, 214
Anxiety 11, 24, 29–37, 41, 42, 50, 53, 54, 60, 61, 79, 88, 116, 127, 132, 134, 136, 151, 159, 163, 168, 172, 179, 181, 193, 197, 206, 208
Apoptosis and autopoesis 63, 123
Arrogance 75, 135–137, 185
Assertiveness 44–50, 75, 80–82
Attribution error 47, 48
Authoritarian 18, 42, 46, 51, 115, 157, 176, 201, 203
Autistic contiguous position 130, 139, 142, 143, 157, 158, 196, 198

Ben Casey 1, 2, 210
Binary oppositional thinking 103
Binding 24, 40, 96, 97
Blame 129, 133, 134, 144, 171, 199
Blazon and antiblazon poetry 213, 214
Boundary setting 40, 152

Caring 34, 78, 169, 176, 207
Change 17, 20, 21, 40, 45, 50, 54, 55, 64–66, 70–74, 78, 79, 82, 84–88, 96, 112, 123, 133, 147, 151, 156, 158, 162, 167, 168, 180, 181, 185, 198, 200, 203, 205
  long-term 71, 83, 88, 155
  organisational change model 71, 77, 86, 88, 123: frozen 71–73, 79, 86, 87; refreezing 71–73, 84, 87; unfreezing 71–73, 79, 80, 84, 87
  resistance 43, 52, 53, 73, 76–83, 205, 206, 208
  short-term 51, 54, 158
Charisma and charismatic 158, 182, 207
Close relationships 53, 54, 184, 185
Coffin construct 157
Communication 38, 63, 78, 136, 172, 179, 188, 197
Compliance behaviour 105, 107–112, 120
Compromise 19, 31, 47, 56, 64, 76, 77, 79, 84, 86, 124, 138, 155
  full 80–83, 88, 120, 124, 131, 147, 149, 151, 153, 154, 210
  high-level 44–46, 51, 73–76, 79, 81–83, 123, 156, 158
  low-level 46, 51, 52, 54, 74, 76, 79, 81, 154
  part 51–56, 71–80, 83, 88, 123, 126, 130, 132–134, 154, 158, 186

schizoid 74, 79, 81, 82, 113, 126, 127, 129, 130, 132, 138, 150, 157, 158, 162, 179, 180–186, 189, 190, 196, 198, 200–203
Thanatic triangle 47–56, 74, 76, 81, 82, 134, 200
Competing 1, 113, 136, 159, 187, 202
Competition 1, 43, 51, 73, 78, 96
Concern for other and/or self 32, 37, 44–50, 75, 80, 82, 114, 118, 121, 126, 133, 135, 152, 186, 187, 202, 213
Conflict resolution 17, 18, 45, 51, 54, 56, 65, 76, 77, 79, 82, 132, 135, 186, 187
Conglomerate behaviour 52
Contradiction 22, 59, 95, 101–104, 133
Control fantasy 105, 112, 133, 182, 196, 205
Cooperation 6, 45, 81, 207
Creativity 6, 17, 41, 56, 66, 76, 84, 88, 106, 115, 125, 151, 208, 212
Critical theory 91, 92, 101, 204

Death-fear 2, 3, 5, 9, 53, 54, 77–79, 127, 150, 151, 163, 165, 181–184, 193
Death in sex 16, 73, 74, 125, 194, 195
Dedevelopment 114, 124, 131, 135, 138, 146, 150, 156, 159, 162, 178, 187, 205
Dedifferentiation 113, 150, 163, 185
Defence mechanisms 19, 34, 35, 178
Deindividuation 113, 133
Delusional 32
Depression 31, 86, 98
Depressive position 35–38, 44–47, 52, 66, 67, 70, 74–76, 79–83, 137, 139, 156, 159, 179, 194, 195, 204, 206, 207
Destructive-reconstruction 60, 124, 150, 204
Dialectics 63, 65, 80, 82, 84, 97, 99, 101–105, 112, 124, 136, 140, 151, 153, 154, 189, 206, 215.
Dissolution 10, 12, 16, 25, 32, 35, 46, 54, 61, 64–68, 73, 74, 79–84, 86, 88, 113, 114, 120, 121, 124, 127, 130–135, 143, 144, 147, 151, 163, 165, 178, 184–187, 203
Diversity 84, 121, 128, 152, 159
Dividual 62, 146
Dreams 23, 59, 213
Dual-instinct theory 10, 67, 90, 95, 98
Dualism 103

Engulfment 41, 44–47, 54, 66, 67, 75, 80, 99, 127, 131, 133, 134, 136, 151, 158, 185, 191
Envy 34–36, 50, 136, 137, 183, 187
Experiential line 44–46, 74, 76, 123, 140, 148, 184
External world 11, 28–30, 33, 45, 74, 99, 123, 212

Fantasy 3, 38, 42, 43, 50, 85, 105, 118, 126, 127, 133, 141, 144, 153, 160, 183, 189, 196, 203, 205, 215
Feedback 21, 43, 52, 53, 78, 86, 172
Followership 12, 83, 113, 118, 140, 147, 151, 154, 163, 164, 189, 204, 206, 208
Force-field analysis 71, 72
Fragmented and fragmentation 25, 32, 34, 46, 82, 128, 132, 133, 139, 181, 203, 205
Frankfurt School 91, 92, 99, 100–103

General systems theory 123, 124
Generativity 151–153, 191
Grimm's Fairy Tales 10
Godfather Death 10, 11
Greed 65, 66
Grim reaper 2, 186
Group 12, 15–17, 38, 43, 66, 82, 87, 91, 113–161, 162–204, 208, 215
Guilt 29, 31, 38, 39, 43, 46, 49–53, 94, 137, 142–145, 160, 182, 191, 192

Halo effect 53, 74, 182
Hegelian triadic structure 101–103
Holding 128, 130, 138, 149, 157, 202

Idealisation 31, 49, 140, 176, 195
Identification and identity 29, 38–52, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, 85–87, 105–107, 110–113, 118, 120–139, 144–158, 160, 162, 180, 182, 184–186, 190–193, 198
Immortality 3, 12, 13, 127, 134, 163, 207, 210
Impossible container 149
Instincts and instinctual 17–19, 35, 44, 45, 50, 56, 79, 83, 96, 101, 119, 131, 132, 135, 144, 145, 153, 158, 189
Intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict 17–19, 44–56, 65, 76–79, 82, 83, 96, 101, 119, 131–135, 144, 145, 151, 153, 158, 177, 186–189, 198, 201, 202
Isolation 35, 44, 46–49, 54, 66, 75, 78, 80, 86, 99, 110, 111, 117, 127, 131, 133, 136, 140, 144, 150, 151, 158, 187, 191

Libido 16, 25, 27
Linking 137–139, 185
Loci of control 17, 49, 51, 88, 180

Marcuse-Fromm dispute 99–104
Masochism 31, 32, 43, 47, 51, 68, 74, 134, 141, 145
Matrix management 159
Melancholia 29
Memory 28, 38, 69, 118
Mortality 1, 3, 26, 39, 54, 114, 128, 129, 134, 151, 163, 181–185, 193, 195, 202, 203, 213
Motivation theory 5, 13, 39, 52, 209
Mourning 66, 67, 70, 84, 87, 88, 124, 158, 194, 198, 206, 214
Mutual causation 34, 64, 81, 126, 129, 149, 162, 184
Mythology 6, 8, 9, 12, 26, 61

Narcissism and narcissistic 25, 32, 65, 85, 110, 111, 118–128, 134–138, 147–163, 179–189, 196
Negative capability 82, 154
Neo-Freudians 95, 99, 100
Nirvana 17, 30, 40, 96, 144

Object and objects 9, 11, 12, 16, 19, 26, 34–38, 50, 52, 64–88, 92, 95–98, 110, 111, 116–120, 125, 133, 136, 138, 139, 143, 146, 153, 156, 165, 187, 203, 206, 207, 211–215
Object-relations theory 11, 12, 19, 34, 36, 68, 69
Obsessional 43, 214
Oedipus complex 22, 29, 94, 118, 211
Organisational culture 42, 43, 182, 206
Organisational-ideal 16, 85, 105, 111, 112, 187, 206, 207

Paradox 34, 35, 56, 82, 88, 119, 124, 127, 134, 146, 153, 157, 160, 186, 189, 207
Paraesthetic persuasion 151
Paranoid-schizoid position 35–38, 45, 46, 48, 52, 74, 79–82, 120, 138, 156–158, 194, 195, 198, 206
Parasitic and parasitism 124–126, 129, 153, 203
Parents 2, 29, 68, 92, 110, 118
Participative management 1, 53, 186
Perceptual-contiguity 116, 117
Performance principle 93, 95, 97–99, 101, 105, 112, 158, 182
Persecution and Persecutory anxiety 35, 37, 50, 79, 128, 132, 133, 159
Plastic surgery 4, 163
Play 110, 111, 122, 128, 142, 173, 180, 193, 210
Pleasure principle 22–24, 93, 96, 117
Politics 1, 17, 188
Pracademic 14, 15, 20, 57, 91, 164, 166
Pre-conscious 28, 72, 119, 148, 211
Pride 136
Primal 34, 64, 65, 69, 94, 99, 100, 113–117, 120, 127, 129–132, 134, 136, 137, 143, 145, 147, 149, 162, 178, 181
Prolepticality and proleptic experience 116, 117, 136, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 162, 179–187

Psychodynamic approach – definition and conceptual nature 5, 6, 10
Psychodynamic suicide 184, 185
Psychological contract 106–111, 120, 140, 145, 190
Psychological contracting 124
Psychological seducement 111

Qualitative research 15, 17, 163, 164
Quantitative research 15, 17

Reaction formation 133, 139, 189
Reality principle 28, 33, 90, 93–97, 105
Reassurance 4, 16, 34, 64, 78, 84, 110, 117, 120, 130, 131, 145, 147
Recursive 15–17, 81, 87, 112, 150, 164, 205
Reductionism 27, 63, 208
Reflexivity 17, 38, 48, 51, 131, 133, 139, 143, 153, 158, 165, 178, 207
Regression 114, 130, 135, 136, 139, 141, 143, 145, 154, 187
Reiterative 15–17, 135
Rejectivity 152, 195
Reparation 24, 192
Repetition 13, 31, 40, 41, 49, 51, 76, 105, 146, 158, 165, 195, 197, 208
Repression 11, 16, 30, 33, 92–98, 101, 104, 105, 133, 143, 182, 190, 207, 214
Risk and risk-taking 5, 54, 66, 68, 71–73, 81–83, 88, 125, 136, 137, 140, 155, 172, 187, 191, 209
Ritualism 13, 40–43, 91
Rules 13, 29, 40, 41, 52, 83, 105, 110, 121, 170, 174, 191, 197

Sadism 32, 47, 49, 68, 83, 134, 137, 141
Schizoid compromise and schizoid split 35–38, 45–52, 74, 79–82, 113, 120, 126–132, 138, 150, 156–158, 162, 178–186, 189, 190, 194–198, 200–203, 206
Self-concept 3, 16, 31, 38, 45, 64, 77, 79, 118, 132
Self-fulfilling prophecy 40, 52
Self-preservation 9, 12, 16, 64, 66–68, 72, 77, 87, 118, 122, 131, 137, 145, 160, 163
Self-serving bias 47, 48
Sexual instinct 9, 10, 21, 25, 26, 30, 33, 59–68, 207, 208, 215
Sexuality 68, 100, 215
Shame 29, 40, 46, 48, 51–53, 133, 134, 137, 142, 144, 160, 182, 191, 192
Special child 136, 138, 139
Spielrein-Freud relationship 19–22, 56–67
Splitting 13, 34, 35, 38, 39, 49, 50, 75, 76, 82, 120, 127–129, 132, 137, 140, 162, 179, 181–185, 198, 203, 207, 213
Structural coupling 124
Structural functionalist 108, 109
Subliminal 2, 5, 12–14, 32, 51, 129, 151, 188, 191, 202
Surplus repression 11, 16, 93–96, 105, 112, 145, 158, 182, 190, 207
Symbiotic 116, 121, 124, 126, 149, 203
Systems theory 123, 124

Teams and teaming 149, 151, 156, 160, 162, 165, 166, 171, 173, 199, 204, 206
Terror Management Theory and mortality salience 15, 17, 163, 181
Thanatic triangle 47–52, 56, 74, 76, 81, 82, 134, 200
Thanatissism 122, 162, 163
Thanatospraxis 14, 83, 164, 165, 206
Thantissist 122, 154–157, 179, 185, 186, 189, 193, 194, 203
Topography of the mind 27, 28, 147, 211
Toxic manager 49, 188, 189, 196
Transcendental 3, 121, 124
Transference 73, 88, 119–121, 132, 138, 139, 144–147, 150, 154, 156, 158, 160, 164, 186, 188, 191, 192, 198, 203, 215
Transformational processes 12, 17, 61, 69, 70, 86, 151

Triangulation 163
Trust 43, 45, 73, 79, 81, 114, 121, 124, 135, 142, 151, 154, 157, 178

Unconscious 5, 6, 13, 23, 28–30, 36, 39, 62, 65, 69, 85, 88, 90, 92, 96, 97, 100, 111, 115, 117, 119, 123, 127, 129, 130, 134, 142, 143, 146, 149, 207, 209–215
Utopia 17

Values 3, 29, 45, 73, 83, 85, 94, 105, 111, 112, 131, 137, 162, 191, 200, 206
Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society 21, 33, 58–62, 67, 214

Wagnerian love 58, 61, 84
Wisdom 5, 38, 70, 114, 127, 135, 145, 179
Worldview 70, 72–74, 77, 79, 84, 88, 151, 183