



*Douglas T. Stuart*

# CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE



**A HISTORY OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA**

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*Douglas T. Stuart*

 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

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*For Carol and Laura, with all my love*

*And for Pendleton Herring; Scholar, Public Servant, and Gentleman*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AAF	Army Air Forces
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
ANMB	Army Navy Munitions Board
BNE	Board of National Estimates
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	(British) Committee of Imperial Defence
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
CND	Council of National Defense
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COI	Coordinator of Information
COS	(British) Chiefs of Staff
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDEL	Dwight David Eisenhower Library
DDI	Deputy Directorate of Intelligence, or Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDP	Deputy Directorate of Plans, or Deputy Director for Plans
DOD	Department of Defense
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HSTL	Harry S. Truman Library
HUA	Harvard University Archives
IAB	Intelligence Advisory Board
IAC	Intelligence Advisory Committee
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
ISG	Intelligence Survey Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFKL	John F. Kennedy Library
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JPWC	Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
JRDB	Joint Research and Development Board
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
MB	Munitions Board
MID	Military Intelligence Division
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRC	National Defense Research Committee
NIA	National Intelligence Authority

NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NME	National Military Establishment
NRPB	National Resources Planning Board
NSC	National Security Council
NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSRB	National Security Resources Board
NWC	Naval War College Archives
OASW	Office of the Assistant Secretary of War
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board
OCI	Office of Current Intelligence
ODM	Office of Defense Mobilization
ONE	Office of National Estimates
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
ONR	Office of Naval Research
OP&M	Office of Procurement and Management
OP-23	Organizational Research and Policy Division
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OPD	Operations Division
ORE	Office of Reports and Estimates
ORI	Office of Research and Inventions
ORR	Office of Research and Reports
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	Office of Scientific Intelligence
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OSRD	Office of Scientific Research and Development
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
OWM	Office of War Mobilization
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
RAC	Rockefeller Archives Center
RAF	(British) Royal Air Force
RDB	Research and Development Board
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SLC	Standing Liaison Committee
SMAC	Senate Military Affairs Committee
SML	Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SPAB	Supply Priorities and Allocation Board
SPD	Special Planning Division
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
UMT	Universal Military Training

USIB	United States Intelligence Board
WIB	War Industries Board
WPB	War Production Board
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

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## INTRODUCTION

ON JULY 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, issued its final report. In many respects, it is an exceptional product—well written, authoritative, and admirably nonpartisan. It is nonetheless a curiously myopic study. In the preface to their report, the commission members describe their mandate as “looking backward in order to look forward,” yet the report rarely looks back much further than the mid-1980s.<sup>1</sup> In spite of the fact that the report recognizes the need for substantive reform of the US national security bureaucracy, no attempt is made to help readers to understand why these institutions were created, or how they have evolved. Perhaps as a consequence of this ahistorical perspective, the specific recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are relatively modest and adjustive—an exercise in gardening rather than architecture.<sup>2</sup>

The 9/11 Commission is not alone in this regard. Virtually all of the current proposals for institutional reform focus on a particular cluster of agencies involved in related activities, such as intelligence gathering or homeland security, rather than on the national security bureaucracy as a comprehensive system of interdependent institutions. Indeed, the evolving debates about reform of portions of the national security system bear little resemblance to the wide-ranging discussions that led to the creation of that system in the period after World War II. This book is designed to introduce readers to those discussions. My focus is upon the 1947 National Security Act, the single omnibus bill that created all of the leading institutions of the US national security bureaucracy, except for the Department of State. The National Security Act is arguably the second most important piece of legislation in modern American history—surpassed only by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But while there are hundreds of books written about the political and social controversies surrounding the 1964 legislation, there is still no comprehensive record of the disputes and compromises that shaped the 1947 National Security Act.

This is especially strange since the early Cold War period has been the subject of so much insightful analysis. Indispensable historical studies such as Melvin Leffler’s *A Preponderance of Power*, richly detailed biographies such as David McCullough’s *Truman*, and definitive memoirs such as Dean Acheson’s *Present at the Creation* do an excellent job of informing readers about the domestic and international environ-

ments in 1947, but they do not focus on the debates that culminated in the passage of the legislation.<sup>3</sup> I attribute this to the understandable preoccupation with the various crises and confrontations that crowded the headlines during this period. It can be argued, however, that none of the well-known events of the immediate postwar era—not the passage of the Marshall Plan, not the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, not even Kennan’s dispatch of his “Long Telegram”—was as significant as the 1947 National Security Act in determining both the direction of American foreign policy and the future of American society.

I would be remiss, however, if I gave readers the impression that there are no available studies that place a special emphasis on the 1947 Act. Three books in particular deserve special mention. The first is Michael Hogan’s essential history of the Truman era, *A Cross of Iron*.<sup>4</sup> Professor Hogan weaves references to the 1947 legislation throughout his narrative. He also provides, in chapter 2 of his book, an excellent introduction to many of the key players and issues in the postwar struggle over institutional reform.

Both Professor Hogan and I seek to demonstrate how a national security ideology was articulated and institutionalized by the framers of the 1947 National Security Act. We nonetheless differ, to some extent, in our views about the genesis of that ideology. At the core of Hogan’s history is a struggle that is played out during the early Cold War period between the proponents of national security and the defenders of “traditional values” of anti-statism and anti-militarism. My study finds the roots of the national security ideology in America’s prewar and wartime experience, and places a much greater emphasis upon Pearl Harbor as a turning point in modern American history. John Gaddis has observed that “surprise attacks tend to sweep away old conceptions of national security and what it takes to achieve it.”<sup>5</sup> My book goes even further, arguing that Pearl Harbor redefined for most Americans both the nature of international relations and the responsibilities of their government toward its citizens. It quite literally changed the way Americans thought about time and space, with attendant implications for the way they thought about their own vulnerability. The fact that America could be directly attacked from a distance of nearly 4,000 miles did not just “sweep away old conceptions of national security”; it *established* the concept of national security as the unchallengeable standard against which all future foreign policy decisions were to be made.

The lessons of Pearl Harbor were central to the postwar debates about the need for a global military presence backed up by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Under these circumstances, the priority at the end of the war was the development and maintenance of what Melvyn

Leffler has described as “a strategic frontier” from which the United States would be able to take “‘timely’ offensive action against the adversary’s capacity and will to wage war.”<sup>6</sup> Of special significance for this study, the lessons of Pearl Harbor also guided efforts to reform the procedures for gathering and sharing intelligence, coordinating the activities of military and civilian advisers, and harnessing the nation’s economic and scientific resources in the name of preparedness. Finally, Pearl Harbor convinced the American people that preparing for the next sneak attack was everybody’s business, all the time, at home and abroad. In the jargon of contemporary constructivist scholarship, America has been “securitized” ever since.<sup>7</sup>

Viewed from this perspective, postwar debates that culminated in the passage of the 1947 National Security Act were not so much a struggle between two competing philosophies, as Michael Hogan argues, as a dialogue about how best to adjust American values and interests to the non-negotiable demands of national security. Pearl Harbor had such a powerful effect on the thinking of the participants in this dialogue that we are justified in calling the network of institutions created by the 1947 Act the “Pearl Harbor system.”

The second study that deserves mention at the start of this book is Aaron Friedberg’s *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*.<sup>8</sup> Professor Friedberg shares with Michael Hogan an interest in the question: “Why didn’t America become a garrison state after World War II?” Friedberg provides rich historical and theoretical insights about efforts before and after World War II to harness the American economy to the demands of the state. His arguments were of special value to me as I sought, in Chapter 5 of this volume, to develop my own explanations for the rise and fall of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). The NSRB was envisioned by some of the framers of the 1947 National Security Act as one of the most important pillars of the new Pearl Harbor system. Professor Friedberg’s book helped me to understand why it did not survive the intense bureaucratic struggles that took place during the Truman era.

I also owe an intellectual debt to Professor Amy Zegart for the many insights that I have taken away from her book *Flawed by Design*.<sup>9</sup> This book comes closest to mine in its focus upon the 1947 National Security Act. Drawing upon, and then going beyond, insights from the new institutionalist literature, Professor Zegart stresses the importance of the bargains struck during the formulation of the 1947 National Security Act in determining the trajectories of the major national security agencies for the next five decades. Her emphasis on the evolution of three components of the national security bureaucracy—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security

rity Council—distinguishes her study from mine, which discusses all of the agencies created by the 1947 legislation. We also differ in terms of time frame. Professor Zegart surveys the entire period from the end of World War II to the 1990s, whereas my study extends from 1937 to 1960.

The most important difference between Professor Zegart's study and this volume is that she is more inclined than I am to downplay the role of interest groups and, in particular, Congress during the formative period of the National Security Act. Indeed, her claims regarding the limited importance of these actors in the formulation of national security legislation is fundamental to her revisions of theories associated with the new institutionalist literature. My study treats these actors as more or less determinative depending on the issues involved and the interests engaged. One reason for our disagreement on this important point is that she does not focus upon the monumental disputes associated with the Truman administration's efforts to unify the armed services, or on the subsequent development of the Department of Defense—two related issues that were greatly influenced by Congress. Nor does Professor Zegart discuss in any detail the creation, development, and ultimate failure of the NSRB, an agency whose activities inevitably engaged numerous economic and political interests in the name of national security.

What all three of the above-mentioned studies have in common with this book is an emphasis upon what Professor Friedberg calls the "interior dimension of American grand strategy."<sup>10</sup> In this sense, they are all responses to demands by students of international relations for more empirical research on the circumstances under which "conceptions of self and interest" that guide a nation's foreign policy become institutionalized.<sup>11</sup> One reason why there are still very few studies of the genesis of a nation's foreign policy institutions is the traditional historiographic problem of infinite regression (e.g., should a study of the ideational and institutional elements of German *Weltpolitik* begin with Bismarck's arrival in 1862 or his removal in 1890?). From time to time, however, history provides us with a relatively unambiguous starting point for a particular story. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is one such event. This book will identify the defining elements of the Pearl Harbor system, by recourse to the debates that took place between 1937 and the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. The participants in these debates were, in the truest sense, "present at the creation" of an entirely new approach to American foreign policy.<sup>12</sup>

## THE PEARL HARBOR SYSTEM

Chapter 1 of this study takes readers back to 1937 and introduces them to a small group of policymakers and scholars who had come to the conclusion that America's approach to international affairs was dangerously naïve and unsustainable. My focus in this section is on Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to prepare the nation for war without running afoul of the pervasive national mood of isolationism. I also introduce readers to some of the people who were recruited by Roosevelt between 1937 and 1941 to assist him in his "preparedness campaign." Some of these individuals—George Marshall, Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, Vannevar Bush—would continue after the war to play important roles in the creation and initial operation of the new network of national security institutions.

I also introduce readers to one academic: Professor Edward Pendleton Herring of Harvard. Prior to World War II, no one was more articulate than Herring in identifying fundamental problems in the existing system for foreign and defense policymaking, and no one was more visionary than Herring in his description of an alternative system. During the 1930s, Herring had drawn upon insights from political science and from the relatively new field of public administration in order to develop three related arguments. First, authoritarian regimes were gaining enormous economic and political advantages over democracies by their exploitation of modern technologies of communication and transportation. Second, management science could help America to replicate the efficiencies of totalitarian governments without doing violence to our democratic values. Third, in order for the United States to become competitive, however, it would have to break free of the grip of special interests that had a stranglehold on both the American economy and the American political system. In 1936, Herring developed this last argument in a book entitled *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, in which he argued that the central problem of our time was "the need for promoting a purpose of the state over and above the purposes of the medley of interests that compose it."<sup>13</sup>

Shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Herring published another important book, *The Impact of War*, which was designed to alert Americans to the immediate and overriding "purpose of the state." It was the first attempt by any American scholar to develop, in a systematic and sustained way, the *concept* of national security. Herring argued that technological developments (most notably, air power) and political developments (the global spread of totalitarian regimes) had converged to present the United States with an unprecedented threat,

which demanded new procedures for the formulation and management of its foreign and defense policies. The first step toward a more competitive system was to “give thought to the possibility of adapting our governmental institutions to the maintenance of a powerful military force as part of the normal structure of our society.”<sup>14</sup> Herring recognized that this idea would be strongly resisted by many Americans, due to their “persistent suspicion of militarism.” But he was encouraged that “by a strange paradox, the most practicable means of approaching this goal today is under the urgency of the red spurs of war.”<sup>15</sup> He also claimed that even after the national emergency was over, the United States would need to remain militarily strong and constantly on guard, since “the Roman phalanx was a necessary preliminary to the *Pax Romana*.”<sup>16</sup>

Pearl Harbor confirmed for virtually all Americans the wisdom of Herring’s prewar arguments. It also established the concept of national security as the standard against which all future foreign policies would be judged.

National security required all Americans to adopt a completely new attitude about their safety. An editorial in the *Washington Post* concluded that “the real villain” in the story of Pearl Harbor “was the bureaucratic mind.”<sup>17</sup> Changing the way that all citizens thought about security was essential for America’s long-term safety. Herring put it this way in 1941: “The happiest future we could envisage in this troubled world is our nation so aroused and unified by the threats from abroad that we could appear too strong for any nation to dare attack.”<sup>18</sup> Following Pearl Harbor, few people questioned Herring’s theory of deterrence, although policymakers would continue to debate issues of resource management and prioritization.<sup>19</sup>

Before Washington could turn its attention to the challenge of deterring the next Pearl Harbor, however, it needed to win the war. This is the focus of Chapter 2 of this book. America’s experiences with the management of World War II provided policymakers with valuable tests of institutions and procedures for civilian-military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and interservice policy coordination. America’s primary ally, Great Britain, played an especially important role in providing Washington with institutional models. World War II also provided some negative lessons for postwar planners. America’s experience with the supply side of the war effort convinced most experts that, contrary to prewar expectations, loosely administered capitalism outperformed centrally controlled systems for economic management. The challenge was to find an approach to postwar planning that would ensure a high level of preparedness without imposing undue restraints

on American business and without crippling America's dynamic research and development sector.

During the last stages of the Second World War, the Washington policy community began to prepare for an intensely divisive battle over the construction of a completely new network of institutions. It is important to note the extent to which this was uncharted territory for all the participants. What they were attempting to imagine had no counterpart in American history during periods of peace. It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that these individuals frequently relied upon metaphors and analogies—citing “gestapos,” “automatons,” “monstrosities,” “men on horseback,” and “Prussian General Staffs”—to make their arguments. It should also come as no surprise that these references were usually vague and often inaccurate, since they were chosen more for their emotional impact than for their descriptive value.

The most important analogy for most participants was, of course, the Japanese “sneak attack” on Pearl Harbor. The initial round of hearings on institutional reform took place while the Joint Committee Hearings on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack were in full swing. The final report of the Pearl Harbor hearings, issued on July 20, 1946, ran to twenty-three volumes and 25,000 pages. Its findings were never far from the minds of the framers of the 1947 National Security Act.

Pearl Harbor provided four specific lessons for postwar planners. First, the United States needed new machinery for collecting and interpreting information regarding potential enemies, before those enemies acquired the ability to “sucker-punch” us. Second, Washington needed to provide military leaders with a permanent and influential role in the formulation of peacetime foreign and security policy. Third, policymakers needed to ensure that both interservice cooperation and civilian-military cooperation would be as seamless as possible. Finally, America needed new procedures for harnessing the energies of its factories and its scientific laboratories in support of national security.

The fact that policymakers agreed on the need for institutional reforms did not make it any easier for them to agree upon the details. Chapters 3 and 4 introduce readers to the two factions whose competing visions of institutional reform tended to dominate the postwar debates. Chapter 3 focuses on the efforts by Harry Truman, George Marshall, and the Army leadership to convince Congress and the American people that unification of the armed services was the *sine qua non* for an effective national security system. Chapter 4 focuses on the campaign by James Forrestal and the Navy to oppose Truman's campaign for armed forces unification, at the risk of being accused of insubordination. This chapter also discusses the alternative vision of national

security policymaking proposed by Ferdinand Eberstadt and his Unification Study Group. Their report was to serve as a key point of reference for the framers of the 1947 National Security Act. It also provided the Navy with the ammunition that it needed for a counterattack against the proponents of armed forces unification.

The battle over institutional reform dragged on for three years, and closure was only achieved when the primary sponsor of the legislation, President Harry Truman, accepted defeat on major elements of his plan. When the intense bureaucratic and political infighting finally ended, almost no one was satisfied with the compromise legislation that was signed into law on July 26, 1947. Kenneth Royall, the incoming Secretary of the Army, predicted that the Act “will not save money, will not be efficient, and will not prevent interservice rivalry.”<sup>20</sup> Many commentators complained that the legislation had failed to accomplish its most important task—complete unification of the armed services. Most participants in the debates nonetheless believed that they had accomplished something significant.

In fact, the scope and ambition of the 1947 National Security Act was astonishing. It created a National Military Establishment, which became the Department of Defense in 1949. It gave the Air Force an independent status and provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff with statutory identity. It established the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and a cluster of lesser-known institutions, including the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. In accordance with the lessons of Pearl Harbor, the legislation created

- new machinery for both the collection and coordination of peacetime intelligence;
- new mechanisms for civilian-military dialogue;
- new, albeit feeble, institutions designed to encourage cooperation among the separate military branches; and
- new procedures for mobilizing and managing the nation’s economic and scientific resources.

Of course, no one could predict what would happen when the Pearl Harbor system began to operate. On the day that the legislation passed the House, *The New York Times* concluded, “The measure was conceded to be experimental. It was agreed that it might require refinement later, as dictated by trial operation.”<sup>21</sup> It would take a little over a decade for the key agencies of the national security bureaucracy to establish their institutional identities within Washington. In one case (the National Security Resources Board), a campaign of bureaucratic empire-building backfired, and the agency did not survive. In two other cases (the

Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board), the agencies created by the 1947 legislation were either not strong enough or not agile enough to endure the intense bureaucratic competition that characterized the initial shake-out period. The reasons for the premature demise of each of these agencies are analyzed in Chapter 5 of this study. In the case of the National Military Establishment (NME), attempts were made to correct serious defects in the initial legislation by means of successive amendments (in 1949 and 1958) and revisions (most notably, Reorganization Plan no. 6 in 1953). The transition from the NME to the Department of Defense, and the development of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are the subjects of Chapter 6 in this volume. Finally, the efforts by Truman and Eisenhower to adapt the NSC and the CIA to their personal preferences and management styles, and their attempts to resist interference by Congress in the administration of these agencies, are discussed in Chapter 7 of this volume.

#### A VISIT WITH DR. HERRING

Pendleton Herring played a unique and important role in the story of the 1947 National Security Act. His scholarly writings prior to World War II helped to introduce academics and policymakers to the concept of national security. He also played an active part in the management of the war effort, applying his theories of public administration to problems of supply and interagency coordination as a consultant to the Army and Navy. As chairman of the Committee of Records of War Administration, Herring supervised the publication of *The United States at War*, the official administrative history of the Second World War. This survey of the activities of 158 wartime agencies provided Herring with the opportunity to look closely at practical tests of interservice and civilian-military coordination. It also served as a valuable resource for the participants in the postwar debates over institutional reform.

Herring also contributed in a more direct way to these debates. In June 1945, he joined Ferdinand Eberstadt and a team of about thirty other experts in a Navy-sponsored study of postwar institutional reform that became the primary reference for the framers of the 1947 National Security Act. Following the completion of the Eberstadt Report, Herring resigned from the Harvard faculty and turned his energies to an entirely new challenge. He became the Secretary of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, working with Bernard Baruch and others to hammer out an agreement for the international control of nuclear power. Herring then moved into the rapidly grow-

ing community of philanthropic and scholarly foundations. In 1948, he became the president of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), a position that he was to retain for the next two decades.

It was in his capacity as president of the SSRC that Herring was to directly confront one of the worst aspects of the national security system that he had been instrumental in creating. In 1954 he testified before the Reece Committee on Tax-Exempt Foundations, which had been created to find links between the major foundations and the world Communist conspiracy. As the only witness who was allowed to testify on behalf of the foundations, Herring gave a spirited defense of the record, and the loyalty, of the leading foundations. Without claiming credit for the outcome, Herring noted in his annual report for the SSRC that during his testimony, "a dispute arose among members of the Committee which was followed by cancellation of all further public hearings."<sup>22</sup>

It was Herring's role in the creation of the postwar national security bureaucracy that led me to his door in 1998. But I was also anxious to get to know him as a person, for it seemed to me that he personified America's "rise to globalism" from the late 1930s to the end of the 1960s.<sup>23</sup> Prior to World War II, he had been one of the first people to make the case for a new way of thinking about America's place in the world—based on the concept of national security rather than on the time-honored concept of national interest. During the war, and in the immediate postwar era, he helped to identify the key premises and institutions of a new policymaking system built around the concept of national security. But he also worked with the United Nations in an attempt to mitigate the most dangerous aspects of the evolving bipolar international situation. Finally, Herring found himself on the wrong side of the logic of national security during the Reece Committee hearings, as one of many targets of McCarthyism.

By the time that I visited Herring in his home in Princeton, New Jersey, I was well along in my archival research relating to the creation of the US national security bureaucracy, and I had come across references to him on several occasions. In preparation for my visit, I had read Herring's books and made a visit to the Harvard archives to look for information about his years as a teacher. But interviews are tricky, and one can never adequately prepare for such meetings. Dr. Herring and his wife Jill made my task exceptionally easy and enjoyable. Both were in excellent health. When I commented on the fact that he was not wearing glasses at 95, Herring responded that he had no problem reading, but he could not follow the small scrolling messages on the bottom of his TV screen. I assured him that he was better off. I was

particularly pleased to discover that Pen Herring still had an impressive memory for events that took place over five decades ago. He brought me straight back to 1945 (“a terribly hot summer in Washington . . .”), and then further back, to the period just prior to World War II, when it seemed that the entire world was on the verge of being crushed by the relentless forces of totalitarianism. . . .

## Chapter One

### A FAREWELL TO NORMALCY

ON THE EVENING of September 16, 1940, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall gave a national radio address in support of the creation that afternoon of a compulsory selective service system. “The situation today is utterly different from that of 1917. *Then* we were at war—but we foresaw small possibility of military danger to this country. *Today* though at peace, such a possibility trembles on the verge of becoming a probability.”<sup>1</sup> Marshall’s alarming rhetoric was needed in order to make the case for the first peacetime draft in American history. The general had, in fact, pressed President Roosevelt to pursue a more ambitious program of national mobilization, but Roosevelt had opted for a modest conscription plan that required only one year of military service and provided that there would be no military deployments beyond the Western Hemisphere.<sup>2</sup> In spite of these limitations, pacifist and isolationist critics accused Roosevelt of placing the United States on the path to war. Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D-Montana) labeled the Selective Service Act “the greatest step toward regimentation and militarism ever taken by the Congress of the United States.”<sup>3</sup>

Roosevelt’s support for conscription represented one more half-step in his carefully orchestrated “preparedness” campaign, which had been under way since 1937. Prior to that date, the president had given the isolationists few reasons to be concerned about his foreign policy. Roosevelt had been a committed internationalist in the period immediately following World War I, but his experience as the Democrats’ vice-presidential candidate in 1920 had forced him to reconsider this position. The Republican candidate, Warren G. Harding, had gained considerable advantage from his appeal for a “return to normalcy” in foreign affairs. For most Americans, this meant a recommitment to a tradition of isolationism that could be traced back to John Winthrop’s admonitions to members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630.<sup>4</sup> The sense of being a “city upon a hill”—both apart from and above the day-to-day machinations of world affairs—had shaped the American identity and provided an essential precondition for the development of the nation’s distinctive approach to foreign policy.

Harding’s victory in the 1920 campaign helped to convince Roosevelt that appeals to America’s moral and strategic interests overseas

were political suicide. During the 1932 presidential campaign, Roosevelt disassociated himself from the most controversial aspects of Wilsonian internationalism and made it clear that he no longer favored American participation in the League of Nations. He continued to play to this isolationist mood for the next five years. In 1935, Roosevelt expressed his public support for the goals of the Nye Committee hearings (discussed later in this chapter), which were designed to expose the influence of "war profiteers" in the shaping of American foreign policy. He also took no substantive action when Italy invaded Ethiopia, when Nazi Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, or when the fascist governments began to provide military support for Franco in the Spanish Civil War.

### NEW THREATS AND NEW MAPS

The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 was the event that finally forced the president to begin to move the country away from a posture of "well-ordered neutrality." But although Roosevelt the statesman was committed to do what he could to prepare his nation for war, Roosevelt the politician was not willing to sacrifice his presidency in the process. Shortly after the Japanese invasion of China, he publicly criticized Tokyo's actions and announced plans to permit the Peking government to continue to purchase weapons from the United States, in spite of the existing Neutrality Acts. Roosevelt justified these actions with a major speech on October 5, 1937, in which he asserted, "The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice are being wiped away." He warned that there was "no escape through mere isolation and neutrality" from "nations of the world which seem to be piling armament on armament for purposes of aggression," and he called for coordinated international action to "quarantine" the guilty parties before it was too late.<sup>5</sup> Though the president did not specifically mention Japan in his "quarantine" speech, he soon began secret discussions with representatives of the British government about the feasibility of a coordinated naval blockade of Japan. Following the start of the Sino-Japanese War, the president also began a stuttering campaign of support for increased defense spending, beginning with a request in January 1938 for a 20 percent increase in funding for the Navy.

The challenge for Roosevelt over the next four years was to pursue military preparedness without playing into the hands of those critics who claimed that such actions were the surest route to war. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the First World War, Roosevelt had

gained first-hand experience regarding the challenges of mobilization. In spite of the fact that the United States had begun armaments production in 1914 in order to supply weapons to friendly governments in Europe, the nation was still totally unprepared for war when it finally began in 1917. Lacking an overall strategy for mobilization, the government scrambled to adapt to the demands of a war economy, creating 5,000 mobilization agencies in the first year of the war.<sup>6</sup> Woodrow Wilson sought to manage these disparate agencies through a Council of National Defense (CND), which was designed to facilitate cooperation among the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.<sup>7</sup> As the problems of a mobilization system based on compromise became obvious, Wilson was forced to take stronger actions and exert more direct control over the defense effort. A War Industries Board (WIB) was established and, in 1918, placed under the dynamic chairmanship of Bernard Baruch, an influential Wall Street financier who used his personal contacts and the authority vested in the WIB to gain control of the wartime economy. By the time that the United States was finally geared up for the war, however, the conflict was coming to a close, leaving Wilson with the problem of re-converting the economy to the demands of peacetime.

Roosevelt's experiences during World War I convinced him that he had to build up as much momentum as possible before war broke out. But he was also aware that there were very severe limits to what he could do prior to a declaration of war. Military planning for mobilization had in fact been ongoing throughout the interwar period. But all of these mobilization plans were built around an "M-Day" scenario in which actual mobilization did not begin until war was declared. The authors of the War Department's 1924 plan for mobilization had settled on the "M-Day" strategy on the grounds that it was unrealistic to believe that "the United States would ever begin mobilizing before the outbreak of war."<sup>8</sup> Roosevelt appreciated this problem. He nonetheless took advantage of successive crises in Europe and Asia between 1939 and the end of 1941 to gain Congressional support for modest improvements in the nation's military preparedness. Lend-lease provided the impetus for the early development of a munitions industry while various agencies and committees began planning for a much more ambitious campaign of wartime production. The president's sponsorship of the 1940 Selective Service Act made it possible for the Army and Navy to begin to redress their serious manpower shortages. During the summer of 1941, Roosevelt also ordered the Army and the Navy to cooperate in a study of likely wartime military requirements, which was completed in September of that year. The document, which came to be known as the "Victory Plan," was to serve as an extremely useful

guide for both military planning and industrial mobilization once hostilities began.<sup>9</sup>

The president's most important contribution during this period was the application of his considerable rhetorical talents to the task of transforming the public mood. He managed this campaign with the help of organizations such as the Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Act and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and with the assistance of influential critics of American isolationism, including Walter Lippmann and Kansas newspaper editor William Allen White. John Gaddis is nonetheless correct in his observation that "despite Roosevelt's efforts . . . the nation came closer during the late 1930's to *hiding* in the face of threats than it had done at any point since the years preceding the War of 1812."<sup>10</sup>

Roosevelt's decision to undertake the preparedness campaign was motivated by more than his concern about the specific actions or statements of Tokyo or Berlin. In fact, he had become increasingly worried over the first six years of his presidency that modernity itself seemed to be permanently altering the situation of unearned security that the United States had enjoyed since its establishment. Technology was a big part of the problem. Innovations in transportation, communication, and the lethality of weapons threatened traditional conceptions of time and distance, which had always favored the United States. Shortly after the Japanese attacked the Chinese mainland, the president asserted that "there is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world."<sup>11</sup>

As a member of the Council of the American Geographical Society, Roosevelt was especially sensitive to geopolitical arguments regarding the revolutionary implications of air power. Geopoliticians such as Hans Weigert relied upon alternative forms of graphic projection of distance—such as polar azimuthal maps rather than the traditional Mercator projections—to highlight America's vulnerability to attack from the air. This perspective overturned the traditional image of the Arctic as one of North America's natural buffers against invasion. Indeed, one contemporary geopolitician, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, even predicted that in the future, the polar region would come to be appreciated as an "Arctic Mediterranean," uniting Canada, the United States, and Russia in the same way that the "old World's lesser Mediterranean" had linked Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.<sup>12</sup>

The whole idea of aerial bombardment of massed civilian populations was viewed by most Americans as an unprecedented form of

barbarity. Jeffrey Legro reminds us that the international community had in fact been engaged in a campaign to establish rules for the protection of cities against aerial bombardment since before the invention of the airplane:

At the Brussels Conference of 1874 countries agreed that undefended “open” cities could not be attacked or shelled and that only fortified cities could be bombarded. This provision helped establish the distinction between combatant and noncombatant that characterized efforts to limit bombing.<sup>13</sup>

During the interwar period, comparable efforts were made to criminalize aerial bombardment during the Washington Conference (1922–23) and the World Disarmament Conference (1932). Yet even before the war began on the continent, the prohibitions against the bombardment of cities were being disregarded—by Italy in Ethiopia, by Japan in China, and by Franco’s allies during the Spanish Civil War.

American poet and playwright Archibald MacLeish sought to capture the revolutionary implications of civilian bombardment in a 1938 verse play for radio entitled *Air Raid*. As the planes approach an unnamed village, a police officer attempts to convince the women of the village to seek shelter underground. The women laugh at him:

Perhaps it’s true they’re coming in their planes: Perhaps it isn’t true.  
But if it is  
It’s not for housewives in this town they’re coming.  
They’re after the generals: they’re after the cabinet ministers. . . .  
We’re women. No one’s making war on women.

As the bombs begin to fall, and a plane turns to make a strafing run, the astonished women continue to believe that it must be a mistake:

Show it our skirts in the street: it won’t hurt us!  
Show it our softness!  
Show it our weakness!  
Show it our womanhood! . . .  
It’s us, do you see!<sup>14</sup>

Nor was it as easy as it had been a decade earlier for Americans to assume that “it can’t happen here.” On both sides of the Atlantic, planes were being developed with greater range and speed, more payload, and improved bombsights. Writing at the start of the Second World War, Alexander de Seversky, the flamboyant author of *Victory through Air Power*, argued that “delusions of defensive invulnerability are fairy tales carried over from an earlier period in our history, just as grownups carry over consoling fairy tales from their sheltered childhood.”<sup>15</sup>

The Germans had made the most visible and provocative innovations in the field of air power during the 1930s. According to Vannevar Bush, a professor of electrical engineering from MIT who would serve during the Second World War as Roosevelt's primary contact with the civilian scientific community in the United States, "It was fear of the doctrine [of air power] and of the fleets being built by the Nazis that accounted principally for the terror that seized the rest of the world in the middle 1930's and that accounted for appeasement."<sup>16</sup> The sense of paralysis was encouraged in the United States by the writings and speeches of Charles Lindbergh, who had made several tours of German air bases and airplane production facilities in the interwar period and returned convinced that no nation in the world could match Germany in terms of the size and quality of its air force. Such arguments contributed to the success of isolationist organizations like American First, which claimed more than 800,000 members by the end of 1941.<sup>17</sup>

Other influential Americans treated the German air threat as a wake-up call. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, who had been making the case since the Great War for the transformative potential of air power, put the matter bluntly in 1930:

What will the future hold for us? Undoubtedly an attack on the great centers of population. If a European country attacks the United States, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh and Washington D.C. will be the first targets.<sup>18</sup>

Mitchell recommended military preparedness rather than appeasement as the only reliable insurance against such catastrophes. Specifically, he called for the creation of an independent air force capable of deterring such attacks by the threat of massive retaliatory bombing.

Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated his support for Mitchell's arguments during his first meeting with George Marshall in the fall of 1938. Recently appointed as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Marshall was one of several military leaders invited to the White House shortly after the historic meeting in Munich between Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier, and Chamberlain. All parties to the White House meeting understood that this was a turning point in European affairs. The question was, how should the United States respond? The president made a strong case for a program of airplane production as America's best insurance against aggression. He expressed a preference for an annual production of 24,000 planes, but predicted that Congress would cut that figure in half. He therefore sought the support of the military for a request for 10,000 planes per year. When the discussion came round to Marshall, whose job it was to preserve the interests of the land army, he replied, "I don't agree with that at all." The general later recalled that "that ended the conference. The President gave me a startled look and

when I went out they all bade me good-by and said my time in Washington was over."<sup>19</sup> In fact, Marshall's forthright response seems to have impressed the president, who became increasingly dependent on the general for military guidance over the next few years. For his part, Marshall used what influence he had during the prewar period to convince Roosevelt that only a "balanced force," with a large and well-equipped land army, could ensure America's safety.

Marshall's arguments in favor of a balanced force dovetailed with the claims of critics of strategic air power, many of whom had an institutional stake in discounting the offensive potential of land-based planes. This group included some members of the Army, and most members of the Navy and Marines. They viewed the proponents of air power as threats to their distinct missions, their bureaucratic influence, and their meager interwar budgets. It is a measure of their influence that all attempts to establish the air force as an independent military service with its own budget were frustrated until 1947.

The debates that took place in Congress and within the armed services during the interwar period on the issue of air force autonomy provided much of the ammunition for both critics and supporters of armed forces unification after the Second World War. Discussions during the 1920s and 1930s regarding the place of the air corps within the armed services often centered on the issue of unity of command. Spokesmen for both the Army and the Navy frequently argued that their services needed to continue to include an air arm in order to provide commanders with the full range of military instruments during combat. As these debates unfolded, however, spokesmen for the air corps, such as Mitchell, turned this argument to their advantage, by placing themselves on the side of comprehensive armed forces unification. As a practical matter, many of the supporters of the air force saw this proposal as the most realistic route to greater autonomy under disadvantageous circumstances. But the air-power enthusiasts had also hit upon an important principle. If unity of command made sense within the two established services, didn't it make even more sense for the armed forces as a whole?<sup>20</sup>

By the fall of 1940, developments in Europe had begun to bolster the influence of the airmen within the Washington policy community. During the previous year, Warsaw had been subjected to intense bombing by the Luftwaffe, and Prague had been threatened with the same fate. The historic center of Rotterdam suffered massive damage as a result of German bombardment in May 1940. And just nine days before Marshall's speech in support of selective service, the Luftwaffe had begun its strategic bombing campaign against London, with an initial assault force of nearly a thousand bombers and fighters, which had left

the East End of the city in flames. The American public was particularly alarmed by this last development, because of the emotional on-the-spot radio coverage of the blitz by Edward R. Murrow and his colleagues. Murrow told his wife that he had “pulled out all the stops” in his “This is London” broadcasts, because “a thousand years of history and civilization are being smashed” by German air power.<sup>21</sup>

### “THE DAY OF THE POSITIVE STATE”

Many US commentators took note of the fact that nondemocratic regimes seemed to be particularly attracted to the strategy of aerial bombardment of cities. This observation became part of a larger debate about the problems that totalitarianism posed for democracy in the mid-twentieth century. Concern about the special threats posed by dictatorships was certainly nothing new to a society that defined itself by its opposition to autocracy. Americans were also very aware of the comparative advantages that dictators enjoyed over democracies in the realm of foreign policy. In one of the most well-known passages of *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.”<sup>22</sup> Why, then, was the problem of democratic competitiveness considered by many experts and policymakers to be so much more serious in the years just prior to the Second World War? Harold Laski provided one answer in the preface to the 1937 edition of his study, *Liberty in the Modern State*:

In the seven years since this book was first published the condition of liberty has visibly deteriorated over most of the civilized world. . . . At times it seems not improbable that mankind is about to enter a new dark age.<sup>23</sup>

For Laski, the crisis of democracy in the mid-twentieth century had to do with the pace and scope of the spread of totalitarian ideologies since 1919. Dictators had been helped into power in Europe and Asia by economic problems in the 1920s—capped by the worldwide depression of 1929. Inherent weaknesses in multiparty parliamentary systems and unresolved ethnic and class disputes also contributed to the rise of autocratic rulers.

But many commentators felt that something more fundamental was at work in the interwar period. The conditions of the modern age seemed to favor totalitarian solutions to the problems of governance. Industrialization, urbanization, and the collapse of monarchies combined to expand the role of the state in society. Citizens expected more

from their governments, and governments discovered that they had new capabilities to intervene in the daily lives of citizens. Increasingly complex societies seemed to demand an increasingly powerful and intrusive state. Hans Morgenthau took note of the unique abilities of totalitarian regimes to exploit these changes:

The modern totalitarian state has been able to fill the gap between government and people . . . through the use of democratic symbols, totalitarian control of public opinion, and policies actually or seemingly benefiting the people. Practically all national energies flow into channels chosen by the government.<sup>24</sup>

The ability of totalitarian governments to channel these energies into aggression, and their natural predilection to do so, were central concerns for some Americans during the late 1930s. Harold Lasswell provided a concise explanation a few years later:

The affinity of despotic regimes for aggressive action comes from the internal stresses generated by arbitrary power. In absolute governments the head men of state are conspicuous targets for the hostilities that accumulate against the established order. . . . Despotisms tend to protect themselves by turning mass grievances against outside targets. This is the technique of the war scare (and of actual war).<sup>25</sup>

These same arguments had been at the core of Woodrow Wilson's claim that the world needed to be made safe both for and by democracy. This aspect of Wilson's vision survived the era of isolation and the failure of the League of Nations, and came to inform Roosevelt's diplomacy just prior to World War II, as illustrated by his Four Freedoms speech (January 1941) and the Atlantic Charter (August 1941).

Totalitarianism also seemed to pose a unique challenge to American economic and industrial competitiveness during the interwar period. Ronald Steel reminds us that during the late 1920s, "Mussolini enjoyed the virtually unanimous support of the American press . . . Henry Luce's *Fortune* devoted an entire issue to a favorable analysis of the 'Corporate State'."<sup>26</sup> By the time that the American people were prepared to accept a more activist government, many experts believed it was too late. When Walter Lippmann met with Roosevelt during the first month of his presidency, he warned him, "The situation is critical, Franklin. You may have no alternative but to assume dictatorial power."<sup>27</sup>

Roosevelt recognized that an important step in making the United States more economically and administratively competitive was the creation of new federal agencies for comprehensive planning. Soon after taking office, he established the National Resources Planning

Board (NRPB), which initially employed about fifty experts and grew to about 250 full-time staffers assisted by another 250 consultants in the early 1940s. Roosevelt was particularly impressed by a report that the NRPB had completed in 1934, entitled *A Plan for Planning*. The report recommended the creation of a permanent office that would serve as the president's "general staff" for research, planning, and policy coordination. Roosevelt did, in fact, move the NRPB into the Executive Office of the President, but he never gave it the kind of support and power that would have been required to establish it as a true "general staff" for policy coordination and advice.<sup>28</sup>

Unfortunately, when Roosevelt began to move from planning to implementing ambitious programs of state regulation and intervention, he did so in a haphazard and experimental way. As Alvin Hansen, a key economic adviser during the New Deal, admits, "The Roosevelt administration had moved in so many directions at once that no one could make sense of it all."<sup>29</sup> As a result, the New Deal never came close to establishing a centralized program for resource allocation and industrial mobilization of the type that was fueling the war machines of Europe and Asia.

Spokesmen for the still-new field of public administration tended to applaud Roosevelt for his appreciation of the need for a much more activist government, but they also criticized him for his sloppy, ad hoc management style. Members of the public-administration community moved in and out of Washington throughout Roosevelt's twelve years in office, either informally, in contexts like the Brains Trust, or in official capacities, in the various agencies of the New Deal. But these individuals were frequently frustrated in their efforts to convince the president of the need for greater cooperation between the various federal agencies.

Professor Edward Pendleton Herring of Harvard addressed both the positive and the negative aspects of the New Deal in his 1936 book *Public Administration and the Public Interest*. Beginning from the proposition that "economic laissez faire is gone, and political laissez faire is passing," he commended the president for attempting to make Washington more responsive to a wide range of new obligations and more competitive with "the authoritarianism of fascism and the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>30</sup> The problem was that Americans were uniquely suspicious of any attempts by the government to increase its authority or expand its area of responsibility. But this was a luxury that Americans could no longer afford. Herring stated, "The orthodoxy that would confine government to a negative role is already discredited. The day of the positive state is upon us."<sup>31</sup>

## CRITICISMS OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

Both the president's campaign to jumpstart the US economy and his efforts to prepare the nation for war were made especially difficult by the fact that Roosevelt could not rely upon traditional appeals to the national interest to bolster his arguments. Indeed, by the late 1930s, the concept of national interest carried more negative than positive connotations for many Americans. Doubts about the reliability of the national interest as a policy guide were encouraged by four developments during the interwar period: growing concern about the political influence of immigrants, critiques of the power of representatives of domestic and international business, criticisms of Woodrow Wilson's conflation of universal and national interests, and concerns regarding the susceptibility of the masses to propaganda.

The first development actually began prior to World War I. In response to the massive influx of immigrants during the first decade of the twentieth century, the American public had begun to acquire an intensely nativist mood by the time the United States entered the Great War. Some critics questioned the loyalty of these recent arrivals, in spite of the fact that many immigrants served with distinction during the war.<sup>32</sup> New immigrants were also depicted as unable or unwilling to accept "Americanization."<sup>33</sup> It did not help that immigrants were associated in the minds of many people with labor union activism and left-wing politics.

The anti-immigrant backlash led to a series of laws—in 1917, 1921, and, most notably, 1924, with the National Origins Act—which imposed strict quotas upon immigration from overseas. At the same time, legal and administrative instruments were employed to encourage the temporary, and more manageable, importation of workers from Mexico. In spite of these prophylactic efforts, many influential commentators continued to warn the American people during the interwar period that the United States had already lost the ability to articulate a coherent and advantageous national interest:

Alien groups press their special views on us in the consideration of the League of Nations, the World Court, war debts, immigration; and their prejudices and passions run athwart all our state, city, and national politics. Our politicians have been so accustomed to consider the will of foreign groups, that it is with the utmost difficulty that a native opinion gets even a hearing.<sup>34</sup>

For racial as well as economic reasons, Asians were viewed with special suspicion and subjected to especially harsh immigration quotas,

but some commentators viewed with even greater concern the waves of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. As Charles Beard noted in 1934, "They brought with them a low standard of living, and an ignorance of American customs, systems of law, and administration, which militated against assimilation in the new environment."<sup>35</sup> C. B. Davenport went further, stating during the 1927 Geneva world population conference that America was in danger of becoming "a little Europe, with warring nationalities included."<sup>36</sup>

Concern about the growing influence of ethnic minorities was part of a larger national debate about the pernicious influence of domestic "pressure groups." Most of the concern was focused on the expropriation and exploitation of the national interest by economic interests. The first half of the twentieth century was characterized by an explosion in the number and importance of both business and labor organizations that employed mass recruitment techniques and utilized technologies of mass communication and mobilization in order to acquire political influence. In a special issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (dated May 1935), Professor Clarence Bonnett of Tulane University argued that business groups had exercised a transformative influence on societies as far back as the Roman Empire, and concluded:

If past history is a safe criterion, the present era of "more and better" organizations in numbers, purposes, and methods indicates that the world's greatest social change is now under way. We are now in a super-organization stage exemplified primarily by international combinations. . . . These have potentialities for change far beyond that experienced in any period in recorded history.<sup>37</sup>

Most Americans did not view this trend with Professor Bonnett's sense of academic objectivity. With regard to domestic economic groups, it was widely assumed that, at minimum, they pressured both Congress and the executive branch to assist them in their efforts to build markets and acquire raw materials. Senate hearings on the issue of granting independence to the Philippines during the winter and spring of 1930 demonstrated for many Americans the problem of misplaced priorities. Charles Beard noted that most of the witnesses who testified "frankly admitted that they spoke for particular economic interests."<sup>38</sup> Agricultural interests viewed imports from the Philippines as a threat to domestic farm prices, while commercial and industrial interests viewed the Philippines as a market and a source of inexpensive raw materials. What united the two sides in the debate, according to Beard, was their tendency to make "little or no reference to any supreme conception of national interest rising above their particular concerns."<sup>39</sup>

Senate hearings during this period also questioned the motives of American bankers involved in foreign lending. Many of the arguments of the Congressional participants in these hearings would be familiar to contemporary readers. They focused on the ways in which foreign lending contributed to the export of jobs, to the creation of industrial and agricultural competitors overseas, and to the enhancement of the economic competitiveness of foreign governments.

By the mid-1930s, the anti-business mood in the country had become toxic, and domestic economic interests were under direct attack as evil influences on American foreign policy and as barriers to world peace. The Nye Committee hearings, which took place between 1934 and 1936, were both a symptom of and a powerful impetus to this widespread anti-business mood. Michael Sherry describes the hearings as “sensationally conducted, sensationally covered by the media, sensationally echoed in bestsellers like *The Merchants of Death*.”<sup>40</sup> The Nye Committee concluded that domestic and foreign munitions companies had engaged in systematic corruption of government officials, actively opposed efforts at arms control and conflict prevention during the interwar period, and “occasionally had opportunities to intensify fears of people for their neighbors and have used them to their own profit.”<sup>41</sup> Many Americans also shared the opinion of Senator Gerald Nye (R-North Dakota) that agencies of the US government were “co-defendants” in the committee’s bill of indictments.<sup>42</sup> The establishment of the Department of Commerce in 1921 was viewed by many commentators as confirmation that Washington had become the creature of these economic pressure groups. Professor Harold Sprout of Princeton described it as “the greatest advertising and selling agency in the world.”<sup>43</sup> Many commentators also expressed concern that the Department of State, the agency established by the Constitution to articulate and advance the national interest, was finding it increasingly difficult to resist pressure from domestic economic interests and from their surrogates in Congress. The final report of the Nye Committee also took note of the fact that the armed services had often been in the “anomalous position” of collaborating with arms manufacturers in the development of new military technologies and then being “forced to let the other nations have the advantages which we have obtained for ourselves, in order to keep the munitions manufacturers going.”<sup>44</sup>

The Nye Committee is perhaps best known for efforts by some members to imply that the members of the Wilson administration had been either dupes or agents of the “merchants of death.” As President Roosevelt warned in a letter to Wilson’s closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, “Some of the Congressmen and Senators who are suggesting wild-eyed measures to keep us out of war are now declaring that you,

Lansing and Page forced Wilson into the war!"<sup>45</sup> In the end, the committee backed away from any explicit attacks on the Wilson administration. Furthermore, the controversy that arose over the indirect attacks on Wilson worked against the interests of the committee, by encouraging coordinated resistance in Congress—including efforts to cut off Congressional funding for the ongoing hearings. The attacks nonetheless contributed to what Roosevelt described to House as

the very large and perhaps increasing school of thought which holds that we can and should withdraw wholly within ourselves and cut off all but the most perfunctory relationships with other nations. They imagine that if the civilization of Europe is about to destroy itself through internal strife, it might just as well go ahead and do it and that the United States can stand idly by.<sup>46</sup>

By the time that the Nye Committee hearings got under way, Roosevelt's assessment of the scope of the isolationist mood was probably conservative, and much of the anti-international mood could be traced to public disillusionment with Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy. According to David Kennedy, "No people came to believe more emphatically than the Americans that the Great War was an unalloyed tragedy."<sup>47</sup> David Brinkley notes that a popular refrain during the interwar period was, "What did we get out of the First World War but death, debt, and George M. Cohan?"<sup>48</sup> During the 1920s, Wilson was widely criticized both for getting America into the war and for mismanaging the postwar negotiations in Paris and Washington. In the wake of the worldwide economic collapse of 1929, many Americans also blamed Wilson for the creation of a postwar economic order that "insanely perpetuated in peacetime the economic disruptions of the war itself."<sup>49</sup> Such criticisms helped to fuel the pervasive mood of isolationism during the interwar period.

President Wilson also helped to undermine the idea of national interest by his rhetorical conflation of the concepts of national interest and collective interest, particularly in his arguments in favor of the League of Nations. Hans Morgenthau would later observe that Wilsonianism and isolationism were "brothers under the skin" because they "refuse to concern themselves with the concrete issues upon which the national interest must be asserted."<sup>50</sup>

Morgenthau was correct in his assertion that neither Wilsonian moralism nor escapist isolationism provided a reliable guide for US foreign policy during the interwar period. But he misled readers by implying that any American leader during the 1930s could have rallied the public behind a more ambitious foreign policy by appeals to "concrete" and overarching national interests. The American people were deeply

cynical about such appeals, not only because they were suspicious of pressure groups and critical of recent ventures into international affairs, but also because they were acutely aware of how effective totalitarian regimes had become at manipulating such symbols.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the susceptibility of an increasingly influential and manipulable mass public to propaganda had become a central focus of concern for students of political science and public administration. Indeed, as early as 1887, Woodrow Wilson developed this argument to make his case for "the eminently practical science of administration" in the United States:

The very fact that we have realized popular rule in its fullness has made the task of organizing that rule just so much the more difficult. In order to make any advance at all we must instruct and persuade a multitudinous monarch called public opinion. . . . The problem is to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. . . . If we solve this problem we shall again pilot the world.<sup>51</sup>

By the time that Roosevelt entered the White House, the problems identified by Wilson were everywhere apparent. Within the United States, urbanization and improvements in mass communication had converged to make the public vulnerable to manipulation by special-interest groups. Outside of the United States, propaganda was proving to be a powerful tool for establishing dictatorial control in nations characterized by widespread social unrest.<sup>52</sup> Both of these trends encouraged Americans to be deeply suspicious of any appeals to the national interest.

By the mid-1930s, Charles Beard was on safe ground in concluding that "the official thesis of national interest was not working out in practice as expected and promised."<sup>53</sup> The idea of national interest was one of the major casualties of World War I and the Great Depression. Postwar investigations raised questions about whose interests had actually been served by the decision to enter the war and by America's postwar foreign policy. But if national interest was no longer a reliable guide, what was the alternative?

## NATIONAL SECURITY AS A GUIDE FOR FOREIGN POLICY

No American scholar during the interwar period was more attuned to the unreliability of the concept of national interest than Pendleton Herring. His first book, *Group Representation before Congress*, was a study of the influence of lobbyists in the legislative process.<sup>54</sup> His subsequent study, *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, was de-

signed to focus attention on the fact that “no effective force for general coordination in the administrative services has counterbalanced th[e] tendency toward particularism” in Washington.<sup>55</sup> He argued that pressure groups posed special problems for the State Department, whose representatives had to continually strive to “discover the national interest among the many special interests urging their views before the department.”<sup>56</sup> Under these circumstances,

there is in our system no gyroscopic device which insures that the foreign policy of our representative government will maintain a constant level regardless of internal political forces.<sup>57</sup>

Herring also observed that it would be extremely difficult for any president to introduce the kinds of reforms that were required in a situation in which “the federal machinery of administration is beaten out on the anvil of Congress by the hammer and tongs of selfish forces.”<sup>58</sup> He left his readers with a sense of direction (more planning, more coordination, more control), but without the sense that Americans were “ready to pay the price.”<sup>59</sup>

Over the next five years, as the Nazi blitzkrieg moved across Europe and the Japanese turned their attention to Southeast Asia, Herring came to conclude that the time for real, substantive change was finally at hand. His 1941 book *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms* was designed to make this case. Drawing upon themes that he had developed in his previous books, as well as arguments from other proponents of public administration such as Leonard White, Herring criticized Washington for perpetuating “decades of divided purposes” that had facilitated the development of “a revolutionary world crisis.”<sup>60</sup>

*The Impact of War* sought to derive lessons from the American experience during World War I. Born at the beginning of the twentieth century, Herring was greatly influenced by the US experience during the Great War. He was especially critical of Washington’s failure to engage in even a limited and selective mobilization program in the period leading up to the Great War, and he developed many of his arguments around the related themes of threat and preparedness. During the interwar period, he warned against a naïve retreat into isolationism in a situation in which even a temporary respite from world affairs was no longer an option.

The most important contribution that Herring made to the post-World War II debate about institutional reform was his emphasis upon the concept of “national security” as a more appropriate and reliable guide to foreign and defense planning than the traditional concept of national interest. He sought to convince Americans that a situation of

unearned security that had lasted for a century and a half had finally come to an end. "Air power means that the globe has shrunk. Mechanized warfare means that armies of industry are in conflict. . . . The margins of safety that our democracy has known have been cut away."<sup>61</sup> Under these circumstances, the United States had no choice but to adopt what Thomas Hobbes called the "posture of gladiators."<sup>62</sup> Herring recognized that this was a special challenge for Americans, who had cultivated a "persistent suspicion of militarism."<sup>63</sup> But he also assured his readers that the reforms he proposed could draw upon some familiar historical traditions: "Symbolically we have returned to those early days in our history when the flintlock hung over every hearth and the powder horn was kept ready."<sup>64</sup>

The concept of national security was not completely unknown when Herring published *The Impact of War*. In 1935, William Y. Elliott, a colleague of Herring's at Harvard, published a book titled *The Need for Constitutional Reform: A Program for National Security*, in which he argued for an activist state to cope with challenges from Japan, Germany, and Italy in a new "age of Machiavelli." Elliott warned that these governments "make small pretense to any other policy than that of craft and might in gaining national ends." Unfortunately, he stated, "others who profess peace are pursuing ends that may lead to war."<sup>65</sup> Over the next six years, Elliott would become one of the most outspoken opponents of the isolationists, arguing in 1938 for the use of quotas and tariffs to "break Japan and save China." He favored such forceful actions both for their beneficial effects in Asia and for their demonstration effects on Italy and Germany, the other two members of the "unholy trinity" who would be "much easier to deal with" once they had a reason to respect America's willpower.<sup>66</sup>

The term "national security" had also become familiar to Americans just prior to World War I because of the activities of the National Security League, an organization created in 1915 to encourage American military preparedness and challenge isolationism. The League was active in the debates that led up to the Great War, and by the end of 1918 the organization claimed over 90,000 members in more than 200 local branches. Once the war ended, however, the League lost its purpose and its direction. Turning their attention inward, the leaders of the organization began to dabble with nativist politics and attacked "Bolshevik" influences within American society, triggering debates that caused dissension within the organization. By the time that a new campaign for military preparedness had begun to develop in the United States in the late 1930s, the National Security League had become an irrelevance. The leaders of the organization declared bankruptcy in 1939 and burned its archives a year later.<sup>67</sup>

Pendleton Herring was one of the individuals who took up the burden of the National Security League just prior to World War II. He called for a rapid and comprehensive program of military mobilization, in spite of the fact that the weight of history was against such a campaign. He argued that reliance upon a militia system had proven itself to be "inadequate" throughout American history, but the nation had nonetheless "blundered through . . . at great cost." In the mid-twentieth century, however, this situation was no longer permissible:

Preparations which might have been accurately branded as militaristic a few years ago may be regarded calmly today as just common sense. The politics of military policy during the last century offer a warning and not a guide to the future.<sup>68</sup>

A large and well-equipped standing army was an immediate necessity in light of the threat posed by totalitarian regimes. And even after the current crisis was resolved, "democracy may have to remain under arms for a long time to come."<sup>69</sup>

A new military policy involved more than an effective standing army, however. Herring also believed that the American political system needed to find an influential place for the professional soldier in the formulation of the nation's day-to-day foreign policy.<sup>70</sup> "As a nation we are facing a new world. This means a drastic change in the context within which our political institutions operate."<sup>71</sup> He quoted Charles Beard's observation that "no philosophy of war in its relation to diplomacy, world economy, national destiny or ideals of the good life has ever been formulated by the United States."<sup>72</sup> He also spoke favorably of Elihu Root's efforts to establish a General Staff within the Army during his tenure as Secretary of the War (1899–1903) and made the case for a similar kind of institutionalized professional military staff as part of the US foreign policy machinery.

Returning to arguments from his 1936 book, Herring also asserted that improvements in communications and transportation favored "centralization, standardization and regimentation" within societies. These trends were irresistible, he claimed, and the nations that managed these processes in the most effective ways would have an enormous comparative advantage in the global struggle for power. Wars had played an essential role in the historical development of the "positive state," according to Herring. Drawing on themes from both Hegelianism and Social Darwinism, he argued that warfare unleashed a nation's energies, stimulated loyalty, and shook governments out of their lethargy. The dictators of the twentieth century were particularly adept at exploiting the opportunities created by warfare. Now, Herring believed, America had to follow suit, and the coming confrontation with

totalitarianism represented a great opportunity to do so. "War means centralization of authority, the standardization of economic functions, and submission to discipline. The grave threat of war starts the same forces in train."<sup>73</sup>

Herring argued that a more centralized and militarized system of foreign policy formulation was a matter of national survival in 1941. But he also believed that once the period of crisis was over, this new system would continue to significantly enhance US competitiveness in the world economy and bolster its prestige and influence in international relations. A positive state would be better able to protect US business interests overseas and in a better position to influence new rules for international cooperation. But all of this would require a more efficient system for foreign policymaking, backed by a large and influential military establishment.

Herring also sought to reassure readers that a fundamental change in the US approach to issues of national security need not engender constitutional and political risks. In the first chapter of *The Impact of War*, he asserted that the challenges posed by totalitarian regimes compelled the United States to respond accordingly, but he also reassured his readers that "this does not mean that the opponents of Nazi Germany must become nazified if they are to resist."<sup>74</sup> He returned to this argument in the last chapter of his book, entitled "Traditional Values and New Imperatives." Having argued for over 200 pages in favor of policies designed to replicate the administrative methods of totalitarian regimes, he finally confronted the implications of such actions for civil liberties in the United States. The result is disturbingly unsuccessful. Indeed, at some points Herring's concluding arguments can only be described as Orwellian:

Freedom undergoes a change of emphasis if it is to be exercised in the intricate maze of our urban industrial order. In terms that may seem paradoxical the enjoyment of liberty now is dependent upon the degree of unity that prevails.

Discipline, as authority imposed from above, becomes necessary when this obligation to conformity is overlooked by the individual. Democracy, as the highest form of social life, holds the highest expectations of each man's capacity to cooperate with his fellows. This is the *duty* of all those who would live in a free society.

We can recognize the need for central controls and discipline without making these needs the central article of our faith. The point really is that a democracy to succeed must take for granted the social integration that a Hitler tries to impose.

The way to preserve civil rights in the final analysis is through maintaining the integrity of the community.<sup>75</sup>

The issues that confounded Herring in the last chapter of his book have become a permanent source of concern for civil libertarians. And it is more than a little ironic that Herring himself would be personally threatened by these issues in the mid-1950s (as discussed in Chapter 7 below). It is nonetheless clear from his arguments in 1941 that, although Herring was concerned about these potential problems, he was also convinced that they represented part of the price of making military preparedness a permanent condition in the United States, rather than an ad hoc response to occasional crises.

### THE NEW TEAM

By the time that *The Impact of War* was published, Roosevelt had recruited a new team to assist him in preparing the nation for war. Henry Stimson, a patrician Republican who had served as Taft's Secretary of War and Hoover's Secretary of State, was asked by Roosevelt to return to the post of Secretary of War in the summer of 1940. Stimson had voted against Roosevelt in both 1932 and 1936, but by his own admission was "well out in front of the President and most other leaders" in his support for an active and assertive foreign policy.<sup>76</sup> He contributed his experience and his bipartisan imprimatur to Roosevelt's war cabinet. Over the next year and half, Stimson also bolstered Roosevelt's resolve regarding such issues as selective service and lend-lease and often served as the president's blunt instrument in political struggles over prewar mobilization.

In his campaign to prepare the Army, and the nation, for war, Stimson was fortunate to have the collaboration of George Marshall, who had been promoted to Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939. In his memoirs, the general describes the period just prior to the Second World War as the most difficult time in his life. During his first six months on the job, he was especially frustrated by Roosevelt's decision to put off discussion of the 1941 defense budget until the mood in Congress was more accommodating. Roosevelt's judgment about the need to move slowly with Congress at this point was probably correct, however, and in any event, it would only be a few more months before reports of Hitler's victories in Europe would soften up the legislature so that the military could begin to make their case for more money and more men. By the middle of 1940, Congress had increased the defense authorization to \$17 billion, a ninefold increase in just one year. This was not the end of Marshall's problems, however, for once the money started flowing, the general still had to fight to make sure that the defense budget was "balanced"—not only in the sense that the Army got its fair share in competition with the Army Air Corps and the Navy,

but also in the sense that the funds were allocated not just for tanks and planes, but for the mundane yet indispensable concomitants of military power such as facilities, blankets, and trucks. Furthermore, the money could not buy the United States more time. In a representative statement dated July 22, 1940, Marshall fretted:

For almost twenty years we had all of the time and almost none of the money; today we have all of the money and no time. It is a long time between the appropriation of the money and the actual procurement of the article, especially when it is of a non-commercial nature.<sup>77</sup>

Rapid mobilization posed extraordinary logistical problems for the military services. For example, the War Department had to construct military facilities to accommodate an Army whose authorized strength in 1940 was increased from 174,000 to 1,400,000. The first wave of munitions plants also had to be built by the Army's Construction Division during this period. The War Department's success in this effort is one of the least-appreciated stories of the war. By the time that war was declared, the Army had completed 375 major projects, with another 320 projects underway, at a total cost of \$1.8 billion.<sup>78</sup> Certainly the most visible and controversial project begun during this period was the five-story, five-sided War Department headquarters located on the Virginia side of the Potomac. The world's largest office building, the Pentagon was designed to accommodate 40,000 War Department employees. At the time that Congress approved the project, it was agreed that the building would be designed in such a way that it could be converted to civilian use once the national emergency had passed.

James Carroll reminds us that the Pentagon was actually the second building created by Roosevelt as the headquarters for the War Department.

FDR had personally overseen the construction of a new headquarters building at 21st Street in Foggy Bottom, but no sooner was it completed than World War II broke out. By mid-1941 the Army had mushroomed to a million and a half men; the new headquarters was instantly inadequate, and senior Army officials told the president they would never use it.<sup>79</sup>

The question of what to do with the unoccupied building on 21st Street was resolved in a way that would be rich in symbolism for the changes that were about to take place within Washington. "Though the entrance was decorated with a huge, undiplomatic martial mural—helmeted soldiers in combat—the building would become the headquarters of the State Department, which it remains to this day."<sup>80</sup>

The individual who was given primary responsibility for the Army's prewar construction campaign was General Brehon Burke Somervell,

who had been appointed director of the Construction Division of the War Department in December 1940. Somervell was an aggressive, egocentric, and extremely ambitious officer who had come to the attention of Secretary of War Stimson as a man who could get things done. Less than a year after taking charge of the Construction Division, Somervell was rewarded for his success by appointment as G-4 within the War Department, responsible for the administration of all aspects of the Army's supply system, in cooperation with the Undersecretary of War, Robert Patterson. In this capacity, Somervell would establish himself as one of the most powerful men in America, and as a very visible point of reference in the debates that culminated in the 1947 National Security Act.

Another valuable addition to Roosevelt's prewar team was Dean Acheson, an influential Washington lawyer and trustee of the Brookings Institution. During the late 1930s, Acheson had begun to acquire a reputation as an articulate proponent of US leadership in world affairs. In a speech at Yale in November 1939, Acheson called for a US foreign policy that would have

two aspects—one we may call the prophylactic side; the other, the therapeutic. One should attempt to check the disintegration of the world, in which our national life and individual lives are rooted, by strengthening the forces opposing disintegration; the other should attempt a cure.<sup>81</sup>

The prerequisite for such a global campaign, according to Acheson, was a US government that was capable of responding quickly and forcefully to international crises. This was in striking contrast to his previously expressed concerns about an activist executive branch, which had led him to challenge Roosevelt's authority to devalue the dollar without Congressional authorization. This action, which Acheson took only shortly after being appointed Undersecretary of the Treasury in 1933, had gotten him fired by Roosevelt.<sup>82</sup>

The president's decision to bring Acheson back into the government in 1940 was due in large part to an editorial that Acheson had published in the *Baltimore Sun*, in support of Roosevelt's reelection to a third term: "Today there is only one test—who can pilot the ship of state in this crisis of civilization? For a year now the president has met that test. No one can ask more and no one dare ask less."<sup>83</sup> Acheson had also performed a special service that summer by helping to draft a letter to *The New York Times* that made the legal case for the president's right to lease or loan American destroyers to the besieged British government. Roosevelt was anxious to comply with the British request, but he felt that he needed at least an arguable legal basis for his action. After obtaining the concurrence of his attorney general, Robert Jack-

son, on the legal reasoning of the *Times* letter, the president moved quickly to strike a deal with Churchill. When the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs became vacant a few months later, the president specifically asked his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to recruit Acheson for the position.

Acheson had ample opportunities to regret his decision to join State during 1941. He soon discovered that his department did not have much influence with Roosevelt or his inner circle, and that the problem was largely attributable to the man at the top. Cordell Hull, who served as Secretary of State from 1933 to 1944,

clung tenaciously to points that did not impress the President, whether with their merit or their timeliness. Roosevelt responded by frequently ignoring him. At the same time, Roosevelt was frequently aware . . . of the value and strength of Hull's support on foreign policy measures in Congress. . . . In the upshot, Roosevelt would not listen to Hull's repeated suggestions of resignation, but neither would he listen to much of his advice, nor even take pains to see that he was informed of what went on.<sup>84</sup>

Hull seemed neither willing nor able to challenge such prejudices. He was a Tennessee statesman—cautious, formal, and legalistic. A septuagenarian in fragile health by the time the war began, Hull was as out of place among Roosevelt's ambitious and aggressive cronies as a bishop at a beach party.

The State Department, meanwhile, had acquired a reputation during the interwar period as a throwback to another age—neither comfortable with, nor interested in, the new technologies for communication or the new procedures for management. State's disconnect from the trappings of modernity reinforced the suspicions of individuals inside and outside of government who viewed career foreign service officers as elitist and unrepresentative of American values. The lack of technical expertise within the State Department in the fields of business, finance, and international trade also encouraged other executive departments—most notably, Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury—to develop their own direct ties with counterpart agencies overseas during the interwar period. Many commentators also raised questions about the reliability, and even the loyalty, of State Department personnel, particularly after Tyler Kent, a member of the US embassy staff in London, was arrested in May 1940 for stealing 1,500 confidential documents that ended up in Berlin.<sup>85</sup>

Throughout its long history, the State Department had jealously defended its status as the lead agency in the formulation of peacetime foreign policy. For the most part, the War Department and the Navy had accepted this arrangement and developed their respective war

plans in isolation from their State Department colleagues. According to Ernest May, "As a rule, . . . diplomatic and military recommendations reached the White House separately, and the relationship between political aims and military capabilities had to be gauged, if at all, by the President."<sup>86</sup> During the first half of the twentieth century, there were sporadic attempts to ameliorate this situation. In 1919, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt proposed the creation of a Joint Plan Making Body in a letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, in order to foster a habit of cooperation among US agencies involved in foreign and defense affairs. Roosevelt envisioned his Joint Plan Making Board as a venue where representatives of the War and Navy departments would reconcile their budget plans with the State Department's vision of US interests.<sup>87</sup> It was a perfectly sensible proposal, which was of no interest to State at the time.

The Foreign Service persisted throughout the interwar period in opposing any initiatives that might provide the military with opportunities for interference in the formulation or management of America's peacetime diplomacy. As the prospect of war increased, however, State agreed to some modest experiments in cooperation. In 1938, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles began periodic meetings with his second-in-command counterparts from the War and Navy departments in order to discuss issues relating to the Western Hemisphere. It is nonetheless a comment on the importance that the Secretary of State accorded to this Standing Liaison Committee (SLC) that, when Secretary of War Stimson asked Hull about the committee in 1940, he had forgotten that it existed.<sup>88</sup>

State Department representatives had traditionally argued that war and peace were mutually exclusive conditions that called for distinct institutional responses. Since US history had been characterized by long periods of relative peace, interrupted by brief instances of major war, this argument had served the interests of the Foreign Service. By the 1930s, however, America had developed global interests and had become increasingly vulnerable to distant enemies. Under these circumstances, the argument was inappropriate, then anachronistic, then dangerously irresponsible. The price that the State Department paid for clinging to this argument was almost total marginalization during the Second World War.

As part of his preparedness campaign, the president also looked for people who could provide him with reliable prewar intelligence. Since September 1939, the Germans had struck out in so many directions, with so little warning and such great success, that by the middle of 1941, US policymakers had no idea of what might come next. Their sense of bewilderment was capped in June by the Führer's decision to

turn against his erstwhile ally, Russia. Roosevelt used both official and unofficial channels of information to help him make sense of these actions. Official sources included representatives of other governments, the existing military intelligence branches (in particular, the Military Intelligence Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence), overseas military attachés, and members of the Foreign Service. Unofficial sources included members of the press and influential Americans living overseas. Conspicuously missing from the list of US intelligence sources were spies. David Kahn notes that “owing to Congressional stinginess, a belief that spy rings would not produce information justifying the effort or potential damage, and a lingering rectitude, the United States did not have, in the years before the Second World War, any secret agents in foreign countries.”<sup>89</sup>

One particularly perceptive and helpful unofficial intelligence source was William Donovan, a New York lawyer whose business frequently took him overseas. A recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery during the Great War, Donovan was an internationalist Republican who was friendly both with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and with Stimson. He occasionally provided them, and Roosevelt personally, with reports on his meetings with such individuals as Mussolini and the Chief of Staff of the Italian General Staff, Marshal Badoglio.

Following a trip to Britain in June 1941, Donovan sent the president a particularly ambitious proposal: a “Memorandum of Establishment of [a] Service of Strategic Information.”<sup>90</sup> His ideas were influenced by a tour he had just completed as a guest of Air Commodore Sir Frank Nelson, chief of Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE). Nelson had permitted Donovan to visit the divisions within his agency that were responsible for propaganda, sabotage, and subversion. In his report to Roosevelt, Donovan argued for the creation of a counterpart to the SOE within the US government, with comparable responsibilities. He also recommended that the new agency become a central clearinghouse for all intelligence relating to security, as well as an independent source of intelligence reports for the executive branch.

The president responded quickly to Donovan’s memo, issuing an executive order on July 11, 1941, that designated Donovan as director of a new agency entitled the Coordinator of Information (COI). The document was a classic example of Roosevelt’s management style—a vaguely worded mandate that invited the subject to sink or swim in the Darwinian swamp of Washington bureaucratic politics.<sup>91</sup> Representatives of the eight different agencies that had some responsibility for foreign intelligence gathering and analysis reacted predictably, chal-

lenging the COI's authority and resisting its claims on their information or resources. Donovan found himself forced to rely upon his colleagues in British intelligence for help with the training of his analysts and operatives. The British also shared some of their intelligence reports with the COI. The untenable nature of Donovan's situation is illustrated by the fact that, in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, the COI had not been receiving copies of the military's "Magic" intercepts of secret Japanese diplomatic messages.

Roosevelt also took steps to enhance the nation's ability to investigate "espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters." In a memo dated June 26, 1939, the president instructed the War Department and the Navy to coordinate their investigations and their intelligence activities with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Once the three agencies began to meet, they agreed to include representatives of the State Department in those sessions which did not involve "closed" subjects. Within a year, the group had acquired an institutional identity as the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Committee, with its own set of "delimitation" guidelines for interagency cooperation. The FBI was designated as the lead agency for the investigation of all cases of civilian espionage within the United States and its territories. As a result of a casual comment by Roosevelt to members of the committee, the FBI's authority was also extended to include the rest of the Western Hemisphere.<sup>92</sup>

At the same time that Roosevelt was scrambling for new sources of intelligence and new arrangements for protecting the nation from espionage, he was also reaching out to the scientific community for assistance in preparing for war. On June 15, 1940—one day after the Germans marched into Paris—the president institutionalized his administration's ties to this community with the creation of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC). The idea for the committee had come from Vannevar Bush, the peripatetic engineer whose accomplishments at the age of fifty included major breakthroughs in the field of analog computing and the co-founding of the Raytheon Corporation. Bush had left the MIT faculty in 1939 to become president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington in order to get closer to the policymaking process. By this time he had become convinced that war was imminent, and he believed that it was the duty of the scientific community to work with government to improve the nation's military technology base. Roosevelt not only approved Bush's plan for the NDRC, he asked him to chair the committee and assemble his own team of scientists to staff it. In his letter to Bush authorizing the creation of the new agency, Roosevelt noted that "the function of your

Committee is of great importance in these times of national stress. The methods and mechanisms of warfare have altered radically in recent times and they will alter still further in the future."<sup>93</sup>

No civilian was more successful than Bush at getting Roosevelt to deliver on his assurances of support during the war. He recognized from the outset that his agency would succeed or fail depending on its ability to establish a close working relationship with the military. He was also convinced that the armed services were not taking advantage of the scientific resources that were available in the civilian community. By drawing upon his personal influence with Roosevelt, Bush was able to overcome much of the institutional resistance of those military representatives who viewed his committee as a threat to their independent research activities and budgets. In the case of the Army, Bush was also able to rely upon the consistent and direct support of Henry Stimson. According to James P. Baxter III, who worked closely with Bush throughout the war, "No one in the War Department approached with keener zest the problem of extracting from scientific research the maximum contribution to the war effort."<sup>94</sup> No comparable cooperative relationship was established during the war with the leadership in the Navy. This did not stop Bush from using the president's indispensable backing and his own persistence to gain access to the strategic deliberations of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Roosevelt also needed individuals with influence and contacts in the overlapping worlds of business and finance to assist him in mobilizing the nation's resources for war. So at about the same time that Acheson was coming on board, Roosevelt appointed James Forrestal, a highly successful investment banker, as one of his six administrative assistants. Forrestal had been recommended to the president by several people, including his friend Thomas Corcoran, as an "acknowledged leader of your crowd in Wall Street" with a "specialty in industrial personnel" and "enormous courage to do things that have never been done."<sup>95</sup> Unfortunately, Roosevelt did not have a clear sense of how to use Forrestal's talents. At first, he was given responsibility for liaison with representatives of the film and radio industries and also asked to deal with some issues relating to Latin America. Forrestal soon lost interest in this vaguely defined position, and within two months of taking the job he accepted Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox's invitation to fill the newly created post of Undersecretary of the Navy.

Forrestal quickly turned his managerial talents to the task of military procurement, which he believed could only be accomplished in coordination with the War Department and with representatives of the civilian industrial base.<sup>96</sup> He agreed with his counterpart, Undersecretary

of War Robert Patterson, that the Army Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), which had been created by the National Defense Act of 1920 to plan for wartime mobilization, was the best available forum for such coordination. As I will have occasion to discuss in Chapter 2, Forrestal asked his long-time friend Ferdinand Eberstadt to study the ANMB and offer some recommendations for reform. Forrestal and Eberstadt had become friends at Princeton and then worked together in the 1920s for the investment firm of Dillon, Read and Company. Eberstadt subsequently became a vociferous critic of Roosevelt's New Deal policies, and an adviser to Tom Dewey in his 1940 presidential campaign. Jeffery Dorwart has observed that "by helping Forrestal" with the ANMB project, "Eberstadt served a Democratic administration . . . that he despised. Personal loyalty to his friend outweighed politics."<sup>97</sup>

Eberstadt submitted his final report to Forrestal and Patterson just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It envisioned a more powerful ANMB, which would make it easier for the Army and Navy to coordinate their wartime procurement activities with representatives of key civilian industries. In spite of the fact that his final report stressed the importance of civilian control over the ANMB, it was heavily criticized by many of Roosevelt's advisers, who saw it as a first step toward military domination of the economy. Since the president tended to share these concerns, he rejected the Eberstadt plan in favor of a looser, and much more confusing, arrangement for wartime mobilization.<sup>98</sup> This was not a fruitless exercise for Forrestal and Eberstadt, however, since the insights derived from this first attempt at reorganizing portions of the executive branch were to inform their subsequent efforts at wartime and postwar reform. Forrestal also learned something about the frustrations of trying to change the system from within, and about the need to bring more than ideas to the table on issues that mattered to him. Consequently, he continued his already very successful efforts to develop an independent base of political support within the Congress.

Stimson, Marshall, Acheson, Donovan, Bush, Forrestal, and Eberstadt all brought one thing to the Roosevelt Administration besides talent, energy, and strong personalities. They all shared the sense of emergency that Herring had captured in his discussion of the concept of national security.<sup>99</sup> Roosevelt's war council agreed with Herring that the democracies had squandered opportunities to improve their military capabilities and engage in preemptive diplomacy during the 1930s. They also agreed with Herring that the US government needed to do whatever it could, within the constraints imposed by time and politics, to place the United States in the posture of a gladiator.

## NO MORE PEARL HARBORS

In one of those rare cases in which historical events prove one side unequivocally right and the other indisputably wrong, the proponents of national security were vindicated by Pearl Harbor. The massive isolationist movement within the United States evaporated overnight. Immediately following the attack, Charles Lindbergh, the most well-known spokesman of the America First movement, issued a press release in which he called upon Americans to unite in support of the war effort, noting (with no apparent appreciation of the irony) that “our own defenses and our own military position have already been neglected for too long.”<sup>100</sup> Lindbergh himself was frustrated in his subsequent efforts to re-enlist (rejected on the grounds that he might not be able to serve the commander in chief “loyally”), and the isolationist movement that he had come to personify became irrevocably associated in the public’s mind with nostalgia and naiveté.<sup>101</sup>

Pearl Harbor seemed to confirm all of the major elements of Her-  
ring’s prewar national security argument: America’s new situation of  
geostrategic vulnerability; the need for military preparedness *before* a  
war breaks out; the unique threat posed by dictatorships; and the  
need to both expand and centralize the US government in order to  
remain competitive. Roosevelt took it upon himself to make sure  
that the American people had learned the first of these lessons. In a  
fireside chat on December 9, 1941, the president explained that recent  
events had proven that “there is no such thing as impregnable defense  
against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike with-  
out warning. . . . We cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on  
any map any more.”<sup>102</sup> On this occasion, Roosevelt did not have to ex-  
ercise his talent for hyperbole. Indeed, the sheer audacity of Japan’s  
action, and the fact that Japan had been able to deliver such a massive  
blow at a distance of 4,000 miles from its shores, had stunned every-  
one. Few people seemed to notice that another 2,500 miles separated  
Hawaii from the continental United States. Within a few days of the  
surprise attack, a gas mask had been attached to Roosevelt’s wheel-  
chair and the president was being chauffeured in an armor-plated lim-  
ousine that had previously belonged to Al Capone. The White House  
architect began work on a bomb shelter, and the Secret Service  
requested that the military mount anti-aircraft guns on the tops of  
government buildings.<sup>103</sup>

The attack on Pearl Harbor also vindicated Roosevelt’s campaign for  
prewar military preparedness. Some of the progress that was made  
was offset, of course, by the damage that Tokyo inflicted on the Ameri-

can military at Pearl Harbor—eighteen warships crippled or sunk, 347 planes damaged or destroyed, nearly 3,600 American casualties. Evaluating the situation at the start of the war, British Field Marshall Sir John Dill concluded that “this country has not—repeat not—the slightest conception of what the war means, and their armed forces are more unready for war than it is possible to imagine.”<sup>104</sup> The problem was made more difficult by the fact that America would have to acquire the resources to fight a two-ocean war, or find a way to hold the line in one theater while it concentrated its efforts in the other. Roosevelt and his advisers would have to train and equip a vastly more mobile and powerful force than had achieved victory in World War I. And to a much greater extent than was true in the Great War, the land, air, and sea components of this global military force would have to find ways to work together.

The third lesson of Pearl Harbor actually had three components: the perfidy of dictators, their natural predisposition toward aggression, and their special advantages in international affairs. There was little that could be done about the first two components other than to learn from the experience of Pearl Harbor not to trust the promises of dictators and not to let our guard down. But, as Pendleton Herring had argued before the war, there was much that the United States could do to level the playing field between dictatorships and democracies in the management of national security.

In accordance with the fourth lesson of Pearl Harbor, the American people were ready to support radical reform of the institutions responsible for making and managing US foreign policy. The coming of war had been described by Herbert Emmerich, a member of Roosevelt’s New Deal team, as “a farewell to normalcy.”<sup>105</sup> The American people recognized that they would never again have the option of hiding from world affairs, and that new procedures and institutions would be necessary to insure permanent preparedness.

Before the 1940s were over, Herring’s arguments about the preconditions for national security were accepted as commonsensical by most Americans. So were his claims about the need for a large and highly centralized bureaucracy within the executive branch that would be capable of managing national security. So were his arguments about the acceptability of the risks that such a bureaucracy posed for civil liberties and the constitutional system of checks and balances. The only major element of Herring’s prewar writings that would not be integrated into the plans for America’s postwar system for national security was his recommendation for an ambitious program of government management of the economy.

Four men who shared Herring's national security perspective—Marshall, Acheson, Eberstadt, and Forrestal—would all play key roles during and after the war in the debates that culminated in the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. In spite of some very strongly held differences, the four men agreed on the fundamental point that the United States could never again assume that security was the normal state of international relations. It would fall to these four individuals, in particular, to work out the institutional implications of this revolutionary change.

The significance of Pearl Harbor for the shapers of the new national security system cannot be exaggerated. It provided postwar planners with a vivid and universally understood image of the costs associated with letting down our guard. Whereas Munich became the default metaphor for American diplomats after World War II, Pearl Harbor became the default metaphor for the members of the national security bureaucracy. From this point on, American foreign policymaking would be answerable to Acheson's warning, "We can be wrong only once."<sup>106</sup> In the jargon of contemporary corporate culture, Pearl Harbor set a new standard of "zero tolerance" in the management of US national security. Such expectations were made all the more problematic by the fact that the Japanese attack had pulled American strategic thinking free of the moorings that had been in place for more than 150 years.

## Chapter Two

### “ONE MAN IS RESPONSIBLE”

#### MANAGING NATIONAL SECURITY DURING WORLD WAR II

THE JAPANESE surprise attack confirmed for all Americans that our procedures for monitoring and managing foreign affairs were fundamentally flawed. Our machinery for intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing had been proven unreliable. So had our arrangements for communication and cooperation between the War Department and the Navy, and between the armed services and the civilian leadership in Washington. But Pearl Harbor also united the nation as never before. An editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune* one day after the attack noted: “The air is clearer. Americans can get down to their task with old controversies forgotten.”<sup>1</sup>

Within fairly broad limits, the American public, the media, and even Congress were inclined to grant the president a “vacation from politics” after Pearl Harbor.<sup>2</sup> Roosevelt responded to this opportunity in different ways at home and abroad. On the domestic front, the president behaved as the nation’s chief politician in his handling of issues that affected the daily lives of the civilian population or engaged influential constituencies. He carefully calibrated the burdens that he imposed upon Americans, and the American economy. By the War Production Board’s own assessment, the public was “subjected to inconvenience, rather than sacrifice” during the war.<sup>3</sup> At the same time that the United States was developing into the “arsenal of democracy,” Roosevelt saw to it that public consumption continued to increase. Wartime labor strikes were permitted, costing the nation 13.5 million worker-days in 1943 alone.<sup>4</sup> Exemptions from military service were granted for individuals engaged in a wide range of activities, including agriculture, civil service, and various wartime industries. Perhaps most important, Roosevelt behaved in accordance with Henry Stimson’s advice: “If you are going to try to go to war or prepare for war in a capitalist country, you’ve got to let business make money out of the process or business won’t work.”<sup>5</sup>

In some cases, the president was personally responsible for the decision not to push harder and faster at home. In other cases, Roosevelt expressed a desire for a greater national effort, but he was not willing to invest the political capital required to make it happen. It seems fair to conclude that the president could have been much more ambitious in his demands upon a willing and patriotic public during the war. By moderating his demands, however, Roosevelt was able to keep all of the major domestic constituencies committed to the war effort, while laying the foundation for a dynamic postwar economy.

By comparison to his role as chief administrator of the wartime economy, Roosevelt acted much more assertively and decisively as commander in chief of the armed forces. He was still careful about the timing of his initiatives, and sensitive to the interests and concerns of America's wartime allies, his military advisers, and the US public, but he did not let these considerations shape his priorities. Roosevelt's bifurcated approach to wartime leadership made sense both politically and constitutionally. And for the most part, Congress, the media, and the American public understood the logic of this approach.

## MOBILIZATION

Roosevelt's concerns about not pushing too hard or too fast at home were tested by the issue of wartime mobilization. The president had rejected proposals in 1936, 1939, and 1941 for the creation of a powerful mobilization agency under the authority of a single individual once war was declared. He had done so for four reasons: First, he was reluctant to give up that much power to one person. The obvious candidate for the role of mobilization czar was Bernard Baruch, who was still the most influential individual in national debates about industrial mobilization. As an outspoken internationalist, Baruch was a natural ally of Roosevelt's, but he was also too powerful in his own right to be attractive to Roosevelt as the leader of a national mobilization effort. Second, Roosevelt was concerned about the demands that a mobilization czar might make on various constituencies that had supported him since 1933. With his ties to Wall Street and to corporate America, Baruch was particularly threatening to the representatives of labor and small business who feared that they would be the big losers in any ambitious mobilization campaign. Many of these individuals still held positions of influence within the Roosevelt administration. They also held considerable power in Congress, as illustrated by the so-called Monopoly Hearings of 1938–39, which had investigated the damaging effects of economic concentration on small-business competitiveness and inno-

vation. Third, the president claimed that there were constitutional barriers to the creation of a “ ‘Czar’ or ‘Poobah’ or ‘Akhoond of Swats’ ” with responsibility for all aspects of mobilization.<sup>6</sup> At a press conference on December 20, 1940, Roosevelt asserted:

You cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is responsible. Now, that man can delegate, surely, but in the delegation he does not delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate responsibility that rests on him.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, Roosevelt claimed that the mobilization effort was simply too big and complex to be managed by a single individual, asserting that “the amateurs who talk about sole responsibility in one man, prove their ignorance. Nobody ever found that paragon yet.”<sup>8</sup>

Having rejected the creation of a mobilization czar, it was difficult for Roosevelt to avoid the problems of confusion and competition that had surfaced during World War I. Between 1941 and 1943, Roosevelt created a hodgepodge of agencies with overlapping responsibilities and unclear mandates relating to wartime mobilization. A flow chart of all the agencies engaged in mobilization during this period would look like a map of Washington, DC, in which a logical grid of letter and number streets is confounded by major roads that slash diagonally across the city, changing direction from time to time and colliding at traffic circles, while at the same time making accommodations for anomalies like 13 1/2 Street. The fact that this arrangement suited Roosevelt’s personality and allowed him to avoid some major political and bureaucratic confrontations has to be weighed against the costs incurred. Avoiding the battles at the top merely diffused the conflict throughout the system once the war began, leaving it to Roosevelt’s subordinates to sort things out as best they could.

The most influential interest group was, of course, the armed forces themselves. The military’s concern about civilian control of the wartime economy had its roots in a 150-year tradition of independence in wartime procurement decisions. The desire to preserve this tradition was reinforced by the military’s experiences during the fifty years prior to World War II. During the Spanish-American War, American forces had been sent overseas with inadequate arms and almost no medical support. Many years later, Dean Acheson reflected on his conversations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull about the latter’s military experiences during that conflict, noting that “it put quite a strain on Cordell Hull’s Tennessee vocabulary to give his opinion of those who had provided for the care of the Army.”<sup>9</sup>

The First World War gave the armed forces many more reasons to be suspicious of civilian management of the war effort. The fact that the nation was militarily unprepared to enter the war, and the government's subsequent mismanagement of wartime mobilization, convinced the War Department to establish its own Industrial College, in order to train a cadre of officers in the fields of procurement, logistics, and industrial management. The military leadership took this action not only to enhance efficiency but also on the grounds that the business community had proven itself to be a fundamentally unreliable partner in the war effort from 1917 to 1919.<sup>10</sup> These convictions informed the arguments for full military control of the wartime economy, as reflected in successive revisions of the Army and Navy Industrial Mobilization Plan during the interwar period.<sup>11</sup>

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Army and Navy did what they could to maintain military preparedness in a political environment of isolationism and anti-militarism. In the years just prior to the Second World War, the armed forces continued to be frustrated in their efforts to acquire greater control over industrial mobilization and resource management. Shortly before the United States entered the war, the Army and Navy leadership attempted to use the Army Navy Munitions Board to enhance their influence over the process of mobilization. Established in 1920 to facilitate military war planning, the ANMB had been a minor actor in Washington until the summer of 1939, when Roosevelt brought it directly under the Executive Office of the President as part of his preparedness campaign. The agency performed numerous prewar functions, including the development of lists of "strategic" materials (deemed necessary for defense but not domestically available in adequate quantity or quality) and "critical" materials (also deemed necessary for defense, but more readily available).<sup>12</sup> As the pace of prewar mobilization began to accelerate, Undersecretary of War Patterson and Undersecretary of the Navy Forrester agreed that the ANMB had the potential to become the lead agency for wartime mobilization. As mentioned in Chapter 1, they called upon Ferdinand Eberstadt to develop a comprehensive plan designed to establish the ANMB in this role. Unfortunately for Eberstadt, his plan was modeled to some extent on the War Industries Board (WIB), which had provided Bernard Baruch with an influential platform for economic management during World War I. Roosevelt saw the proposal as a threat to his personal authority, and to the authority of existing agencies responsible for portions of the mobilization effort. Although Eberstadt had made it clear that the ANMB must have a civilian director, his plan was also attacked as an attempt to give the military control over the nation's industries.

Roosevelt responded to the Eberstadt Report, as he had in so many other instances, by encouraging his subordinates to fight it out among themselves. He allocated a small slice of the administrative pie to the ANMB, but then bolstered the authority of other agencies and created new competing institutions to oversee the wartime economy. Eberstadt became the director of the significantly constrained ANMB, but then decided to accept Donald Nelson's invitation to become his vice chairman in the War Production Board (WPB). He survived in this position for a few months before being fired—a casualty of the power struggles that Roosevelt had made inevitable by his administrative decisions. As the war progressed, and the president continued to dabble with various combinations of voluntary and compulsory arrangements for mobilization, Eberstadt became more and more strident in his criticisms of Roosevelt's "stupidity," describing him as "an apostle of confusion."<sup>13</sup> His experience with the ANMB study and his subsequent experiences with wartime administration convinced Eberstadt of the need for an overarching system for improved civilian-military cooperation.

The two services responded differently to the challenge of mobilization. While General Brehon Somervell, with Marshall's support, was the driving force in the Army's campaign of procurement and construction during the war, the locus of power within the Navy remained within the office of the civilian Secretary of the Navy. This was attributable to the personal initiative of Forrestal, who had been appointed Undersecretary of the Navy in August 1940. At the time of the appointment, the responsibilities of the newly created post of Undersecretary were unclear. Forrestal made the most of the opportunities that this situation provided, moving quickly to establish his office as the central clearinghouse for Navy contracts. He created the Office of Procurement and Management (OP&M) within his office, to standardize Navy procurement procedures and to coordinate naval contracting activities with representatives of the Army and the civilian mobilization agencies. He also bolstered civilian influence over the Navy procurement process by developing a Procurement Legal Division to evaluate both the legal and the business aspects of Navy contracts. This undermined the authority of the Office of Judge Advocate General within the contracting process.<sup>14</sup>

These early initiatives by Forrestal brought him into direct conflict with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Ernest King. The CNO had been concerned about Forrestal's encroachment into traditional areas of military responsibility since shortly after Pearl Harbor, when the Undersecretary requested information from King regarding "broad plans for the prosecution of the war."<sup>15</sup> In this regard, at least,

King's concerns were unwarranted, since Forrestal was content to leave both strategic planning and the operational management of the war effort to the military. On the other hand, Forrestal was convinced that career military officers did not have the expertise or the point of view necessary for high-level negotiations with representatives of the civilian business community, and he was prepared to draw upon the backing of both Knox and Roosevelt to ensure that these responsibilities were administered by his office. By contrast, Forrestal's counterpart in the War Department, Robert Patterson, was content to use his office to monitor and, for the most part, support General Somervell's procurement activities and to serve as a liaison with the civilian business community.

The most intense wartime struggles were between the military and the War Production Board, from the time of its creation in January 1942 until the summer of 1944. In his memoirs, WPB Chairman Donald Nelson asserts that Roosevelt told him that in a democracy, the economy "should be left in charge of civilians," and that he should be prepared to fight the Army over this issue.<sup>16</sup> But the president never gave Nelson the kind of support that would have been necessary to resolve this issue once and for all. The result was a situation of constant competition between representatives of the military and representatives of the WPB. In some cases, open conflict was avoided by leaving controversial issues unresolved, to the detriment of the overall war effort. A particularly egregious example of this problem was the fact that there was no systematic procedure for coordinating military strategy with civilian procurement policies prior to the spring of 1943.

Nor was the military the only institutional challenger of the WPB. According to the Bureau of the Budget's official study of wartime administration:

The Chairman of the War Production Board was . . . battered, abused and cajoled by other agencies of the Government. Instead of being an official of infinite wisdom and endless knowledge surveying the national scene from an Olympian vantage point and assigning our economic strength where it could do the most good . . . he became the much-abused referee of a free-for-all fight among agency heads who knew no rules and were not above loading their gloves with Congressional blocs, pressure groups, and an occasional chit initialed by the President at their urging.<sup>17</sup>

From time to time, Congress intervened to either defend or reprimand the WPB. The Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, called the Truman Committee in honor of its chairman, criticized Nelson for not taking advantage of powers that were available to him to wrest control of the procurement process from

the Army and the Navy. "The War Production Board must exercise its authority in a tough manner. . . . Where necessary heads must be knocked together."<sup>18</sup>

The committee leveled at least as much invective at military representatives. Truman particularly enjoyed roasting General Somervell, whom he described as a man who "cared absolutely nothing about money."<sup>19</sup> John Ohl has defended General Somervell as a man who "accepted civilian control of the economy." He also admits, however, that the general viewed Nelson "as an errand boy, whose primary job was to see that Army requirements were satisfied."<sup>20</sup> In fact, the historical record supports this second picture of Somervell's relationship with civilian authority. The general also resented attempts by Congress to interfere in what he considered to be his personal empire. He was especially critical of Truman's committee, which he claimed had been "formed in iniquity for political purposes."<sup>21</sup>

The struggle between Truman and Somervell came to a head in December 1943, when the latter was called to testify about the so-called Canol project, one of the most extraordinary, and eccentric, undertakings of the Second World War. The project employed nearly 15,000 men for over two years to drill oil wells in a region about seventy miles south of the Arctic Circle and to construct a 550-mile pipeline across Canada to bring the oil to Whitehorse, in the Yukon Territory, to service US airfields in Alaska. The general had approved Canol without consulting key civilian agencies involved in energy or production matters, and without bothering to inquire whether the Navy might be able to transport the oil more cheaply and easily by ship. The committee grilled Somervell and his assistants, and then presented its conclusions on January 8, 1944. The project was described as "undertaken without adequate consideration or study," and Somervell's management of the project was assessed as "inexcusable."<sup>22</sup> The general nonetheless pushed the project to completion in May 1944, only to have the whole undertaking scrapped by the Army nine months later, under increasing pressure from Congress.

Roosevelt finally confronted the issue of centralized management of all aspects of the wartime economy with the creation of the Office of War Mobilization (OWM) on May 27, 1943. The new agency was given the authority "to unify the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials and products, and to resolve and determine controversies."<sup>23</sup> More important than the formal mandate of the OWM, however, was the fact that Roosevelt appointed his close friend and confidant James F. Byrnes to be director. David Kennedy has observed that by appointing

Byrnes, an influential former Congressman and Supreme Court Justice, "Roosevelt openly acknowledged the political dimension of economic mobilization."<sup>24</sup> The media was quick to dub Byrnes the "Assistant President" for mobilization. One authoritative report nonetheless notes that the military "never abandoned the sincere conviction that they could run things better and more expeditiously than could the civilians."<sup>25</sup> And when confrontations occurred, Byrnes sought to avoid the kinds of "head-on collisions" that had so often characterized Nelson's interactions with the armed services.<sup>26</sup>

Pendleton Herring enjoyed a unique vantage point for evaluating Roosevelt's confusing record as a wartime administrator. As chairman of the Bureau of the Budget's Committee of Records of War Administration, which wrote the official history of the Roosevelt administration's management of the war effort, Herring was able to refine his insights about the kinds of institutions that were required to formulate and manage national security policy.<sup>27</sup> His experience with the Budget Committee also helped to convince Herring to fundamentally alter his perspective on the need for a centrally controlled economy in order to achieve national security:

Our reluctance to establish even the semblance of autocratic rule may have been partly responsible for our constant struggle to coordinate or harmonize a mobilization effort made up of many separately operating parts, but problems of coordination do not disappear even in an autocratic administration, and we developed methods that produced effective end results.<sup>28</sup>

Roosevelt and his advisers managed the war effort without making fundamental changes in the structure of the American capitalist system. Based upon his experience with the New Deal, the president understood that there were limits beyond which the executive branch should not attempt to go in the management of the American economy, and that even during wartime, "You've got to let business make money."<sup>29</sup>

Roosevelt could have, and should have, developed a more centralized and orderly system for wartime administration. But criticisms of Roosevelt's role as chief administrator need to be weighed against the hard-to-disagree-with results that were achieved, including, of course, the ultimate defeat of the Axis powers and the establishment of the United States as the indispensable core of the postwar global economy. Furthermore, any judgment of Roosevelt's record must take note of his heroic wartime leadership, and his success at instilling confidence and a sense of common purpose among the American people. Never before or since has the nation been more united. Roosevelt also had to cope with a problem that was identified in the Herring committee's official

history of the wartime administration: "In American public life, even in time of national emergency, the supply of recognized leaders of national stature who are regarded as persons with views transcending their class or group interests seems to be extremely limited."<sup>30</sup> The president was reminded of this fact each time he had to fill a vacancy at the top of one of the wartime agencies.

### TOO MANY CHIEFS: UNITY OF COMMAND DURING WORLD WAR II

Roosevelt's tentative and tactical management of the mobilization effort was in striking contrast to his performance of the duties of commander in chief during World War II. Two years before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt had already made it clear that if war were to come, overall military strategy would be set in the White House. In July 1939, he issued an executive order that brought the Army-Navy Joint Board (established in 1903 to facilitate coordination between the chiefs of the two services) and the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board directly under his authority as commander in chief. This provided the service chiefs with unprecedented access to the president. It also marginalized the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, who were no longer the official intermediaries between the president and the Chiefs of Staff. Samuel Huntington contends that this reform laid the groundwork for a wartime system in which the secretaries "were excluded from matters of grand strategy" and left with only two areas of responsibility:

Within their departments, they directed the administration, housekeeping, and more narrowly civilian matters. Externally, they defended the interests of their services before the President, Congress, and the public.<sup>31</sup>

Huntington's claim is correct, from the point of view of a line-and-box organizational chart. But it fails to account for the importance of personalities and personal contacts in the policy process, as illustrated by the difference between Forrestal and Patterson in their performance of comparable procurement responsibilities. It also fails to account for presidential leadership style, which in the case of Roosevelt tended to confound all efforts at line-and-box management of national security. The president's wartime relationship with the service chiefs nonetheless established a precedent that the military hoped to build upon once the conflict ended.

According to its original mandate, the Army-Navy Joint Board was created to encourage "mutual cooperation" between the services. Lawrence Legere, Jr., has noted, however, that this was "nothing but a ver-

bal rationalization of the independent action which had always characterized Army-Navy relations.<sup>32</sup> Information was shared, and common problems were discussed, but the two services were not under any pressure to speak with one voice. Roosevelt did not help this situation in the period before the war, since he was inclined to interact with each member of the Joint Board separately and leave it to them to reconcile their policies. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, however, it became apparent that a more ambitious and coherent arrangement would be required to assist the president in the formulation of military policies. During the Arcadia Conference (December 22, 1941, to January 14, 1942) between Churchill, Roosevelt, and their respective military advisers, the service chiefs were struck by the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) enjoyed a considerable advantage in negotiations because they frequently presented a common front on issues of strategy. When discussions turned to wartime planning for Anglo-American combined operations, it became clear to both sides that the United States needed to establish a body comparable to the British Chiefs of Staff that would be capable of unified command of all branches of the armed services. The outlines for such a body were quickly worked out among the service chiefs, with the prodding of a British memo on "Post-Arcadia Collaboration," and on February 9, 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) held its first meeting.<sup>33</sup> The Joint Board remained in existence on paper, but was effectively replaced by the JCS at this point. This important change took place without any fanfare, and without any written mandate for the new organization. Indeed, when the secretariat of the Joint Chiefs proposed a charter for the JCS in June 1943, the president rejected it on the grounds that it was unnecessary and that it might unduly restrict the flexibility of the organization.<sup>34</sup>

One significant difference between the Joint Board and the JCS, as originally conceived, was the elevation of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces (AAF), General Henry ("Hap") Arnold, to the effective status of a co-equal with the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations on the JCS. The principal reason for this action was to provide the US team with a counterpart to the Royal Air Force (RAF) representative in meetings of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. But it was also a nod to the reality of the growing power and influence of the air force within the US military. Marshall supported this arrangement, but recognized that it gave the Army two votes to the Navy's one on the JCS, since the AAF was still a branch of the War Department. He attempted to correct the imbalance by the addition of a fourth member to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending to the president that he establish a Chief of Staff position within the JCS. This individual would perform the formal duties of *ex officio*

chairman of the JCS, and also serve as a "neutral agency" to encourage unity among the services. Marshall also hoped that the Chief of Staff would function as a permanent liaison between the Joint Chiefs and the president. The general felt that Admiral William Leahy would be the ideal candidate for the job because he was "impersonal and a man of good judgment," and because "the Navy couldn't resist" a proposal that put one of their own in the new position.<sup>35</sup>

Neither Leahy nor Roosevelt had a clear sense of what Marshall had in mind when he proposed the Chief of Staff position. For his part, Marshall does not seem to have thought through the implications of a plan that would place Leahy within the White House as a personal military adviser to the president—with unprecedented and unspecified responsibilities in the field of foreign policy. Roosevelt resisted the proposal for about four months before acceding to Marshall's wishes and appointing Leahy as "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy" on July 21, 1942. Roosevelt explained at a press conference that Leahy would serve as his "leg man." When asked what kind of staff the new military adviser would have, he stated that he did not have the "foggiest idea."<sup>36</sup> From that point on, Leahy had daily access to the president, attended the major wartime summits, and served as a reliable channel of communication between the White House and the JCS. In his capacity as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he convened meetings, set the agenda, and participated in discussions as a nonvoting member of the JCS. It is nonetheless symbolic of the actual power relationship within the JCS that Marshall quite literally showed Leahy where he should sit when the admiral attended his first meeting.<sup>37</sup>

For the rest of the war, Leahy had surprisingly little personal influence over Roosevelt's wartime decisions. He would be the eyes and ears of the armed services in the meetings between the wartime leaders, but Roosevelt would continue to accord much greater weight to the opinions and advice of Marshall. For his part, Marshall would later express some disappointment that as the war progressed, Leahy became "more the Chief of Staff of the president and less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff," as his time and attention were taken up with personally assisting Roosevelt at the various international conferences.<sup>38</sup> This issue of divided responsibility at the top of the executive branch would come to be a point of dispute in the debates that culminated in the passage of the 1947 National Security Act.

Marshall's interest in the creation of the Chief of Staff position was part of a broader campaign to improve unity of command during the war. There was never any doubt, however, about who made decisions at the very top of the military system during the war. As James Burns

has observed, "Roosevelt not only assumed the role of Commander in Chief, but he embraced it and lived it."<sup>39</sup> Marshall had little reason for complaint about this situation. Roosevelt had a sensible appreciation of his own limitations as a military planner, and was comfortable deferring to his military advisers on operational questions.<sup>40</sup> He reserved his judgment for questions of grand strategy, and on these matters he was prepared to reject the advice of the members of the JCS, and to override their objections.

The most well-known, and the most important, example of the president's willingness to act over the heads of his military advisers was Roosevelt's decision to back the British plan for the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch). The Army and Navy were united in their opposition to this plan primarily because it would divert resources from an invasion of continental Europe. In this case, and in most of the other instances where the president made a decision that ran counter to the preferences of the JCS, Roosevelt was influenced by his desire to maintain close cooperation with his principal wartime ally, Churchill. The British prime minister had been making a strong argument in favor of a North African offensive even before the United States entered the war. The president made his decision shortly after being informed that the British had suffered a serious military defeat in Libya. Rick Atkinson concludes that "the President's decision was plausible, if not precisely wise."<sup>41</sup> Operation Torch did complicate planning for the opening of a second front in France, but it also "broke a dangerous Anglo-American deadlock over strategy . . . and conformed to the military principle of utilizing ready forces at the first opportunity to pass to the offensive."<sup>42</sup> In opting for Torch, the president was functioning not just as commander in chief but also as chief diplomat, a role in which he felt he had both the personal qualifications and the constitutional mandate to act without the advice of the military. It is also worth emphasizing that the cases of conflict between the president and the JCS were the exceptions, in a relationship that was overwhelmingly positive.

Part of the reason why the commander in chief worked well with his service chiefs was that the members of the JCS made an effort to present a common front whenever possible. Inevitably, however, there were limits beyond which the separate services were not willing to go to compromise their interests. One striking example was the Army's effort to defend the principle of "balanced forces" in the initial stages of prewar mobilization. As discussed in Chapter 1, this issue had come up during Marshall's first meeting with Roosevelt in 1938. Over the next three years, Marshall led a rear-guard action to justify the allocation of a substantial portion of the defense budget to the ground forces,

in the face of arguments from a number of sources to the effect that in any future war the outcome would be determined by air and naval power. Walter Lippmann made one such argument in a column about six weeks before Pearl Harbor entitled "The Case for a Smaller Army."<sup>43</sup> Roosevelt heard similar arguments from the British, who saw an expensive American land army as a direct threat to lend-lease, and from supporters of the Navy. Marshall correctly interpreted this as a survival issue for the ground forces, and worried that both the Navy and the recently established Army Air Forces had a distinct advantage in the prewar public debate because they were more "photogenic" than the infantry.<sup>44</sup> To short-circuit this campaign, Marshall requested a personal meeting with the president and received Roosevelt's assurance that he was not thinking along the lines proposed by Lippmann. The Joint Chiefs subsequently agreed to plan for a wartime army of 8,200,000 men, almost exactly the size of the force that was in place by the end of the war.<sup>45</sup>

The AAF was the principal beneficiary of public opinion both before and during the war. As discussed in Chapter 1, a large portion of the elite and mass public had become convinced by the time that war broke out that the airplane would be the most important weapon in the evolving global conflict. In spite of this fact, the established services had succeeded in keeping the air force under the institutional control of the War Department. The Army leadership nonetheless recognized the need to grant the airmen considerable status and independence throughout the war. On various occasions, the AAF benefited from its affiliation with the large and influential War Department, particularly when it found itself in conflict with the Navy over wartime roles and missions. According to Vincent Davis, "the most bitter, harmful, and ominous" dispute during the first years of the war involved whether the AAF or the Navy should be responsible for anti-submarine operations in coastal areas.<sup>46</sup> This conflict reached the point where Marshall, backed by the president, finally had to intervene to force a compromise solution that gave the Navy responsibility for anti-submarine warfare while granting the AAF greater independent control over other types of bombing operations.<sup>47</sup>

The AAF also became embroiled in an intraservice dispute with the Army over the issue of tactical ground support. Not surprisingly, the Army argued that a top priority for the AAF was the contribution that it could make to battlefield support of infantry, tanks, and artillery forces. This ran counter to two AAF priorities: The desire for as much autonomy as possible in the deployment and use of AAF forces, and the preference for strategic bombing and deep-strike missions. The tensions generated by this disagreement persisted throughout the first

two years of the war. According to Kent Greenfield, the dispute was ultimately resolved not by dramatic intervention at the top, but by gradual adjustment to operational necessities by representatives of both the land forces and the AAF "in the field."<sup>48</sup>

Marshall understood that, to a certain extent, turf battles between the military services were unavoidable during war. He nonetheless hoped that they could be ameliorated by early agreement between the Army and the Navy on the principle of unified command within each theater of operations. He also recognized that the same principle should be applied to US military cooperation with America's wartime allies. Marshall raised these issues on the third day of the Arcadia Conference, arguing: "I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater—air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. . . . If we make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles."<sup>49</sup> He chose the Southwest Pacific theatre as his test case, and sweetened the deal for the British by proposing that one of their own, General Sir Archibald Wavell, be appointed to the post of commander. It was nonetheless still difficult to convince Churchill of the logic of unified command, since the prime minister suspected that a British general would have difficulty giving orders to naval officers, and members of the Royal Navy would have trouble taking them. Marshall heard the same arguments from representatives of the US Navy when he proposed the plan. He nonetheless continued to press his case. In the end, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to Marshall's proposal for unified command of the Southwest Pacific, and accepted the principle as a guide for planning in other wartime theaters.

Wavell's command unraveled about one month after the Arcadia Conference, in the face of Japan's relentless sweep across the Pacific. From that point on, the combined Chiefs of Staff struggled unsuccessfully for the rest of the war to reconstruct a unified command in the Pacific. Most of the problems occurred not at the level of Anglo-American relations, however, but within the JCS. According to the official history of the Joint Chiefs:

The desirability of single direction of operations against Japan in the Pacific is so obvious that it must be assumed that the U.S. Chiefs did not agree on how such an arrangement could be set up. The obvious choice for the position, obvious because of his popularity, was General MacArthur, to whose direction the Navy would never have given the fleet. Apparently there was no naval commander acceptable as senior to General MacArthur, and so the solution was to establish two commands under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>50</sup>

This study goes on to credit the Joint Staff of the JCS for its efforts to resolve disputes between the services in the wartime management of the Pacific campaign, but concludes that "the division of the Pacific Theater into two major commands complicated the problems of war and undoubtedly reduced the efficiency with which the war was fought."<sup>51</sup>

## CIVILIAN-MILITARY SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

The Joint Chiefs also exhibited less-than-perfect cooperation in the development of new technologies for warfare. In this regard, problems of interservice communication and cooperation were compounded by the need to work with the civilian scientific community. By the time the war began, the National Defense Research Committee had been replaced by the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) as the lead agency for wartime research and development, and Vannevar Bush had been moved into the position of director of the new organization. Military representatives were concerned that the well-funded civilian researchers would use the new agency to dominate their counterparts in the armed forces and undermine the services' independent research programs. Rear Admiral Harold Bowen made this point to Navy Secretary Frank Knox in early 1941: "Every day it becomes more apparent that the [civilian agencies] will eventually supplant instead of supplement the research activities of the Army and Navy."<sup>52</sup> However, once Roosevelt had made it clear to the service secretaries that Bush had his strong personal backing and that he considered the civilian researchers to be an indispensable resource for the armed services, both the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Navy worked out arrangements for collaboration with the OSRD.

Cooperation was sometimes made more complicated by personalities. On the civilian side, Bush was impatient and instinctively disdainful of military procedures and traditions. On the military side, Admiral King was especially resentful and suspicious of interfering civilians. Both sides benefited, however, from the mediation of men like Harvey Bundy (who represented the War Department in the OSRD's Advisory Council), Rear Admiral Julius Furer (Coordinator of Research and Development for the Navy), and James Conant (Bush's deputy at OSRD).<sup>53</sup> Bush and his colleagues also benefited significantly from the direct support that they received from Secretary of War Stimson, who took it upon himself to serve as the principal sponsor of the civilian scientific community within the military community.

One important test of the ability of the Army and the Navy to work with members of the civilian scientific community was the development of procedures for the production and testing of new weapons. In fact, the overall record of wartime scientific cooperation demonstrates that the greatest barriers to communication were to be found between the services themselves, and even within the same service, rather than between the services and the civilian community. Interservice tensions were most likely to surface when the two services were engaged in the same research but were at different stages of progress. Irvin Stewart, who served as the NDRC's executive secretary during the war, subsequently observed:

Faced with a common problem, each service worked out its own solution, and in some cases declined to apprise the other of that solution. The most probable reason for the refusal to exchange information in certain fields was the feeling on the part of the more advanced Service that the less advanced would not keep its secrets.<sup>54</sup>

James Phinney Baxter III, the OSRD's official historian, has noted that the military were more cooperative with, and appreciative of, the civilian scientists in the development of completely new weapons technologies where their own laboratories and research facilities were not involved. This point is borne out by the record of the Manhattan Project, which Secretary Stimson described as "the greatest achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military in history."<sup>55</sup> One reason for this success was that the civilian scientists only had to work with the Army, the branch of the military with which they had developed the closest relations. G. P. Zachary contends that "the decision to exclude the Navy from the Manhattan Project was Bush's alone," and was influenced by Bush's resentment of the interference and resistance he had experienced from the Navy leadership. He also notes that Bush's decision was "curious" because the Navy was "more technically savvy than the Army" and was already studying the potential of nuclear power for propulsion purposes.<sup>56</sup> Whatever expertise the project lost by cutting the Navy out was probably more than compensated for by the reduction in confusion and the elimination of bureaucratic barriers that would have been created if both services had been actively involved in the project.

Another key to successful cooperation was mutual recognition in the first stages of the project of what both sides were, and were not, capable of doing. Thus the War Department accepted the need to defer to the civilian scientists in the initial stages of experimentation and design, and did not oppose Bush's request to Roosevelt in May 1940 that

his agency be given the authority and the budget required to manage all aspects of research relating to the atomic bomb.<sup>57</sup> Conversely, the civilians recognized that, once the project moved into the development stage, they would have to rely upon the Army to run things. Such a vast engineering feat as the Manhattan Project, which was to cost \$2 billion and employ 125,000 workers by the time it was finished, could only be managed as a major military campaign. In spite of the Army's extraordinary success in this undertaking, public criticism of its role in the development of the atomic bomb resulted in the postwar establishment of a civilian agency, the US Atomic Energy Commission, to manage the development of nuclear power.<sup>58</sup> As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission proved to be an important step in a process that led to the dismantlement of the wartime system for coordination of the civilian and military scientific communities in the service of national security.

The successful cooperation of the War Department and the OSRD on the Manhattan Project was largely attributable to the two communities' ability to agree upon a division of labor that played to each side's strengths and respected their distinct values and traditions. Conversely, some of the points of greatest tension in this history occurred in the gray area between these two realms of responsibility, most notably when Bush discovered that the military's head of the development project, Colonel Leslie Groves, was having him watched as a routine security precaution.<sup>59</sup>

#### OSS: WARTIME INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, COVERT OPERATIONS, AND THE ISSUE OF CENTRAL COORDINATION

The problems of cooperation were much more serious and debilitating in the fields of intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, and covert operations, precisely because the gray area between the military services and the civilian agency that Roosevelt had created to centralize American intelligence activities was much larger and more fluid. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Army and the Navy had registered their strong opposition to the idea of a centralized intelligence service even before it was established. Roosevelt nonetheless went forward with the creation of the Office of Coordinator of Information on July 11, 1941. In light of the fact that the armed services were hostile to the new agency, Roosevelt placed it within the Executive Office of the President. The Executive Order that established the COI stipulated:

The several departments and agencies of the government shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all and any such information and data relating to national security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.<sup>60</sup>

William Donovan, who was appointed as the head of the new agency, soon found himself frustrated, however, by the resistance and suspicion of the established agencies that had a bureaucratic stake in intelligence gathering and analysis. In his *History of the Military Intelligence Division*, Colonel Bruce Bidwell provides a very different interpretation of Donovan's mandate, and an introduction to the kinds of argument that would surface after the war:

Although the Coordinator of Information had been specifically cautioned not in any way to "interfere with or impair the duties of the regular military and naval advisers of the President," he lost no time in seeking to assume an authoritative control over all American overseas intelligence activities. In this eager endeavor he was strongly championed by a politically influential group of supporters, who not only favored the establishment of a single central intelligence agency for the United States government but also displayed a grave ignorance of the deep complexities of the subject by naively asserting that now "there would be one intelligence organization rather than eight."<sup>61</sup>

Representatives of the FBI were especially sensitive to every hint that the new agency was attempting to gain a foothold in Latin America.<sup>62</sup> J. Edgar Hoover had succeeded in staking a claim to all intelligence and counterespionage activities in this region in June 1940, in spite of the fact that his organization's original mandate was limited to domestic police and intelligence functions. He accomplished this by leveraging the growing concern in Washington about rumors of a large and influential Nazi spy network in Latin America, and by exploiting his agency's popularity as a result of its crime-fighting record.<sup>63</sup> The fact that the FBI scored several successes in Latin America during the war should not divert attention from the anomalous nature of this arrangement, or from the problems that it caused for the global management of wartime intelligence activities. The FBI was quick to take action at the first sign that the COI was attempting to gain a foothold in this region.<sup>64</sup>

Roosevelt ameliorated, but did not resolve, Donovan's bureaucratic problems in June 1942 by giving his organization a new name and a clearer institutional relationship to the military. Executive Order 9182 created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the direct authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Roosevelt nonetheless chose to leave the

new agency with a vaguely worded mandate: "To collect and analyze strategic information and to plan and operate special services."<sup>65</sup>

Over the next three years, Donovan had to fight three kinds of bureaucratic battles in order to protect and advance the interests of his agency. First, he had to carve out roles and missions for the OSS. Second, he had to convince military commanders to support OSS operations in the different geographic theaters. Third, he had to make arrangements for cooperation, or at least coexistence, with Allied intelligence services and their governments.

Some of the most intense battles over roles and missions took place in the first few months of the agency's existence. Donovan had made it clear from the outset that he viewed the OSS as an "adjunct to military strategy," an interpretation of the agency's general responsibility that was consistent with its establishment under the direct authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>66</sup> But the specific services that the OSS was to perform for the JCS, and the agency's relationship with the established military intelligence services like the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID), were unclear. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that the organizations involved in discussions about the OSS's future could not agree on the need for, or even on the meaning of, such key concepts as psychological warfare and propaganda. Thus Donovan found himself fighting for turf that was in constant motion.

In a situation in which the established military intelligence agencies had concerns about both the logic and the propriety of a civilian intelligence service within the military establishment, they tended to favor the use of weak coordinating committees, such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC), in order to monitor OSS activities and, if necessary, block its access to the JCS. This situation became more difficult for Donovan in August 1942, when the JPWC was formally designated as the intermediary between the JCS and the OSS in the chain of command. This move played into the hands of opponents of the OSS, most notably Major General George Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence, who used the JPWC to isolate and marginalize the fledgling agency. Donovan was made even more vulnerable by the fact that the OSS still did not have specific guidelines from the JCS about the activities that it was authorized to perform. By November it was clear that either the OSS or the JPWC would have to be scrapped, and that whichever survived would need to be given real authority and support. In fact, the odds were in favor of the JPWC, since it prepared the report to the JCS that called for a decision. The report cited a majority preference for preserving the JPWC and eliminating the OSS.

Two factors appear to have intervened at this point to tip the scales in favor of Donovan. First, by this time the OSS had begun to score some successes in North Africa, one of the theaters where they had been permitted to undertake some espionage activities. The OSS provided military planners with valuable information about harbors and landing facilities, and OSS agents coordinated resistance activities throughout the region, in preparation for the first major Allied amphibious campaign of the war—Operation Torch. The second factor that helped the OSS in its struggle to survive was Donovan's personal contacts in Washington. As the moment of decision approached, the OSS director pressed his friend, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, to intervene with Roosevelt on the agency's behalf. Shortly thereafter, Roosevelt mentioned to General Marshall that "I wish you would give Bill Donovan a little elbow room to operate in."<sup>67</sup>

Faced with growing and conflicting pressures, the JCS sought to resolve the issue by instructing Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney and Vice Admiral Frederick Horne to study the OSS and offer their recommendations regarding its possible roles and missions. As a result of their favorable findings, the JCS finally provided the OSS with a mandate on December 23, 1942 (JCS 155/4/D). The JPWC was abolished, and the OSS was officially designated as the agency responsible for "the planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military program for psychological warfare."<sup>68</sup> Oversight of OSS activities was delegated to a new Planning Group, whose membership was designed to facilitate, rather than frustrate, OSS operations.

Donovan had won an important victory, but he was soon embroiled in another bureaucratic battle. The Office of War Information (OWI), which had opposed Donovan's activities since the founding of the COI in 1941, immediately took issue with the Joint Chiefs' designation of the OSS as the sole agency responsible for psychological warfare, arguing that this undermined the OWI's propaganda mission. Not content to pressure the JCS directly, representatives of OWI also took their case to the media and to supporters in Congress. By February, tensions had reached the point where Secretary of War Stimson felt compelled to press Roosevelt to intervene again, comparing the bureaucratic infighting between the two agencies to "an attempt by a procession of the Ancient and Honorable Order of Hibernians and a procession of Orangemen to pass each other on the same street."<sup>69</sup> The president finally resolved the problem on March 9, 1943, by an executive order that confirmed the OWI's status as the agency responsible for wartime propaganda activities. The JCS duly modified its mandate for the OSS to exclude propaganda. This was a political solution, which made little sense on its own merits. As Kermit Roosevelt notes in his official his-

tory of the OSS: "Propaganda was an integral part of psychological warfare. Without propaganda the military program was not psychological warfare."<sup>70</sup> This was a setback for the OSS, but it was more than compensated for by the fact that from this point on, Donovan was able to get on with the business of building his intelligence organization from a relatively secure position within the military system.

Over the next two years, the OSS grew to approximately 13,000 people, most of whom were based overseas. But the agency was not accorded the same degree of influence, or even access, in all theaters of the war. The JCS accorded the various military theater commanders considerable latitude in their decisions about how to use OSS assets, or whether to use them at all. As a result, both Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific theater and General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific theater resisted efforts by the OSS to operate in their areas of responsibility. In other military theaters, the OSS was not permitted to engage in particular types of espionage activity or was kept out of specific areas. For example, Army intelligence would only permit the OSS to seek information relating to the German nuclear-weapons program in neutral countries where the War Department did not have its own agents in place. The agency also ran into frequent problems with field commanders who were only interested in using OSS agents to deal with immediate tactical problems.

OSS agents in the field also had to establish a *modus vivendi* with Allied governments and their respective intelligence services. The biggest problems, and the biggest rewards, came from the United Kingdom. The British had played an indispensable role in the establishment and early development of the COI. Once the OSS had acquired an independent identity for itself as a large and ambitious intelligence service, however, some representatives of British intelligence exhibited signs of defensiveness and resentment toward their American cousins. At times, this defensiveness took the form of British demands for control over OSS operations. This occurred in India during the spring of 1943, and in the European theater during fall of the same year.<sup>71</sup> In both cases, the Joint Chiefs had to intervene to back up Donovan's demands for independence from British control.

Donovan had even less success in his relations with Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, who was jealous of any intrusion into his area of operations, and (justifiably) resentful of the way in which he had been treated by both Churchill and Roosevelt. Chiang had allowed his intelligence chief, General Tai-li, to develop an exclusive cooperative relationship with the head of Navy Group China, Vice Admiral Milton Miles. In order to gain a foothold in China, Donovan had to agree to subordinate OSS activities to both the Navy Group and Tai-li's secret

service. This proved to be no bargain at all for the OSS, since Tai-li and Miles effectively froze the OSS out of all China operations until the end of 1944, when General Albert Wedemeyer took command of the theater and authorized the agency to engage in the full range of intelligence gathering and guerilla operations in China.<sup>72</sup>

There is considerable disagreement among historians about the overall success that the OSS had in fulfilling its mandate during the Second World War. There is also disagreement over the extent to which the activities of the agency made a difference in the outcome of the war regardless of the success or failure of particular OSS operations. What is beyond dispute, however, is that Donovan did an extraordinary job of protecting and advancing the interests of his agency in the face of persistent bureaucratic resistance. By the end of the war, the OSS employed nearly 16,000 men and women worldwide, and Donovan, who had risen to the rank of Major General, commanded a budget of approximately \$57 million.<sup>73</sup> In spite of (or because of) these measurable indicators of bureaucratic success, both Donovan and the OSS had made many enemies within Washington. Indeed, William Langer, who served as director of the Research and Analysis branch of the OSS, later observed that "perhaps Bill Donovan's greatest single achievement during the war was to survive."<sup>74</sup>

It is a measure of Donovan's success that as the end of the war approached, the president invited him to provide some guidance on the possibilities for a centralized US intelligence service after peace had been achieved. Donovan responded with a memo dated November 18, 1944, in which he made a strong case for a peacetime successor to the OSS. He observed that once the war was won, there would be no further need for the OSS, which was designed to serve military needs under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs. On the other hand, Donovan noted, "once our enemies are defeated, the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace." He recommended, therefore, that a new, permanent peacetime organization be established under the direct authority of the White House, "with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy." In effect, what Donovan was recommending was a return to the model of how the COI was supposed to work. He attached a draft directive to assist the president in designing such an institution and pointed out: "You will note that coordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence [that pertaining primarily to Department action] remains with the existing agencies concerned."<sup>75</sup> Donovan's organization was to have "no police or law-enforcement

functions, either at home or abroad," and it was designed in such a way that it could be placed back under JCS authority in time of war. He concluded his memo with a recommendation that the president "lay the keel of the ship at once" rather than wait until the war was over. "Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transition which, before we are aware, will take us into the tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence system will contribute to informed decisions."<sup>76</sup>

Ironically, Donovan's plans to "lay the keel" for a peacetime intelligence service were crippled by an intelligence failure. Before the president could take action on the proposal, a copy of the November 18 letter and the draft directive were leaked to the media. In an article that appeared in both the *Chicago Tribune* and the *New York Daily News* on February 9, 1945, Walter Trohan reported that Donovan was attempting to establish a postwar "super-spy agency" "which would supersede all existing Federal police and intelligence units, including Army G-2, Navy ONI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Agency, and the Federal Communications Commission."<sup>77</sup> We do not know whether Roosevelt would have acted on Donovan's suggestion in the absence of this news leak, but once the article was published, there was no hope for a quick and positive response from the White House. The president died approximately one month later, and the question of whether the United States needed a peacetime centralized intelligence system was passed on to Harry Truman—a cipher to most Americans, including Donovan.

Several commentators have speculated that representatives of the FBI leaked the story to Trohan, who was a close friend of J. Edgar Hoover. Whether or not this is true, there can be no doubt that Hoover was especially anxious not to let Donovan drive the debate about postwar intelligence gathering and coordination—particularly as it related to the issue of homeland security. As previously mentioned, the FBI had worked out arrangements prior to the start of the war for cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department regarding their respective responsibilities for domestic security. The most important test of this wartime cooperation occurred in the months following Pearl Harbor, as the three agencies sought to develop a policy for dealing with the 320,000 Japanese immigrants and Japanese-Americans living in the United States. According to Godfrey Hodgson:

The tragedy of the Nisei was that their fate depended on a struggle between the Department of Justice, upholding the civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution, and the War Department, upholding the dictates of supposed

military necessity. What was even more sharply their tragedy was that the Justice Department upheld their rights with far less conviction or tenacity than the War Department held their belief that they could not be trusted.<sup>78</sup>

It fell to Secretary of War Stimson to make the case with Roosevelt for internment. In spite of the fact that his office had received no reports of sabotage or espionage activities in the United States by people of Japanese origin, Stimson pressed the president to sign Executive Order 9066, which gave the War Department responsibility for managing the resettlement campaign.

If the FBI was content to leave the issue of Japanese internment to the Army, it was more protective of its turf on other issues relating to domestic security. Questions of industrial security and “counter-fifth column” activities invited constant competition between the military leadership and J. Edgar Hoover. For its part, the US public was broadly supportive of such wartime activities, and most of the demands for more intrusive and restrictive action came not from within the government but from members of the media. Michael Sherry has concluded: “The FBI and military intelligence exercised far broader surveillance than in the previous war, and the courts only belatedly resisted the engines of internal security, but sharp memories of the ugly repression of World War I helped to curb its random release in World War II.”<sup>79</sup>

## THE DOG THAT DID NOT BARK: THE STATE DEPARTMENT DURING WORLD WAR II

In the midst of all the agencies and individuals jockeying for access to Roosevelt during World War II, the Department of State is remarkable for its almost total absence. Many factors contributed to State’s marginalization during the war, but the most important was the historic tendency of US policymakers to approach war and peace as two dichotomous and mutually exclusive phenomena.<sup>80</sup> Reflecting some years later on the reasons for State’s wartime irrelevance, Acheson observed: “*Silent leges inter armes*. Diplomacy, it seems, was here as silent as law.”<sup>81</sup> To the extent possible, the president tried to run US wartime policy out of the White House, and when he could not do it himself, he preferred to rely upon personal emissaries. Roosevelt was also inclined to solicit, and defer to, the advice of his key military advisers, Leahy and the Joint Chiefs, in the formulation of wartime policies, even if they had obvious political elements.

In his memoirs, Hull makes it clear that he deeply resented being marginalized by the White House, noting that

I feel it is a serious mistake for a Secretary of State not to be present at important military meetings. I often had occasion to point out to the President that some developments of a military character, which undoubtedly had been decided at one of these meetings, also had a strong foreign affairs angle of which I should have been informed at the time.<sup>82</sup>

Hull's concerns about being out of touch with developments were confirmed on many occasions, but perhaps never more clearly than by an incident that followed the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in Casablanca in January 1943. Shortly after the conference, the British Undersecretary of the Foreign Office sought the guidance of the State Department on details of the discussions between the Allied leaders over wartime policies toward Turkey. Hull was unable to provide an answer, since his agency had not been represented at the meeting, and Admiral Leahy had refused the secretary's request for a copy of the Casablanca agreement.<sup>83</sup>

State's influence was also circumscribed by two decisions that Roosevelt made in the earliest days of the war. The first decision was a resolution to pursue the goal of unconditional surrender, which meant that there was no need to bring the diplomats into discussions about the modalities for ending the conflict. The second decision was the commitment to close cooperation with America's principal ally, Great Britain. In consideration of this strategic partnership, Roosevelt was prepared to consult with Churchill when formulating plans for both wartime and postwar diplomacy in portions of Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Cordell Hull was also frustrated in his efforts to coordinate his department's activities with the leadership of the armed services, due in large part to the fact that the military tended to share the president's disdain for the State Department. In fact, the Army leadership harbored special resentments against Hull for what they saw as his unwillingness to assist them in a campaign to stall for time before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, while the United States was building up its deterrent and war-fighting capabilities in the Philippines. According to Mark Stoler, "While service and congressional boards of inquiry would place the blame for Pearl Harbor primarily on the local commanders, many officers saw Hull and his associates as the real culprits."<sup>84</sup> Under these circumstances, military leaders were not inclined to help the State Department to find a foothold at the upper levels of the wartime policymaking community.

As the war progressed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became more accustomed to and protective of their privileged position in Washington. As Samuel Huntington has observed:

Each of the committees which conceivably might have evolved into a war council withered on the vine after Pearl Harbor. The civilians ceased to consider grand strategy. Ironic as it was, Roosevelt, who normally skillfully played subordinates off against each other in order to maximize his own authority, allowed one set of advisors to preempt the field with respect to his most important decisions.<sup>85</sup>

At the same time, however, key military leaders such as Marshall also came to recognize that the situation was becoming problematic. First, Marshall and the other members of the Joint Chiefs had been introduced to a very different, and frequently more effective, model of civilian-military cooperation in their routine interactions with their British counterparts. The skill and ease with which British representatives utilized their War Cabinet to reconcile the demands of diplomacy and war-fighting was not lost on thoughtful American policymakers. Second, over time, the marginalization of State had encouraged Roosevelt's instinct for summitry over strategy, with the result that both State *and* the JCS were often left in the dark about the president's plans. The problem was mitigated to some extent by the presence of Leahy within the White House, but the military leadership nonetheless felt sufficiently frustrated about the flow of information that they established their own personal and unofficial communications system with their counterparts on the British Chiefs of Staff, who provided them with copies of Roosevelt's communications with Churchill. Ray Cline notes that, over time, the Operations Division (OPD) within the General Staff of the War Department built up an extensive file of such back-channel information. OPD officials treated these materials as top-security items, in part because they "realized that they had moved into fields of national policy in which their presence might be criticized, however much they needed to be there in the interests of doing their own work well."<sup>86</sup>

Gaps in communication became particularly problematic for both the military and the Foreign Service during the last two years of the war, as issues of postwar occupation and demilitarization became more important. For the most part, military leaders approached these issues with the same attitude as the OPD officials—taking what actions they felt were required to get the job done without losing sight of the fact that they were straying into areas that were beyond their competence or perhaps beyond their constitutional authority. Some theater commanders were less concerned about the distinction between the civil and military realms, of course, and took advantage of the changing situation to establish their personal identities as political leaders. MacArthur certainly interpreted the latter stages of the war in the Pa-

cific from this point of view. But it is worth emphasizing that such actions were often encouraged by key Republicans in Congress, who were anxious to help military leaders like MacArthur to build their resumes in preparation for postwar politics.<sup>87</sup>

As the end of the war approached, key military leaders came to agree with the conclusion of a June 1943 memo by the Strategy Section of OPD: "It is becoming increasingly evident that State Department advice and assistance during the planning period is not only desirable but necessary."<sup>88</sup> Ambitious individuals in the Foreign Service such as Sumner Welles were anxious to take advantage of the opportunities that the changing situation presented, but as long as Hull was in charge, there were strict limits to what could be accomplished. And even after Hull stepped down as Secretary of State in the fall of 1944, his successor, Edward Stettinius, concentrated most of his department's attention and time on the postwar United Nations organization.

Some improvements in political-military cooperation were nonetheless made under Stettinius's leadership. As the problems associated with the end of the war became more immediate, military staffers associated with the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Joint Chiefs all began to make recommendations for institutional arrangements designed to enhance cooperation with their counterparts in the State Department. Many of these proposals made specific reference to the British War Cabinet as a model for the United States to emulate. Guided by these proposals, Secretary Stimson took the lead in pressing Stettinius and Knox to establish a new State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) at the level of assistant secretaries of the three departments. It is worth pointing out that at least part of the reason for Stimson's interest in the SWNCC was his concern about a growing pattern of unofficial consultations between representatives of the State Department and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the expense of the service secretaries.<sup>89</sup> The JCS, which still had no legislative mandate to exist, had no formal representation on the new committee.<sup>90</sup> But documents produced by the SWNCC relating to military matters were routinely shared with the Joint Chiefs.

Alan Ciamporzero has noted that both Stimson and Forrestal accepted Stettinius's interpretation of the SWNCC's mandate—"formulating recommendations to the Secretary of State on questions having both military and political aspects." As the committee became more influential, however, it also became more of a problem for State. The State Department representative to the committee was frequently outvoted by the spokesmen for the two military services on issues relating to postwar occupation and strategy. Ciamporzero concludes, "As its influence increased, SWNCC skewed American policy toward military

solutions to political problems." He goes on to argue that scholars have underestimated the SWNCC's importance not only as a factor in the formulation of US containment policy but also as a model for the National Security Council.<sup>91</sup>

Army and Navy participation in a wide range of policy discussions, both inside and outside of SWNCC, was symptomatic of the most important change that had taken place by the latter stages of the Second World War—the politicization of the image, and self-image, of the armed services. According to Samuel Huntington:

American civil-military relations in World War II paralleled in some respects those of Germany in World War I. . . . When war came, the American military did not reach out after power—Marshall was no Ludendorff. Instead, power was unavoidably thrust upon them.<sup>92</sup>

As the end of the war approached, and strictly military issues were increasingly displaced by diplomatic political issues relating to the modalities of US demobilization and overseas occupation, the military did not prepare to return to the barracks. The habit of influence had already become too strong, and as one leading Army officer observed, "The time has come when, whether we like it or not, the War Department must face the fact that it has a real interest in political matters of varying categories."<sup>93</sup>

Both the War Department and the Navy Department recognized that they would have to develop the expertise and skills required to succeed in this realm. One particularly important innovation was the establishment of the Strategic Policy Section within OPD, under the direction of Brigadier General George Lincoln. The explicit mandate of the new unit was to develop plans for issues that had both political and military elements. The activities of groups like Lincoln's made the term "pol-mil" a familiar part of the military lexicon, and being able to at least understand the political aspects of military issues soon became a prerequisite for career progression within the leadership of the armed forces.

By the time the war ended, not only were the American people ready to give the military an influential role in the formulation of peacetime foreign policy, but the military was ready to accept it.

## CONCLUSION

The lessons that the American people took away from World War II regarding the institutional prerequisites for national security were in striking contrast to the lessons that they learned regarding the planning and administration of the domestic economy. After 1945,

there was nearly unanimous support for Pendleton Herring's prewar argument that the American system of defense planning and political-military consultation had to be replaced by a much more centralized and proactive arrangement. In this regard, the war experience reinforced the lesson that had already been learned by the American people at Pearl Harbor—the United States had been vulnerable to attack because it had not developed adequate procedures and institutions for permanently monitoring, evaluating, and defending against threats from abroad.

On the other hand, the war experience overturned an almost universally held prewar belief that centrally controlled economies enjoyed enormous administrative, technological, and military advantages over liberal democracies. The ultimate success of Roosevelt's patchwork administration of the domestic economy made it difficult to argue after 1945 that America needed a more authoritarian and intrusive approach to economic management. Alan Brinkley notes:

Far from legitimizing an increased government role in the managing of investment and production, as some had hoped, the wartime mobilization added strength to the already growing inclination among many liberals to find a role for government that would allow it to manage the economy without managing the institutions of the economy.<sup>94</sup>

Roosevelt's multidirectional experimentation with mobilization had the effect of undermining the case of those big planners who had hoped to use the wartime experience to transform the role of the state in the postwar economy. On the contrary, as Melvyn Leffler has observed, "The war resurrected faith in the capacity of the capitalist system to serve the welfare of the American people."<sup>95</sup>

The war also demonstrated very clearly that administrative changes are never as important as personnel decisions in determining the efficiency of a bureaucracy. Wartime Washington provides historians with such an extraordinarily rich cast of strong and weak characters that one is tempted to play the "What if . . ." game. Would wartime strategy have evolved in different directions if Marshall had taken Stimson's advice and put his own name forward, rather than Leahy's, for the position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief? It is hard to imagine Roosevelt asking Marshall to serve as his "leg man," and harder still to imagine the general accepting such a role. Or consider, perhaps, how the role of the State Department might have developed if Hull had gone ahead with his plans to resign in the first days of the war. This might have cleared the way for Sumner Welles—whom Acheson described as having an "incisive mind and decisive nature"—to move into the top spot at State.<sup>96</sup> Would such a man, who was both

respected and trusted by Roosevelt, have allowed insiders like Harry Hopkins to dismiss Foreign Service Officers as “cookie pushers, pansies,” and block State’s access to the major wartime conferences?<sup>97</sup> Finally, would wartime mobilization have looked very different if the president had given in to pressure from a number of sources and appointed a “poobah” like Baruch or a trusted insider like Byrnes to the position of chairman of the War Production Board in January 1942?<sup>98</sup>

In each of the above-mentioned cases, it can be argued that the individual never fulfilled the potential of the office. But it is also well to remember that in each of these cases, the situation was created and perpetuated by Roosevelt himself. Harry Truman, whose Congressional committee criticized Donald Nelson in 1943 for his lack of initiative as head of the WPB, summarized the situation in a statement on the floor of the Senate two years earlier, when he admitted that “the chief bottleneck” in the procurement system was in the White House.<sup>99</sup> But was it reasonable to expect more under such chaotic circumstances? A similar problem of expectations would plague Truman, Marshall, Forrestal, and the other participants in the debates about the creation of a new system for national security policymaking. The shared experience of Pearl Harbor helped to concentrate their minds regarding the need to get it right, but it also helped to establish an impossibly high standard for efficiency. Just how high the bar needed to be set was hinted at by Representative Hamilton Fish in response to a comment during the Pearl Harbor hearings by General Walter Short (who had served as commander of the Army’s Hawaiian Department during the attack). Short had testified on his efforts prior to the attack to maintain the quality of his forces by an extensive program of training. This led Fish to observe that “we were in a state of preparedness instead of a state of alertness.”<sup>100</sup> Presumably, an alert defense establishment would not have permitted this to happen. It would have focused its attention on the right warning signs, analyzed them correctly, and taken the appropriate counteractions. It was that simple—and that unrealistic.

## *Chapter Three*

### **MARSHALL'S PLAN**

#### *THE BATTLE OVER POSTWAR UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES*

**P**EARL HARBOR and World War II created a consensus among most US policymakers on the need for fundamental changes in the way that America managed its national security. But at war's end, key questions about the shape and content of such a system were unanswered. This was due in part to the fact that the war had ended more abruptly than most people expected. In his memoirs, Secretary Stimson notes that at the time that the first nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima (August 6, 1945), US war plans assumed that "major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946 at the earliest."<sup>1</sup> Planning for the postwar order did take place throughout the war, of course, but it served primarily to identify fundamental points of dispute between the lead agencies in the foreign and defense communities. All parties agreed that such disputes could not be permitted to undermine the common goal of winning the war, and so they were willing to defer. This made perfect sense at the time. Once the emergency was over, however, there was no longer an overriding need for cooperation among these agencies. Furthermore, Congress, which had accepted significant restraints on its actions during the war, was anxious to reassert its influence over issues relating to postwar national security policy and federal spending. And a president who had excelled (and reveled) in the uses of power had been replaced by a self-described "average man."

Two clusters of related issues came to dominate wartime and postwar discussions about the new national security bureaucracy. The first cluster of issues involved proposals for the unification of the armed services. This was by far the most important topic for US defense planners, as well as the topic that was accorded the greatest attention by Congress, the president, and the media. The second cluster of issues dealt with proposals for reform of the executive branch to improve political-military consultation, institutionalize intelligence gathering and analysis, enhance presidential management of resources affecting national security, and establish a more efficient system for presidential

advisement and national security planning. Pendleton Herring was one of those participants in the postwar debates who believed that this cluster of issues was more important for America's future than the issue of armed forces unification.<sup>2</sup> Yet the arguments over comprehensive reform of the executive branch were almost completely eclipsed by the very public battle over military transformation. As a result, the issue of comprehensive institutional reform has never been properly integrated into the history of the early Cold War period. This chapter will discuss the intense political struggle over the issue of armed forces unification. Chapters 4 and 5 will survey the debates that culminated in the creation of such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board.

### ARMY-NAVY RELATIONS BEFORE WORLD WAR II: SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

During the century and a half prior to World War II, the Army and the Navy evolved as two distinct institutions, with different war plans and differently trained forces committed to different traditions. The logical basis for this separation was what came to be known as the *elemental distinction* between land and water. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur made a typical argument in 1932, in a strongly worded letter to Congress in opposition to proposed legislation designed to unite the two services:

Fighting on the sea and fighting on the land have no elements in common, except in so far as they are both engaged in the ultimate mission of victory. Separate commands, specialized staffs, particularized training, and individual supply arrangements must remain as essentials for each.<sup>3</sup>

By the time that MacArthur made this argument, however, the distinction had begun to break down in the face of technological progress.

The airplane was the most important source of change, since it provided both services with the opportunity to carry their war deep into the traditional domain of the other service. This assumed, of course, that the two services would be able to retain control over air power. Shortly after the end of the First World War, individuals like Billy Mitchell had begun to use the elemental argument—that air was a different medium—to press their case for an independent service. By the mid-1930s, counterarguments by the two established services were becoming increasingly strained, as illustrated by the claims of a special report of the War Department in 1934, which rejected the call for a sep-

arate air force on the grounds that airplanes only operated in the air "for a few hours at a time" and that they were still dependent upon bases that had to be defended by ground forces.<sup>4</sup> The fact that the Army and the Navy were able to retain control over the airmen throughout this period had more to do with their institutional clout than with the force of their reasoning.

Improvements in communication and transportation were also beginning to have an effect on service autonomy, by making it easier for the political leadership in Washington to monitor and manage the military's activities during both war and peace. This development was consistent with the American tradition of civilian control of the military. But some defense experts questioned whether it made strategic sense in an age when warfare was becoming vastly more complex and destructive. Samuel Huntington illustrates the military's point of view with a quote from a 1936 publication of the Army's Command and General Staff School:

Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics ends. The line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply and operations. Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing.<sup>5</sup>

Huntington concludes that military officers during the interwar period worried that "the desire to save money and to win quick victories were constant temptations" for elected politicians.<sup>6</sup>

In fact, prior to World War II, efforts by Congress to create a single Department of National Defense were motivated almost entirely by the desire to reduce a peacetime defense budget that was already dangerously low. Unification was viewed by many people in Washington as an easy way to eliminate duplication and save the taxpayer money. Hearings during the 1930s did raise some interesting questions about redundancy in weapons procurement, but most of the discussions were vague and unfocused, and orchestrated to play to a general public mood of anti-militarism and isolationism. Congressman Joseph Byrns, who authored a unification bill in 1932, estimated during hearings on this issue that merging the Army and the Navy into a single Department of National Defense would save the government over \$100 million per year. When Byrns was asked if he "had any definite tangible places in mind where you are going to save even 10 per cent of the amount you speak of?" the Congressman responded that he could not provide specifics but that the savings were a matter of "common sense."<sup>7</sup> The true purpose of the legislation is illustrated by two proposals that were floated during the hearings, one requiring disabled veterans to undergo periodic reexaminations to confirm their

continuing eligibility for benefits, and the other raising the retirement age (then 64) for Army and Navy officers.<sup>8</sup>

Not surprisingly, Army and Navy spokesmen were united in their opposition to all Congressional proposals for armed forces unification. During the House Committee on Expenditures hearings of 1932, Secretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams testified that neither the experience of other governments nor the experience of corporate America supported the claim that savings would be made by merging the armed forces. He also worried about the implications of unification for American democracy: "You are creating one agency which, if you do not have just the right man at the head—and sometimes you may not—will create a great political machine. Think of the power that that one man has."<sup>9</sup> General MacArthur also questioned the presumption of savings, but focused most of his comments on the damage that unification would do to military efficiency, concluding, "I give it as my fixed opinion that such an amalgamation as proposed would endanger victory for the United States in case of war. . . . Pass this bill and every potential enemy of the United States will rejoice."<sup>10</sup>

In the face of such concerted opposition, the 1932 unification hearings went nowhere. The experience nonetheless reinforced the doubts that were held by many military leaders at the time about the extent to which civilians could be trusted to determine policies that affected national defense. Two years later, the War Department sought to discourage any future proposals for unification in the conclusion to the aforementioned study of the Army Air Corps:

Since the reorganization of the Joint Board, in 1919, effort, generally successful, has been made to consider every possible operation in which joint action would be required and to establish the basic principles under which unity of command would be established. By this it is expected that controversies between the commanders ashore and those afloat, such as have occurred in past wars, may be avoided. . . . Studies leading up to these decisions have brought out so strongly the wide divergence in requirements of the Army and Navy as to equipment, training, organization, and doctrines as to lead the War and Navy Department to oppose every proposal to unite them into a single department.<sup>11</sup>

The shock of Pearl Harbor led many thoughtful representatives of both services to reconsider this position. As Congressional investigations into the attack would later confirm, habits of conditional cooperation and selective information-sharing between the Army and Navy leadership in Hawaii actually undermined the ability of both services to take necessary precautions. These same habits characterized relations between the two services within the aforementioned Joint Board. Shortly

after the attack, key military leaders began to argue that radical reform of the defense establishment was required in order to avoid similar misunderstandings and disagreements between the service chiefs. George Marshall, who was himself later to be tarred by the catastrophe of Pearl Harbor, took the lead in pressing for change on several levels.

The unification debate that took place during and after World War II is sometimes presented as a struggle between a forward-looking War Department and a reactionary and hidebound Navy. It is better understood, however, as a battle between two distinct conceptions of unity of command. Representatives of the War Department were inclined to favor a comprehensive form of unity that would have placed all military services under a central authority beneath the commander in chief. By contrast, Navy spokesmen associated efficiency with intraservice unity of command, which meant that each service had to have autonomous control over whatever types of forces and instruments of war were necessary for it to accomplish its military missions. The Navy viewed attempts to unite the services as a threat to this latter form of unity of command. As the debate over unification evolved, this basic point of dispute became overshadowed by narrower issues of interservice disagreement. It nonetheless remained at its core a principled dispute over the best way to defend the national security of the United States.

The Navy is also depicted by some writers as the institution that resisted the establishment of strong civilian control over the armed services after World War II. Once again, however, the record demands a more nuanced interpretation. As previously mentioned, the postwar unification debate was part of a larger struggle between Congress and the president for control over the national security establishment. The Navy had a long tradition of close cooperation with members of Congress, and feared that an ambitious new system of national security management that placed a powerful Chief of Staff or a "super-secretary" between the president and the services would upset this relationship. Navy representatives also warned that a powerful intermediary might acquire so much independent influence that he would be in a position to threaten the constitutional prerogatives of the president. In this sense, the Navy was merely reiterating Roosevelt's argument that there could only be one commander in chief.

The dispute between the War and Navy Departments also mirrored scholarly debates in the field of public administration over the relative merits of centralization and decentralization. On the one hand, War Department representatives were able to draw upon a substantial body of theoretical and empirical work in support of a "pyramidal" system of management. Leonard White's *Introduction to the Study of Public*

*Administration* was probably the most influential source for such arguments.<sup>12</sup> Most War Department representatives tended to favor the pyramidal approach because of what they viewed as failures of consultation and policy coordination during World War II. On the other hand, Navy representatives built their arguments around a corporatist vision of management that drew heavily from the experience of big business. This approach emphasized the creation of institutions designed to facilitate cooperation between independent agencies to achieve common goals.<sup>13</sup> Pendleton Herring was an influential spokesman for this point of view, arguing that “relatives do not live in greater harmony because they are put under the same roof.”<sup>14</sup> Proponents of the corporatist approach also tended to exhibit a “glass half full” perspective on interservice cooperation during the Second World War, citing in particular the impressive record of the JCS in resolving differences.

The Army and the Navy came naturally to favor these two distinct approaches to administration because of their different historical experiences. Navy Secretary Forrestal attempted to explain this point to Truman at the height of the struggle over unification, noting that the Army was traditionally comfortable with a clear, vertical chain of command, but the Navy had developed a looser and more decentralized system of management over its long history in order to accommodate its “varied and diverse activities” across the globe.<sup>15</sup> This naval tradition was threatened by the prospect of either a powerful Secretary of Defense or a strong chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The Navy was also concerned that most proposals for unification began from the premise that an independent air force would be established as part of the reform of the military establishment. In fact, the issues of “triplication” and “unification” had been intermingled since the mid-1920s.<sup>16</sup> Prior to this period, airmen had argued that only the creation of an air force, as an independent third armed service, would allow the United States to exploit the enormous military potential of air power—in particular, the ability to “combine physical destruction with . . . reach and speed.”<sup>17</sup> Billy Mitchell made such an argument in 1919, during Congressional testimony in which he argued against allowing the Army and the Navy to develop their own air elements. Mitchell asserted that the two services only needed airplanes “for observation purposes,” which was “only a twentieth part” of the military role of air power.<sup>18</sup> By the mid-1920s, however, Mitchell and his colleagues had concluded that, for the foreseeable future, the political situation made full independence for the air force unlikely. They therefore lowered their sights to the goal of equality with the land and sea forces within a single unified service.

Although both the War Department and the Navy felt threatened by the airmen's campaign for greater autonomy and new missions during the interwar period, these issues would become much more important to the Navy during the Second World War, as more and more of its war-fighting strategy, and its *raison d'être*, became tied to naval air power. By the summer of 1944, the Navy was developing postwar plans that assumed that naval aviation would account for 53 percent of that service's annual budget.<sup>19</sup> Congressman Carl Vinson (D-Georgia), who was to play a central role as the Navy's patron in the unification debates, made the point clearly in a statement on the House floor in 1945: "Let there be no mistake about the role of air power and carriers in the proposed postwar Navy. The fleet will be built around the carrier."<sup>20</sup> An independent air force would be a direct threat to this defining element of the postwar Navy, and to the Navy's traditional role as the first line of national defense.

Navy representatives were also cognizant of the risk that if the airmen became an independent military service, they would join with the Army to gang up on them. The Army stood to lose nothing if an independent air force succeeded in displacing naval aviation for strategic bombing missions. Conversely, the airmen could find common ground with the Army in their opposition to a large Marine Corps with its own air wing. Representatives of the Army had been critical of the Marine Corps since its inception, on the grounds that it represented an unnecessary duplication of the Army's traditional roles and missions. Marshall spoke for most members of the War Department in a letter to Admiral King dated June 28, 1943, in which he referred to the Marines as "virtually another Army."<sup>21</sup>

For some Navy spokesmen, the greatest danger posed by triplification was that it might be used to bolster the case of those individuals who favored comprehensive armed forces unification. During World War II, Navy representatives tried to defer discussions on the issue of unification, due in part to the fact that, by contrast to the Army leadership, the Navy had not yet achieved a common position on this issue. By the end of the war, however, it had become obvious to many Navy representatives that armed forces unification had dangerous implications for budgets, roles, and missions. Many Navy representatives also became increasingly suspicious of Army and AAF intentions as a result of their experiences in the Pacific Theater. From the Navy's point of view, frequent War Department appeals to the principle of unity of command in the Pacific Theater were in fact cynical attempts to expand Army and AAF authority at the expense of the Navy.<sup>22</sup> The Navy nonetheless found it extremely difficult to articulate its specific institutional

concerns during the postwar unification debates without looking like the villain to many members of the media and to the American public.

### MARSHALL'S PLAN

George Marshall had become interested in the issue of Army-Navy unification early in his career. As an aide to Army Chief of Staff General John Pershing in the early 1920s, he had participated in studies of the feasibility of creating a Secretary of National Defense. Marshall also made the case for improving Army-Navy coordination in a series of meetings with the assistant secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., during this period. Specifically, he proposed that the services routinely exchange officers engaged in similar administrative tasks in order to improve each service's understanding of the problems and procedures of the other institution.<sup>23</sup> Marshall was also guided by a more narrow institutional interest in unification. As he rose through the ranks during the interwar period, he became convinced that only comprehensive unification of the two services could save the Army from a situation of permanent disadvantage in competition with the Navy for funding. Marshall's concern about the natural advantage that a "photogenic" Navy had over the Army was compounded during the 1930s as an even more "photogenic" community of airmen began to gain the attention of the media and Congress. Nor were the Army's prospects enhanced, from Marshall's point of view, by the election of Franklin Roosevelt—a man who prided himself on being a part of the Navy family.<sup>24</sup>

General Marshall actually began his campaign to improve unity of command by reforms within his own service. About a week before Pearl Harbor, he initiated a drastic reorganization of the War Department that replaced a large and loose system of coordinated agencies with a system that allowed for "more definite and positive control by the Chief of Staff."<sup>25</sup> The job of reorganization was given to Brigadier General Joseph McNarney, who was to serve as Marshall's Deputy Chief of Staff until October 1944. McNarney created a vertical system of authority, in which only six officers had direct access to the Chief of Staff. In the process, he displaced over fifty officers who had previously enjoyed such unfettered access. The victims of this reshuffling referred to Marshall's new team as the "Soviet Committee."<sup>26</sup>

By the time that McNarney's reforms were in place (March 1942), Marshall had struck out in three other directions to improve unity of command: He had taken the lead in the discussions that created the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he had convinced the British and American leader-

ship to accept the principle of unified command of Allied operations in major wartime theaters; and he had begun to develop the case for the creation of a JCS chairman who would serve as the link between the Chiefs and the president. In each case, he demonstrated a striking lack of concern for detail. His strategy was to obtain agreement in principle among the key decision makers, and then make changes as necessary.

The general's experiences during the first year of the war reinforced his opinion that an even more ambitious form of unification was essential. He became convinced that the existing arrangement, based on coordination between two formally independent military services, did not correspond to the realities of modern warfare. Marshall attempted to raise the issue of armed forces unification with Roosevelt during the Quebec Conference (August 14–24, 1943), only to be informed by the president that he was opposed to such a fundamental reform of the military establishment during wartime. In light of this rebuff, the general instructed his staff to study the issue of postwar unification, but to do so in secret for the time being.<sup>27</sup>

On October 11, Marshall received a report from Brigadier General William F. Tompkins, Director of the Special Planning Division (SPD) of the War Department Special Staff, that made a strong case for unification of the armed services after the war. The report concluded that "this war is, and future wars undoubtedly will be, largely a series of combined operations in each of which ground, air, and sea forces must be employed together and coordinated under one directing head." Tompkins also advised Marshall that "the proposal is so inevitable and so many thoughtful officials favor it that the War Department might well take the initiative in advancing it."<sup>28</sup> The report called for the creation of a single Department of War, headed by a Secretary of War and organized into ground, sea, air, and supply components. It also envisioned a joint general staff arrangement, modeled on the wartime JCS, which would be headed by a Chief of Staff who would serve as the principal military adviser to the president. Marshall recommended some minor changes in the SPD report and then submitted the revised document to the JCS on November 2, with a request that the Chiefs consider supporting in principle the creation of "a single Department of War in the post-war period."<sup>29</sup>

Lawrence Legere has observed that by stating his support for the SPD proposal, Marshall "broke the long-standing tradition of unyielding opposition by service Department spokesmen to the principle of unification of the armed services."<sup>30</sup> He was careful, however, not to push too hard for this idea at a time when cooperation within the JCS was essential. When Admiral King made it clear that the Navy was not prepared to accept the principle of unification at this time, Marshall

settled for a JCS decision to instruct the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) to study the issue without prejudice.

The JSSC reported back to the Joint Chiefs on March 8, 1944. The committee advised that it did not have the resources to properly address the complex and important issue of unification and that a special committee should be established to specifically consider this proposal. The JSSC nonetheless recommended that the Joint Chiefs narrow the focus of discussion of this special committee by instructing it to assume that the JCS approved the principle of unification. This time, both Admiral King and Admiral Leahy registered their opposition to this proposal, and Marshall had to settle once again for a noncommittal statement by the JCS and the creation of a "Special Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Reorganization of National Defense." The general nonetheless attempted to tip the scales a bit: to accompany the JSSC report, Marshall sent an independent statement to the Secretaries of War and Navy in which he emphasized that the report had recommended acceptance of the principle of unification. He also seems to have decided that the time had come for him to become more personally active in the management of the campaign for unification, both inside and outside of the military establishment.

Marshall's opportunity to orchestrate a public campaign of pressure in support of unification came in March 1944, when Senator James Wadsworth (R-New York), a strong supporter of the War Department, obtained Congressional approval for the creation of a select committee, under the chairmanship of Congressman Clifton Woodrum (D-Virginia), to hold hearings on postwar military policy. As the date for the opening of the hearings approached, Marshall attempted to use the prospect of Congressional involvement in the unification issue to pressure the Navy to be more cooperative. In a letter to Admiral King dated April 17, the general warned:

If we [the Joint Chiefs] cannot solve the question [of unification] it is going to be solved for us, and probably in a manner which neither the War nor the Navy Departments would desire. It is therefore desirable that, if possible, we present a united view on this matter. Above all, I do not want to be forced into a position where my statements and attitudes might in any way interfere with the smooth working of our present joint organization.<sup>31</sup>

On the same day, Marshall wrote to Secretary Stimson to express his concern about the risk that if he or General Henry Arnold (representing the Army Air Forces) testified before the Woodrum Committee, it would generate unnecessary Army-Navy conflict at this critical point in the war. He proposed, therefore, that Stimson take the lead in testifying in favor of the principle of unification and that McNarney be

brought in to provide the details. Marshall concluded, however, that "should Admiral King appear early in the affair and give testimony in opposition to the reorganization then I should certainly wish to move in myself in a vigorous manner though I should deplore this necessity."<sup>32</sup>

The Woodrum hearings, which began on April 24, 1944, forced into the open the fundamental differences between the services on the issue of unification. General Tompkins testified on the first day of the hearings, stressing the importance of having a unification plan in place as soon as possible in order to guide wartime planning for postwar demobilization. Secretary Stimson followed the next day, stressing the inadequacy of a system of "voluntary cooperation" between the services in an era of "triphibious warfare." McNarney then presented an organizational chart for a postwar military establishment, modeled on the plan that Marshall had pressed upon the JCS five months earlier. Marshall's voice could also be heard in McNarney's assertion that it was "essential" that the committee approve the principle of "one great unification" so that planning for postwar national security could move forward.<sup>33</sup>

## THE NAVY BEGINS TO RESPOND

Navy representatives were caught off guard by the strong and well-coordinated Army campaign for unification during the Woodrum hearings. There was still a good deal of disagreement within the Navy leadership regarding the whole issue of unification at this stage in the war. Leahy and King had already made it clear that they were strongly opposed. On the other hand, the Navy's General Board had actually made a case for unification in June 1941. And retired admiral Harry Yarnell had argued for postwar unification in an article in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* in August 1943. Yarnell favored complete integration of all ground, air, and naval forces, under a single civilian secretary and a Chief of Staff. He also proposed that all military leaders should be "carefully trained in all three branches" of the unified Department of War.<sup>34</sup>

The most vulnerable member of the Navy's team at this point was Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who advised Stimson that he was prepared to accept postwar unification because he believed that it was inevitable.<sup>35</sup> By the time that the Army had completed its statements before the Woodrum Committee, however, Knox was close to death, and it was necessary for Assistant Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to stand in for him at the hearings. Like many of his col-

leagues in the Navy, Forrestal resented the Army's use of a civilian venue to press a case that had not been thoroughly vetted within the military establishment. He testified that it was premature to commit the government to the principle of postwar unification. He drew upon his experience in the business world to challenge the Army claim that unification would inevitably enhance efficiency and eliminate duplication within the armed services. Forrestal also harked back to the kinds of arguments that Roosevelt had presented in 1940 to oppose the creation of a mobilization czar: The job of managing the entire defense establishment was simply too big and complex for any one individual, and there could be only one constitutionally designated commander in chief. Finally, Forrestal articulated the specific institutional concerns of most Navy men when he concluded that his service would oppose any unification scheme that threatened the survival of the Marine Corps or naval aviation.<sup>36</sup>

Forrestal was followed by several other Navy representatives, most of whom were inclined to be more confrontational and explicit in their opposition to the creation of a single department of national defense. They were assisted by Representative Carl Vinson, a member of the Woodrum Committee, who questioned the motives of the supporters of the Army Air Forces who testified during the hearings. Vinson implied that they were only using the unification issue to achieve their goals of service autonomy and gain control of naval air missions. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus Gates, meanwhile, injected a novel argument into the proceedings when he observed that if Congress was looking for a way to unify the armed services, it should consider "merging the whole military organization into the existing Navy," since this service had already done a good job of integrating land, sea, and air elements.<sup>37</sup> Finally, Navy representatives questioned the wisdom of any plan to reorganize the postwar military establishment that did not also address the larger issue of reform of the whole apparatus of national security planning.<sup>38</sup>

The strong positions taken by the opponents of unification effectively canceled out the coordinated arguments of the War Department and left the members of the Woodrum Committee with no choice but to recommend that no further legislative action be taken on the issue of unification until the war was over. The committee also noted that it was still too soon for Congress to take action because the Joint Chiefs were about to begin their own internal study of the issue of unification. Most Navy representatives saw the outcome of the hearings as a victory, but it came at a high price in terms of public opinion. For the Navy's rear-guard campaign made it easy for critics to depict that service as a reactionary defender of outdated traditions and parochial interests.

The Special JCS Committee on Reorganization of National Defense, under the chairmanship of Admiral J. O. Richardson, began its work on June 7, 1944—one week after the end of the Woodrum hearings. It is not surprising, in light of the disputes that had surfaced during the hearings, that both services made sure that their principal representatives on the committee held clear and unwavering opinions on the issue under study. Admiral Richardson was an outspoken critic of unification before the study got under way, and General William Tompkins, who was the chief spokesman for the Army on the committee, had been working with Marshall and McNarney since the start of the war to develop plans for a single Department of National Defense. This was a formula for a stillborn committee investigation. But the Army representatives succeeded in manipulating the committee's membership and agenda in such a way that the final majority report appeared to be a fairly strong endorsement of an arrangement that was similar to the McNarney plan. The most serious setback for the Navy was that the report was able to state that "the great majority of the Army officers and *almost half of the Navy officers whose views were heard* favored the single department." Based upon this finding, the authors of the report predicted that the single department scheme "will have the support of an important majority of commanders in the field."<sup>39</sup>

The results cited in the study were partly attributable to the fact that most of the fifty-six individuals interviewed by the committee were high-ranking officers in overseas theaters of battle. Many of these individuals, in both the Army and the Navy, were comfortable with the principle of overall unity of command based upon their experiences with unified theater commands. The comments by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey (Commander of the South Pacific Area) and Admiral Chester Nimitz (Supreme Commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas) were especially problematic for those opposed to unification. Nimitz testified that he supported armed forces unification because

my appearance before the Joint Chiefs of Staff started me thinking how difficult it would be for me if I were a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make up my mind with the divergent opinions that were expressed. To put the heads of these three forces in there, each one looking out for his own force, I thought it would promote irresolution rather than resolution.<sup>40</sup>

The Navy leadership was stunned by the conclusions of the majority report. In effect, the Army had stolen the committee from its official chairman. Admiral Richardson filed a dissent, in which he complained that the authors of the majority report had exaggerated the degree of support for unification that they had received from key respondents like Nimitz. He also argued that many of the theater commanders who

had expressed general support for the idea of unification had not given the issue adequate attention prior to being interviewed.<sup>41</sup> Richardson's comments seemed fairly anemic in comparison to the majority report, but at least he introduced a pretext for the lack of consensus within the Navy leadership.

The submission of the majority report to the JCS on April 11, 1945, was a major setback for the Navy in the evolving struggle over unification. But the situation threatened to become a rout just one day later, when Harry Truman was sworn in as the thirty-third president of the United States. Truman noted in his memoirs:

One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the office of President was that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace.

Truman attributed his convictions about the need for unification to his personal experiences in the military during World War I, to the lessons he had learned as a member of the Senate Appropriations and Military Affairs Committees and as chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, and, above all, to the "record of the Pearl Harbor hearings."<sup>42</sup> Shortly after he was nominated for the vice presidency, Truman had pressed his case in an article in *Collier's* magazine entitled "Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified." The first lines of the article illustrate the intensity of Truman's feeling on this issue:

Proof that a divine Providence watches over the United States is furnished by the fact that we have managed to escape disaster even though our scrambled professional military set-up has been an open invitation to catastrophe.<sup>43</sup>

With specific reference to the experience of Pearl Harbor, Truman stated that "without entering into the question of personal remissness, I hold that a principal fault was the division of authority that necessitated conferences over two sets of orders instead of obedience to one set of orders." He commended General Marshall and Admiral King for their efforts at cooperation throughout the war, but noted that "a stiff-necked contentiousness still marks Army and Navy contacts in the lower echelons and will continue to mark them as long as each arm enjoys independent status." Truman concluded:

The road, as I see it, stretches straight and with no turns. . . . The end, of course, must be the integration of every element of America's defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible head. Call it the War Department or the Department of National Security or what you will, just so it is one department . . . one team with all the reins in one hand. . . . Under such a set-up another Pearl Harbor will not have to be feared.<sup>44</sup>

Truman viewed the Congressional patrons of the separate services as the "greatest stumbling blocks to unification," noting that these individuals "had to have seventeen-gun salutes, parades, etc. as often as they could find excuses."<sup>45</sup> As a result of his experiences during the war, the president was also convinced that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force all "made excessive demands, but the Navy was the worst offender."<sup>46</sup> Shortly after becoming president, Truman became concerned that Navy plans for a postwar force of 500,000 men and 1,000 ships would break the federal budget, and he resisted attempts by friends and representatives of the Navy to develop such plans without reference to cost. He also put Navy leaders on notice during a meeting at the White House on September 14, 1945, that "we could not determine the size of the Navy without regard to the size of the Army or the size of the Army without regard for the size of the Navy and Air Forces."<sup>47</sup> Truman also told his Budget Bureau director on more than one occasion that he thought the "Navy people had a complex toward him and had developed the attitude of stepchildren."<sup>48</sup>

Truman saw armed forces unification as one half of a two-part strategy for improving the nation's military preparedness at a time when the United States could no longer assume that it had the "luxury" of mobilizing and retaliating after another Pearl Harbor.<sup>49</sup> The other essential element in Truman's strategy was Universal Military Training (UMT), which the president proposed to Congress in a letter dated October 22, 1945. Truman did not interpret UMT as "a military training program in the conventional sense." He saw it as a "thoroughly democratic" way to "develop skills that could be used in civilian life, to raise the physical standards of the nation's manpower, to lower the illiteracy rate, to develop citizenship responsibilities, and to foster the moral and spiritual welfare of our young people."<sup>50</sup> He was also convinced that UMT would have a dramatic impact on the nation's war-fighting capability. Between 1945 and 1947 the debate over UMT paralleled, and at times converged with, the debate over armed forces unification.

In retrospect, the release of the Richardson report and Truman's concurrent arrival in the White House actually worked against the Army, in that it convinced the Navy of the need to close ranks and to begin a counteroffensive under the leadership of Forrestal. The secretary's first step was to meet with the new president, to communicate the Navy's point of view regarding unification. He also spoke with the leadership of the War Department, including Stimson and Marshall, in an effort to convince them to cooperate. At the same time that he was pressing the case for compromise within the executive branch, Forrestal did what he could to ensure that the Navy leadership spoke with one voice. A representative memo to all flag officers warned, "The uni-

fication proposals of the War Department create what is in effect a military dictatorship." It also claimed that unification would threaten the survival of both naval aviation and the Marine Corps.<sup>51</sup> Forrestal also used this period to consolidate his support within Congress and to reach out to influential media personalities such as Walter Lippmann and Arthur Sulzberger.<sup>52</sup>

### THE EBERSTADT REPORT

Forrestal's most important move during this period was his decision to ask his close friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of unification that could be used by the Navy Department to break the momentum in favor of a single Department of the Armed Forces. Eberstadt in turn recruited Pendleton Herring to join a small team composed mostly of naval reserve officers to assist him in this endeavor. Herring's views on the issue of administrative coordination were well known by this time, as a result of his scholarly writings and his role as chairman of the Budget Bureau committee that was still writing the official administrative history of the war effort. So Eberstadt could be confident of the kind of advice he would receive from Herring.

Jeffery Dorwart credits Herring with giving the Eberstadt Report its "methodological and conceptual framework."<sup>53</sup> As a civilian, Herring also helped to dilute the image of the Eberstadt team as an extension of the Navy. The members of the committee were well aware of this potential problem, as illustrated by a July 21 memo to Eberstadt from one member of the team, E. F. Willett, that warned:

We must be in a position to defend ourselves against the allegation that we are getting an unduly large part of our material and opinions on the matter of unification from Navy sources. In this connection, an examination shows our interview list, for example, is heavily weighted on the Navy side.<sup>54</sup>

The completed report was submitted to the secretary on September 25, 1945. Most of the arguments that it presented against unification were well known by this time:

"In theory and in logic, unification appears highly plausible. It looks good on paper. It sounds good in words. There are many appealing arguments in support of unification: but it lacks equally convincing support in actual practice."<sup>55</sup>

A system of coordinated, rather than unified, services "is more in line with the principles of our Constitution, our customs, and our traditions."<sup>56</sup>

"We have often longed for the one-man decision and have been inclined to minimize the tremendous benefits that arise from the parallel, competitive, and sometimes conflicting efforts which our system permits."<sup>57</sup>

Rather than a single unified military service, the Eberstadt Report proposed "a coordinate one having three departments—War, Navy and Air—each headed by a civilian secretary and tied together by strong ligaments of coordination expressed by interorganizational links."<sup>58</sup> The primary responsibility for coordination between the three services would fall to a proposed National Security Council, which was modeled after the British War Cabinet and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. The report also recommended that the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff be given statutory identity and placed under the National Security Council so that it could provide strategic plans and advice to the president within the NSC context. The Eberstadt Report included a provision for an optional Chief of Staff position, at the president's discretion, but made it clear that JCS decisions should be unanimous, and that the Chief of Staff should not be granted authority over the service chiefs. The model for this Chief of Staff position was Admiral Leahy, who had served as Roosevelt's liaison with the Joint Chiefs but had never interpreted his position as superior to the other JCS members.

The Eberstadt Report also contributed one novel, if not very convincing, argument to the debate about unification. It asserted that it would be premature for the United States to experiment with a new system of military organization at a time when the demands of America's new global responsibilities, and the implications of new war-fighting technologies, were still unclear. The report concluded that it was risky to undertake substantial changes in the military establishment since "the changing content and scope of the phrase 'national security' is apparent."<sup>59</sup> This argument for caution in the face of uncertainty was undermined, however, by the report's conclusion that "our present situation calls for action far more drastic and far-reaching than simply unification of the military services."<sup>60</sup>

The Eberstadt study will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. At this stage, it is necessary only to state that it provided the Navy with a positive alternative to the Army's vision of postwar unification. Up until this point, the opponents of unification seemed to have nothing to contribute to the debate other than a curmudgeonly commitment to the status quo. Senator David Walsh, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, demonstrated an appreciation of this problem in his letter of May 15, 1945, to Secretary Forrestal, authorizing the Eberstadt study: "If we discard an 'either/or' logic, we may find it is not

necessary or desirable to either consolidate the War and Navy Departments into a Department of National Defense, or let them remain entirely separate as they were before the war."<sup>61</sup>

The Eberstadt Report was certainly an enrichment of the postwar debates about armed forces unification. But it was also a very effective challenge to the whole concept of military merger. The report not only cast doubt on the principle of armed forces unification, it also opposed the creation of a new national military establishment, or a new Secretary of Defense, as possible coordinating mechanisms. In subsequent testimony, Eberstadt explained that proposals for full unification or tight control over the armed services would place "unification at too low a level." Since in the future the problems of national security would be multifaceted, they would demand the coordinated attention of those agencies which are responsible for America's military, diplomatic, and economic interests.<sup>62</sup> Eberstadt saw the NSC, with the president serving *ex officio* as chairman, as the most appropriate institutional response to this postwar challenge. Over the next two years, this vision of national security coordination served as the most influential alternative to Marshall and Truman's plan for armed forces unification.

## THE SMAC HEARINGS

The Eberstadt Report was completed just in time to give the Navy the ammunition it needed to resist the next Army offensive. The occasion was a new round of hearings held by the Senate Military Affairs Committee (SMAC) between October 17 and December 17, 1945, to consider two bills that favored the creation of a single Department of the Armed Forces. By this time, the media was focused on the issue of armed forces unification, and all of the constituencies that would be affected by the creation of a single department were also fully engaged. *The New York Times* described the start of the hearings as "the beginning of what will be a brass-knuckle fight to the finish."<sup>63</sup>

The Army sought to build on the momentum they had already acquired by introducing the majority report of the Richardson Committee into the hearings, with its conclusion that nearly half of the Navy officers interviewed favored some form of military unification. The Army also presented a new plan, which had been written by a War Department committee under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Lawton Collins. The Collins Plan was designed to reconcile the JCS majority report with elements of the minority report submitted by Richardson himself, while also incorporating some recommendations

that Marshall had made after receiving the two JCS reports. In fact, this hastily prepared document actually weakened the Army's position during the hearings, by injecting a degree of confusion into an otherwise well-coordinated War Department offensive. In an effort to patch together three different proposals, the authors of the Collins plan lost much of the coherence and rhetorical impact of the earlier McNarney plan. This was partly Marshall's fault, since he still believed that it was neither wise nor necessary to deal with specific aspects of the unification issue at this point. His emphasis on general principles of unification permeated the Collins plan and made it vulnerable to the criticism that it was not well thought out.

Marshall's own testimony during the SMAC hearings went a long way toward correcting the damage done by the Collins plan. By placing his considerable prestige and authority behind the campaign for unification, Marshall immediately put the Navy on the defensive. He was also able to speak with authority in refuting the Navy's claim that the wartime JCS was an appropriate model for the postwar military establishment:

I am strongly convinced that unless there is a single department for the armed forces, within which the difficult and numerous complexities can be ironed out prior to a presentation of requirements to the President and Congress, there can be little hope that we will be able to maintain through the years a military posture that will secure for us a lasting peace.<sup>64</sup>

Marshall also played to Congress's interest in finding ways to reduce costs within the postwar defense establishment:

Under the present system, or lack of system, two separate executive departments compete for annual appropriations. Each asserts its independent viewpoint before separate committees and subcommittees of the Congress. And each tends to maximize appropriations for itself. Such a procedure offers no assurance that each dollar appropriated buys the largest measure of protection for the Nation.<sup>65</sup>

Other Army representatives, including Secretary of War Robert Patterson (who had replaced Stimson in September), expanded upon Marshall's arguments. Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy introduced one new element to the Army's position when he implicitly attacked the assertion by the Eberstadt Report that experimenting with armed forces unification was risky in an era of rapid political and technological change. McCloy argued that, on the contrary, unification would have the positive effect of "stimulating the minds of our military, naval and air leaders in the postwar period." McCloy concluded:

The officers of the new department would be compelled to work intensively and together on problems of unification in the course of which appraisals of the new weapons, new sciences, and training methods would have to be considered as a whole. New points of view would be developed, and there would be a minimum of the retrogression to fixed positions which usually follows a successful war.<sup>66</sup>

Armed with the Eberstadt Report, Forrestal took the lead in challenging the testimony of the War Department spokesmen. He assured the members of the Committee on Military Affairs, "I do not appear here simply in opposition to unification of the War and Navy Departments." Instead, he offered to "present a comprehensive and dynamic program" that went well beyond the Army's narrow vision of a single Department of the Armed Forces. Forrestal contended that Eberstadt's study had convinced the Navy leadership that "our national security can only be assured on a very broad and comprehensive front." He introduced a chart from the Eberstadt Report that placed the military establishment in the context of a national security system that included (among other things) a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Resources Board. The chart illustrated that the military component of the Eberstadt scheme was built around a Joint Chiefs of Staff that would coordinate its policies in much the same way that it had done during the Second World War. To illustrate that the Eberstadt study was "an objective [and] independent examination" of the problem of national security management, Forrestal pointed out to the committee that the report had recommended the creation of an independent air force ("With that conclusion I am not yet prepared to agree. . ."). The secretary left it to other spokesmen for the Navy point of view to directly criticize the Army plan. He nonetheless concluded his remarks with three familiar themes: Unification will not necessarily lead to savings; the US military establishment is too large to be administered by a single individual; and unification "in effect amounts to an isolation and derogation of the civil authority."<sup>67</sup>

Forrestal provided the committee with the most influential arguments against unification, but Assistant Secretary of the Navy Struve Hensel provided the committee with some of its most incisive testimony. He sought to undermine the image of unity and coherence that the Army had been constructing since the first days of the unification debates within the JCS by presenting a chart that illustrated the significant points of disagreement between various spokesmen for the Army plan, including Collins, McNarney, and Marshall. The chart also demonstrated disagreements between the Army positions, the Rich-

ardson majority report, and the two pieces of unification legislation that the Senate was considering at this time. Hensel also relied upon charts to illustrate the difference between the Collins Plan and the existing system for the formulation of the budget, noting: "The eclipse of the civilian Secretaries and agencies in the preparation of the budget colors the whole War Department approach. Civilian control is reduced to the vanishing point."<sup>68</sup>

After presenting its plan for a comprehensive approach to national security, and attacking elements of the Army's plan for unification, the Navy attempted to ameliorate a serious problem that had been created by the Richardson majority report. Both Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey were brought in to recant their earlier statements of support for the principle of unification, and to assure the committee of their commitment to a system of interservice coordination modeled upon the wartime JCS. Their testimony put both Congress and the Army on notice that the Navy was now united in its opposition to unification. The *Washington Post* nonetheless editorialized after Nimitz's testimony that "we shall be very much surprised, however, if the committee gives his present convictions as much weight as his wartime views." The editorial also concluded that "his [Nimitz's] yardstick for measuring any unification plan is: 'How does it affect sea power?' " rather than " 'How do they [unification plans] affect our national security?' " The *Post* also observed that the invention of the atomic bomb "doubly reinforced" the logic of unification, since "to think of any service going its separate way in the atomic age is to visualize disaster."<sup>69</sup>

The position taken by the *Washington Post* in support of unification reflected the dominant opinion at the time that the Senate hearings concluded. But the Eberstadt plan had at least given the Navy something positive to work with as they sought to take their case to the American people. Two days after the conclusion of the SMAC hearings, however, President Truman released a Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of a Department of National Defense. He called for a single department that would unite three separate military branches (ground, sea, and air—another setback for the Navy) under a single civilian Secretary of National Defense who would serve within the president's cabinet. Without specifically mentioning the JCS, Truman's proposal also called for the creation of a Chief of Staff who would work with the three commanders of the "component branches" to advise both the president and the new Secretary of National Defense. The president asserted that this arrangement would provide "improved co-ordination between the military and the rest of the government."<sup>70</sup> Truman's message also gave a nod to the Eberstadt Report by leaving the door open for further re-

form of the machinery for civilian-military cooperation for national security. The proposal was an almost total victory for the Army, although Truman did state that the Navy should “retain its own carrier- or water-based aviation” and that the Marines were to be preserved.<sup>71</sup>

Truman’s proposal seemed to leave the Navy with little room to maneuver. From this point onward, the position of the commander in chief was officially on record, and naval spokesmen had to take very seriously the risk of being “Billy Mitchelled” if they came out too strongly or explicitly in opposition to unification. Over the next few months, Forrestal and his colleagues did what they could within the confines of the presidential message to shore up the opposition to unification. When the Navy secretary registered his concern that his actions might be interpreted by the White House as insubordination, he was assured by Truman’s aide Clark Clifford that the president was willing to permit any member of his administration to “express their personal views” on the unification question if they were called before Congress.<sup>72</sup> Meanwhile, Eberstadt began to play a much more visible role in the public debate over unification. But although he was an influential member of the business community and an insightful critic of the various unification schemes, Eberstadt had no official status within the government, and his participation in the debate did not count for much in the face of a concerted campaign by the president and the War Department.

### CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE

This is the point at which the Navy’s friends in Congress—most notably, Congressman Carl Vinson and Senator David Walsh (D-Massachusetts)—elevated the issue of armed forces unification to the status of a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Most of the Navy’s strongest Congressional supporters were members of the Naval Affairs Committees and the Naval Appropriations Subcommittees of the House and Senate, whose political identities had become inseparable from the institutional interests of that service over the years. Demetrios Caraley notes that “Vinson, and to a lesser degree, Walsh, and their committees had pretty much built the World War II fleet which the War Department coalition apparently wanted in part to scuttle.”<sup>73</sup> The two men had already established themselves as important critics of unification by the spring of 1946. As a member of the Woodrum Committee, Vinson had helped to keep Army witnesses honest by challenging their assertions about the strategic, administrative, and economic advantages of unification. He was

particularly critical of any unification proposal that included the creation of a general staff, on the grounds that it smacked of "Prussian Militarism."<sup>74</sup> Likewise, it had been Walsh, in his capacity as chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, who had encouraged Forrestal a year earlier to undertake the "thorough study" of unification that became the Eberstadt Report.<sup>75</sup>

The Navy's patrons in Congress contrived to provide Forrestal with a safe venue—in the form of hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs—from which to launch a counterattack against the idea of a single Department of National Defense. These hearings ran from April 30 to July 11, 1946, with a break from mid-May until the end of June. The official purpose of the hearings was to ascertain the Navy's position with regard to the two unification bills that had been studied during the SMAC hearings. This made it possible for Navy representatives to criticize these bills without being put in the position of having to directly address the president's proposal for unification. The committee hearings also provided the Navy with a forum for publishing the Eberstadt Report in its entirety. Perhaps most important, the hearings provided the Navy's powerful friends in Congress with a rallying point for a campaign to challenge the whole idea of armed forces unification, and to put Truman on notice that he was not going to be able unilaterally to determine the future shape of the military establishment.

The Navy's counteroffensive came at a particularly inauspicious time for the president. Throughout 1945, Truman had enjoyed a honeymoon period with Congress, the media, and the American public. Six months after taking office, his approval rating was still above 80 percent.<sup>76</sup> Much of Truman's popularity was attributable to the image of normalcy that he projected—as being "one of us," after the heady Roosevelt years. But normalcy soon became a deficit for the president. David McCullough states that

not in eighty years, not since Andrew Johnson, Lincoln's successor, had a president been the target of such abuse. He was made fun of for his mid-American mannerisms, his Missouri pals, the by-now famous devotion to his mother.<sup>77</sup>

By February 1946, Truman's popularity rating was at 63 percent, and in free fall. It hit bottom in October of that year (just prior to the Congressional election) at 32 percent.<sup>78</sup> Throughout this entire period, one of the criticisms leveled against Truman was that, by contrast to his predecessor, who had led the military to victory, Truman was not even capable of resolving an interservice squabble over postwar organization.

The one-sided Naval Affairs hearings had been going on for about a month when the president decided to act. By this time members of his staff were encouraging him to get tough with subordinates who were unwilling to toe the official pro-unification line. Truman's Budget director, Harold Smith, recorded in his diary:

I took the opportunity to tell the President that much damage has been done to various programs by members of the administration testifying against them and that I thought that this thing should not be tolerated any longer. I mentioned specifically the testimony of my friend Forrestal [Secretary of the Navy] against the Army-Navy merger.<sup>79</sup>

Truman decided, however, that compromise was preferable to counter-offensive. On May 13, he called Secretary of War Patterson and Forrestal, along with seven high-ranking military men, to the White House. After soliciting the opinions of various participants regarding unification, he asked the two secretaries to meet over the next couple of weeks to identify points of agreement and disagreement on the issue of unification and to provide him with a report by the end of the month.

Coming as it did during a pause in the naval hearings, Truman's intervention at this point can be interpreted as an attempt to pull the issue of unification back into the executive branch, as an effort to short-circuit a serious fight between Congress and the White House, or simply as an attempt to introduce some clarity, and perhaps some closure, into a debate that had gone on much too long. His action was probably motivated by all three of these considerations. Unfortunately for the president, his actions also encouraged the opponents of unification to redouble their efforts. According to White House assistant George Elsey's handwritten notes: "Truman was reasonable" during the May 13 meeting with the military representatives. "Army was for the pow-wow, because it felt merger was a dead pigeon [for] this congress. Navy was against this meeting, feeling it had licked the Boss this year."<sup>80</sup>

For the first time since the start of the unification battle, Forrestal was in the driver's seat. Walter Millis scores the meeting as "a decisive victory for Forrestal, largely reversing the effects of the defeat he had suffered in December with the president's initial message on unification."<sup>81</sup> This is true, but it is hard to imagine that Forrestal would have obtained this victory if his supporters in Congress had not placed their considerable weight on his side of the balance. The Navy secretary had assured Truman on March 18 that "if we arrived at a compromise that the Navy truly believed in . . . we could sell it even to Mr. Vinson, but it would have to be something that we could really put our hearts into."<sup>82</sup>

Two days after the meeting in the White House, Forrestal received a letter from Walsh and Vinson advising him that, in their opinion, Congress would not pass any legislation that created a single Department of Common Defense or established a single military officer over all the armed services. The Walsh/Vinson letter, which was published in the Naval Committee hearings, threatened a destructive confrontation between the White House and Congress over unification. Perhaps this was inevitable in a situation in which, as Robert Albion and Robert Connery note, "Congress had always had wide powers over what the Navy should *be* in contrast to the Executive's over what it should *do*."<sup>83</sup>

The most important result of the meeting of May 13 was that Truman let it be known that he was backing away from the idea of a single Chief of Staff for the armed forces. The supporters of unification had not done a good job of responding to criticisms that a powerful Chief of Staff was a large step in the direction of militarization. The confused and confusing testimony of Senator Elbert Thomas (D-Utah) during the Naval Affairs hearings certainly did not help. Thomas, a supporter of unification, described the proposed Chief of Staff as the "big frog" in the new national security set-up. When pressed for clarification, he admitted that, in the event that the Chief was a "strong man," he would be a "one-man joint chief of staff." He went on to observe that, under these circumstances, "If you had a very powerful President of the United States you would have one kind of Government, and if you had a weak President you would have another kind."<sup>84</sup>

The president's decision to abandon his proposal seems to have been particularly influenced by Admiral Leahy, who informed the president that "his experience during the war had convinced him that the idea of a single Chief of Staff was dangerous."<sup>85</sup> Immediately after Leahy made this argument, Truman informed his military advisers that he was dropping plans for a Chief of Staff on the grounds that it was "too much along the lines of the 'man on horseback' philosophy."<sup>86</sup> Eberstadt applauded this change of position by the president, but could not resist the temptation to turn it against him. Arguing in support of specific legislative protections for the Marine Corps, Eberstadt testified before Congress that leaving such a decision to the discretion of future presidents was too risky. "It is no expression of disrespect on my part toward the president—in fact, quite the contrary is true—when I refer to the fact that within 6 months he changed his opinion on so vital a subject as a Chief of Staff."<sup>87</sup>

On June 15, Truman made one last attempt to press his case with Congress. He sent Vinson, Walsh, and two other members of Congress a summary of the points of agreement and disagreement that Patterson and Forrestal had identified. The secretaries had agreed on the need

for new arrangements for civil-military cooperation, and they drew heavily from the Eberstadt Report in their comments about precisely what kinds of institutions were needed. But on the issues that had divided the Army and the Navy for over two years, there was not much evidence of progress. Patterson and Forrestal still could not agree on the need for a separate Department of National Defense. Nor could they agree on the need for an independent air force. The Navy was also still adamant that any new arrangement should not jeopardize the future of either the naval air arm or the Marine Corps.

In hindsight, the Navy's preoccupation with these issues seems almost paranoid. But the Navy's actions must be judged against the mood of the time. A memo that Forrestal forwarded to the president on January 14, 1947, illustrates the intensity, and the venom, of some of the public attacks on the Navy. The memo cites in particular a speech by Brigadier General Frank Armstrong of the Army Air Forces to businessmen in Norfolk, Virginia. Noting that Norfolk was "a Navy town and a Navy hangout," the general went immediately on the offensive:

Like it or not, the Army Air Force is going to run the show. You [the Navy] are not going to have anything but a couple of carriers which are ineffective anyway, and they will probably be sunk in the first battle. Now as for the Marines, you know what they are. They are a small bitched-up Army talking Navy lingo. We're going to put those Marines in the regular Army, and make efficient soldiers out of them. The Navy is going to end up by only supplying the requirements for Army Air and the ground forces too.<sup>88</sup>

Against the background of such polemics, Truman's letter to Congress was a last attempt to find a compromise solution that would still achieve "true unification." But this proved to be a waste of time.

Having been put on notice that Congress was not going to give him one of the few things he had explicitly sought when he entered the White House, Truman now turned to the leadership in the Army and the Navy to provide him with some kind of compromise—as quietly and quickly as possible—so that he could put the whole unification mess behind him. Harold Smith warned the president not to turn the issue over to the two services, on the grounds that they would be inclined to use the Eberstadt Report as their primary point of reference. The result would be "a most unsatisfactory compromise." Truman reassured Smith that he would "not compromise very much with the fundamentals of the Army-Navy unification and that he did not actually expect that a satisfactory plan would be presented to him."<sup>89</sup> These assurances notwithstanding, Truman seems to have resigned himself by this time to the fact that this was one political fight that he had already lost.

The Naval Affairs hearings were concluded about three weeks later, on July 11. To no one's surprise, the committee did not report out the unification bill (S. 2044), and the administration chose to permit the legislation to die quietly. Over the next six months, Forrestal and Eberstadt threw themselves into the effort to engineer a compromise, organizing a series of meetings with civilian and military representatives of the War Department in order to find common ground on the unification issue. Forrestal had established the parameters of these deliberations, however, by warning the president that "the Navy had very sincere misgivings and apprehensions about the 'mass play—steam roller' tactics of the Army." Truman promised his secretary that "he intended to see that any such tactics were not successful."<sup>90</sup> Having already lost on the central question of a strong Chief of Staff, and faced with the real possibility that Congress would give them nothing at all, Army representatives proved to be quite malleable (or, from the Navy's point of view, quite reasonable) during these discussions. Both the president and the Navy's friends in Congress stayed on the sidelines during this period.

For the most part, the participants in these meetings re-traced arguments that had become very familiar over the previous two years, but one new piece of information was introduced during the fall of 1946. This was the British government's White Paper on defense organization. One of the conclusions of the British report was welcomed by the critics of unification: "Amalgamation [of the land, sea and air forces] . . . is a step which could not and should not be taken here and now."<sup>91</sup> But the White Paper offered much more to the supporters of centralization. Its principal finding, based upon the experience of the previous six years, was that Her Majesty's Government should establish a new Minister of Defence "who has both the time and the authority to formulate and apply a unified defence policy for the three Services." The report listed three specific functions of the new minister:

1. The apportionment in broad outline of available resources between the three Services . . . ;
2. The settlement of questions of general administration on which a common policy for the three Services is desirable;
3. The administration of inter-Service organizations, such as Combined Operations Headquarters and the Joint Intelligence Bureau.<sup>92</sup>

Truman was provided with an analysis of the White Paper by a representative of the Army, Colonel J. B. Montgomery, who used the British study as a direct refutation of Eberstadt's proposals for a comprehensive system of executive branch agencies with a loosely coordinated defense establishment:

The creation of the new Ministry of Defense in Britain is acknowledgement on their part that they do not consider any plan such as the Eberstadt plan operable in practice; and this basic change is a move toward a system of unified control similar to that proposed in the president's letter of decision.<sup>93</sup>

Although he was quite interested in the British reforms, Truman chose not to use the report as a weapon in the fight over unification. By this time, the president viewed the whole issue of national security reform from the point of view of damage control, and he was anxious for closure.

On September 27, Eberstadt worked out a deal with Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy and Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett for a new military establishment that would include a Joint Chiefs of Staff under the authority of a Department of National Security. The new department would be headed by a Secretary of National Security with the authority to "settle disputes" between three essentially independent military services. It was not clear, however, how the secretary would accomplish this task, since he was to have "no general nor specific responsibility with respect to the administration of the three military departments."<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, in the event of disputes between the Secretary of National Security and any of the service secretaries, all parties were authorized to take their case directly to the president.

The breakthroughs that were made at the September 27 meeting set the stage for follow-up discussions on November 7. Forrestal brought together one representative for air power and one representative from the operations division from each service. The War Department was represented by Stuart Symington (who had just replaced Lovett as Assistant Secretary of War for Air) and General Lauris Norstad, director of the Plans and Operations Division of the General Staff. The Navy representatives were Admiral Arthur Radford, deputy chief of Naval Operations (Air), and Admiral Forrest Sherman, deputy chief of Naval Operations. Norstad and Radford already had extensive experience working together on the unification issue, as liaisons to Congress in the formulation of S. 2044. At this stage, however, it was agreed that Sherman and Norstad would be paired up and given the primary responsibility for working out the details of a compromise. In his subsequent testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Admiral Sherman summarized the discussions as follows:

It soon became apparent that our problems fell into three categories, each requiring a separate agreement. One of these agreements had to cover the question of the Government organization for national security. Another one had to delineate the functions of the services. The third had to embrace the organization for unified commands in the field.<sup>95</sup>

The issue of unified theater command was dispensed with quickly, by an agreement in support of the principle of a "world-wide" system of unified commands. The details of this global arrangement were to be considered at a future date so that they did not disrupt the Army-Navy negotiations. Norstad and Sherman also reached a deal on the core issue of the composition of the military establishment. The Navy agreed to drop its opposition to air-force independence and to accept the establishment of a Secretary of National Defense. The Army abandoned its vision of comprehensive unification of the armed forces and settled for a system built around the wartime JCS model, with the new secretary merely coordinating the activities of the three services. Confusion about the new secretary's role was the price that both services paid to achieve this compromise. It is likely that the Army and Navy representatives recognized the potential for trouble that was inherent in this arrangement, but they also believed that it should be left to future presidents to decide how much authority they wished to delegate to the Secretary of National Defense.

By far the most difficult aspect of the Army-Navy talks had to do with the functions of the separate services. When the two men reached an impasse over the future of naval aviation and the Marines, Norstad advised his superior that he was thinking of quitting the talks in order to communicate that "I no longer have confidence in the good faith of the Navy on this particular point."<sup>96</sup> The negotiations nonetheless continued through the end of the year, and on January 3, Forrestal and Patterson met to resolve outstanding issues. By glossing over questions about the future of Navy air and the Marines, they were able to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.<sup>97</sup> On receiving the report of the two secretaries, the president pronounced himself "exceedingly pleased" with the results and set in motion the process of preparing legislation that would create a new National Defense Establishment.<sup>98</sup>

## THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS

This was by no means the end of the struggle, however. First, various members of Congress let it be known that they were skeptical about aspects of the Army-Navy compromise. Second, much work still needed to be done to reconcile the agreements worked out between the services with Truman's own vision of what was minimally acceptable. The job was made much easier, however, by the fact that Norstad and Sherman now saw themselves as partners rather than adversaries. Furthermore, most of the concerns that the president harbored at this late stage in the process had to do with the proposed institutions for

civilian-military cooperation, which were matters of secondary importance to the military.

During the spring and early summer of 1947, some of Truman's advisers tried to encourage him to fight harder for specific elements of his original unification plan. The Bureau of the Budget submitted a report to the White House staff in late January that described the draft legislation as "a three department plan rather than a unification plan." It argued:

It must be borne in mind that the Air Forces, the Army and the Navy are three powerful, self-conscious, close knit organizations. Placed in the same structure, they represent *centrifugal forces* which drive inexorably to break down and decentralize any structure for unified action. Within bounds this is natural and proper. But [they] must be offset by at least equally powerful *centripetal forces* serving to pull the structure together.<sup>99</sup>

At about the same time, White House aide George Elsey offered a new interpretation of the ongoing talks in a handwritten note to Clifford: "What we have is a Navy and Air Force betrayal of Army's merger idea—they have ganged up to get 3 depts. with only the most nominal nod at merger."<sup>100</sup> Truman certainly realized that what was being created bore very little resemblance to what he had proposed. But he had to balance any instinct to re-join the battle against the fact that the Division of Press Intelligence was reporting overwhelming editorial support for a final agreement.<sup>101</sup>

The president was also concerned about the risk that a stalemate over unification would undermine his efforts to convince Congress to support Universal Military Training. In December 1946, Truman had created an Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training to help him make his case. Six months later the commission issued its 445-page report, which provided the unanimous recommendation for which the president had hoped, in favor of a universal training program. Armed with the commission's report, Truman redoubled his efforts to obtain Congressional approval for a "National Security Training Act" at the same time that the Senate and House were working with the White House to hammer out the details of the National Security Act.<sup>102</sup> The frustration that the president felt over his failure to achieve armed forces unifications was compounded, therefore, when Congress rejected his plan for UMT. He would later claim in his memoirs that UMT would have sent a powerful message if it had been enacted soon after the war ended: "I am morally certain that if Congress had gone into the program thoroughly in 1945, when I first recommended it, we would have had a pool of basically trained men which

would have made the Soviets hesitate in their program of expansion in certain strategic parts of the world."<sup>103</sup>

The Truman administration also had numerous foreign and security issues to deal with during this period. As the historian Alfred Grosser has observed, "Time does not always have the same value . . . density and intensity of experience can make a moment weigh more than an extended period."<sup>104</sup> Few moments in American history have been more dense and intense than the first half of 1947. At the same time that Truman was attempting to work with Congress to pass the National Security Act and a system for Universal Military Training, he was also working with his advisers to formulate and sell the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan; to adapt US foreign policy and defense plans to British announcements of plans to relinquish their mandate over Palestine and withdraw from the eastern Mediterranean; to reorient US strategy regarding Germany in general and Berlin in particular; and to adapt American diplomacy to the reality of a fledgling United Nations.

While Sherman and Norstad were working closely with two members of Truman's staff, Charles Murphy and Clark Clifford, to iron out the details of a draft unification bill, Forrestal, Patterson, and others began to smooth the way for legislative action. After eight major revisions, a draft was submitted to Congress, where it was turned over to the newly established Senate Armed Services Committee.<sup>105</sup> The committee began hearings on S. 758 on March 18. The proposed legislation called for the creation of a "National Defense Establishment which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense." The proposed "Establishment" was to be composed of three military services, each with its own service chief and its own civilian service secretary. Each military branch would enjoy a great deal of autonomy, and the service secretaries would retain the right to take any defense matter directly to the president, after informing the new Secretary of National Defense. Although the secretary was not in charge of his own department, he was expected to "supervise and control the budget program" of the new National Defense Establishment. The legislation also provided for the continuation of the Joint Chiefs, with a staff of not more than 100 officers, but without a chairman and without the kind of direct access to the president to which the Chiefs had become accustomed during World War II. The legislation also established a War Council to facilitate military cooperation between the Joint Chiefs, the service secretaries, and the Secretary of National Defense. Finally, the Act envisioned the creation of institutions for the "coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the government concerned with the national security."<sup>106</sup>

In spite of the fact that the proposed legislation bore almost no resemblance to the plan that he had introduced in December 1945, Truman still worried that it would not become law. Members of his staff monitored the hearings and attempted to guess which way each senator was leaning. According to an April 16 report, there were four committee members who were strongly in support of the bill, two who were "open to suggestion for approval," one each in favor of "mild," "some," and "drastic" curtailment of the authority of the proposed Secretary of National Defense, one in favor of eliminating the new Secretary of National Defense, and one "against the bill in its entirety."<sup>107</sup> Under these circumstances, Truman was very reluctant to tip the scales against committee approval by criticisms of specific portions of the draft legislation.

One item in the Senate version of the bill did trigger special concern within the White House, however. On June 6, Elsey received a memo alerting his office to changes in the legislation that "would seem to warrant some action in protection of the President's interests." Specifically, the amendments eliminated the position of executive secretary in the proposed National Security Council and provided that the new Secretary of National Defense (referred to in this version of the legislation as the Secretary of National Security) would serve as "director" of the NSC. The White House memo asserted that this change would "put on the Secretary of National Security a wholly inappropriate job in view of his responsibilities as the head of an 'Establishment.'"<sup>108</sup>

The proposal for vesting enormous authority in the Secretary of Defense within the context of the National Security Council alarmed all of Truman's personal advisers. It ran counter to the information that the White House had received one week earlier, to the effect that "the bill was amended to provide that the President may designate any member of the National Security Council to preside in his absence."<sup>109</sup> Clifford had been warning since January that the proposals for "creating certain interdepartmental mechanisms" (in particular, the NSC and the National Security Resources Board) "would seriously undermine the position of the President and threaten the principle of civilian control of our national security program."<sup>110</sup> Although the Senate proposal would have placed a civilian—the Secretary of Common Defense—directly under the president in the NSC system, Clifford nonetheless worried that the arrangement, "in the name of national security, will practically ensure that many non-military policies and programs of the government will be determined primarily from the military viewpoint."<sup>111</sup> While it is not clear whether the White House had to intervene directly, Clifford was pleased to inform the president on

July 22, 1947, that "the House has restored the provision for a civilian secretary to be director of the staff of the Security Council. This is a most desirable change and is essential to the proper functioning of the Council."<sup>112</sup>

Not surprisingly, the most difficult aspects of the Senate hearings, and of the companion hearings conducted by the House Expenditures Committee, were the discussions concerning the future of Naval Air and the Marine Corps. The draft legislation that had been submitted by the White House had argued that future roles and missions of the armed services should be determined by the president, who had made it a point to obtain a commitment to this principle from the leadership of the Army and Navy. Once the hearings began, however, the Navy's friends in Congress pressed for an amendment to the legislation that would have provided specific safeguards for naval aviation and the Marines. Thoughtful spokesmen for the Navy's position, such as Admiral Sherman, nonetheless made it clear that any such statement would have to be fairly general, since "if too much detail gets into legal form, it will prevent refinement and improvement of those matters in the future."<sup>113</sup> The Congressional defenders of the Navy's interests finally settled for an amendment that asserted that "the provisions of this Act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of naval aviation."<sup>114</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The final product was a major defeat for Harry Truman, George Marshall, and the other proponents of comprehensive military unification. Kenneth Royall, the incoming Secretary of the Army, spoke for most of the leadership in his service when he predicted that the new defense establishment "will not save money, will not be efficient, and will not prevent interservice rivalry."<sup>115</sup> Many members of the two services recognized, however, that the war was not over. Shortly after the National Security Act became law, elements within the Army began to prepare for the next battle in the campaign for military unification, and the Navy began to develop plans for holding onto what it had achieved. This next round in the unification fight will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Ironically, Ferdinand Eberstadt, the person who had as much right as anyone to claim paternity of the legislation, also registered strong criticisms of key aspects of the 1947 National Security Act during his testimony on the last day of the Senate hearings. Eberstadt the businessman had no appreciation for the politics involved in the unifica-

tion struggle. Consequently, he was critical of all compromises, deferrals, and purposeful vagaries, which he saw as undermining the efficiency of the postwar national security system. He was especially concerned that the powers of the Secretary of National Defense, as envisioned in the Act, were "disturbingly general and indefinite." Eberstadt noted that the legislation authorized the secretary to "administer" the entire defense establishment, but did not stipulate how he was to accomplish this in a situation in which the three separate services would preserve their administrative autonomy. To remedy this situation, Eberstadt recommended the "specification of the categories of his authority in positive and affirmative terms." He also expressed concern that the bill lacked a "definite organizational mechanism for fostering unity and teamwork among the military services through appropriate programs of joint education and training at various stages," and consequently proposed the creation of "appropriate agencies" to foster an "integrated program calculated to stimulate unity and teamwork" among the services.<sup>116</sup> Eberstadt's proposals did not become amendments to the 1947 legislation, which was rushed through Congress on the last day of the legislative session (July 26). His comments would be remembered just two years later, however, when the National Security Act was back in Congress to undergo major revisions.

In its final form, the National Security Act created a National Military Establishment (NME) headed by a Secretary of Defense with responsibility for "general direction," as well as supervision and coordination of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and (newly created) Air Force. As the president's "principal assistant . . . in matters relating to the national security," the Secretary of Defense was authorized to "take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication" among the three services. He was also responsible for supervision of the budgeting processes of the three services. At the same time, however, the legislation also provided each service with a civilian secretary who was authorized to administer his service as a separate department, with "all powers and duties . . . not specifically conferred upon the Secretary." The service secretaries were also granted the right to take any issue to the president or the Director of the Budget, after informing the Secretary of Defense. The administrative authority of the Secretary of Defense was also circumscribed by the fact that he was only authorized to hire three civilian "special assistants" to aid him in supervising the activities of the three services. It was expected that the Secretary of Defense would draw most of his resources from the three armed services, but he was not permitted to create his own "military staff."<sup>117</sup>

The National Security Act established four other agencies within the NME. First, and most important, it gave statutory identity to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as the "principal military advisers to the president and the Secretary of Defense." The JCS was to be composed of three service chiefs (Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force). The Act also allowed the president to decide whether he wanted to include a "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief" within the JCS, but it was understood that the model for this individual would be Leahy, serving as a liaison between the White House and the JCS, rather than some kind of "super chief" with authority over the other service representatives. The legislation also created a War Council, which was expected to facilitate discussions between the Secretary of Defense (as chair), the three civilian secretaries, and the three service chiefs. The National Security Act also provided for a Munitions Board, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, with responsibility for coordinating the procurement and purchasing activities of the three services. Finally, the legislation established a Research and Development Board (RDB) within the NME, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, to oversee and coordinate the research activities of the three services.<sup>118</sup>

By the time that Congress voted on the 1947 National Security Act, Truman's priority was closure, at the lowest possible political cost to other priorities. Ever the politician, he did a masterful job of making the best of this bad situation. Thus, on July 26, as he was rushing to Grandview, Missouri, to be with his dying mother, he delayed the departure of his plane ("The Sacred Cow") in order to sign the Act into law. He took as much credit as he could for the final product, while preparing to use the power of his office to control or block the most problematic elements of the legislation.

On the other side of the ledger, the passage of the National Security Act was an extraordinary example of one man's ability to bend a seemingly irresistible political alliance to his personal vision. It does no disservice to James Forrestal to point out that his victory over the supporters of unification could not have been achieved without the patronage that he enjoyed within the ranks of Congress. For it was Forrestal who solicited and channeled this support, using tactics that frequently verged on insubordination. Walter Millis, the editor of the Forrestal diaries, concludes:

If in the end Forrestal was largely the winner in the unification fight, it was because he had thought more deeply, because he had enlisted Eberstadt and others to think for him, because he looked at the real and central problems involved rather than accepted quick solutions which under the test of time and events could not stand.<sup>119</sup>

This goes too far. For at the same time that Forrestal was looking at "the real and central problems," he was also looking after the Navy's interests and traditions. And rather than stand the test of time, Forrestal's formulations could not even stand the test of the first six months of operation. Whatever satisfaction Forrestal may have felt when Truman invited him to serve as the nation's first Secretary of National Defense was soon eclipsed by overwhelming feelings of frustration and impotence, as the institution that he had been so instrumental in creating began to exhibit fundamental defects in design and operation.

## *Chapter Four*

### **EBERSTADT'S PLAN**

#### *ACTIVE, INTIMATE AND CONTINUOUS RELATIONSHIPS*

**A**S INTENSELY DIVISIVE and exhausting as it was, the battle over armed forces unification was only one part of the debate that culminated in the 1947 National Security Act. And it was by no means the most important part, according to many of the participants. As the struggle over unification evolved, various members of the armed services, the media, Congress, and the White House staff became convinced that reform of the national military establishment was not nearly as significant for America's long-term security as were changes in the arrangements for civilian-military consultation, for intelligence gathering and analysis, and for harnessing the nation's industrial and scientific resources to enhance preparedness. The unprecedented inter-service conflict over armed forces unification nonetheless eclipsed the discussions that took place over the creation of such institutions as the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board. As a result, these debates are often depicted as a kind of academic exercise, in which a few basic principles were accepted by all participants as the basis for an objective analysis of the best means to achieve the established ends. Chapters 4 and 5 will illustrate, however, that at least some of the issues were more controversial than the popular image would indicate, involving both institutional interests and constitutional principles.

By contrast to the story of the unification debates, which is an epic involving many main characters over a long period of time, the story of the debates that culminated in the creation of the NSC and CIA is relatively short and simple. The focus of this story is the Eberstadt Report, which was introduced in Chapter 3. Submitted by Ferdinand Eberstadt to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal on September 25, 1945, the 253-page report was impressive in terms of its scope, vision, and originality, particularly in light of the fact that it was completed in just three months. It was nonetheless vague, and even contradictory, with regard to several key points. As a result, the report often served as

a Rorschach test, with each participant in the postwar debates over comprehensive institutional reform reading into it what they hoped, or feared, to find.

Eberstadt and his team of thirty experts produced a wide-ranging study that drew insights from America's prewar and wartime experiences as well as lessons from other nations and from corporate America. The guiding premise of the Eberstadt Report was that peace was too important to be left to civilians, and war was too important to be left to the military. The plan rejected armed forces unification, and instead argued forcefully for new arrangements to insure "active, intimate and continuous relationships" among all of the executive branch agencies responsible for the national security.

One reason why Eberstadt's committee was able to produce such a comprehensive report in such a short period of time was that its chairman had spent much of his time during the Second World War looking at aspects of this problem. As discussed in Chapter 2, Eberstadt had been recruited by Forrestal and Undersecretary of War Patterson in June 1941 to do a study of the Army Navy Munitions Board (ANMB). His ambitious report envisioned the ANMB as the lead agency for facilitating both interservice cooperation and military interaction with the US domestic economy. Roosevelt's rejection of the ANMB plan was the first of several wartime experiences that convinced Eberstadt that the president was an "apostle of confusion." It also convinced him of the need for a postwar system that would facilitate cooperation among experts and administrators, while protecting them from the vagaries of politics and personality.

Eberstadt's views on the need for comprehensive reform of the postwar national security system dovetailed nicely with the arguments that Pendleton Herring had espoused prior to the Second World War. So it is not surprising that Eberstadt recruited Herring in June 1945 to serve as one of his principal assistants in the formulation of the Navy report.<sup>1</sup> According to Jeffery Dorwart, "Over the summer, the two men shared ideas nearly daily on national security concepts and structures. No one saw more of Eberstadt than Herring did."<sup>2</sup>

They were a good team. Herring, the academic, was greatly impressed with Eberstadt, "a type of personality I had never come up against—sharp, brilliant, energetic men of action."<sup>3</sup> Eberstadt introduced Herring to the world of Wall Street financiers, lawyers, and corporate managers—the "dollar-a-year men" who came to Washington to improve efficiency and, in Eberstadt's words, to protect the "onward march of civilization" from the New Deal regulators.<sup>4</sup> Herring reciprocated by providing a political-science perspective that enriched Eberstadt's understanding of the concept of national security.

It is not surprising that some sections of the Eberstadt Report mirror Herring's prewar writings. They also reflect his sense of emergency, which had become reinforced by the experience of Pearl Harbor and the development of new technologies for war-fighting:

Almost every mistake of the first war was duplicated in the second one. Each further gamble, bearing in mind the result of technological changes, increases the chances against us and makes adequate preparation more urgent. The margin of resources is no longer so great, while the scope of the enemy's weapons is far greater.<sup>5</sup>

Eberstadt's team also benefited from the extensive experience that Herring was gaining from his work as chairman of the Committee on Records of War Administration, which was still engaged in an in-depth study of the Roosevelt administration's management of the war effort. The committee spent the war collecting and analyzing information on the government's handling of such issues as mobilization and demobilization, procurement, personnel administration, and interagency coordination. The final report of the committee, published in June 1946 as *The United States at War*, is an indispensable source for anyone interested in Roosevelt's wartime leadership. Herring's participation in the Committee on Records project provided him with both the practical experience and the empirical information that complemented the broad theoretical arguments he had developed in his prewar study, *The Impact of War*.

### THE "ISMAY MACHINE"

The project that brought Eberstadt and Herring together was designed to answer three questions posed by Forrestal in his June 19, 1945, letter of request to Eberstadt:

1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?
2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve the national security?
3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Governmental departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?<sup>6</sup>

As discussed in Chapter 3, the Eberstadt Report recognized that the idea of armed forces unification "looks good on paper" but concluded

that it had created more problems than it had solved when it had been attempted by other governments.<sup>7</sup> The report argued instead for “strong ligaments of coordination expressed by formal intergovernmental links” between the three military services.<sup>8</sup> It also stressed that military reforms were by no means the most important requirement for America’s long-term security:

Our present situation calls for action far more drastic and far-reaching than simply unification of the military services. It calls for a complete realignment [sic] of our governmental organizations to serve the national security in the light of our new world power and position, our new international commitments and risks and the epochal new scientific discoveries.<sup>9</sup>

When they looked for models for “drastic and far-reaching” reform, Eberstadt and his team were drawn to the British experience during the first half of the twentieth century. As noted in the Eberstadt Report: “Of all countries in which the civilian supremacy amounts to a constitutional principle, England has made the most progress in devising a satisfactory solution” to the problem of comprehensive policy coordination.<sup>10</sup>

Three problems had focused the attention of British defense planners at the beginning of the twentieth century: The enormous administrative challenges involved with the management of empire, intense public criticism of the human and material costs of the Boer War, and the rise of German military power in support of a strategy of *Weltpolitik*. The British government responded to these challenges by sponsoring various committees whose general mandate was to propose permanent institutional reforms that would facilitate cooperation and reduce misunderstandings among the various cabinet departments responsible for colonial and national security. The most important of these was the so-called Esher Committee (chaired by Viscount Esher), which began its work in November 1903 and submitted its first report to the government three months later. The Esher Committee addressed the need for greater cooperation between the military services, basing its recommendations on the model of the German General Staff. But the report also concluded that more comprehensive reform was required. Eberstadt judged the Esher Committee’s reasoning to be important enough to merit inclusion in his report four decades later:

We are driven to the conclusion that no measure of War Office reform will avail unless it is associated with provisions for obtaining and collating for the use of the Cabinet all the information and expert advice required for the shaping of national policy in war and for determining the necessary preparations for peace.

The scientific study of imperial resources, the coordination of the ever-varying facts upon which imperial rule rests, the calculation of forces required, and the broad plans necessary to sustain the burden of Empire have, until recently, found no place in our system of government.<sup>11</sup>

The major innovation proposed by the Esher Committee to accomplish these tasks was the establishment of a Committee of Imperial Defence (CID). The CID was established in 1904, with the prime minister as its *ex officio* chairman. He was supported by a small professional secretariat that evolved over the next forty years into a sophisticated system of subcommittees, whose members routinely monitored international developments and cooperated with their counterparts within every cabinet department involved in security planning. The voice of the military within the CID system was strengthened in 1923 when the Chiefs of Staff (COS) committee was established as a subcommittee of the CID. Procedures were also introduced for the relatively seamless transformation of the CID into a War Cabinet during both World War I and World War II.

An essential element in the organic relationship between successive prime ministers and the relatively small CID staff was the unprecedented role played by the secretary. For most of its history, this role was played by Sir Maurice Hankey, who served six prime ministers from 1912 to 1938. Thanks in large part to this very long tenure, the secretary became, in the words of Franklyn Johnson, "the conscience and remembrancer of the Prime Minister in defence" as well as "one of the half-dozen most influential governmental figures in the state."<sup>12</sup>

It is worth emphasizing that the Esher Committee explicitly argued for a permanent secretariat with a long-serving secretary in order to protect the empire from future prime ministers who might be insufficiently attentive to matters of security:

There have been . . . in the past and there will be in the future Prime Ministers to whom the great questions of Imperial Defence do not appeal. . . . It is not safe to trust matters affecting national security to the chance of a favourable combination of personal characteristics.<sup>13</sup>

It is doubtful that the CID ever played the role of truant officer for irresponsible prime ministers. What can be stated with confidence is that when the system was tested during the 1930s, the natural limits of the CID's influence over the chief executive were made evident. During this period, which Churchill described as "the years the locusts have eaten," successive British governments opted for policies of appeasement rather than confront the domestic political challenges associated with a campaign of national mobilization. The members of the

CID secretariat could do little under these circumstances, other than concentrate their efforts on contingency planning. This was by no means a waste of time, however. In fact, Franklyn Johnson has speculated that "it may well be" that the plans developed by the CID in the late 1930s "prevented the defeat of the 1939–41 allies before the United States could exert her great industrial weight."<sup>14</sup>

Rather than placing a check on the chief executive, the secretariat functioned for most of its history as the prime minister's indispensable personal staff. According to Johnson, the CID "was history's most successful experiment, under democratic auspices, in harnessing land, sea and airpower to the political objectives of strategic planning, preparedness, policy formulation, and war-making."<sup>15</sup>

The great strengths of the British system for comprehensive policy coordination had come to the attention of several American leaders during World War II. In a confidential letter dated July 10, 1943, to James Byrnes, who was serving at this time as Director of War Mobilization, George Marshall complained that the US Chiefs of Staff were at "a serious disadvantage" in their dealings with their British counterparts because the British officers

are connected up with other branches of their Government through an elaborate but most closely knit Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we suffer accordingly. . . . I am of the opinion that a great deal of our difficulty in composing military effort with production and civil life economy flows from the fact that we have no well-integrated system which is at work on the job day and night.<sup>16</sup>

Roosevelt was also aware of the relative merits of what he called the "Ismay machine" (a reference to Lord Ismay, Hankey's successor as secretary of CID and then as the prime minister's representative to the wartime Chiefs of Staff). Although the president reportedly told Churchill that the United States needed such a system, it is hard to take such assertions seriously in light of Roosevelt's instinctive opposition to any arrangement that threatened his personal control over the wartime bureaucracy.<sup>17</sup>

Navy Secretary Forrestal also became very attracted to the "Ismay machine" during the war. In the early stages of the unification fight, Forrestal invited Lord Ismay to Washington on two occasions to discuss the workings of the CID with members of the Navy staff. Forrestal saw this arrangement as a compromise between no system for high-level coordination and a system that would impose unacceptable constraints on the Navy and accelerate a process of "relentless consolidation of power." Indeed, Forrestal worried that this process of consolidation was already very far along, and leading toward "the creation of a real socialist state."<sup>18</sup>

Based on his experience with Roosevelt, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Eberstadt was also attracted to the British model because of its potential as a "conscience and remembrancer" for—and perhaps a direct restraint upon—future chief executives. As he wrote in a memo to himself during the preparation of the Eberstadt Report: "The resort to a multitude of emergency agencies and many of the other mistakes which we made were not so much a matter of new conditions as the abandonment of old principles."<sup>19</sup> Eberstadt argued that even in the best of circumstances, the United States in the twentieth century needed something like the CID at the top of the national security bureaucracy. But he also shared Forrestal's concern about concentrating too much power in the White House, or in some presidential surrogate within the executive branch.

Paul Hammond has associated Eberstadt and Forrestal's vision of collective decision making with what he calls the "cabinet fallacy": "The idea that a committee of some kind could assume some major burdens of the Presidency."<sup>20</sup> In fact, Eberstadt's whole approach to postwar security planning reflected these assumptions. As Jeffery Dorwart has noted, Eberstadt's experiences in the business world had convinced him that the best way to manage a complex social organization was to establish institutions that allowed "good men" who represented different institutions but also shared a common goal to develop habits of cooperation.<sup>21</sup> To the extent possible, such systems were to be voluntary, with only as much central authority as was needed to facilitate negotiations. Forrestal was fully supportive of this vision. There was nonetheless a great deal of ambivalence in both men's approach to fundamental reform, since they both expressed the conviction that national security was too important to be allowed to become captive of either intransigent special interests or self-interested bureaucracies. Over the next decade, the challenge of squaring this circle would become an increasing source of frustration for Eberstadt. And by the end of the 1940s, it had completely overwhelmed Forrestal.

Harry Truman was also deeply ambivalent about the relative merits of horizontal and vertical systems of administration, but he came at the problem from the other side. Both on constitutional and personal grounds, he was viscerally suspicious of any system that threatened to steal, or leach, authority from the president. But Truman was also too much of a politician not to appreciate that public policy demanded continuous and substantive compromise. The president was absolutely committed to a system in which the buck stopped at his desk, but he was also convinced that this system would collapse if it depended too heavily upon micromanagement.

During the latter stages of the war, Truman's staff had looked closely at the British CID and War Cabinet models for guidance. George

Elsley's record of his April 9, 1945, meeting with a representative of the War Cabinet secretariat notes, "Churchill [takes] no action without War Cabinet," whose members have "mutual group responsibility" for the management of the war effort at home and abroad.<sup>22</sup> Although Truman felt that there was "much to this idea" of institutionalized cooperation, he noted in his memoirs that "under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the president. To change it we would have to change the Constitution, and I think we are doing very well under our Constitution."<sup>23</sup>

### "POL-MIL"

In spite of his reservations about the applicability of the British model, Truman agreed with the Eberstadt Report that the postwar situation demanded new arrangements for civilian-military cooperation. He also came to accept the report's claim that the "keystone" of any postwar system of comprehensive policy coordination was an arrangement that would

institutionaliz(e) the relationship between those responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military policy so that a proper balance will be maintained without endangering civilian supremacy.<sup>24</sup>

There was certainly a need for such an institution by the start of the twentieth century, but the historical record, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, clearly demonstrates that the major barrier to such cooperation had been the Department of State. At the start of World War II, the State Department had painted itself into a corner by clinging to the myth that diplomacy and war-fighting were distinct realms of activity that required different institutional responses. State's problems were exacerbated by Hull's negative image within the White House and among the armed services. Under these circumstances, State was forced to concentrate its attention on a few issues that were unrelated to the major war effort, including relations with neutral governments, diplomatic matters in the Western Hemisphere, and planning for a postwar international organization. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, political-military issues of postwar occupation and alliance relations began to impinge as the momentum of the war shifted, and the absence of the State Department at the top of the policymaking community became increasingly problematic. This is the point at which Secretary of War Stimson pressed for the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.<sup>25</sup>

During the fall of 1944, Stimson's proposal languished in the State Department, while all parties awaited the resignation of an increasingly ill Cordell Hull. When the Secretary of State finally stepped down, Roosevelt moved quickly to appoint Edward Stettinius as his successor. Chastened by his experiences as Undersecretary and then Acting Secretary of State, Stettinius accepted the president's offer on the condition that his department would enjoy greater access to the White House, and greater influence over the policy process, than had been the case since the attack on Pearl Harbor. The subsequent interchange between the president and Stettinius is worth quoting, if only as a comment on Roosevelt's haphazard approach to administration:

I told the President that we had to do something to strengthen the White House relationship and that there were too many papers and too much stuff going unattended to. For example, the response from [Patrick] Hurley [ambassador to China] this week had been in for nine days and I didn't know about it yet. The President said, "How could you, I had it in my pocket?"<sup>26</sup>

Stettinius was not content to settle for Roosevelt's assurance that "you and I could have a perfect understanding and complete harmony and work as a team."<sup>27</sup> He pressed the president to create a new position for Charles Bohlen (Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs at State) as a "liaison officer" between the State Department and the White House. Roosevelt agreed to bring Bohlen into the inner circle, but instructed that he be referred to as the liaison officer between the president and the Chief of Staff to the President.<sup>28</sup> This placed a State Department representative between Roosevelt and Leahy, precisely at that point in time when the latter seems to have become much more assertive and influential as a foreign policy adviser. In spite of this anomalous status, Bohlen proved to be quite effective at bolstering the influence of the State Department in Washington.

Having established a toehold for State in the White House, Stettinius was prepared to accept Stimson's invitation to establish the SWNCC. In a letter to Forrestal and Stimson dated November 29, 1944, Stettinius asserted that the SWNCC would be "charged with the duty of formulating recommendations to the Secretary of State on questions having both military and political aspects."<sup>29</sup> Over the next two-and-a-half years, the SWNCC played a valuable role in facilitating political-military cooperation on such complex issues as the Japanese surrender terms, the occupation of Germany and Japan, US policy toward China, and the management of relations with an increasingly difficult Soviet Union. Supported by its own secretariat, which was divided into regional and functional subcommittees, the SWNCC provided all concerned parties with a venue for both discussion and in-depth analysis

of rapidly changing events. It played a key role, for example, in guiding decisions relating to the postwar control of atomic power and in the formulation of guidelines for America's postwar basing network. David McClellan also credits the SWNCC with the formulation of "one of the strongest policy memos yet prepared for the President" on Soviet intentions and the strategic implications of Soviet expansionism, in response to Moscow's demand for control of the Dardenelles in early August 1946.<sup>30</sup>

What is less well known, and much more important for this study of the 1947 National Security Act, is the essential role that the SWNCC played in the transformation of the military's influence within the Washington policy community and within American society. By filling a decision making vacuum in the latter stages of the war and the immediate postwar era, the SWNCC contributed significantly to the institutionalization of military authority at the highest levels of the policymaking community. As Alan Ciamporzero has demonstrated in his close reading of the minutes of SWNCC meetings between 1944 and 1947, the simple fact that the SWNCC formalized a two-against-one (War and Navy versus State) voting arrangement tipped the scales of deliberations in favor of military perspectives on wartime and postwar issues.<sup>31</sup> At a time when the War and Navy Departments were engaged in a "brass-knuckle fight" over armed forces unification, they were usually able to create a common front in the SWNCC during negotiations with their State Department counterpart. It may be an exaggeration to claim, as Ciamporzero does, that "by piecemeal action, War and Navy, through SWNCC, had foreclosed the option of peace" with the Soviet Union.<sup>32</sup> It is nonetheless clear that the SWNCC contributed to a policy environment that favored military perspectives on major diplomatic issues at a crucial moment in American history.

This trend was reinforced during the latter stages of the war by fundamental changes in the culture of the armed forces. As mentioned in Chapter 3, both the Army and the Navy had by this time come to accept that they had an obligation to remain both informed about and involved in debates relating to the significant political issues of the time. The Army's initial response to this challenge was to establish a new Strategic Policy Section within the Operations Division, under the leadership of General George Lincoln. The new section was given specific responsibility for formulating policy papers on political-military matters. Lincoln brought together an exceptional team of highly educated officers, three of whom shared with their commander the distinction of being Rhodes Scholars. "Our problem," according to Lincoln, "goes beyond the normal one of working out the answer to a message or paper with a suspense date on it; we are constantly being forced

into a precipitate determination concerning long-range projects and objectives."<sup>33</sup> Over the next several years, such "pol-mil" thinking permeated all three services at all levels of training and responsibility.

Many people within the State Department, including Stettinius and Acheson, were hopeful that their department would replace both the Joint Chiefs and the SWNCC as the preeminent source of foreign policy advice once the war was over. This had, after all, been the traditional pattern during earlier transitions from war to peace. Furthermore, Roosevelt's successor had made it clear that he believed that "the State Department is set up for the purpose of handling foreign policy operations, and the State Department ought to take care of them."<sup>34</sup> Soon after taking office, however, it became clear to Truman that virtually all of the major postwar foreign policy issues had substantial military elements that made it necessary to rely upon some interagency device such as the SWNCC. When he sought the help of the SWNCC in the development of US bargaining positions at Potsdam, Truman was very favorably impressed. He recorded in his memoirs, "When I assigned a problem, I received prompt and clear-cut answers combining their best judgments. . . . Before leaving Potsdam I informed the three departments that I liked this system and requested them to continue to cooperate on all common problems through this committee."<sup>35</sup>

The State Department's postwar prospects were also undermined by Truman's decision to replace Stettinius with an individual who could help him in his relations with Congress. Like Hull, James Byrnes had served in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, and had preserved close ties to key members of both branches of Congress. This was an important consideration for the White House at a time when Congress was likely to become much more assertive on foreign and defense matters. But Truman also realized that appointing Byrnes, whom he referred to in his diary as "able and conniving," was risky.<sup>36</sup> The president was soon worrying that Byrnes was making foreign policy decisions without adequately consulting the White House. The issue came to a head when the Secretary of State attempted to schedule a personal radio address to the nation at the conclusion of the Council of Ministers meeting in Moscow, prior to meeting with Truman to report on the results of the negotiations. David McCullough contends, "There was no open break" between the two men following this incident, "but Truman's confidence in his Secretary of State was not to be the same again."<sup>37</sup> Byrnes also failed to establish an efficient system for communication and consultation with members of his State Department staff. Anxious to retain as much personal influence as possible, Byrnes even removed Bohlen from his liaison position within the White House. As a result of these maneuvers, the secretary lost the

support of both his superior and his subordinates; in the process, he undermined the prospects for bolstering the influence of State within the Washington policy community during the crucial period (1945–47) leading up to the passage of the National Security Act.

Even if the State Department had been blessed with a different secretary during this period, however, it would have had difficulty in regaining the kind of influence over foreign affairs that had characterized previous postwar eras. Memories of Pearl Harbor were simply too clear and strong to allow State to make the traditional case for the subordination of military advice during peacetime. Herring's argument in 1941 for the institutionalization of a permanent place for the military at the highest levels of policymaking was by now almost universally accepted. Unless State was prepared to agree to this arrangement, and adapt its procedures and its institutions to the demands of national security, it ran the risk of completely losing its influence over postwar foreign policy in the same way that it had lost its influence over developments during the war.

But there was a catch. If the State Department bought into the logic of "pol-mil," and sought to demonstrate its *bona fides* as a national security agency, it would be competing for status and influence with other agencies—most notably, the armed services—whose national security credentials were well established and unimpeachable. Faced with a choice between complete irrelevance and unfair competition, State chose the second option, and joined the national security community.

Congress did not make this easy. Soon after the war ended, the State Department became the target of Congressional criticisms—not just of the efficiency of some State Department employees, but of their loyalty as well. Acheson notes that "Representative Andrew Jackson May, Democrat, chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, was the chosen instrument for the attack. On March 14 [1946], May charged that persons with 'strong Soviet leanings,' who had been forced out of the War Department, were now to be found in State."<sup>38</sup> Even Byrnes was vulnerable to criticisms from influential senators like Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan) that he was not tough enough in his dealings with Moscow, and that he was prepared to give too much away in negotiations relating to nuclear energy. Such "pre-McCarthy attacks" (Acheson's term) continued to be a persistent distraction for State, even though key State Department personnel (Acheson, Bohlen, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, and Paul Nitze) were on the verge of becoming some of the most influential proponents of anti-Soviet containment.

State's prospects brightened on January 21, 1947, when George C. Marshall replaced Byrnes as Secretary of State. No individual stood a better chance of adapting the State Department to the new standards of national security. And no individual stood a better chance of securing an influential role for State at the top of the national security community. Acheson goes so far as to refer to the appointment as "an act of God."<sup>39</sup> But Marshall found it difficult to use his enormous personal prestige to defend State's interests in a new era with new expectations. Ironically, this was attributable in large part to the success that he and the other members of the military leadership had achieved in their campaign to improve the image, and the political influence, of the armed forces during the war.

### "THE KEYSTONE":

#### THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Pendleton Herring's influence was apparent in the section of the Eberstadt Report that addressed the State Department's traditional lack of interest in dialogue with the War and Navy departments. Noting that "it has been the exception rather than the rule that American foreign policy has been brought into balance with military policy," the report argued for "a means of institutionalizing the relationship between those responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military policy" at the top of the Washington policy community.<sup>40</sup> The report proposed the creation of a National Security Council to perform this role, but it did not provide many specifics. This was at least partly attributable to the fact that although the report described the NSC as the "keystone of our organizational structure for national security," it was not the central focus of the discussions among Eberstadt's team.<sup>41</sup> The minutes of the initial meetings of the group, in June 1945, confirm that the issue of armed forces unification demanded almost all of the committee's attention. Indeed, the minutes of one of the first planning sessions record that seven of the ten tasks proposed by Eberstadt for his staff relate specifically to the issue of unification, and the other three are recommendations for general background research and organization.<sup>42</sup>

Eberstadt did hint at the need for a new policy-coordinating agency in one of his first meetings with his committee, when he listed three possible "approaches to unification": Full merger (in accordance with the Army proposals); a Department of Defense without any coordinating at the top (Eberstadt warned his staff that if no coordinating institution were created, it "might involve dangerous rivalries"); and "a third possibility . . .":

It was suggested that a Board or Council of National Defense should be established to consist of the Secretaries of each of the services and also other interested governmental departments. The Executive Council should presumably have an executive head responsible directly to the President. The Council would run all phases of [a] unified defense program both in war and peace.<sup>43</sup>

It is instructive that this early reference to what would become the NSC was developed in the context of the issue of armed forces unification. Although both Eberstadt and Herring frequently protested that they were not simply “making the Navy’s case” against unification, it seems clear in retrospect that the Eberstadt Committee backed into their recommendations for comprehensive reform only after they had established a firm point of reference in support of the Navy’s position.<sup>44</sup>

Eberstadt’s initial instructions to his team are also useful because they highlight the problem that would plague this report, and most of the subsequent discussions leading up the 1947 Act—the search for a system that would enhance efficiency without doing violence to the constitutional authority of the president and Congress and without threatening the status and influence of established executive branch institutions. In his 1941 book, Herring had made the case for such a “positive state” system, which could improve central decision making without falling prey to special interests and without becoming a dictatorship.<sup>45</sup> Forrestal and Eberstadt had arrived at the same conclusion as a result of their careers in the corporate world and their cautionary experiences during the war. Their ability to design such a system was nonetheless compromised by the priority that they accorded to the preservation of the Navy’s autonomy.

By August, the committee’s attention had shifted to this issue of comprehensive policy coordination. They relied heavily upon the lessons they had learned from their study of the British institutions for high-level policy coordination and the SWNCC.<sup>46</sup> In accordance with the model of the British War Cabinet (the wartime successor to the CID), the Eberstadt Report proposed an agency with the smallest possible number of permanent members required to oversee foreign policy, defense affairs, and national mobilization issues. The president was to be the *ex officio* chairman of the proposed National Security Council, assisted by a full-time executive and a small secretariat. The only other permanent members were to be the Secretary of State, the three service secretaries, and the chairman of the proposed National Security Resources Board (discussed in Chapter 5). In the event that the president could not attend, the vice president was to preside over the NSC. Though the report stated specifically that the function of the

NSC would be "advisory to the President on questions involving the national security," it went on to stipulate:

1. The members of the NSC "would be responsible, in their collective capacity, for the formulating of joint policy, and in their individual capacities, for its decentralized execution. . . ." <sup>47</sup>
2. "The fact that the President himself heads the Council would for all practical purposes insure that the advice it [NSC] offers would be accepted."
3. The NSC would "exercise the power of review over the budgets of the armed services before they were presented to Congress, advising the President in writing on this matter." <sup>48</sup>

In spite of the fact that Eberstadt himself had warned the members of his committee about the importance of precision in their use of terms relating to collective decision making, the report raised more questions than it answered about the nature and degree of the NSC's executive authority. The report also generated some confusion regarding the role played by the permanent secretariat, which was to be "composed about equally of military and civilian personnel." Furthermore, the report stated that the secretariat's primary responsibility would be "the collection and ordering of all information and intelligence from the various departments of the Government," but it assumed either that these departments would voluntarily submit to this authority or that successive presidents would intervene to compel such cooperation. The same problem of implied or assumed authority was to haunt the Central Intelligence Agency, which was designated as the "mechanism through which the Secretariat would work to accomplish th(e) mission" of gathering and interpreting information. Nor was it clear what powers would be exercised by the person selected to head the NSC's secretariat. Indeed, even the duration of employment of this individual was cast into doubt by the statement that he "would in effect have permanent tenure although it might be desirable to fix a term of 5 or 7 years renewable at pleasure." The report also stipulated that the NSC "turn to" the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice on strictly military matters. <sup>49</sup> At another point, however, it recommended that the activities of the JCS be "related" to those of the NSC. <sup>50</sup> As discussed in Chapter 3, the report also favored the creation of a Chief of the Joint Staff within the JCS, "to administer the Joint Staff and to act as executive to the Joint Chiefs." But it did not clarify the relationship between the Chief of the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs (speculating that this person might be "a coequal member" of the JCS). <sup>51</sup> Nor was it made clear how a Chief of the Joint Staff would interact with the NSC. The report also left open the option of a Chief of Staff to the President, but did not address the question of whether this person would play a liaison role

similar to the one played by Admiral Leahy during the war or some more ambitious executive role within the JCS and/or the NSC. It merely stated that this individual would “serve with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”<sup>52</sup>

The minutes of the Eberstadt Committee’s discussions also provide one other intriguing element in the debates about the purpose and identity of the proposed National Security Council. In a memo dated August 27, Eberstadt advised members of the committee:

We should, I think, point out that the focal point of our future foreign policy is likely to be a Security Council set up under the San Francisco Charter and that our proposed National Security Council is its domestic counterpart in a very real sense.<sup>53</sup>

These instructions made sense at a time when the media, the White House, and most of Congress were united in a mood of optimism about the new United Nations, whose charter had been signed on June 24. Eberstadt’s comments also reflect the atmosphere of confidence about the prospects for international cooperation just ten days after the Japanese surrender. By implying some kind of relationship between the proposed National Security Council and the UN Security Council, however, he compounded the already serious confusion within his team about the precise role that the NSC would play in the postwar policymaking system.

The Eberstadt Report’s proposal for a National Security Council helped the Navy to shift the focus of the debate away from the issue of armed forces unification (or, for that matter, effective armed forces coordination). Protests by Forrestal and Eberstadt to the contrary notwithstanding, this was a “Navy plan,” which began from the premise that the service secretaries and service chiefs should be left alone to administer their separate military branches. In fact, there was no Secretary of Defense or Department of Defense (or variants thereof) in the original version of the Eberstadt Report. Policy coordination was expected to take place “at the top” within the NSC, but it was left to the president, and to the goodwill of all participants, to resolve disputes and break deadlocks. The result was an enormous grey area between national security planning (very broadly defined) and the day-to-day management of national security.

It is hard to believe that Eberstadt was confident that this arrangement could actually achieve effective policy coordination. It preserved intact the status and autonomy of the service secretaries, and actually exacerbated the problem of interservice cooperation by supporting the creation of a third independent service with its own secretary of equal rank. The prospects for consensus on strictly military issues were fur-

ther reduced by the requirement of unanimity of decision among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report relied primarily upon the NSC to encourage cooperation both among the services and between the military and key civilian agencies, but it did not designate an individual (other than the president) to exercise permanent control over the NSC. Furthermore, since the report recommended that the NSC be composed of three military representatives and two civilian representatives and envisioned the JCS as both a subcommittee and a second staff for the NSC, it virtually assured the predominance of military advice and perspectives within the new organization.

The Eberstadt Report became a primary point of reference for all of the Congressional hearings and for the various rounds of Army-Navy negotiation between the fall of 1945 and the passage of the National Security Act. Its vaguely defined vision of the NSC as a substitute for a Secretary of Defense and a Department of Defense resurfaced in many forms during this period, making these discussions more interesting, but also contributing significantly to an atmosphere of confusion and misunderstanding.

Soon after the final report was submitted to Forrestal on September 25, 1945, Eberstadt found himself directly involved in follow-on negotiations with representatives of Congress and with the leadership of the two services. Meanwhile, members of Truman's staff pored over the report to assist the president in preparing an official statement on the issue of unification. Clark Clifford accepted Eberstadt's argument that the proposed NSC was more important than the issue of armed forces unification. In an internal memo dated December 13, 1945, he noted:

Our needs require integration of the whole organizational structure of the government. . . . The grave danger exists, in my mind, that these needs which are more vital and essential than merger of the War and Navy Departments will not be met if they are not recommended and strongly endorsed by the President at this time.<sup>54</sup>

Even though the president recorded in his diary that he "endorsed fully" the Navy's claim that the United States needed some system for the coordination of foreign, defense, and mobilization policies, his letter to Congress, dated December 19, 1945, shifted the focus of the debate back to the issue of armed forces unification.<sup>55</sup> This official statement by the president made it much more difficult for Eberstadt and Forrestal to make the Navy's case. Over the next few months, as the Senate Military Affairs Committee moved forward with plans for legislation based on Truman's (and the Army's) vision of unification, Eberstadt engaged in a rear-guard campaign to salvage key elements of his

report, while Forrestal wrestled with members of Truman's staff and cultivated the Navy's friends within Congress. By March 1946, Eberstadt was involved in almost daily discussions with Robert Patterson and/or Forrestal, as the two service secretaries attempted to reach a compromise position that they could present to Congress as a basis for legislation.

Faced with the real prospect of losing this fight, both Eberstadt and Forrestal looked for compromise solutions that would preserve the autonomy of the armed services while fulfilling the president's demand for improved coordination. One very controversial proposal that grew out of Eberstadt's discussions with Patterson and Forrestal envisioned "effective over-all unification of our national security organization in the person of one man, the Secretary of Common Defense (who will be Chairman of the Council of Common Defense)." The proposed council would be composed of the three service secretaries and the Secretary of State (a spokesman for the National Security Resources Board was conspicuously absent from this version). The most important change in this version was the addition of a very powerful chairman:

He is the fount from which the unifying decisions will flow. His responsibilities are clear, his duties are clear, and his powers are clear. From him stems a simple and definite line of authority to integrate and supervise the whole national security program. On his own initiative or at the request of others, he can settle conflicts and remove obstructions to prompt and effective decision and action.<sup>56</sup>

Eberstadt argued that relieving the Secretary of Common Defense of the arduous duties of direct administration of the armed services would actually enhance his personal authority over national security affairs by allowing him to concentrate his attention on the truly important issues that required coordination at the top. In fact, this formulation could have given the proposed secretary enough power to threaten the constitutional prerogatives of the president, but not enough to control the administrative activities of the service secretaries.

Not surprisingly, proposals such as this foundered on concerns in both the White House and Congress about an unelected "poobah." But Eberstadt countered in testimony on May 9 that the proposed legislation—which favored a Secretary of Common Defense who would have considerable authority over the armed services and a Council of Common Defense to facilitate discussions between the Secretaries of State and Defense and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board—would place "unification at too low a level." It would not solve the obvious need for a civilian "who can coordinate and reconcile dif-

ferences not only among the military services but throughout the entire national security structure." Eberstadt nonetheless backed away from his previous proposal for a chairman of the Council of Common Defense as the "fount" for all major national security decisions. Instead, he described the proposed chairman in corporatist terms, based on models from World War II:

Such a coordinator need have no huge department under him. He would have no temptation to indulge in empire building, nor any ability or opportunity to do so if he were tempted. It is not necessary to give him dictatorial power. We should be able to reach a sound balance between giving him too much power and too little power. I think that no one would feel that Justice Byrnes [as director of War Mobilization] or Judge Vinson [head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion] had been dictators.<sup>57</sup>

Eberstadt admitted in his testimony that this emphasis upon an influential (but not "dictatorial") chairman represented a departure from his recommendations one year earlier. "In the report I recommended that the President be Chairman of the Council and that in his absence the Vice President so act. . . . Now, I think that it might be improved if there were someone along the lines of Justice Byrnes or Judge Patterson . . . using the President, if you will, as a chairman, realizing that he would not be in regular attendance."<sup>58</sup>

Forrestal's testimony before the Naval Affairs Committee dovetailed with Eberstadt's arguments. He agreed that, in order to get things done, the council would need a person at the top who could serve as the president's "alter ego," and referred to both Byrnes and Vinson as models for this individual.<sup>59</sup> But Forrestal also injected a new note of confusion, by referring to the much-maligned Donald Nelson as another example for the proposed chairman. The Navy secretary confronted directly the argument that such an arrangement would concentrate too much power in the hands of one unelected individual. Drawing upon his Wall Street experience, he assured the committee that the proposed council would "conform to the chairman and the board of directors of a large industrial organization."<sup>60</sup> He also asserted that the chairman of the council "would be less of a dictator than the Secretary of Common Defense envisaged in this bill" because he would be coordinating the activities of various independent agencies rather than directly administering the entire military establishment.<sup>61</sup>

Some proponents of substantive reform were willing to go farther, by directly challenging the president's claim to constitutionally protected authority. These individuals argued that, in a much more dangerous strategic environment, it was unwise to be overly concerned about deferring to the president as the final arbiter of national security.

Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1946, journalist George Fielding Eliot noted, "The total and global wars of today make demands on knowledge and ability that are just too vast for one-man decisions."<sup>62</sup> Eliot also advanced a theory of American democracy to support a tilt toward cabinet government:

This is not to say, of course, that no one man can be qualified to be President of the United States. In a sense, of course, that too could be argued. . . . Under our system of government, we take the best we can get, or the best that the political lottery brings to the surface for our choice. But we surround that executive power with a system of constitutional checks and balances, as precautions against the inevitable uncertainties involved in entrusting any human being with the vast powers of the Presidency. We do not extend the one-man idea any farther than we have to, and where we must use it we guard it carefully.<sup>63</sup>

Eliot's logic led him to reject not only an unconstrained president but also a chairman of the proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff and a powerful chairman of the proposed National Security Council:

To put final decisions in the hands of one man seems an easy way out of all difficulties involving differences of opinion. It has been said that the easy way in business is monopoly; in politics, dictatorship; in international affairs, imperialism. But these are ways which are foreign to our fundamental conceptions of human relationships; we have struggled against them at home and abroad.<sup>64</sup>

Eberstadt and Forrestal agreed that a corporatist arrangement could protect the Navy's interest in autonomy, respect the constitutional prerogatives of the president and Congress, and still significantly enhance national security decision making. On the other hand, they also recognized that the corporatist model allowed for great variation, and unpredictability, in decision making. Their ambivalence was reflected in the full range of possibilities that they were prepared to consider in their proposals for a National Security Council and a Council of Common Defense, including the option of a strong secretary who would be capable of imposing his will upon the national security community.<sup>65</sup>

The coordinated efforts of Eberstadt, Forrestal, and their allies in Congress began to pay off after the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs orchestrated hearings that directly challenged the president's plan for armed forces unification and sought to shift the focus of the debate toward proposals for an NSC. As previously noted, the president suspected that an agency designed for high-level policy coordination was more appropriate in a parliamentary form of democracy, and that it might become a "second cabinet." But he was also becoming increas-

ingly anxious for an end to this debilitating and distracting dispute over unification. Under these circumstances, he was not prepared to allow arguments over the proposed NSC to delay passage of the National Security Act.

Secretary of State Marshall felt more strongly about the problems posed by the NSC. One of his first memos to Truman after taking office (dated February 7, 1947) challenged the Navy's recommendation that a National Security Council be included in the proposed National Security Act. Marshall worried that this proposal was "extraneous to the purpose of the bill" and would divert attention from the issue of armed forces unification. Since unification was essentially a lost cause by this time, Marshall's criticism was beside the point. His second argument against the proposed NSC was nonetheless destined to carry more weight with Truman. He described the NSC as a "critical departure from the traditional method of formulating and conducting foreign policy" and warned that it "would evidently by statute dissipate the constitutional responsibility of the president for the conduct of foreign affairs":

I think it would be unwise to vest such a Council by statute with broad and detailed powers and responsibilities in this field [foreign policy]. Under the proposed statute it would be the duty of the Council in carrying out the specific obligations imposed upon it and in exercising the authority granted to limit, in effect, this vital responsibility of the President.<sup>66</sup>

Marshall also claimed that the NSC would undermine the traditional prerogatives of the Secretary of State. He noted that the proposal envisioned six permanent members of the NSC besides the president—the Secretary of State, the secretaries of the three armed services, the new Secretary of the Armed Forces, and the new chairman of the National Security Resources Board—and he warned that in a situation in which "at least four [members] would be the civilian heads of military establishments . . . the Secretary of State would become the automaton of the Council." He went on to observe that State had not even been invited to participate in the drafting of earlier versions of the legislation because it was understood that it dealt primarily with matters that were within the purview of the armed forces. Since the proposal for a National Security Council went well beyond this initial understanding, and threatened to do violence to the "constitutional and traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs," Marshall argued strongly against presidential approval.<sup>67</sup>

Many of Marshall's concerns were echoed by Donald Stone of the Bureau of the Budget, who often served as the strongest defender of the president's constitutional authority during the unification debates.

In January 1947, Stone warned Clark Clifford that the compromise language for the proposed unification bill would “take control of national security policy out of the Present’s hands and . . . place it under military domination.” He leveled his strongest criticisms at plans to make the NSC “other than an advisory agency,” describing it as a “usurpation of the necessary powers of the president and a direct violation of our Constitutional system.”<sup>68</sup> Stone registered equally intense criticisms of the Senate’s subsequent draft version of the legislation (S-758), which designated the Secretary of National Security as the NSC’s executive secretary (a variation on Eberstadt’s 1946 proposal). Stone noted that “the wearing of two hats by a subordinate of the President is unworkable,” and also argued that “planning for national security . . . is a Presidential responsibility, and one which he can carry out only with staff assistance of his own.”<sup>69</sup> As discussed in Chapter 3, White House representatives communicated these concerns to members of Congress, and the draft legislation was revised to allow for a civilian secretary as director of the NSC staff.<sup>70</sup>

Stone also took issue with the Senate’s attempt to introduce language that would have compelled the president to provide Congress with an accounting of budgetary deliberations within the proposed council:

The provision is impertinent, and is destructive of the unity within the Executive Branch . . . and would by Congressional mandate *require* the parties concerned to “wash their underwear as a public exhibition.”

Stone also touched a nerve with some White House staffers by claiming that any legislation that gave Congress access to the details of executive branch deliberations over defense budgets would encourage the natural instincts of the separate services to inflate their estimates.<sup>71</sup>

Neither Stone nor Marshall was successful in convincing the White House that the entire NSC section should be stricken from the proposed legislation. To insure against the “second cabinet” problem, however, the president made sure that the wording of the draft legislation was changed from “The function of the Council shall be to integrate foreign and military policies . . .” to “The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of foreign and military policies. . . .”<sup>72</sup> The president also resolved, on the advice of the Bureau of the Budget, not to attend NSC meetings on a regular basis so that he “could best preserve his full freedom of action with respect to NSC policy recommendations.”<sup>73</sup>

In spite of these tactical adjustments, the NSC was still vulnerable to Paul Hammond’s critique of the “cabinet fallacy”: “The confusion of the president’s relationship to the NSC was never clarified.”<sup>74</sup> Fur-

thermore, as approved, the legislation did not resolve Marshall's "automaton" problem. It favored a military perspective on foreign and defense issues by designating military representatives to fill four of the seven permanent seats on the council (i.e., the Secretary of Defense and the three service secretaries, along with the president, the Secretary of State, and the chairman of the newly created National Security Resources Board). The president was granted the authority to appoint other specifically designated individuals to the NSC—"the Secretaries of the executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board . . . and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board"—but only after they had received the advice and consent of the Senate for their executive branch appointments.<sup>75</sup>

The council was to be served by a "civilian executive secretary," who was authorized to hire and supervise his own staff.<sup>76</sup> Sidney Souers, who had been serving as the first director of Central Intelligence for about six months, was named as the first executive secretary. The Act was nonetheless silent regarding whether the Secretary of State or the new Secretary of Defense or the new executive secretary would run the NSC on those occasions when the president was not present. Rather, it was left to the president to decide who would represent him in his absence.<sup>77</sup>

The fact that the legislation did not specifically state who would chair the NSC in the president's absence left open the possibility that the new Secretary of Defense would play this *ex officio* role. James Forrestal certainly assumed this. Forrestal envisioned the NSC as the institution that would provide the Secretary of Defense with considerable personal authority over the formulation and management of national security policy, both because he would serve as the president's surrogate within the new entity and because he would be able to draw upon the support of the other three permanent representatives of the armed forces on the NSC. As Forrestal noted subsequently in his diary, "I regard it [the NSC] as an integral part of the national defense setup and believe it was so intended by the Congress." And it was for more than symbolic reasons that Forrestal fought (without success) to locate the NSC within the Pentagon. This helps to explain one of the central questions of the early Cold War era: Why would Forrestal agree to serve as the first Secretary of Defense when he had been more instrumental than any other individual in emasculating this new office within the National Military Establishment?<sup>78</sup>

As I will have occasion to discuss in the next chapter, Truman was completely aware of Forrestal's intentions. Soon after the legislation was signed into law, he approved a request from Souers and Clark Clif-

ford to “head Forrestal off” before the new Secretary of Defense could establish the NSC as a branch of the Pentagon.<sup>79</sup>

### “CENTRALIZED SNOOPING”:

#### THE CREATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Just as Truman had no doubts that some agency for the coordination of foreign and defense affairs was necessary after World War II, he likewise recognized the importance of creating some kind of postwar agency for the management of centralized intelligence:

I have often thought that if there had been something like co-ordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. . . . The war taught us this lesson—that we have to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.<sup>80</sup>

Beyond this general belief in the need for some new arrangement for managing intelligence, however, Truman was pretty vague about what was necessary. He was guided in his thinking by a fundamental concern about the risks of creating an “American gestapo,” and he was inclined to assume that this problem would be most likely to arise if peacetime intelligence coordination was turned over to the military.<sup>81</sup> But this left considerable room for debate, and for bureaucratic maneuvering, about the institution that should perform this task.

One possible solution to the problem of intelligence coordination would have been to allow the wartime Office of Strategic Services to evolve into a postwar intelligence service with real authority over the other agencies responsible for intelligence collection and analysis. William Donovan had pressed this argument with Roosevelt on several occasions during the war. As discussed in Chapter 2, the OSS director had encouraged the president, in a memo dated November 18, 1944, to “lay the keel” for a postwar intelligence agency before hostilities were concluded, in order to cope with the complex problems that would inevitably arise as a result of demobilization and the reorientation of US foreign policy.<sup>82</sup> But whatever inclination Roosevelt might have had to support Donovan’s proposal was dampened by opposition from State, War, Navy, and the FBI. Thomas Troy has summarized the problems that Donovan faced in his struggles against these agencies:

In the first place it [OSS] was a wartime agency with no statutory foundation for permanence. As such it had little strength—no sustaining traditions, no hallowed place in government, no corps of influential alumni, no prestige in Congress, no deep and wide public support, nothing beyond temporary acceptance as an emergency mechanism in the war against Hitler and Tojo.<sup>83</sup>

Donovan was also frustrated during the last months of the war by the fact that both MacArthur and Nimitz opposed his efforts to establish a high-visibility role for the OSS in the anti-Japanese offensive. This cut off Donovan's supply of adventure stories, which the director had used so effectively to bolster his influence with Roosevelt, the media, and members of the Washington political community. As discussed in Chapter 2, the OSS was also damaged by negative publicity following the leak to the press of Donovan's November memo. Walter Trohan followed his story on the Donovan memo with several other articles that were critical of the wartime record of the OSS and of Donovan's plans for a postwar agency. These attacks had been going on for about two months when Truman became president.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1945, as the war entered its final stage and the Washington policy community entered the first stage of its own war over armed forces unification, Truman did not directly address the issue of postwar intelligence. To Donovan's considerable frustration, he did not have the president's confidence. According to James Murphy, a close friend of Donovan's who served as his executive assistant in the COI, "Donovan was a Catholic Republican, Truman was a Democratic Baptist. They never saw eye to eye on anything."<sup>84</sup> And when the president did turn his attention to this matter, he was guided by the advice of his budget director, Harold Smith, who shared Truman's suspicions regarding both Donovan and the OSS. Both men were committed to the re-establishment of an orderly administrative structure in post-Roosevelt Washington, and such a system held no place for a man like Donovan. In the words of Sherman Miles, who as the head of G-2 had competed against Donovan during the war, "If there is a loose football on the field Wild Bill will pick it up and run with it."<sup>85</sup> But Donovan's talents as a broken-field runner were entirely inappropriate in a game with clear rules and a narrow field of play. Just nine days after Truman announced the Japanese surrender, Smith instructed his staff to provide him with a plan for the dismemberment of the OSS.<sup>86</sup>

It is worth pointing out at this stage in the narrative that the OSS was not the only agency to suffer once Truman and Smith turned their attention to the issue of postwar intelligence. During their first conver-

sation on this topic (on September 5, 1945), Truman advised his budget director that he wanted to eliminate the FBI's Latin American operations and restrict its activities to the United States.<sup>87</sup> For the next eleven months, J. Edgar Hoover fought a rear-guard action against this decision. When he could no longer resist, Hoover opted for a slash-and-burn campaign. According to Mark Riebling:

He removed all personnel, equipment, and records from the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica by mid-August 1946, and soon thereafter from Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, and Brazil.<sup>88</sup>

It must have provided Donovan with some small degree of satisfaction to see Hoover, one of his principal critics during the war, reined in by the White House. On the other hand, the FBI was still in the game, whereas the OSS was completely eliminated on September 20 by Executive Order 9621.

The other major players in the foreign policy and defense community recognized that the White House interest in a single agency to supervise intelligence gathering and analysis provided them with an extraordinary opportunity to expand their agency's missions, budgets, and influence. None of the lead agencies could afford to stay out of the competition, for this was one of those rare occasions in Washington when an entirely new function was up for grabs. In this case, the stakes were particularly high because the agencies were competing for control over information—the most fungible form of bureaucratic power. The result was a classic inside-the-Beltway scrum, between State, Navy, War, the Bureau of the Budget, and the FBI.

Smith and Truman were initially inclined to favor the State Department in this struggle, as part of a process of repositioning State as the lead agency in postwar US foreign affairs. Thus, in the same executive order in which he dissolved the OSS, the president transferred that agency's Research and Analysis branch to State. Other OSS functions, including clandestine activities, were transferred to the War Department. Significantly, the order also authorized the State Department to "take the lead" in the coordination of intelligence produced by all federal agencies. In a letter to Secretary Byrnes that accompanied Executive Order 9621, Truman instructed the State Department to develop

a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity. This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval.<sup>89</sup>

Faced with a situation in which State might be able to establish itself as the gatekeeper between the president and all other agencies in-

volved in intelligence gathering and analysis, representatives of the War and Navy departments moved quickly to challenge Truman's decision. Rather than a system in which the Secretary of State would be just below the president in the information pyramid, the military pressed for a *coordinated* approach to intelligence management. In his memoirs, Acheson is especially critical of administrative arrangements based on coordination ("that slippery word"). He complains that "a good many of us had cut our teeth and throats with this sort of nonsense."<sup>90</sup> Acheson opposed coordination of the intelligence function both because he viewed it as inefficient and, more importantly, because it would constitute a missed opportunity to significantly enhance State's clout within the evolving national security system.

In spite of Acheson's best efforts, his department was not able to hold on to the gift that Truman had given. This was due in part to the fact that Acheson's boss, Secretary of State James Byrnes, was too busy with overseas conferences to give the matter the attention that it deserved. The secretary was attracted to the idea of establishing State as the lead agency in the intelligence community, but he was also concerned about the administrative challenge of integrating over 1,300 former OSS employees into the State Department's hidebound bureaucracy.<sup>91</sup> He turned this project over to Acheson, who soon discovered that he had neither the budget, nor the expertise, nor the internal support to accomplish his task. In his memoirs, Acheson notes that "Congress struck the first blow" by cutting the amount of money that the president had proposed for the integration of the OSS into State. This forced Acheson to wrestle with Congress for supplemental funding at a time when he needed to concentrate his energies on internal reform. Acheson levels his strongest attacks, however, against those Foreign Service officers in charge of the geographic desks, who opposed the creation of the intelligence division because it threatened their funding and clout within the organization, and also infringed upon their traditional responsibilities for the collection and analysis of information.

Some of Acheson's opponents within the State Department also questioned the reliability, and the loyalty, of various former OSS employees, warning that Donovan's organization was riddled with people who had close ties to the Soviet Union and the Communist party. There was some irony in this, since the OSS seems to have been the first branch of the government to make the case for an ambitious campaign of worldwide resistance to Russian expansionism, in the form of a long memorandum that Donovan sent to Truman on May 5, 1945, more than two months prior to Truman's meeting with Stalin at Potsdam. The memo warned of Russia's strategic advantages in Europe and Asia, and expressed special concern about the "dynamic and allur-

ing" nature of the Communist ideology in these regions. The OSS report concluded with a recommendation that the United States commit itself to a campaign designed to "balance" the Russians in these and other regions of the world, noting that this campaign might have to be pursued for fifteen years or more.<sup>92</sup> The memo is of interest both as a very early contribution to Cold War strategy and as part of Donovan's personal effort to convince the new president of the need for an active and independent postwar intelligence agency. Former OSS employees were nonetheless among the first targets of what Acheson called "pre-McCarthy attack" both from within the State Department and (by the spring of 1946) from members of Congress.<sup>93</sup>

The fact that Byrnes and Acheson could not keep their own house in order made it easier for the military, and their friends in Congress, to challenge the president's vision of a State-run intelligence system. But the military had to offer something more than criticism in order to convince Truman to change his course. The Eberstadt Report, which was submitted just five days after Truman gave State the lead role in intelligence, provided the Navy with its alternative vision, based on the coordinated supervision of intelligence. The study proposed "that a Central Intelligence Agency be established within, and report to, the National Security Council."<sup>94</sup> According to this arrangement, the Secretary of State would not enjoy a special intermediary status between the White House and the various agencies of the intelligence community.

Six weeks later, the Army put forth its own case for a coordinated approach to intelligence in the form of the Lovett Board Report, named in honor of the hastily assembled board's chairman, Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett. The Army version agreed with Eberstadt on the need to create a CIA and to place it under the authority of a committee, which the Lovett Board referred to as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). But the Lovett Report went further than the Navy's version by recommending the creation of a second coordinating committee, called the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB). This committee was to be composed of representatives of Army, Navy, and Army Air Force intelligence, with authority over the selection of CIA personnel. By sandwiching the CIA between these two committees, the Lovett proposal would have constrained the CIA even more than the Eberstadt Report envisioned. On the other hand, the Lovett Board was willing to give the CIA one source of independent power that the Eberstadt Report did not recommend: its own budget.<sup>95</sup>

The Lovett and Eberstadt reports were close enough on the issue of intelligence coordination to provide for a common front against a disorganized and directionless State Department. Although State still enjoyed the patronage of the Budget Bureau, it could not stand up to

the military's counteroffensive. On January 22, 1946, just over four months after designating the State Department as the lead agency for intelligence, Truman reversed himself and opted for a new arrangement that epitomized all that is worst in Acheson's "slippery word"—coordination.<sup>96</sup> Thomas Troy has described the new arrangement as "an interdepartmental group of borrowed people subsisting on financial handouts and utilizing such borrowed facilities as might be offered them."<sup>97</sup> At the top of the system was a National Intelligence Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and one representative of the White House (Truman chose Admiral Leahy for this position). The NIA was to appoint a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who would be responsible for the coordination and analysis of intelligence, with the help of a new Central Intelligence Group (CIG). Staff, budget, and supplies were to be provided by an Intelligence Advisory Board, as envisioned by the Lovett Report. The *ex officio* members of the IAB represented the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy, Army Air Force, and the State Department. Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, who had served in Naval Intelligence during the war and had authored the intelligence section of the Eberstadt Report, was appointed to the position of DCI.

Two days after the establishment of this eccentric system, Truman brought the members of the NIA together with Souers for an appropriately eccentric ceremony. During a celebratory lunch, the president presented Leahy and Souers with black hats, black cloaks, and wooden daggers, and taped a large black mustache to Leahy's upper lip.<sup>98</sup> The president then read a mock proclamation in which he named Leahy and Souers, respectively, as his "personal snooper" and "director of centralized snooping."<sup>99</sup>

Admiral Souers made the most of an intolerable situation. He cooperated with both the NIA and the IAB, and concentrated his time and energy on providing the president with a daily summary of world events. In deference to Secretary Byrnes's argument that it was the State Department's mission to make sense of world affairs for the White House, Souers avoided analysis, interpretation, or policy recommendations in his daily reports.<sup>100</sup> Truman came to rely heavily upon his "daily digest," and Souers quickly established himself as an indispensable presidential assistant on matters of national security.<sup>101</sup> Long after Souers left the position of DCI, Truman continued to refer to him as his "cloak-and-dagger" man.<sup>102</sup>

Provision of the daily report was a valuable service, but Souers recognized that some fundamental changes would have to be made to achieve true intelligence coordination. When he left the job about six months later, in order to become the first executive secretary of the

NSC, he submitted a progress report in which he stressed the need to "obtain enabling legislation and an independent budget as soon as possible, either as part of a new national defense organization or as a separate agency."<sup>103</sup>

Souers's successor, Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, was well qualified to take up this challenge. The nephew of the powerful Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg, he had served in the Army Air Forces during the war, and was positioning himself to take over the new Air Force once the unification debates were completed. In the interim, he was serving as the Army's representative to the IAB. This experience convinced him that the existing system, built around a weak CIG, was unworkable. Within days of replacing Souers as DCI, Vandenberg began to strike out in several directions. He asked the NIA to support a dramatic increase in the CIG's budget, from \$10 million to \$22 million, to fund the development of a network of "intelligence agents all over the world." He also proposed that the CIG's payroll be expanded from 165 employees to 3,000. The principal justifications that he offered for this rapid expansion of the CIG were the potential for conflict with the Soviet Union and the unreliability of British intelligence sources, which had been so helpful to the OSS during the war.<sup>104</sup>

Vandenberg also pressed Souers's claim that the CIG needed to have its own statutory authorization. The two DCIs differed, however, in their strategies for accomplishing this goal. Souers, who had helped Eberstadt to develop his comprehensive vision of a new national security system, believed that authorization for the CIG or its replacement should be part of omnibus legislation for a new national military establishment and a National Security Council. Vandenberg, on the other hand, felt that the issue of intelligence coordination was important enough to warrant its own legislation. Before this tactical question could be resolved, however, Vandenberg had to convince the White House, represented by Clark Clifford, that legislative authorization was even needed. Clifford's initial message to Vandenberg was that reform could be accomplished by executive order and that the president had not intended to establish a large new federal agency when he approved the creation of the NIA and the CIG. With the help of his assistants, Vandenberg was nonetheless able to convince Clifford that the current system was untenable and that a more powerful coordinating agency with its own independent statutory identity was required. Once Clifford accepted this argument, he turned the issue over to Admiral Forrest Sherman and General Lauris Norstad, and his assistant Charles Murphy, to hammer out the details in the context of their discussions on the issue of armed forces unification. White House control over these discussions was reinforced in May 1947, when Vandenberg

returned to active duty in order to help prepare for the battles over roles, missions, and budgets that would inevitably arise once the Air Force acquired an independent status. He was replaced as DCI by a much less ambitious (and much less influential) individual—Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter.

By placing the issue of intelligence coordination in the context of the ongoing unification debate, Clifford tipped the scales in favor of Souers's strategy rather than Vandenberg's. The successor to the CIG would be developed as an integral part of the new national security bureaucracy. The White House was nonetheless concerned that including the still-controversial issue of peacetime intelligence in the unification legislation might jeopardize the whole project. After three years of wrestling with this issue, Truman and his advisers wanted closure as quickly and easily as possible. They sought, therefore, to reduce the intelligence section of the proposed legislation to as few words as possible, based presumably on the theory that a small target would be less vulnerable to attack by the media and Congress. Charles Murphy, who represented the White House in the drafting of the administration's version of the unification legislation, argued that "all but the barest mention of the CIA" should be omitted.<sup>105</sup> Some participants in the White House deliberations argued that once the successor to the CIG had been established, all of the complex questions relating to the day-to-day operations of the new agency could be resolved by subsequent enabling legislation. But Truman and his advisors were reluctant to support a public commitment to such follow-on legislation.

It is difficult to judge whether Murphy's strategy was successful. On the one hand, the plan to create a new peacetime intelligence agency did not become a major issue for public debate. On the other hand, the brevity of the intelligence section of what became the 1947 National Security Act generated confusion and concern among some legislators during the hearings. Congressman Clarence Brown (R-Ohio) worried that the creation of a new intelligence agency with a vague and open-ended mandate would invite the kinds of abuse that had come to be associated with totalitarian governments. Supporters of the proposed legislation had to work very hard to calm such fears, usually by stressing that the new agency would only be authorized to act outside of the United States. Vannevar Bush also offered a bureaucratic argument to reassure suspicious members of Congress, testifying that any attempt by the new agency to expand its authority into the realm of domestic security would be blocked by the FBI.<sup>106</sup>

Before the draft legislation reached Congress, however, there was one more hurdle that the White House had to overcome. When George Marshall took over as Secretary of State in January 1947, he made a

last-ditch effort to save the State-centric system of intelligence coordination that Truman and Smith had proposed a few months earlier. As a first step, he knocked heads within his own agency, forcing the geographic desks to accept the existence of an office of Intelligence and Research within the State Department. Next, he took his case to the White House in the same memo in which he opposed the creation of the National Security Council. Once again, his opposition was based upon the claim that the new agency would dilute the constitutionally designated authority of the State Department:

The Foreign Service of the Department of State is the only collection agency of the government which covers the whole world, and we should be very slow to subject the collection and evaluation of this foreign intelligence to other establishments, especially during times of peace. The powers of the proposed agency seem almost unlimited and need clarification.<sup>107</sup>

By the time that Marshall raised these concerns, however, the State Department was no longer in a position to regain control over the intelligence process in Washington. A new agency was going to be created to take up the challenge to which State had failed to respond.

Marshall's personal success at bridging the civilian-military gap highlighted the other issue that occupied the attention of those responsible for creating the successor to the CIG. Several participants in the debate wanted to introduce wording into the legislation that would explicitly prohibit any serving military officer from holding the position of Director of Central Intelligence. Interestingly, this position was not taken by Truman or his advisers, although they had originally been concerned about the possibility that a military-led intelligence system might become a "gestapo" in peacetime. By the spring of 1947, this was no longer a concern for the White House, in part because it was now cognizant of the limitations that the proposed legislation placed on the new intelligence agency and in part because of a growing concern about the Soviet threat. The White House also preferred not to introduce wording that might constrain the president's choice for DCI. The opposing position was taken by various Congressmen, and by some influential representatives of the wartime agencies, including Vannevar Bush.

In the end, the two sides settled on a compromise that allowed the president to appoint either a civilian or a serving military officer to the post of DCI. Cumbersome conditions were introduced, however, so that if a military man were chosen for the job, he would be isolated from the armed services during his term in office. The DCI would continue to receive military pay and benefits appropriate to his rank in the military, but "he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction,

or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian." Furthermore, "he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions . . . with respect to the armed services" during his tenure in office.<sup>108</sup>

The actual roles and missions of the proposed agency seemed to be far less important to members of Congress than the issue of military control. The legislators approved a plan for a peacetime Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the authority of the new National Security Council. The purposes of the CIA were to advise the NSC regarding intelligence, to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of the intelligence activities of the various government agencies involved in national security, and to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence within the government. The legislation made no reference to the new agency's responsibility for clandestine collection activities. On the other hand, Congress was well aware that the CIG, under the leadership of Vandenberg, had been engaged in "espionage and counterespionage operations outside of the United States" since October 1946.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, Vandenberg raised the issue of covert operations during meetings with representatives of the White House who were responsible for drafting the administration's version of the unification bill. He discussed with the drafting committee the need for unvouchered funds and special rules for recruitment and retention of personnel involved in clandestine affairs. Whatever qualms these comments might have generated within Congress seem to have been dispelled by Vandenberg's argument that peacetime intelligence had to be so effective "that no future congressional committees can possibly ask the question asked by the Pearl Harbor Committee: 'Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history—why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?'"<sup>110</sup> Vandenberg was assured that these special provisions would be included in the forthcoming legislation.<sup>111</sup> Although the legislators chose not to publicly address the issue of clandestine activity during the hearings, Thomas Troy is certainly correct in his assertion that Congress "knew it was authorizing foreign espionage and counterespionage" when it passed the 1947 National Security Act.<sup>112</sup>

Some participants in the intelligence deliberations, including Vandenberg, compared the NIA, with its four permanent members, to the proposed NSC, with seven permanent members, and concluded that the CIA would be weaker than the CIG because it would have to answer to more masters.<sup>113</sup> The proponents of a strong, centralized intelligence system were also rebuffed in their efforts during the hearings to give the DCI a permanent nonvoting seat on the NSC. But these arguments failed to account for the fact that one of the seven permanent

members of the proposed NSC was to be the president. This provided the DCI with direct access to the chief executive, unlike the existing system, in which the NIA functioned as a gatekeeper. Furthermore, the new legislation eliminated the IAB and gave the DCI direct authority over the personnel and budget of the CIA.

The 1947 legislation also authorized the DCI to inspect the intelligence holdings of the other federal agencies involved in national security. But the DCI had to have the sanction of the NSC in order to engage in such inspections, and since the NSC was comprised of the heads of the lead agencies involved in national security affairs, it was unlikely that the DCI would be granted sweeping powers to reach down into the various national security institutions to obtain information.

It was also virtually certain that the CIA would not be permitted to control the intelligence activities of the various national security agencies in the name of centralization. The legislation authorized the CIA to recommend to the NSC procedures for the coordination of the intelligence generated by all of the agencies involved in national security. In fact, however, the practical reality of the situation was that the CIA was hostage to the NSC, which insured that the new intelligence agency would have great difficulty in exercising the powers that were explicitly and implicitly granted by the 1947 National Security Act.

There was also a structural defect in the CIA's statutory responsibility to identify threats to the national security. Section 102D3 of the legislation specifically stipulated that the new agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions." But as an internal FBI memo had warned with regard to the CIG:

It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of *foreign* intelligence existing in that field. Also, it is impossible to separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions performed by the Bureau.<sup>114</sup>

Indeed, the National Security Act implicitly accepted this fact by its stipulation (in section 102E) that the DCI would have to submit a written request in order to obtain information from the director of the FBI. This left considerable room for disagreement, and interagency conflict, over the circumstances under which such requests should be submitted, or approved.

The CIA was not the powerful intelligence agency that Donovan had envisioned. But something, at least, had been salvaged from the bureaucratic struggle between State, War, Navy, the FBI, and the Budget Bureau. The proponents of a truly centralized intelligence system

could console themselves that perhaps at some future date, a DCI who enjoyed the support of the president would be able to use the Act's vaguely worded mandates to good advantage.<sup>115</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The sections of the National Security Act that established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency fulfilled Napoleon's guidelines for a good constitution—they were short and vague. This served the interests of both the White House and Capitol Hill, once they agreed on the need to end the battle over institutional reform before Congress began its summer recess. It is nonetheless fair to say that no one really understood what had been agreed upon on July 26, 1947. The legislation had established a new institution to assist the president in the coordination of foreign and defense policy, but it was up to the president to decide how to use it, or whether to use it at all. The Act had also approved a new intelligence agency, but cursed it with the responsibility to coordinate information without a clear grant of authority over the other intelligence services.

## *Chapter Five*

# CONNECTING THE DOMESTIC LIGAMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

FOR MOST AMERICANS, World War II reinforced the message of Pearl Harbor—that the United States needed a more centralized and powerful state apparatus for the management of national security. But the wartime experience tended to have the opposite effect on opinions about state management of the economy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the war confirmed for many people that unfettered capitalism was a vastly more powerful source of state power than central planning.

Still, two world wars had demonstrated that the nation could not wait until “M-Day” to begin to mobilize for another protracted conflict. If America was “sucker-punched” again, as it had been at Pearl Harbor, the nation had to be ready to respond immediately and massively. This required more than planning. In the opinion of many policymakers, it required strategic reserves, dispersed and coordinated facilities for wartime production, and perhaps a new system of universal military service to ensure that America’s fighting forces could be quickly and effectively organized. It also required the nation to stay in the forefront of scientific innovation, since “Buck Rogers weapons” were now recognized as a key determinant of military power.

The segments of the 1947 National Security Act that dealt with the mobilization of the nation’s industrial, human, and scientific resources came closer than any other parts of the legislation to touching the daily lives of the American people. As a result of their personal experiences with the New Deal and World War II, all citizens understood that there were clear winners and losers whenever the government became involved in the domestic economy, and they expected Congress to protect their interests now that the war was over. President Truman was acutely aware of this fact, since he had built a national reputation upon his role as chairman of the Senate committee that had investigated wartime mobilization activities. He therefore approached issues of postwar mobilization with considerable caution, convinced that preparedness demanded some degree of action by his administration, but

also anxious to avoid any political missteps. This chapter will discuss the government's attempts to manage this difficult process by means of three institutions: the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the Munitions Board (MB), and the Research and Development Board (RDB). In the next chapter I will revisit the related issue of universal military training.

The history of the NSRB, the MB, and the RDB is characterized by frustration, delay and compromise. Four overlapping and interacting tensions were at the core of the postwar debates relating to these agencies: between the tradition of economic liberalism and the new demands of national security; between assumptions about peace and assumptions about war; between the civilian and military agencies involved in mobilization; and between two approaches to mobilization—planning and operational control. The mobilization agencies created by the National Security Act sought to resolve, or at least reconcile, all four tensions during the formative period of the Cold War. None of these agencies survived this process in the form in which they were established.

It is worth mentioning at the outset that the history of the control of atomic energy followed a completely different path than the other postwar experiments in managed mobilization. By contrast with the other agencies created to organize the nation's resources, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established quickly and given sweeping and comprehensive authority over an entire field of activity. As Robert Duffy has argued convincingly, the AEC's success during the postwar era was attributable to the fact that the various groups and individuals who had a strong interest in the future of civilian and military applications of nuclear power were able to come together to form a powerful "subgovernment."<sup>1</sup>

The peripatetic Pendleton Herring was to play a part in this story as well, by his service as the secretary of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. In this capacity he worked with Bernard Baruch and others to develop a plan for international controls over nuclear power that would not jeopardize US national security. The Baruch Plan called for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, with responsibility for managing "all phases of the development and use of atomic energy."<sup>2</sup> In the face of persistent Soviet resistance and growing Cold War tensions, the UN plan ultimately collapsed. The deliberations within the UN nonetheless contributed an additional note of urgency to the debates that culminated in the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

## ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

Prior to the twentieth century, both the federal and the state government had felt compelled to interfere in the economy from time to time. But as Aaron Friedberg explains in his important study, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*:

Despite all this, by the closing years of the nineteenth century there had emerged a strong and widely shared presumption in favor of the market over the state, the private sector over the public sector, the efficiencies of “free enterprise” over what turn-of-the-century social theorist Herbert Spencer referred to as the “clumsy mechanisms” of “political schemers.”<sup>3</sup>

At the turn of the century, Theodore Roosevelt’s regulatory initiatives increased the government’s direct involvement in the economy, but since the primary rationale for this type of intervention was to protect the nation against monopolies, it tended to reinforce, rather than challenge, the traditions of economic liberalism that had endured since the founding of the republic.

Once the United States entered World War I, the consequences of this hands-off policy were immediately apparent. The nation had no stockpile of strategic materials, no plans for prioritization, production, or procurement, and no idea about where to begin. In the absence of prewar mobilization, the United States had to rely primarily upon its British and French allies for munitions when Wilson finally decided to enter the war. By the time that American industry was harnessed to serve the war effort, the enemy had surrendered. British Prime Minister Lloyd George would later observe, “It is one of the inexplicable paradoxes of history, that the greatest machine-producing nation on earth failed to turn out the mechanism of war after 18 months of sweating and toiling.”<sup>4</sup> In fact, there was nothing paradoxical about America’s mobilization problems. They were largely attributable to Washington’s failure to get a “running start” by prewar planning, organization, and stockpiling.

By March 1918, the situation was so chaotic that Wilson concluded that he had no choice but to create a powerful mobilization agency under one man’s control. As mentioned in Chapter 1, he appointed Bernard Baruch to the chairmanship of the War Industries Board (WIB), with the authority to decide all issues relating to domestic mobilization, except for the determination of prices (which was to be handled by a separate committee). Baruch was a controversial choice. His great personal success as the “lone eagle” of Wall Street had created many enemies, and Baruch seemed to revel in their criticisms. He was

viewed as “the biggest menace in America” by some individuals who saw unbridled capitalism as, at best, a necessary evil. But he was also viewed with suspicion by many leaders of American industry, because, as an independent speculator, he had no direct interest in the success of any specific sector of the economy.<sup>5</sup>

Baruch nonetheless proved to be the right man for the job. Within a few months, he transformed the WIB into an exceptionally powerful and comprehensive agency. Baruch and his supporters presented the WIB as an integral part of an associative network of wartime institutions designed to facilitate voluntary cooperation between the public and private sectors. But WIB representatives also made it clear to civilian businesses and industries that they were authorized to make unchallengeable decisions regarding production priorities and raw materials allocations, if necessary. An excerpt from Baruch’s memoirs illustrates the scope of the agency’s activities:

In the WIB we constantly sought the wartime equivalent of supply and demand. . . . Thus, when steel was in short supply we refused to permit the building of a theater in St. Louis, saved over 2,000 tons by reducing bicycle designs, and garnered enough metal for two warships by taking the stays out of women’s corsets. When the demand for woolen fabric grew acute we induced the tailors to reduce the size of their sample swatches, thus saving 450,000 yards of cloth.<sup>6</sup>

Pendleton Herring would later conclude that, in spite of the WIB’s autocratic approach to civilian mobilization, the agency remained “the product of capitalist thought.” Subordination to the demands of the wartime agency was “a sacrifice gladly made for the preservation of free enterprise.”<sup>7</sup> This generous interpretation of the patriotism of America’s industrial and business leaders notwithstanding, the end of the war saw immediate and intense demands for the termination of emergency controls over the economy.

Although the WIB exercised unprecedented power over the civilian economy, it had no authority over the armed forces. According to Baruch, “They were our clients and we existed to serve them.”<sup>8</sup> In accordance with the tradition of treating war and peace as completely distinct undertakings, the nation accepted that once it entered the Great War, the military was in charge until the job was done. The Chief of the Army’s General Staff, General Peyton March, tested this principle with both Congress and the WIB on a regular basis—on one occasion keeping Baruch standing in front of his desk during a meeting. Baruch would later claim that Army/WIB relations improved once supplies began to flow to the military, but this one-way arrangement also resulted in massive surpluses and terrible problems of reconversion

when the war ended unexpectedly in November 1918. As soon as the war ended, Congress, under pressure from powerful industrial and business interests, began to take the economy back from the military. Most legislators were convinced, however, that some residual system of peacetime mobilization was essential for the nation's long-term security, and that the armed forces needed to participate in this system. It also made sense for the military to play a leading role in postwar demobilization efforts, at least until such time as wartime stockpiles were reduced and wartime industries were converted back to civilian purposes. The compromise solution was the 1920 National Defense Act, which designated the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War (OASW) as the principal agency responsible for industrial preparedness. It was a curious piece of legislation. Vaguely worded, in order to avoid foreseeable criticisms from business and industry, the Act vested overall responsibility for mobilization in the War Department, but it was assumed that the OASW would represent the interests of both the Army and the Navy. Although some sponsors of the legislation offered a narrow definition of its purpose as a procurement agency, the Act charged the OASW not only to oversee military procurement, but also to ensure "adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs."<sup>9</sup> The OASW was given no specific authority in support of this much more ambitious mandate.

These inherent contradictions might have overwhelmed the OASW, but the agency wisely kept a low profile and avoided controversy. During the 1920s it focused on planning activities and on the development of War Department procurement guidelines. Military leaders did not completely disregard the more difficult issues of comprehensive prewar economic mobilization, however. The General Staff began to cultivate the next generation of planners, at first by sending a small contingent of officers to the Harvard Business School and then by introducing courses in industrial mobilization and procurement at the Army's institutions of higher learning—the US Army War College and a new Army Industrial College (which later became the Industrial College of the Armed Forces). These efforts resulted in the training of about 1,000 officers (fifteen percent of whom were from the Navy and Marines) in the basic principles of civilian mobilization prior to the outbreak of World War II.<sup>10</sup>

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War was not the only agency responsible for mobilization issues during the interwar period. In 1922, an attempt was made to ameliorate one of the most obvious flaws of the 1920 National Defense Act by creating the Army Navy Munitions Board to facilitate interservice cooperation in areas of procurement and

planning. It soon became apparent, however, that in order for the ANMB to succeed, it would be necessary for the War Department and the Navy to cooperate in the development of their strategic plans. Neither service was interested in this level of cooperation until 1929, and only conditionally after that. The change was nonetheless sufficient to increase the effectiveness and importance of the ANMB during the 1930s. But at a time when successive Congressional hearings, culminating in 1934 with the Nye Committee hearings, were highlighting the excesses and abuses of mobilization efforts during World War I, there was still little room for maneuver by the ANMB. The most important contribution that the ANMB made to prewar preparedness was its sponsorship of the 1936 and 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plans, but since both plans were attacked as devices for pushing the nation into war, the president saw to it that they died quietly.<sup>11</sup>

Bernard Baruch was the most influential critic of the government's limited mobilization activities during the interwar period. He describes himself in his memoirs as a "somewhat lonely realist" in the service of preparedness.<sup>12</sup> His arguments for peacetime mobilization made him a popular guest speaker at the US Army War College, but they went largely unheeded outside of the military community.

As part of his carefully orchestrated preparedness campaign, Franklin Roosevelt placed the ANMB within the Executive Office of the President in 1939, and gave it more direct responsibility for industrial mobilization and stockpiling. As the pace of prewar mobilization accelerated, however, Army and Navy representatives became frustrated over what they considered to be insufficient military involvement in key mobilization decisions. When Roosevelt created the civilian-controlled Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB) in August 1941, the Army and the Navy tried to come up with an alternative arrangement that would give the military authority over the SPAB. They asked Ferdinand Eberstadt to undertake a study of the reforms that would be necessary to establish the ANMB as the lead agency in the management of the transition to war. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, the president rejected Eberstadt's proposals and instructed the Army and the Navy to continue to work with the established mobilization agencies.<sup>13</sup>

Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt created the War Production Board (WPB) to serve as the wartime counterpart to the ANMB. In theory, the WPB was responsible for management of the civilian mobilization process. Its first director, Donald Nelson, was instructed by the president to maintain civilian control over the military, in spite of the wartime emergency. This was a reversal of the patron-client principle that had characterized the military's relationship with

the WIB during World War I. Unfortunately, Nelson had neither the personality nor the presidential support necessary to accomplish this task. His relations with very strong military representatives like General Brehon Somervell, the head of the Army Service Forces, frequently ended in gridlock. By the fall of 1942, the situation had reached a crisis point, with WPB representatives warning their military counterparts that their procurement demands threatened to overwhelm the nation's productive capacity. The confrontation went to the heart of the problem of marrying strategic considerations with domestic economic and political realities.

It also highlighted the problem that the president faced in reconciling his role as the nation's chief politician and chief administrator with his role as commander in chief. As discussed in Chapter 2, Roosevelt never lost sight of the fact that, even in wartime, he needed to preserve his base of political support (New Dealers), cope with his traditional critics (big business), and cultivate important swing votes (labor). On the other hand, Roosevelt encouraged the armed services to believe that they could rely upon him for support in their all-out military effort. In the fall of 1942, the problem of reconciling these contradictory pressures was made easier by the facts presented by the WPB. The United States was simply not in a position, at this still-early stage in the process of economic conversion, to deliver the kinds of resources demanded by the military.

The resulting "feasibility dispute" culminated in a decision by the Joint Chiefs to reduce their military budget request for 1943 from \$93 billion to \$80 billion. According to the Army's official account:

To accomplish the reduction the Army revised its troop basis, decreasing its planned strength for 1943 and 1944 by some 300,000 men and effecting heavy reductions in armored, motorized, airborne, and infantry divisions, as well as in tank battalions, field artillery units and tank destroyer battalions.<sup>14</sup>

The Joint Chiefs were willing to accept these cutbacks in part because, contrary to the predictions of the military's 1941 Victory Plan, the Russian Army had not collapsed in the face of a massive German offensive. This made it possible for the War Department to scale back its plans for ground forces—from an initial estimate of 215 divisions to 90 divisions.<sup>15</sup>

The resolution of the "feasibility dispute" proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for Nelson, however. The controversy had drawn too much attention to the WPB, and invited both media and Congressional criticisms of Nelson's leadership. By May 1943, Roosevelt had concluded that comprehensive mobilization needed to be managed by a more power-

ful agency, headed by a more influential and politically savvy individual. While permitting Nelson to stay on as director of WPB, Roosevelt created the Office of War Mobilization (OWM), with a mandate that included not only civilian mobilization but military procurement as well. He placed his trusted collaborator James Byrnes at the head of this new agency. David Kennedy has described Byrnes as a “consummate political operator” who had served in both the House and the Senate and on the Supreme Court.<sup>16</sup> The decision to create the Office of War Mobilization with a powerful director at its head was difficult for Roosevelt, but by this time the president had concluded that he had no choice but to create precisely the kind of “poobah” that he had consistently opposed on both constitutional and administrative grounds. The decision was made much easier, however, by the fact that Byrnes was both a crony and a committed New Dealer.

The most important test of Byrnes’s authority came when he announced plans to become directly involved in every major procurement decision by the armed services. Most military leaders registered intense opposition to this expansion of civilian authority into their traditional area of responsibility. According to Alan Gropman, “The Army had to be told a second time and the Navy only did what it was told when the president insisted they follow orders.”<sup>17</sup> The military leadership did succeed in protecting their most important prerogative, however, by resisting Byrnes’s efforts to convince the Joint Chiefs to include his agency in the strategic planning process.

Over the next two years, Byrnes used his authority as “assistant president” to exercise great control over the domestic economy. But the director of the OWM never lost sight of Henry Stimson’s insight that, in a capitalist system, “you’ve got to let business make money,” even in a situation of supreme emergency.<sup>18</sup> He also understood that even in wartime you had to let organized labor defend its interests—in many instance, by means of strikes. Furthermore, Byrnes began to lose control over all sectors of the economy as the end of the war approached and his agency (renamed the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion) shifted its focus from winning the war to overseeing the transition to peace.

Economic mobilization during the Second World War was a process of continuous compromise with multiple constituencies. Although the system became more orderly and more centralized as the war progressed, it remained a far cry from the kind of arrangement supervised by German armaments minister Albert Speer. It was also much less coherent than the system that Churchill oversaw in England. But as the official Bureau of the Budget history of the war effort concluded:

Our reluctance to establish even the semblance of autocratic rule may have been partly responsible for our constant struggle to coordinate or harmonize a mobilization effort made up of many separately operating parts, but problems of coordination do not disappear even in an autocratic administration and we developed methods that produced effective end results.<sup>19</sup>

Prior to World War II, Pendleton Herring had argued strenuously for a new system of industrial and scientific mobilization based on “centralization of authority, the standardization of economic functions and submission to discipline,” not only during wartime but also in periods when the “grave threat of war” exists. His work as chairman of the committee that produced the Bureau of the Budget’s administrative study of World War II nonetheless tempered Herring’s earlier interest in “a high degree of centralized control” of the domestic economy. In spite of the fact that the committee report provided readers with over 500 pages of detailed analysis of the complex and confusing interaction of Roosevelt’s wartime agencies, it concluded with “a fundamental generalization: that programming in a democracy such as the United States, while it may seem slower and more argumentative, results in a sounder course of action” than systems created by dictatorial regimes.<sup>20</sup> The challenge for the framers of the 1947 National Security Act was to develop a postwar system to ensure civilian and military preparedness while preserving the liberal and capitalist characteristics of the economy.

## THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

Herring’s wartime experiences made him an ideal partner for Ferdinand Eberstadt in the construction of the portion of the Eberstadt Report that dealt with the issue of mobilization. Eberstadt and his mentor Baruch were less forgiving than Herring, however, regarding Roosevelt’s loose and tentative management of the war effort. Both men harbored deep personal resentments against the president as a result of their treatment during the war, and they were convinced that a postwar system for economic coordination had to be strong enough to resist day-to-day intrusions by politicians and interest groups. The National Security Resources Board, which was proposed by the Eberstadt Report, reflected this tension between an enduring commitment to the free market and a concern for efficient coordination of the economic sinews of power. As envisioned in the report, the NSRB would have two tasks: advising the president on mobilization issues, based upon up-to-date “plans and programs,” and “maintaining a skeleton organi-

zation . . . ready and able to implement military plans in the industrial mobilization and civilian fields" in times of national emergency.<sup>21</sup> Reflecting Eberstadt's personal frustrations with Roosevelt's management of the mobilization process, the report also recommended that the NSRB should function in times of both war and peace, to avoid the "resort to emergency agencies hastily created" once fighting had begun. The section of the report that dealt with mobilization concluded with a warning: "If this is not done soon it will probably not be done at all."<sup>22</sup>

The Eberstadt Report was not specific regarding the powers of the NSRB, or its chairman. At one point it stated that the chairman should be appointed by the president with "power of decision similar to the power now conferred upon the Chairman of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion." This could be interpreted as a very open-ended mandate for direct intervention in the economy. The report also envisioned the NSRB "exercising supervision over the disposal of present surpluses" and "guarding against" shortages of strategic materials. On the other hand, all of the other references to the agency's responsibilities give the impression that it should function as a relatively small planning and advisory agency.<sup>23</sup>

The report also recommended the creation of a military Munitions Board composed of the undersecretaries of the military departments and, as needed, the chairman of the Maritime Commission, with a civilian chairman and a full-time staff. The MB was described in the report as a successor to the Army Navy Munitions Board, but with "broader powers than those heretofore enjoyed" by the ANMB. "It should, so to speak, parallel in the procurement and logistics field the authority and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of military strategy and operations."<sup>24</sup>

The report makes clear that both the NSRB and the military MB were expected to develop habits of institutionalized cooperation during periods of peace—not only with each other, but also with the other national security coordinating agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. To assure the development of these habits of cooperation, the chairman of the MB was designated as a permanent member of the NSRB, and the chairman of the NSRB was designated as a permanent member of the NSC. The Eberstadt Report also sought to avoid the pre-World War II problems of miscommunication between the public and private sectors by the creation of an Advisory Committee "consisting of representatives of business, industry, labor and agriculture" to give these constituencies an appreciation of the needs and concerns of the federal government and, ideally, a sense of stake in military preparedness.<sup>25</sup>

The first reactions by members of the Truman administration to the Eberstadt mobilization proposals were positive. In a summary of the Eberstadt Report, George Elsey informed the president:

No less important than the integration of our foreign and our military policies is the integration of the military program into the civilian economy. Modern wars bring the total resources of combatant countries into conflict. Modern wars are fought in the factories of the contestants. Armies, navies and air forces are only the apex of the pyramid of national strength. . . . Sustained preparedness is necessary for our security and we can no longer rely upon our ability to prepare quickly.<sup>26</sup>

Elsey's memo was actually more ambitious than the Eberstadt Report in its vision of the powers that should be given to the NSRB. He argued that the board should be authorized to "make policy decisions with respect to the mobilization of material resources, productive capacity and manpower." It would be the NSRB's responsibility to "direct industrial mobilization . . . for the maximum use of the nation's resources." It is also a reflection of the importance that Elsey accorded to the mobilization agency that he recommended that the NSRB and the NSC share the same secretariat in order to "insure that there is always a thorough and complete exchange of information among the top policy-making officials."<sup>27</sup>

This went well beyond anything that Truman was willing to consider. Although his wartime committee work had given the president a deep appreciation of the need for efficient and timely mobilization activities, he was too much of a politician to believe that either Congress or the American business community would allow a postwar agency to exercise this kind of control over the domestic economy. Nor was he prepared to permit a postwar mobilization czar to cut this deeply into the president's constitutionally designated authority.

By the time that Congress began to grapple with the various recommendations of the Eberstadt Report, the proposal for a National Security Resources Board had been watered down in several respects. According to the Senate's draft version of the legislation (S. 2044), the NSRB was to be placed under the Council of Common Defense (which later became the NSC). Its duties would be to advise the council on issues of mobilization and to develop plans and programs, on the instructions of the council, regarding such issues as manpower, resources, and productive facilities. A close reading of the draft legislation gives no reason to believe that the NSRB was envisioned as anything more than a staff agency, with limited coordinating responsibility and virtually no operating authority.<sup>28</sup>

The picture is somewhat murkier if one considers the testimony of experts during the Senate hearings. The responses by Charles Wilson, former vice chairman of the War Production Board, to questions by Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Massachusetts) are illustrative. Wilson began his testimony by making a strong argument for comprehensive planning for military mobilization during periods of peace. Saltonstall pressed him to be more specific:

Suppose, for instance . . . the War Department wanted, we will say, trucks and the Navy Department wanted amphibious craft. . . . And we will say the civilians wanted trucks also. This being assumed to take place in peacetime . . . how much authority would you give this chairman of the war resources board to determine the priorities?

Wilson was clearly discomfited by this line of argument. When pressed, however, he concluded that it would be necessary to give the NSRB chairman "very substantial authority" to determine whether the civilian claim took precedence over the military requests.<sup>29</sup>

Wilson's vision of a very powerful mobilization agency was not shared by the majority in Congress, or by the White House. With the support of the president, the intent of S. 2044 regarding the NSRB remained relatively unchanged as the National Security Act moved through Congress. The status of the NSRB was nonetheless elevated to that of a "parallel organization to the National Security Council, but independent of it." In its final form, the 1947 legislation stated that the function of the board was "to advise the president concerning the coordination of military, industrial and civilian mobilization." The civilian chairman of the NSRB was designated as a permanent member of the NSC. After asserting that the NSRB would develop mobilization plans during peacetime, the report concluded that "in time of war it could be made the effectuating agent for putting these plans into operation."<sup>30</sup>

David Stowe, who supervised the NSRB staff during 1948, has asserted, "I am not quite certain that Congress knew what it meant when it established the NSRB."<sup>31</sup> This claim is supported by the limited attention that legislators gave to this portion of the 1947 National Security Act. In a replay of the debates that culminated in the passage of the 1920 National Defense Act, Congress seems to have concluded that although it was clear that some form of postwar mobilization agency was essential, the issues involved were complex and potentially explosive. Under these circumstances, it was better to leave the initiative to the president, and reserve the option of critiquing some or all of the actions taken by this new executive branch office.

Eberstadt, Forrestal, and Baruch were among the Washington insiders who felt that a more powerful NSRB was required in order to en-

sure preparedness. "The basic consideration," Eberstadt told Forrestal, "is to put the burden as near as possible to where it will fall in case of actual mobilization, so that the work will be not merely a study, but will in fact be preparation for an emergency."<sup>32</sup> Baruch's opinions on the need for an activist mobilization agency were even more explicit. They were also more unwelcome by Truman and most legislators. Baruch would later record in his memoirs: "By 1947, I was publicly calling for mobilization of our economic, political and spiritual resources. . . . This call for preparedness was heeded no more in 1947 than it had been in 1937. And in 1947, as earlier, it was our weakness which invited aggression."<sup>33</sup> In spite of (and perhaps partly because of) Baruch's very public pressure campaign, Truman made it clear that he was resolutely opposed to any proposal that would provide a postwar mobilization czar with the kind of authority that Baruch had enjoyed as chairman of the WIB.

The NSRB held its first meeting in November 1947. Arthur Hill, a former chairman of the Atlantic Greyhound Corporation with extensive wartime experience with mobilization, was appointed as the agency's first chairman. Hill had been nominated for the job by Forrestal, and he shared the Defense secretary's sense of alarm about America's postwar vulnerability. Even before this first meeting, Hill pressed the White House for a clear statement of support for the chairman's authority—over the other members of the NSRB and over the other federal agencies involved in mobilization issues. This proposal was firmly rejected by the president. In preparing the president's position on this issue, his assistants (Clark Clifford and George Elsey) argued:

The President is always opposed to the "sandbag" approach. To give the Chairman or the Board the authority to *direct* the work of any or all agencies is to give one man, or one group, more authority than has ever been given before, and it gives it in a way that will inevitably result in conflict and confusion, with numerous appeals to the President.<sup>34</sup>

The memo concluded, "It [NSRB] was *not* intended to be a group which could direct all the resources of the Government into mobilization planning."<sup>35</sup>

In spite of this setback, Hill continued to interpret aggressively the NSRB's open-ended mandate, authorizing studies on a range of unrelated topics and dramatically expanding the size of his staff. Hill also invited criticism for taking on seemingly eccentric projects. According to Stowe, "One of the first studies, I remember, was how to organize the toy pistol industry in war."<sup>36</sup> By December, he was testing one of the most controversial issues of the recent war—the necessity for mobilization agencies to be active participants in strategic discussions. In

this case, the board put the White House on notice that the obligations incurred as a result of the president's controversial European Recovery Program should not be allowed to deplete US stockpiles of strategic materials or "materials which are approaching the critical stage of supply."<sup>37</sup> This early attempt by the board to establish its identity with the White House demonstrates, at the very least, the poor political sensitivity of its chairman.

Hill compounded his problems with Truman in April 1948, when he submitted a report to the president in which he made a forceful argument for expanding the authority of the NSRB. The subsection headings of the report are informative: "Present Power Is Inadequate," "Voluntary Means May Be Inadequate," "Adequate Powers Should Be Available," and "NSRB Should Be Charged with Over-All Integration."<sup>38</sup> At the same time that he was constructing this report for the president, Hill hired Eberstadt to prepare a study of "the authority and functions of the National Security Resources Board." As had been the case when Forrestal recruited Eberstadt for the unification study in 1945, Eberstadt was offered the job because his opinions on the subject were well known, and consistent with those of his sponsor. The 58-page study, which took less than two months to complete, argued that the NSRB was not living up to its potential. It began with the claim that the National Security Act "created no more important agency" than the NSRB, and then offered some revisionist history, asserting that the authors of the legislation intended the agency to be "a kind of economic and social general staff."<sup>39</sup> The study went on to claim, "There is further evidence that it was the intent of Congress that the Board would discharge functions more immediate than those of making blueprint plans for a future emergency."<sup>40</sup>

For Eberstadt, however, what was said or implied in the 1947 debates was not nearly as important as the changed nature of the national security problem by 1948:

In ordinary circumstance, so early a review of NSRB's authority, functions and organization might seem premature. The existing situation, however, presents compelling reasons for such reexamination. We are not at war. But we are not at peace, as that state was once understood. Congress is about to grant heavy increases in our already large military expenditures, and a substantial program of rearmament is about to be undertaken. . . . These circumstances raise new and acute problems—problems which are important if the present world situation continues, and are even more important if it deteriorates and the burden of mobilization becomes heavier.<sup>41</sup>

The report specifically criticized the habit of thinking about mobilization as an exercise in planning "against a hypothetical 'M-Day,' " by

recourse to a “phase pattern” approach that distinguished between three periods: peace, “the appearance of an emergency,” and war. As a result of changes in technology and changes in the global distribution of power, “we find ourselves in an international position which, whatever it may be called, certainly bears small resemblance to ‘peace’ as we have been accustomed to think of it. For the first time in our history, we find ourselves carrying, almost unaided, the full burden of world economic and military power.”<sup>42</sup> The study also warned that failure to give the NSRB greater authority “can lead to only one result. Inevitably, it must mean the domination of the military over the industrial and great areas of the civilian life of the United States.”<sup>43</sup> This argument played to a growing sense among some experts that the armed forces were taking advantage of the chaotic postwar situation to significantly expand their authority. Respected journalist Hanson Baldwin captured this mood when he warned of the risk of unrestrained procurement activities by the armed services:

The military are getting the bit in their teeth. There is considerable evidence that their objective is absolute preparedness in time of peace, an objective which has led all nations which have sought it to the garrison state, bankruptcy and ruin.<sup>44</sup>

For the supporters of an activist NSRB, this was an argument for a strong civilian mobilization agency that would be capable of standing up to the armed services.

If Eberstadt was clear about the reasons for expanding the authority of the NSRB, he was much less precise about the kinds of powers that should be granted to the agency. He certainly favored giving the NSRB greater access to information from other agencies and the ability to request/compel these agencies to undertake particular studies relating to mobilization issues. With regard to controls over aspects of the civilian economy, the study emphasized that voluntary public-private cooperation should always be preferred, but then asserted that the government had to be prepared to pursue “mandatory methods” if a collaborative approach proved unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, the NSRB “should become the agency not to operate them itself, but to coordinate their operation.”<sup>45</sup>

The Eberstadt Report was presented to Truman before it was made public. According to Edward Hobbs, “the President reacted violently” and, “in a sharp letter to the Chairman,” rejected virtually all of Eberstadt’s recommendations for expanding the authority of the NSRB. Within a few months, Hill had resigned, and Truman had brought in two of his trusted assistants—John Steelman and David Stowe—as interim managers of the NSRB. According to Robert Turner, one of his

assistants at this time, Steelman was "a coordinator and problem-solver within the executive branch, especially when conflicts among agencies were involved."<sup>46</sup> Stowe, meanwhile, took on the day-to-day task of reasserting White House control within the NSRB bureaucracy. He stated, "I became known as Truman's 'hatchet man' " as a result of his shake-up of the staff within the NSRB.<sup>47</sup> The president also reinforced his control over the agency by moving it from the Pentagon to the Executive Office Building.

But the mobilization question could not be dispensed with that easily. In an atmosphere of growing international tension, Congress provided Hill, Forrestal, Eberstadt, and Baruch with a new platform in the form of the Brewster Committee hearings of April 1948.<sup>48</sup> Meanwhile, Forrestal continued to make the case within the National Security Council for elevating the status of the NSRB, while Baruch—who had coined the term "Cold War" in a speech before the South Carolina legislature in April 1947—continued to sound the tocsin to any media or professional organizations that would listen.<sup>49</sup>

Having placed his own people at the top of the NSRB, Truman was prepared to respond to these pressures by loosening the restraints on the agency. Although it remained a staff office, the NSRB was given more support for its information gathering and coordination activities within the executive branch. Working in particular with the Munitions Board, the NSRB began to develop specific plans for industrial production and supply in the case of an emergency. The use of "phantom orders" was a particularly effective strategy, involving the identification of specific items and the development of contingent orders with specific delivery dates in the event of a crisis. Over 100,000 machine tools were ordered by this method during 1948. The agency also developed a list of sixty-nine materials for stockpiling and plans for conservation, rationing, and industrial expansion during 1949.<sup>50</sup>

The agency also began to take on new roles. In March 1949, the president responded to growing pressure for a national civil defense program by ordering the NSRB to perform both the planning and the public information function. David Stowe recounts that one of the first challenges for the NSRB was to convince the American people to take civil defense seriously, since it had acquired a reputation during the war as "fan dancing" as a result of its association with such celebrities as Eleanor Roosevelt and Fiorello LaGuardia.<sup>51</sup> The NSRB also had to develop its own understanding of the prerequisites for a serious program of civil defense. As a first step, the NSRB sent a delegation to England to obtain advice and guidance, and then hosted a team of British experts, who helped the agency to develop plans for the nation's first Civil Defense center in Olney, Maryland. The NSRB was soon ac-

tively involved in developing plans for dividing civil defense responsibilities among different federal agencies. It also undertook an ambitious program of communication with state and local agencies, to explain the principles of civil defense and the federal government's plans for coordinated action in the event of an attack.

As Cold War tensions intensified, the NSRB also took responsibility for developing industrial decentralization plans in preparation for an atomic attack. The guiding document, published in September 1948, was entitled "National Security Factors in Industrial Location." Its key finding was that "dense agglomerations of industrial plants were inviting targets for the enemy." The NSRB's responsibility was to develop and communicate plans for spatial distribution and coordination of industrial plants in order to "better survive atomic attack."<sup>52</sup> Once the plans were completed, civilian industries were expected to collaborate voluntarily with the NSRB and other federal agencies in order to put this ambitious program into effect. Aaron Friedberg nonetheless highlights an obvious flaw in the system: "Any serious attempts to alter the geographical distribution of the nation's industries would have required an enormous increase in the powers of the federal government."<sup>53</sup>

The tentative steps taken by the NSRB were criticized as insufficient after the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon in the fall of 1949. In an internal memo to Clark Clifford, George Elsey warned that "in the next week or so, we shall be faced with a torrent of articles. . . . Baruch will undoubtedly foam at the mouth for our "failure" to have an industrial mobilization plan. Republicans will jump at the cue."<sup>54</sup> Not just Republicans, as it turned out. Democratic Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts criticized Truman for inviting an "atomic Pearl Harbor" by his limited commitment to civil defense.<sup>55</sup> The president nonetheless continued to approach the issue of civil defense as an "M-Day" problem until the start of the Korean War.

The North Korean invasion on June 25, 1950, lent support to the arguments of the recently completed NSC-68 study, which called for a massive increase in defense spending and a dramatic mobilization effort. At first, Truman, with the support of both the Defense Department and the Bureau of the Budget, argued for caution. Truman was concerned that a massive mobilization effort might cripple the domestic economy. Secretary of Defense George Marshall added that a too-rapid mobilization effort might result in the wrong decisions. He also warned that the United States had never attempted such an all-out effort prior to a declaration of war.<sup>56</sup> These arguments for moderation were difficult to sustain, however, once the Chinese entered the war in late November. The president declared a national emergency on De-

ember 16 and, at the same time, established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) as the agency responsible for overseeing a comprehensive program of industrial mobilization. In keeping with Truman's tendency to distinguish between staff and operational agencies, the NSRB was retained as a planning office, and the chairman of the NSRB was designated as "the President's chief adviser on the coordination of military, industrial and civilian mobilization."<sup>57</sup>

Over the next two and a half years, the NSRB worked closely and productively with both the NSC and the ODM to fulfill this mandate. Among its most memorable activities was continued refinement of the government's industrial dispersal plans. The NSRB helped to develop strategies for inducing American businesses to comply with these dispersal plans in order to avoid accusations of dictatorial behavior. These strategies included the granting of government loans and contracts to corporations that had met "satisfactory standards of dispersal."<sup>58</sup>

The very rocky history of the NSRB ended in 1953 with the arrival of the Eisenhower administration. As Aaron Friedberg has noted:

Instead of building on it [Truman's mobilization campaign] the Eisenhower administration set about to dismantle the foundation left by its predecessor. The period 1953 to 1960 was marked by institutional devolution and policy constriction. By the end of the 1950's the United States had departed from the path on which it appeared to have been traveling, however hesitantly, since the onset of the Cold War.<sup>59</sup>

My only quibble with Friedberg's excellent analysis of US mobilization efforts during the formative period of the Cold War is that it does not accord sufficient attention to the grudging and conditional nature of the Truman administration's commitment to mobilization. Even during the Korean crisis, Truman and his advisers never lost sight of the distinction (political, economic, administrative, and, most important, constitutional) between a Cold War situation and a situation of all-out war. According to an internal White House memo dated May 28, 1951, the NSRB's primary responsibility was "to develop policies permitting a free world expanding economy capable of supporting a partial mobilization while also permitting political and social stability."<sup>60</sup> Nor were they willing to accept the costs and risks associated with the creation of a Cold War mobilization "poobah."

The tendency on the part of Eberstadt and Herring to study the two world wars in order to develop their plans for the NSRB was understandable, but nonetheless misleading. The question that the framers of the 1947 National Security Act should have been asking was: "Why was there so little interest in Baruch's proposals for a continuation of the WIB at the end of the First World War?" Beginning their study with

this question would have alerted the proponents of a strong NSRB to the problems that any agency would have confronted if it attempted to exercise direct control over the American economy.

The desire on the part of NSRB representatives to go beyond planning is certainly understandable. "Planning agencies," as David Stowe has noted, "historically have had to face the problem that planning in the abstract is not the most interesting thing to do. And once you have something reasonably well planned, then comes the desire to operate it."<sup>61</sup> This natural tendency is greatly increased when the end product is as intangible as "preparedness." But even in a situation of pervasive and growing fear about the threat posed by the Soviet Union, with the memory of Pearl Harbor still fresh in everyone's mind, there were strict limits to what most Americans were willing to permit in the name of national security.

The disappearance of the National Security Resources Board was a turning point in the history of what would come to be called the military-industrial complex. No other postwar agency came as close to establishing permanent, central authority in the field of comprehensive economic mobilization. The NSRB's successor agency—the Office of Defense Mobilization—exercised more power over specific sectors of the domestic economy during the Korean War, but its status as an emergency agency made it vulnerable to being phased out once the war ended. For the rest of the Cold War, the military-industrial complex evolved and expanded, but it remained, in the words of one of its most respected monitors, "a rather amorphous, loosely structured entity."<sup>62</sup>

## MOBILIZING SCIENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

In the same speech in which he coined the term "military-industrial complex," Dwight Eisenhower also warned the American people of "the prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money," and of an "equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."<sup>63</sup> During the formative period of the Cold War, a succession of Congressional committees, presidential advisory commissions, think-tank reports, and public intellectuals offered proposals for harnessing the nation's scientific resources in such a way that it would contribute to national security without doing violence to other national or special interests and without stifling the mysterious process of scientific innovation. The debates that culminated in the relevant section of the 1947 National Security Act (section 214) played a relatively small role in this story. They nonethe-

less provide a useful point of reference for anyone interested in the complex history of the US government's cultivation and management of postwar science.

Prior to the Second World War, the federal government and the civilian scientific community had, by mutual consent, interacted infrequently and tentatively. During periods of national crisis, Washington had sought the advice of leading scientists. President Lincoln established the National Academy of Sciences during the Civil War, and President Wilson authorized the National Research Council on the eve of the First World War. World War I also saw the establishment of the Navy Consulting Board, to assist that service in reviewing the scientific merit and military potential of proposals submitted by civilian inventors, and to help the Navy to develop its own research laboratory.<sup>64</sup>

Williamson Murray and Allan Millett have observed that the armies of the major nations had been strikingly similar during the Great War, in terms of both their organization and their weapons. During the interwar period, however, "the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical," largely as a result of technological developments.<sup>65</sup> To the extent possible in a situation of very limited budgets, both the Navy and the War Department sought to exploit these asymmetrical changes by developing their own laboratories and monitoring the technological improvements made by foreign militaries. Meanwhile, industrial research laboratories that had been stimulated by the war effort developed into an important source of scientific innovation, and a powerful and independent interest group. Major universities also established themselves as centers of organized scientific research, often with the support of the leading philanthropic organizations. These three realms of scientific activity evolved in relative isolation from each other, except in those circumstances when issues of funding led to temporary alliances or precipitated open conflicts. Although they followed their own paths, the three scientific communities all grappled with the same kinds of issues. The two most persistent sources of dispute were the place of the social sciences in the scientific community and the relative importance that should be accorded to applied versus basic research. On occasion, these issues resulted in the development of cross-cutting networks of professional cooperation.

By the mid-1930s, two new questions had begun to create cross-cutting patterns of affiliation and conflict within the scientific community: How vulnerable was America to the rapidly changing international situation? And what, if anything, should scientists be doing about it? By 1935, Vannevar Bush was in the forefront of those scientists who argued that, in the event of another war, the aforementioned asymmetries in military technology would be determinative. Bush was to be-

come one of a very few outsiders to gain access to Roosevelt's inner circle of advisers in the immediate prewar and wartime environment. In June 1940, Roosevelt established the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), with Bush as its chairman. Based upon a plan proposed to the president by Bush, the agency's mandate was "to correlate and support scientific research on mechanisms and devices of warfare." With an eye toward inevitable disputes over turf, the NDRC was instructed "to aid and supplement, and not to replace, activities of the War and Navy departments."<sup>66</sup> Eleven months later, the president established the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) to work with the NSRC on a wider array of scientific projects. Bush was to use the new agency as the primary platform for the expansion of his personal authority over the nation's wartime scientific agenda. In his memoirs, Bush describes the president's actions as "the first time in history the decision was taken to recognize scientists as more than mere consultants to fighting men."<sup>67</sup>

Even before the war started, the leadership of the armed services attempted to provide their own definitions for the NDRC's mandate to "aid and supplement" the military. The official histories of World War II provide numerous instances of confrontation between Bush and the service chiefs. In most instances, Bush relied upon institutional solutions. For example, Bush's leverage was significantly enhanced in April 1942, when Roosevelt approved his request for institutionalized access to the strategic discussions of the Joint Chiefs, in the form of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment. Responding to various complaints by Admiral King, Bush asserted that "planning at the top level in the absence of the scientific mind was an incomplete and hence dangerous procedure."<sup>68</sup> For those officers who were unwilling to accept this argument on its merits, Bush could point to the results that his team of scientists had been able to achieve. His fallback option was always to rely upon the president's personal support. As the war progressed, Bush's empire expanded rapidly:

We had, during the war, approximately thirty thousand men engaged in the innumerable teams of scientists and engineers who were working on new weapons and new medicine. . . . We spent half a billion dollars. Congress gave us appropriations in lump sums and trusted us to decide on what projects to spend the money.<sup>69</sup>

The most important test of Congress's willingness to trust the scientific community was, of course, the Manhattan Project. It was also the most important test of the ability of the civilian scientists and the armed services to work together. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Bush worked out a *modus vivendi* with the War Department, based upon a

distinction between experimentation and design (civilian responsibilities) and development (Army responsibility). As the end of the war approached, the future of nuclear power was both unclear and contested. All parties recognized, however, that whatever regulatory schemes were to be put in place, they would have to be established quickly. Within two months after the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, representatives of the scientific and military communities were engaged in a public debate over ownership of postwar nuclear power.<sup>70</sup> The problem was made more serious for US defense planners by the fact that the military had virtually exhausted its small stockpile of nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, military leaders believed that a quick decision was essential.

In view of the complexity of the subject and the importance of the issues at stake, Congress moved with impressive speed and authority to create regulatory machinery for the management of both civilian and military nuclear power. In December 1945, Senator Brian McMahon introduced Senate Bill 1717, which was hammered over the next eight months into the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.<sup>71</sup> With the backing of Truman, the Act took control of nuclear energy away from the military and vested it in an Atomic Energy Commission, composed of five civilians and answerable to a new Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which would assure Congressional oversight of this important program. The armed forces had to settle for an advisory body, called the Military Liaison Committee, to make their case for the production of nuclear weapons. Throughout the Truman and Eisenhower eras, the AEC was to function as a highly cohesive and influential body that was usually able to achieve unanimity in its decisions.

### "SCIENCE FOR THE NATION"

The AEC was the exception in a situation characterized by stalemate and disagreement. Vannevar Bush had foreseen the potential for destructive battles over science and technology during the latter stages of the war. Consequently, as the momentum of the war shifted in favor of the Allies, Bush turned his attention to the short-term issue of demobilization of the vast network of defense-related laboratories and to the longer-term question of the future of institutionalized collaboration between scientists and the state. He believed that the wartime agencies would, and should, be dismantled once victory had been achieved. But he was concerned that, unless a new science agency was prepared to replace the OSRD, the valuable arrangements for high-level coordination between the government, the military, and the scientific commu-

nity would become the victims of interest-group politics. He was particularly concerned that the hard-won status of scientists as “responsible partners” and “equals” within the Washington policy community and the military community would be lost. In order to preempt these unwelcome developments, Bush began work on his now-famous study, *Science—The Endless Frontier*, in November 1944. Since Roosevelt had invited Bush to undertake the study, Bush had ample reason to be optimistic about its reception.

By the time that the study was completed in June 1945, however, Franklin Roosevelt had been replaced by Harry Truman, and Bush soon found himself once again on the outside. The relationship between the two men was confounded by personality differences—Bush was the kind of New England elitist with whom Roosevelt was quite comfortable but whom Truman abhorred. Bush also undermined his relations with Truman by becoming a public spokesperson for the sharing of nuclear secrets with all other nations, including the Soviet Union. More fundamentally, Bush had made it clear in various statements and speeches that he envisioned a postwar system that would provide scientists with substantial governmental support but would involve minimal governmental interference. This ran counter to Truman’s political philosophy, and also threatened his personal authority as president.

Truman was also listening to another influential voice regarding the issue of scientific mobilization. Senator Harley Kilgore of West Virginia was a close personal friend of the president. They had worked in harness on the wartime Truman Committee, with Kilgore often serving as the committee’s point man for investigations of industrial or military mismanagement. Both men were New Deal Democrats with strong populist instincts. Kilgore had a particular interest in the role that science and technology could play in the service of the nation. During the war he had introduced various pieces of legislation that were designed to establish a leading role for the government in the administration of postwar science. These efforts were consistently frustrated, in part because they smacked of a power grab by Washington and in part because they were viewed as favoring small businesses and agricultural interests at the expense of industry. The number of scientists who were employed in industrial laboratories had grown significantly during the war, from 22,000 to 57,000, and there was no reduction in this number two years after the war’s end.<sup>72</sup> Powerful lobbying groups like the National Association of Manufacturers made sure that Washington did not interfere too much in the research activities of these laboratories. These organizations were also on constant guard against any indications that the government might attempt to gain control over in-

dustrial patents as a result of federal contracts.<sup>73</sup> Kilgore was viewed as a major threat to these industrial interests.

Kilgore also incurred the wrath of some members of the scientific community (in particular, Vannevar Bush) by his insistence that any postwar arrangement for managing scientific activity should be controlled by nonscientists in the service of the public interest. This point of view was shared by Truman's Budget director, Harold Smith, who testified before Kilgore's committee that "I regret very much . . . that the subject of what we do about research gets into the position of the scientists telling us how to organize the government."<sup>74</sup>

Bush accepted the principle that postwar science should serve the nation as a whole, but he was deeply concerned about the risk that, unless priorities could be maintained, politics as usual would dissipate America's scientific potential. As a conservative Republican, he was also worried about the prospect of a resurgent welfare state at war's end:

Carried to extremes . . . it can create a class of loafers supported by taxation, for, unfortunately, the love of work is not universal, and there are many who would bask in the sun and scoff at those who produce, even on a pittance. It is no way in which to progress and maintain strength in a world in which technical innovation is rapid and necessary.<sup>75</sup>

Bush was convinced that scientists, rather than politicians, had to be in the position to make the tough choices:

With the Federal government plunging into the support of research on an enormous scale there is danger of the encouragement of mediocrity and grandiose projects, discouragement of individual genius, and hardening of administrative consciences in the universities. . . . We need to centralize the effort inside the Federal government, and place the ultimate control of policy in the hands of a representative body of citizens.<sup>76</sup>

Bush left no doubt in his writings and speeches that the individuals who were appointed to manage this effort should be drawn primarily from the scientific community.

Truman agreed with Kilgore that the end of the war created the opportunity for America's vastly expanded network of laboratories and research institutes to be adapted to a wide range of national challenges, not only in the military realm, but also in the service of medicine, small businesses, agriculture, etc. The president wanted a system that would provide all of these constituencies with a chance to solicit help from the federal government. But he also wanted to be sure that the White House remained at the center of whatever arrangement was established. As he told his Budget director, Harold Smith, in reference to a

proposal to give the civilian National Academy of Sciences an influential role in the management of postwar science policy, "We cannot let this outfit run the government."<sup>77</sup>

A turning point was reached in June 1945, when Bush submitted a prepublication copy of *Science—The Endless Frontier* to the White House. Bush sought the support of the president for a new National Research Foundation, as proposed in his study, and recommended that it replace the OSRD prior to the actual termination of hostilities with Japan. Truman chose not to endorse Bush's report, in part because the plan did not allow for direct presidential selection of the foundation's director.<sup>78</sup> Over the next two years, Truman worked with Kilgore and members of the White House staff to develop plans for a new agency to oversee postwar science and technology. These efforts became more difficult after the November 1946 election resulted in a Republican-dominated Congress that removed Kilgore from the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Science Legislation of the Military Affairs Committee.

Truman also attempted to retain control over postwar science policy by calling upon John Steelman to undertake a study of the whole question of national science policy that could both serve as a guide to the creation of a new agency and divert some attention from Bush's report. As would be the case two years later, when he was asked by the president to replace Hill at NSRB, Steelman threw himself into the project, chairing a committee that would produce a five-volume report, *Science and Public Policy*. The committee's principal recommendations, summarized in an introductory section entitled "Science for the Nation," included a significant increase in national spending on science (with a target of "at least one percent of our national income" dedicated to science by 1957), "a heavier emphasis" upon basic research and medical research, and, most importantly, the establishment of a National Science Foundation that would be "responsible to the President."<sup>79</sup>

Just two weeks before the Steelman Report was officially submitted to the White House (on August 27, 1947), the president was forced to veto legislation based on Bush's vision of a scientist-controlled National Science Foundation. He explained his decision as follows:

Our national security and welfare require that we give direct support to basic scientific research. . . . However, this bill contains provisions which represent such a marked departure from sound principles for the administration of public affairs that I cannot give it my approval. . . . The proposed National Science Foundation would be divorced from control by the people to an extent which implies a distinct lack of faith in democratic processes.<sup>80</sup>

It would take another three years before the proposed National Science Foundation was created. But even before Truman's veto and the completion of the Steelman Report, the government had missed whatever opportunity it might have had to establish a powerful central agency for the administration of postwar science and technology. The field was simply too dynamic, and the stakes too high, for key participants to allow the government to put an administrative fence around it.<sup>81</sup> By 1947 the two major sponsors of organized scientific research, American industry and the armed forces, had taken steps to ensure that they retained control over those portions of the vast network of wartime laboratories and institutes in which they had an interest.

### THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

The introductory section of the Steelman Report asserted:

A generation which has witnessed the awful destructiveness of the atom bomb or which has read newspaper accounts of developments in biological warfare needs no special demonstration of the relation of science to military preparedness.<sup>82</sup>

The report nonetheless went on to state that, aside from medical research, it would not address the ongoing science programs of the War and Navy departments. Although the Steelman Report made it clear that it did not support any arrangement that would turn over the "entire national science program" to the military, it also accepted that the management of the military aspects of science and technology should be left to the armed services.<sup>83</sup>

By the time that the Steelman Report was completed, it would have been unrealistic to take any other position on the issue of defense-related science and technology. For while the politicians, industrialists, and scientists had been haggling over the issue of comprehensive control of postwar science, representatives of the military had moved forward. By 1945 the Army and the Navy were fully converted to the argument that scientific innovation would be an important factor in determining military strength in any future war. Both the Army and the Navy appreciated the contributions that scientists had made to the war effort. At the same time, however, there was widespread resentment within the military about the way that the American people had celebrated members of the scientific community as war heroes. There was also a unanimous opinion among the leadership of the armed services that revolutionary scientific breakthroughs, including the nuclear weapon and the long-range missile, could not be allowed to drive post-

war decisions about the roles and missions of the armed services. For all of these reasons, the military sought to retain substantial control over postwar scientific research. It is a measure of their success that, by the fall of 1946, *Business Week* could argue, "Partly by design, partly by default, federal support of pure science is today almost completely under military control."<sup>84</sup>

Ferdinand Eberstadt did not believe that the military should exercise direct control over postwar civilian science. On the other hand, he was convinced that civilian scientists could not be relied upon to bring to the attention of the military scientific innovations with potential military applications. Some bridging mechanism comparable to the OSRD would be necessary after the war ended. Since Congress and the White House were in the middle of deliberations at the time that the Eberstadt Committee was working on this problem, the Eberstadt Report did not get into specifics. The report supported Bush's vision of a powerful organization to manage government-sponsored research, and assumed that this agency would be responsible for maintaining a sustained and productive dialogue with the armed services. The precise organizational form was less important to the Eberstadt Committee than the preservation of the wartime attitude of "true partnership" between the military and the scientific community.<sup>85</sup>

The Eberstadt Report was more specific about the type of postwar agency that would be required to foster interservice cooperation on matters of scientific innovation. "If joint service planning in research and development is to be anything more than a pious hope," the report concluded, it would need a committee (Eberstadt recommended that it be entitled the Joint Research and Development Committee) that would be staffed by a permanent secretariat and composed of civilian scientists and uniformed officers who "should feel primary loyalty to the committee rather than to one service or the other."<sup>86</sup> Since the Eberstadt Report did not favor the creation of a Department of Defense, or even a Secretary of Defense to oversee the armed services, the report could not provide much guidance regarding how the proposed committee would be able to inspire service representatives to transcend their traditional loyalties.

A Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) was actually established by the secretaries of War and Navy in June 1946 (one year after the completion of the Eberstadt Report, but one year prior to the passage of the National Security Act). The service secretaries decided to take this action to ensure that a successor organization was in place before Bush succeeded in his efforts to terminate the OSRB.<sup>87</sup> By the time that the JRDB was established, however, the Army and the Navy

were on two well-established, and diverging, trajectories in their handling of the challenges and opportunities of postwar science.

It may seem ironic, in light of the fact that the War Department was in charge of the massive Manhattan Project, that the Navy was well ahead of the Army in developing an institution capable of administering postwar scientific research. During the war, the Navy experimented with various institutional arrangements for liaison with Bush's Office of Scientific Research and Development and for direct communication with representatives of the civilian science community. Shortly after Roosevelt's death, Navy Secretary Forrestal created the Office of Research and Inventions (ORI) to perform these duties. As the end of the war approached, Navy representatives worked with their friends in Congress to pass legislation that transformed the ORI into the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The legislation was signed into law on August 3, three days before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Over the next few months, arrangements were made for existing OSRD contracts to be transferred to the armed services, and since the Army did not have an effective counterpart to the ONR, the Navy became the primary beneficiary of this arrangement.<sup>88</sup>

Harvey Sapolsky has argued, "For a few years, in the late 1940's, ONR functioned as the federal government's only general science agency."<sup>89</sup> In a situation in which the White House and Congress were unable to agree on the details for a postwar National Science Foundation, the Navy managed the bulk of the federal government's funding for both basic and applied research. It also served as the primary military collaborator with the Atomic Energy Commission in support of research relating to nuclear physics. Sapolsky commends the ONR for its ambitious, flexible, and imaginative policies of engagement with the civilian scientific community. He notes, for example, that only 10 percent of ONR's research funding in 1946 was designed to support "Navy applications," and only fifteen of 700 ONR contracts in 1948 were classified.<sup>90</sup>

Although the ONR performed valuable services for the civilian scientific community during the immediate postwar period, it also contributed to the problems that the government faced in its efforts to establish a powerful National Science Foundation. Representatives of ONR saw the proposed agency as a direct competitor, and took steps both to delay its creation and to restrict the scope of its activities. Thanks in part to these efforts, the NSF was not established until 1950, with an initial budget of only \$3.5 million. Five years later, the agency's budget had only grown to \$16 million, rather than the \$122.5 million that Bush had proposed for his national science organization after five

years of operation. By this time, the military controlled 70 percent of the overall federal budget for science and technology.<sup>91</sup>

The ONR was also protective of its hard-earned influence over post-war science in its relations with the other armed services. When the 1947 National Security Act was passed, the legislation established a successor to the Joint Research and Development Board within the new National Military Establishment. The Research and Development Board (RDB) was established as a seven-member board, with two representatives from each service and a civilian chairman appointed by the president. Truman overcame his suspicions and invited Bush to serve as the first chairman of the new agency. He nonetheless put the scientist on notice during their first meeting after Bush was chosen as RDB chairman that he was not prepared to spend his time "soothing the sensitivities" or "saluting the backsides" of those individuals who worked for him.<sup>92</sup> For his part, Bush had to overcome more than his resentment of the president in order to accept the position. As a fervent advocate of armed forces unification over the past three years, Bush was suspicious of any arrangement designed to encourage interservice cooperation, rather than unified action. Furthermore, the position was envisioned as only a part-time appointment. It is a comment on Bush's sense of confidence, and mission, that he decided to accept the challenge.

The 1947 National Security Act also created the aforementioned Munitions Board within the National Military Establishment, with a civilian chairman who was subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.<sup>93</sup> The Senate report that accompanied the legislation envisioned the Munitions Board collaborating with the Joint Chiefs to achieve "a higher degree of economy in logistics and efficiencies in military performance." It also expressed the hope that "large savings will be the final result."<sup>94</sup>

As statutory staff agencies of the NME, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board were expected to provide the Secretary of Defense with most of the personnel who would perform the day-to-day work of armed forces coordination. In fact, representatives of the two agencies found themselves on the front lines of the battles between the Secretary of Defense and the separate services, as both sides sought to test the limits of their authority under the new system.

The specific mandate of the Research and Development Board was to

advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.<sup>95</sup>

The legislation required the RDB to do more than advise the secretary, however. It was also expected to "prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes," "recommend measures of coordination" among the three services, "formulate policy" for military cooperation with nonmilitary agencies, and "consider the interaction of research and development and strategy."<sup>96</sup>

The Steelman Report took note of the "prospective importance" of the proposed RDB as an instrument for coordinating the research activities of the armed services.<sup>97</sup> Dwight Eisenhower shared the report's opinion on the potential importance of the Research and Development Board within the NME. Indeed, a few months after Forrestal took office, Eisenhower informed him that the RDB was the kind of technical agency that could serve the secretary as a venue for asserting control over the separate services. He encouraged the Secretary of Defense to use the RDB to influence the agendas of the Joint Chiefs and shift their discussions "out of the realm of generality."<sup>98</sup>

It is hard to believe that Eisenhower realistically imagined that the Secretary of Defense could use the Research and Development Board to rein in the Navy's research programs. By the time that the legislation was passed, the ONR had developed an impressive record of collaboration with the civilian scientific community, and it was not attracted to the prospect of RDB interference in its activities. Nor was it prepared to let the other two services use the RDB as a venue for gaining access to its programs. In fact, the ONR was so far ahead of the fledgling research-and-development agencies of the other services in its support for postwar scientific research that it felt justified in offering on several occasions during the late 1940s to take over the responsibilities of the Research and Development Board for all three services. According to Harvey Sapolsky, these offers "appeared selfless" but "were not innocently offered."<sup>99</sup> Nor were they viewed as altruistic by the other two services.<sup>100</sup>

Though the Navy had the most to lose from interference by the RDB, the Army and the Air Force also fought to protect their science programs from this agency. In fact, the RDB faced strong and persistent opposition from all three services and from the corporate Joint Chiefs. The RDB's problems were a microcosm of the problems that the Secretary of Defense was to confront during the late 1940s in his efforts to establish control over the separate services. Bush tried to resolve, or at least ameliorate, these problems at the level of the RDB soon after taking office. He sought and received Forrestal's support for a charter that clarified the responsibilities of the Research and Development Board, but since the board did not have control over the internal administrative or budgetary decisions of the separate services, these clarifications

did not make much difference.<sup>101</sup> The RDB could do little more than suggest policies that each service might want to consider.

In an era of tight budgets, all three services were particularly critical of any proposal for scientific innovation that threatened to be at the expense of weapons system that were already well integrated in the service's training, doctrine, and planning. And since the RDB depended on the input of the uniformed service representatives regarding the military value of specific weapons systems, the board was at a distinct disadvantage. The result was that RDB was more successful at working with the separate services to improve existing weapons systems than at introducing new systems. The RDB was also frustrated in its efforts to eliminate redundant research programs within the armed services, as illustrated by the fact that the three branches were engaged in thirty-five concurrent and distinct guided-missile projects by 1948.<sup>102</sup>

The RDB also confronted a perennial problem for all civilian agencies involved in national security planning—gaining influence over, or even access to, the strategic deliberations of the Joint Chiefs. During the war, with Roosevelt's backing, Bush was able to compel the service chiefs to give him intermittent access to their top-level discussions. But the first Secretary of Defense had no comparable leverage over the chiefs. This confounded efforts by the RDB to develop the "complete and integrated program of research" that was part of its mandate. During the famous summit meeting in Newport, Rhode Island (discussed in Chapter 6), Forrestal convinced the Joint Chiefs to permit the chairman of the Research and Development Board to attend JCS meetings on "all appropriate occasions." Forrestal also got the Joint Chiefs to approve the creation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), modeled on the wartime Joint Weapons Systems Evaluation Board. Its mandate was to serve as a bridge between the JCS and the RDB in order "to provide rigorous, unprejudiced and independent analysis and evaluations of present and future weapons systems under probable future combat conditions."<sup>103</sup> Due to JCS concerns that the RDB would use the new agency to interfere in its affairs, the decision was made to place the WSEG under the authority of both the Joint Chiefs and the Research and Development Board. In spite of this confusing arrangement, Forrestal was confident that the WSEG would significantly reduce the "human frictions . . . that are not removable either by law or directive."<sup>104</sup>

The modest reforms negotiated at Newport did little to improve Bush's relations with the Joint Chiefs. Indeed, Steven Reardon has noted that, in spite of the Newport agreement, "there is no evidence that Bush or any other RDB Chairman ever sat with the Joint Chiefs on any of their official meetings."<sup>105</sup> Bush resigned from the chairman-

ship of the RDB in October 1948. One year later, he leveled some of his most intense attacks upon the postwar military establishment. In *Modern Arms and Free Men*, he took note of "an apparent paradox":

In recent times, we have done military planning of actual campaigns in time of war exceedingly well, and we have done military planning of broad nature in time of peace exceedingly badly. Yet both have been done largely by the same individuals.<sup>106</sup>

Based on his wartime experiences, Bush had convinced himself that he would be able to leverage his impressive interpersonal skills, the support of Forrestal, and the inducements of scientific information to transform the RDB into a powerful instrument for interservice cooperation. It was to be Bush's last official attempt to impose his vision on a portion of the Washington policymaking community.

Bush's very public resignation may have helped Forrestal to make the case for bolstering the authority of his office, and his staff agencies, vis-à-vis the armed services. But these reforms were only accomplished after Forrestal's death. In August 1949, the National Security Act was amended to give the Secretary of Defense more direct control over the RDB, while at the same time giving the chairman of the RDB greater independent decision making authority over issues within his jurisdiction. The legislation introduced the same reforms for the Munitions Board, whose chairman had been experiencing the same problems in his efforts to establish his board's authority over the separate services and in his efforts to establish his personal authority over the other members of the board.<sup>107</sup>

Successive RDB chairmen were encouraged by the 1949 amendments to believe that conditions were in place for the board to fulfill its mandate as the primary agency for the "coordination of research and development among the military departments and allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs."<sup>108</sup> Unfortunately, the separate services continued to view the RDB as an advisory board, which had neither the legal authority nor the expertise required to determine how they should allocate their respective budgets. The Navy continued to manage its research-and-development program through the Office of Naval Research, the Army continued to rely upon the separate supply services (in particular, Ordnance, Signal, and Engineering), and the Air Force developed its own Research and Development Command.<sup>109</sup> The Joint Chiefs, meanwhile, continued to resist efforts by RDB chairmen to gain access to their strategic deliberations, making it virtually impossible for the RDB to develop long-term plans or priorities relating to particular weapons systems.

The RDB might have overcome some of these problems with the strong and consistent support of the Secretary of Defense. But successive secretaries—Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett—were unwilling to invest the requisite bureaucratic capital to bolster the authority of the board within the military community. Some secretaries (most notably, Lovett) also recognized that there were limits to what could be accomplished in a system based upon statutory boards. The rapid turnover in the office of Secretary of Defense (three secretaries between March 1949 and January 1953) also made it extremely difficult to exercise the kind of concerted effort that would have been required to transform the relationship between the RDB and the armed services. Under these circumstances, secretaries settled for marginal adjustments. Marshall, for example, modified the charter of the RDB in February 1951 to permit the board to issue directives in his name. Such changes were nonetheless exercises in gardening, in a situation that demanded architecture.

The secretaries of Defense also had other problems to deal with during this period. Like all wars, the Korean conflict forced all parties to direct their attention to the pursuit of victory. Although the war justified a dramatic increase in the overall defense budget, it also bolstered the direct authority of the three services over their portions of that budget. For its part, the RDB was expected to contribute to the war effort by helping the three branches to improve the weapons systems that were already in their arsenal.

The record of Walter Whitman's tenure as RDB chairman is illustrative. At the time that he took over as chairman (August 1951), Whitman's specific goals were to acquire direct control over the budgets of the three services and the authority to unilaterally cancel redundant programs. When he became frustrated with the lack of support that he received from Secretary Lovett, Whitman recruited the backing of influential members of Congress. This end-run tactic proved effective, and Lovett agreed to revise the RDB's charter in accordance with Whitman's requests. This decision was almost immediately challenged by representatives of the three services, who argued that Lovett's grant of authority to the RDB chairman was not authorized by the 1947 National Security Act.<sup>110</sup> These issues were still being debated when Lovett left the office of Secretary of Defense in January 1953.

Just as Forrestal set in motion reforms that were only realized after his departure, so, too, Lovett left as his legacy a series of recommendations that resulted in fundamental reform of the Department of Defense. Most of these recommendations will be discussed in the next chapter. It is sufficient here to note that among his proposals were recommendations that both the Munitions Board and the Research and

Development Board be abolished and that their functions be taken over by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In a letter to the president dated November 18, 1952 (two months before leaving office), Lovett argued that the existing system, based on statutory boards, had demonstrated a "built-in rigidity." He went on to observe:

The cure for the problems presented by the rigidity of organization and over-specification of functions . . . does not appear to be difficult. It does, however, require legislative action to permit the administrative reorganization.<sup>111</sup>

A few months after Lovett submitted his letter, his general recommendations received external validation from the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization. After holding a series of hearings on administrative aspects of the military establishment, the committee concluded:

As a general principle . . . boards and agencies should not be set up by statute in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense should be left free to adjust from time to time the assignment of staff functions within his own office in a flexible and expeditious manner.

The committee leveled specific criticisms at the Research and Development Board, describing it as "rigid and unwieldy." In accordance with Lovett's recommendation, the committee proposed that the RDB be abolished and its functions "transferred to the Secretary of Defense."<sup>112</sup>

President Eisenhower submitted Reorganization Plan no. 6, which supported both the Rockefeller and the Lovett proposals, to Congress on April 30, 1953. In the absence of Congressional opposition, the plan went into effect on June 30 of that year. All of the functions of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board were transferred to the Secretary of Defense.<sup>113</sup> Conditions were finally in place for a substantial increase of the Secretary of Defense's direct influence over decisions by the three services regarding questions of scientific innovation, logistics, and procurement.

## CONCLUSION

The brief institutional lives of the National Security Resources Board and the Research and Development Board highlight the circumstances under which centralization of authority, in the name of national security, is least likely to be successful. In the case of the NSRB, the proponents of centralization ran afoul of powerful economic interests with

close ties to Congress and the media. In spite of the growing Cold War atmosphere and the outbreak of war in Korea, these groups rejected the attempts by some individuals to depict the situation as a national emergency that required the kinds of sacrifice that had become so familiar during the Second World War. Furthermore, both Truman and Eisenhower were deeply suspicious of any arrangement that might allow an agency or an individual to establish comprehensive control over key elements of the society. According to Michael Hogan:

The desire to adapt national security needs to the country's democratic traditions also drove Truman and then Eisenhower to seek better control over military leaders, to protect their own prerogatives, and to worry about diverting too much of the country's resources to national security purposes.<sup>114</sup>

In this case, the traditions of anti-statism were reinforced by a shared experience during World War II that had convinced most Americans that greater central control over the economy did not necessarily result in greater productivity or increased efficiency. As Pendleton Herring and his colleagues had concluded in their study of America's management of the war effort: "The record dispels the notion that government in a time of stress is best conducted by autocrats."<sup>115</sup>

There was also a widespread concern, shared by many in government, that state control over the process of scientific research could stifle innovation. Some degree of state sponsorship for both pure and applied research was generally accepted as useful. But if the state was not the appropriate guide toward the "endless frontier" of science, then who was? Vannevar Bush's elitist vision of a community of selfless scientists with relatively unfettered access to the federal budget was problematic on both political and constitutional grounds. It was especially disturbing to confirmed New Dealers like Truman, who were committed to the most equitable distribution of benefits from any government-supported science program. The outcome was a situation of deadlock, in which the institution that came out of the war with the most efficient machinery for administering a portion of the nation's scientific program—the Navy—became the primary sponsor of post-war scientific research. Nearly six decades later, we can see the results of this development, not just in the "'scientification' of the military" (Everett Mendelsohn's fortuitous phrase), but also in the militarization of science.<sup>116</sup>

Efforts by the Research and Development Board to guide the Navy's program of research support were clearly a matter of too little, too late. But the RDB did not have much more success in its efforts to influence the decisions of the other two services, or, for that matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With an unclear grant of authority and an institutional-

ized dependence upon the armed services for its staff and its board membership, the RDB highlighted all of the flaws of the National Military Establishment, as established by the 1947 National Security Act. By 1953 it had become clear that these flaws were terminal, and that an entirely new system of interaction between the Secretary of Defense and the armed services was required.

## *Chapter Six*

# FROM THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**T**HE ARMY and the Navy agreed on one thing after the 1947 National Security Act was signed into law: The battle over armed forces unification was not over. Army Secretary Kenneth Royall's prediction that the new system "will not save money, will not be efficient, and will not prevent interservice rivalry" encouraged many Army representatives to believe that, when the wheels began to come off of the new system, the government would have to revisit the issue of unification. For its part, the Navy leadership began almost immediately after the passage of the 1947 legislation to prepare for the next offensive by the Army. These efforts were initially managed by the Secretary of the Navy's Committee on Unification, and then by the Organizational Research and Policy Division (OP-23) within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>1</sup> The wild card in this continuing struggle was the newly independent Air Force, which was anxious to exploit its postwar popularity in order to establish a preeminent position within the armed services. An active supporter of unification during the interwar period, the Air Force now recognized an interest in keeping the services divided so that it could pursue its own strategic goals and develop its own distinct identity. This did not make the Air Force a natural ally of the Navy, however, since some of the roles and missions that the Air Force sought to control were "owned" by the Navy.

These power struggles were played out within a completely new institutional arena: the National Military Establishment (NME). No one really knew what the term "establishment" meant, but many of its flaws were apparent even before the National Security Act was signed into law. After years of bitter and divisive disputes, most commentators and policymakers were nonetheless loathe to recommend that the new machinery for military coordination be completely scrapped. The challenge for the Washington policy community was to identify and correct the most glaring defects of the National Military Establishment without throwing the nation back into another paralyzing struggle

over comprehensive reform of the national security bureaucracy. The job was made much harder by the fact that any attempts at reform had to be undertaken against a background of fundamental strategic confusion and growing national insecurity.

The burden fell on James Forrestal, as the first Secretary of Defense, to make what he could of this novel administrative arrangement. He did not receive specific guidance from the president. More important, he did not receive an assurance of support. When Truman informed Forrestal of his intention to nominate him for the new office, he let him know that he was being offered the job because "Bob Patterson wouldn't take it." The president also used the occasion to register his continued resentment toward certain representatives of the Navy and Air Force for the roles that they had played in the fight over unification.<sup>2</sup>

Forrestal certainly had deep misgivings about the new position. Shortly after his nomination was made public, he informed one well-wisher that he would "probably need the combined attention of [Bishop] Fulton Sheen and the entire psychiatric profession by the end of the year."<sup>3</sup> He nonetheless felt a deep sense of personal obligation to get the new agency off on the right foot. Forrestal also believed that whatever problems he would face within the new National Military Establishment could be compensated for by the leadership that the Secretary of Defense would exercise within the larger network of national security institutions created by the 1947 legislation. In this regard (as will be discussed in Chapter 7), Forrestal was woefully misinformed.

Forrestal was also confident that the basic elements of an efficient military organization had been put in place by the 1947 National Security Act. His challenge was to manage the "human frictions" that he believed constituted "90 percent" of administration.<sup>4</sup> In his first meetings with the service secretaries and service chiefs during the fall of 1947, Forrestal had made it clear that he appreciated the fact that the heads of the three services were authorized by the legislation to exercise "all powers and duties . . . not specifically conferred upon the Secretary." He informed them that he viewed his job as coordinative, and that he would rely upon the War Council and the National Security Council as the primary venues for coordination. He also made it clear that he intended to keep his personal staff very small and that he planned to work through the three statutory staff agencies—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board—for day-to-day liaison with the services. Over the next eighteen months, Forrestal's dogged efforts to work within this system were consistently confounded.

This chapter will survey the efforts by Forrestal and his successors in the office of Secretary of Defense to work within the boundaries imposed by the 1947 National Security Act and then to guide the national debate about reform of the defense establishment between 1947 and 1960. The fact that six individuals held this office during this brief period is both a comment on the difficulties that they faced and also part of the problem. Although the focus of the chapter will be the administrative reforms introduced by the executive and legislative branches over a thirteen-year period, that story is only comprehensible when it is presented against the backdrop of overlapping and interacting debates over “politics, strategy and money” (Forrestal’s phrase).<sup>5</sup> Politics involved both the rapidly changing international environment and the competing domestic agendas of key national leaders. Strategy involved the efforts to develop a comprehensive war-fighting doctrine as a precondition for decisions about the appropriate roles and missions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Money meant budgets, of course, but it also related to a larger debate (introduced in Chapter 5) about the overall level of preparedness that was achievable without crippling the postwar economy.

The tone and substance of the debates about preparedness were, of course, influenced by changes in the international situation. Two months after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, Stalin established the Cominform in order to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe. His efforts to put pressure on Berlin triggered a direct confrontation that established precedents for subsequent American administrations involved in brinkmanship crises. It also injected a note of urgency to preliminary discussions regarding the creation of a North Atlantic alliance. When NATO was established in April 1949, it did little to reduce a pervasive sense of vulnerability in the United States. Indeed, a few months later, the United States suffered two more shocks—confirmation that Moscow had tested its own nuclear weapon, and news that the communists had taken control in mainland China. These developments did not make it any easier for Truman to press the case for holding down defense spending. They also tended to bolster the arguments of representatives of the new Air Force that deterrence—based primarily on air power—was the *sine qua non* of postwar national security.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman’s rear-guard campaign to keep a lid on defense spending effectively collapsed. In accordance with the premises of NSC 68, Truman authorized a massive increase in the defense budget.<sup>6</sup> But instead of solving the problems of interservice rivalry, it merely raised the stakes. As Michael Hogan has correctly observed, “Eisenhower was more successful in strengthening civilian

control of the military, reorganizing the Defense Department, and working out a scientific advisory system to advance his goals."<sup>7</sup> Eisenhower's persistent efforts to give the Secretary of Defense "clear and direct" control over the military, including his sponsorship of Reorganization Plan no. 6 in 1953 and his campaign in support of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, are discussed in this chapter, along with the Truman administration's 1949 revisions of the National Security Act.

### THE BATTLE OVER ROLES, MISSIONS AND BUDGETS (1947–1949)

International politics began to intrude even before Forrestal was sworn in as the first Secretary of Defense. After announcing his selection, the Truman administration planned to give Forrestal time to work out the administrative details relating to his new office prior to the actual swearing-in ceremony. During the first weeks of September, however, Washington was receiving reports that Yugoslavia might attempt to resolve a border dispute with Italy by invading the city of Trieste, which was occupied at the time by US and British troops. Faced with the prospect of a military confrontation, Forrestal informed Clark Clifford of his concern that the Secretary of Defense was not yet in place at the top of the National Military Establishment. The fact that the president was out of the country (in Brazil, for the inauguration of the Rio Pact) lent an additional element of risk to the situation. Clifford obtained Truman's permission, and on September 17, Forrestal was sworn in, in what Clifford described as "an atmosphere of urgency, drama and tension."<sup>8</sup>

Domestic politics was also never far from the surface during this period. Forrestal's stock had risen considerably as a result of his nomination as Secretary of Defense, and some commentators were already mentioning him as a possible alternative to Truman as the Democratic presidential candidate in the upcoming campaign.<sup>9</sup> Having publicly challenged the president over unification, the Secretary of Defense had to be particularly careful not to be depicted by the media or perceived by Truman as disloyal. During his first few months in office, Forrestal demonstrated his reliability by his strong and consistent support for two of Truman's political priorities: Universal Military Training (UMT) and a bare-bones defense budget of \$10 billion for fiscal year 1948.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Truman was attracted to Universal Military Training not only as a means of bolstering military preparedness but also as a means of insuring against any drift toward military domi-

nation in the United States. He envisioned one year of compulsory military training for all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 20, at the end of which the citizen-soldiers would be enrolled in a general reserve force. Alonzo Hamby notes, "In his more lyrical descriptions, he [Truman] made the program sound like an extended post-secondary-school class in citizenship and physical fitness."<sup>10</sup> The idea was attacked from both sides during Truman's presidency—as a back-door form of militarization and as an unrealistic campaign that would not contribute to military preparedness. Truman had failed to obtain Congressional support for UMT between 1945 and 1947, but he remained hopeful that when Congress and the media were no longer preoccupied with the issue of armed forces unification, he would be able to sell his plan to the American people.

One big problem with UMT was that it threatened to impose an additional burden on the defense budget at a time when the president was managing the wholesale dismantlement of the armed services. By the time that the process of postwar demobilization officially ended (one month prior to the passage of the 1947 National Security Act), a wartime force of 12 million troops had been reduced to 1.6 million, and there was no reason to believe that the free fall had ceased.

Some of the pressure for troop cuts was a natural and necessary adjustment to victory in an all-consuming world war. Some of it had its roots in traditions of anti-militarism, which Michael Hogan has analyzed in his essential study of the Truman era, *A Cross of Iron*.<sup>11</sup> But there was also a widespread sense that America was on the verge of a new era of "push-button warfare" that would make traditional military appeals for manpower and equipment obsolete. The Army was the biggest victim of both the comprehensive demobilization process and the popular interest in "Buck Rogers weapons." By the summer of 1947, the size of the Army had been reduced to 684,000, with more than half of this force tied down overseas performing occupation functions. Six months later, although the authorized size of the Army was only slightly smaller (667,000), the service was only able to recruit 552,000 men.<sup>12</sup>

Forrestal considered the Army's manpower problem to be his most serious and immediate challenge when he took office. But he also recognized that he could not expect much progress on this issue, or on the related issue of UMT, in a situation in which the National Military Establishment had no agreed-upon military strategy to guide its debates about military requirements. On the same day that Truman signed the 1947 National Security Act, he also approved Executive Order 9877, which was supposed to designate the roles and missions of the three armed services. This vaguely worded document, which

tended to allocate service responsibilities according to the traditional elemental distinction between land, sea, and air forces, was no substitute for a coherent and comprehensive war-fighting doctrine. It did not even resolve key points of dispute between the three services.

All three services attempted to capitalize on the vagueness of Executive Order 9877. By the time that Forrestal took over as Secretary of Defense, the Army had completed (on August 11, 1947) a secret study of future roles and missions that argued that "for the foreseeable future," there would be no need for the Navy to develop a capability for major offensive operations. Its responsibilities would be supply, the protection of sea lanes, and support for amphibious forces.<sup>13</sup> Within a few months, the Navy responded with their own ambitious plans, which emphasized the indispensability of the Navy in any future offensive campaign. The core of the Navy's offensive strategy was "air-sea power," built around the aircraft carrier.<sup>14</sup>

To the great frustration of both of these services, mass and elite public opinion in postwar America tended to assume that the newly established Air Force would be the service that would carry the war to any future enemy. It was also assumed that the Air Force would have primary responsibility for *deterrence* in a post-Hiroshima strategic environment. The Truman administration had encouraged this type of thinking by its creation during the summer of 1947 of the Air Policy Commission (the Finletter Commission) on the future of civilian and military aviation. The commission concluded in December 1947 that "military security must be based on air power," and supported the Air Force's request for a force composed of seventy air groups, built around the long-range heavy bomber.<sup>15</sup> Similar conclusions were reached by the Congressional Aviation Policy Board (the Brewster Committee).

Coming as they did within his first few months in office, the Finletter Commission hearings forced Forrestal to take an early position on the general issue of roles and missions. While emphasizing the importance of staying within the administration's budget ceiling of \$10 billion for the 1948 fiscal year, Forrestal made the case for a balanced force that would preserve an essential role for each service and assure each service of the capability to perform that role. Within a few months, this effort to be all things to all people had begun to unravel. Whatever chance there was for cooperation among the three services over roles and missions foundered on Truman's draconian budget, which elevated every point of dispute to the status of a survival issue. Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington compared the situation to "throwing a piece of meat into an arena and letting 300 hungry tigers go in after it."<sup>16</sup>

At a meeting of the War Council on October 21, it was agreed that the existing Executive Order did not resolve key questions relating to the respective roles and missions of the three services. When the Joint Chiefs failed to deliver on their commitment to develop a coordinated strategic plan by January 1, 1948, the secretary decided that a change of scenery might help the chiefs to overcome their "human frictions." The well-known Key West negotiations began on March 11, 1948, and ran for three days. The results were meager, and since no minutes were taken during the negotiations, the participants tended to present very different versions of what, in fact, they had agreed to. The core issue was the "one or two air forces" question—whether, and in what way, the Navy might share with the Air Force the responsibility for strategic bombardment (nuclear and conventional) in any future war. The issue was "resolved" by a truly Jesuitical compromise: the Navy agreed not to develop a strategic air force, but it also reserved the right to develop the capabilities necessary to make a "contribution . . . to strategic air warfare."<sup>17</sup>

Although he had informed the president that he was prepared to make his own decisions if the services were not able to come to an agreement on roles and missions at Key West, Forrestal did not pressure the Air Force and Navy to clarify their understandings.<sup>18</sup> He also allowed the Air Force to continue to make its case for expansion to a seventy-air-group size and the Navy to continue to plan for a future force built around the aircraft carrier and capable of contributing directly to any future nuclear conflict. Forrestal's willingness to accept these compromises may have been due in part to the fact that he needed the support of these services for his priority goal of "balanced strength in manpower." The secretary had a sincere interest in helping the Army to stop the hemorrhaging that had been ongoing since the end of the war, because he was convinced that the United States needed to be prepared for a wide range of military contingencies. But Forrestal also saw the goal of balanced forces as an indirect way to help the president press the case for Universal Military Training.

By this time, Forrestal had come to accept that he could not obtain the kinds of agreement that he sought from the armed services unless he was prepared to be flexible on the budget. He therefore let it be known at Key West that he was willing to seek additional appropriations from Congress, even though Truman had informed Congress only two months earlier that he did not intend to increase the defense budget for fiscal year 1949. From this point onward, Forrestal found himself in the increasingly untenable position of intermediating between the military and the White House over the issue of funding.

In fact, Truman's desire to hold the line on defense spending was becoming less and less realistic, in light of the fact that the United States faced a number of international conflicts that had implications for the National Military Establishment. The escalating confrontation with Russia over Berlin was the most immediate and dangerous situation, but the administration was also facing potential crises in Greece, Turkey, China, Czechoslovakia, Palestine, Italy, and Korea. Furthermore, many of these problems were linked. As Acheson famously argued with regard to the Greek situation:

Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France.<sup>19</sup>

The Truman administration was also on the verge of making a commitment that was both unprecedented in American diplomatic history and potentially overwhelming in terms of its implications for the armed forces. During March 1948, Washington communicated its official support for the Brussels Treaty (a mutual defense agreement among France, Britain, and the Benelux States), and then began secret negotiations with British and Canadian representatives that were to lead one year later to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Joint Chiefs viewed these negotiations with special concern because they threatened to provide Western European governments with a pretext and a venue for soliciting US military and financial support for their particular security interests, including their residual colonial commitments.<sup>20</sup>

Three days after the conclusion of the Key West meeting, the president also presented his famous "Truman Doctrine" speech to Congress. Although, as Walter Millis has observed, "the message was, and was widely assumed to be, a ringing call for a serious effort at military rearmament," the president did not publicly support the recommendations of Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs for substantial improvements in the capabilities of all three services.<sup>21</sup> His only specific requests to Congress were for UMT (to enhance military preparedness over the long term) and a return of the draft (to fill immediate manpower requirements). Truman made it clear in subsequent statements that he still intended to keep tight controls on the defense budget, but a turning point had obviously been reached. Shortly after his Truman Doctrine speech, the president established a \$1.5 billion ceiling for supplementary appropriations for the military, and then informed Congress, just a few days later, that he was prepared to support a \$3 billion increase in the defense budget. Both of these adjustments were welcomed by Forrestal, but neither came close to the level of funding required by the compromises reached at Key West.

Congress began to play a more active role at this point. During an important series of hearings by the Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 1948, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the service secretaries were pressed to specifically link roles and missions to budgets. During his testimony, Forrestal returned to the theme of balanced forces, but adjusted his specific recommendations in accordance with the president's authorization of \$3 billion in additional funds. The secretary continued to argue that additional manpower was the highest priority, and, without specifically opposing the goal of a seventy-group Air Force, developed his budget recommendations around a fifty-five-group force. This put him in direct conflict with Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, who made a strong case during his testimony for the immediate need for the seventy-group force. Symington was encouraged to make this "end run" around the Secretary of Defense by the popularity of his service since the publication of the findings of the Finletter and Brewster committees. His budget recommendations effectively overturned Forrestal's balanced-forces argument and pressed the case for allocating the entire supplemental appropriation to the Air Force.<sup>22</sup>

The Secretary of Defense responded to these provocations by redoubling his efforts to seek a workable compromise with the three services. He finally convinced the Joint Chiefs to accept a deal that would assist the Air Force in moving toward its seventy-group goal while preserving the principle of balanced forces and continuing to treat manpower as a top priority. The result was a compromise proposal for a budget increase of just under \$3.5 billion. If Forrestal had reason to feel satisfied for having achieved this difficult agreement among the services, his mood was quickly deflated when he brought the proposal to the White House. The secretary's request that the president support a compromise that went beyond his publicly stated budget ceiling was immediately attacked by Truman's Budget director, James Webb. When Forrestal sought a direct meeting with the president, Truman sided with Webb (although he allowed, grudgingly, for a slight increase in the appropriations ceiling—to \$3.2 billion). From this point onward, Forrestal's tenure as Secretary of Defense was colored by the conviction among key White House advisers that he had "lost control" of the three services.<sup>23</sup>

## THE 1949 AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Always his own harshest critic, Forrestal was beginning to show signs that he agreed with this assessment. The Army's Chief of Staff, Dwight

Eisenhower, noted that "he blames himself far too much for the unconscionable situation existing now."<sup>24</sup> But by the summer of 1948, the secretary had also come to recognize that many of the problems that plagued the National Military Establishment had their roots in the 1947 National Security Act. Forrestal began to feel under pressure to take remedial actions because he shared the widely held opinion that Truman would soon be out of the White House. But "no matter what the outcome in November," Forrestal informed a friend, "the end of this year will be the end of my bureaucratic career."<sup>25</sup> He resolved not to burden his successor with the seriously flawed system that he had been instrumental in creating.

Once Forrestal started to think seriously about reform of the NME, it became apparent that many of the system's problems began at the top. The National Security Act designated the War Council as the "principal advisory body" to the Secretary of Defense. A holdover from the 1920 National Defense Act, the War Council was envisioned as "a means for bringing into common action the civilian and military direction of the Services."<sup>26</sup> As stipulated in the 1947 legislation, the council was composed of the three civilian service secretaries and the three service chiefs, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense, who had "power of decision" over the committee. Forrestal had viewed this institution as the natural bridge between the National Security Council, which would formulate the nation's overall strategy, and the armed services, which would translate the strategy into policy. To this end, Forrestal frequently invited Admiral Sidney Souers, the NSC's executive secretary, to attend War Council meetings. The secretary also asked the chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board to attend War Council sessions on a regular basis. Forrestal also established a smaller advisory group, called the Committee of Four, which was composed of himself and the three civilian service secretaries. Steven Reardon notes that this group held highly classified discussions on "matters that did not require the immediate attention of the Service Chiefs or that the Service Secretaries might discuss more openly in the absence of their military advisers."<sup>27</sup>

Although Forrestal accorded great importance to the War Council and the Committee of Four, he never obtained the results for which he had hoped from these institutions, for three reasons. First, neither the civilian service secretaries nor the military chiefs were prepared to permit the secretary to use these organizations to impose policies that might have operational implications upon their respective services. Second, since the civilian secretaries were also statutory members of the NSC, the Secretary of Defense confronted the same stalemates at that level that he did at the level of the War Council. Finally, Truman did

not permit either the NSC or the War Council to become an influential source of policy advice during Forrestal's tenure as Secretary of Defense. Forrestal demonstrated his appreciation of this problem during his first meeting with the members of the War Council (on September 22, 1947), when he warned that "we would have to be most careful to avoid (a) the appearance of either duplicating or replacing the functions of the Cabinet, and (b) giving the public the impression that our foreign policy was completely dominated by a military point of view."<sup>28</sup>

Forrestal found that he faced an even more difficult situation when he attempted to use the Joint Chiefs as a statutory staff agency. From the point of view of the Secretary of Defense, it must have seemed unfortunate that this committee was given the same name as the exceptionally powerful group that had managed US strategy during the Second World War. According to the 1947 National Security Act, the Joint Chiefs were to serve as "the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense." The JCS was also expected to "perform such duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law."<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the Congressional Report that accompanied the legislation, while recognizing that the president had the authority to grant the Secretary of Defense "power of decision over the Joint Chiefs . . . within certain fields," also asserted that the legislation permitted the Joint Chiefs to function "in accordance with procedures developed by war experience."<sup>30</sup> This latter description of the status of the Joint Chiefs implied a direct "super-cabinet" relationship with the commander in chief. Lawrence Korb seems to have been influenced by this reading of the legislation when he asserted, "The framers of the legislation felt that the Secretary of Defense could fulfill the role played by Chairman Leahy during World War II."<sup>31</sup> This interpretation of the secretary as the president's "leg man"—essentially a liaison between the White House and the Joint Chiefs, with limited individual authority or status—is a far cry from the role envisioned by either Forrestal or Truman.

During his eighteen months in office, the Secretary of Defense made every effort to work with the Joint Chiefs to obtain consensus on issues of strategy, roles and missions, and budgets. For the most part, the service chiefs responded by using the JCS as a forum for presenting their respective demands and leaving it to Forrestal to reconcile those demands with Truman's budgets. At one low point in this struggle, the Joint Chiefs presented three separate budgets totaling \$30 billion in response to the president's proposed fiscal year 1950 budget of \$15 billion. While continuing to express his faith that "decisions on the questions of our national security will come far better from a group reflecting varying experience than from any single arbitrary source,"

Forrestal became increasingly frustrated by the Joint Chiefs' inability, or unwillingness, to resolve "profound differences as to the methods of attaining" national security.<sup>32</sup>

As mentioned in Chapter 5, Forrestal was also frustrated in his efforts to use the other two statutory staff agencies as his primary instruments for day-to-day administration of the NME. In the absence of clear signals from the Joint Chiefs on issues relating to strategy, roles, and missions, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board found it increasingly difficult to make decisions in such areas as logistics and weapons development. Lack of support and guidance from the armed services also undermined efforts by the two boards to perform their mandated liaison functions with civilian agencies and committees like the National Security Resources Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The status of the board chairmen proved to be particularly problematic during Forrestal's tenure. Representatives of the three armed services frequently referred to section 202A4 of the 1947 National Security Act—which stipulated that "all powers and duties relating to such departments [the three services] not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries"—in order to challenge the authority of the chairmen of the statutory boards. Furthermore, the fact that much of the work of the two boards was highly technical and fairly tedious tended to undermine any efforts by a "take-charge" administrator to exercise individual control. This situation very quickly created a vicious cycle in which frustrated board chairmen would resign and the Secretary of Defense would not be able to find adequate replacements. In one case, Forrestal offered the position of Munitions Board chairman to eleven candidates before someone accepted.<sup>33</sup>

It had become obvious to many commentators one year after the passage of the National Security Act that a system that relied upon the goodwill of the three separate armed services to identify their respective needs and then resolve the attendant budget disputes was simply unworkable. By this time, Forrestal agreed. While still convinced that national security was better served by a three-service arrangement than by a single unified military, the secretary had become more sympathetic to the Army's general arguments in favor of centralized decision-making. As a result, he was increasingly comfortable with Army representatives, in particular Major General Alfred Gruenther and Eisenhower. By contrast, as Forrestal became more and more frustrated with what he considered to be the Navy's unreasonable and obstinate resistance to interservice compromise, he gradually distanced himself

from many representatives of that service who had been his closest collaborators during the postwar battles over armed forces unification.

Forrestal's search for reliable and knowledgeable advisers led him back to his closest friend within the civilian national security community, Ferdinand Eberstadt. Eberstadt agreed to study the administrative problems of the National Military Establishment as part of a Task Force on National Security Organization under the auspices of the Hoover Commission's ongoing study of Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. The Army leadership sought to block Eberstadt's appointment to this position on the grounds that he was a recognized and influential opponent of armed forces unification. Still clinging to the hope that the ongoing problems of defense cooperation might convince all parties to reconsider the whole issue of unification, Secretary of the Army Royall complained:

Experience has completely demonstrated that Mr. Eberstadt's original views on unification are largely fallacious, particularly in failing to realize the necessity for the existence and exercise of a strong central authority in military and logistics matters.<sup>34</sup>

Forrestal was not responsive to these complaints.

Eberstadt's task force was composed of fourteen influential policymakers and journalists and a staff of thirty-four, which included some of the key participants in the 1945 study group (in particular, E. F. Willett and Robert Connery). There is no record of whether Pendleton Herring, whom Jeffery Dorwart credits with giving the 1945 report its "methodological and conceptual framework," was asked by Eberstadt to reprise his role in 1948. But it is unlikely that Herring would have been able to participate in any event, since he had left the Harvard faculty by this time to become president of the Social Science Research Council.<sup>35</sup>

The task force interviewed 245 witnesses between May and November and issued its final report to the Hoover Commission on November 15, 1948. Contrary to the Army's suspicions, it was not a whitewash. While the report did express overall satisfaction with the system established in 1947, it also recognized some serious defects and offered ambitious recommendations for improvements, in three general areas—the status and authority of the Secretary of Defense within the military establishment, the procedures for developing and managing budgets, and the procedures for day-to-day administration and coordination.

The most important recommendations of the Eberstadt Report relating to the status and authority of the Secretary of Defense dealt with the secretary's relationship with the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries. Section IIIC of the report proposed that "the Secretary of De-

fense be the sole representative of the National Military Establishment on the National Security Council," although the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries should be "invited" to attend NSC meetings as non-members. Section I (1E) also recommended that the service secretaries be prohibited from appealing directly to the president or the Budget director. To bolster the secretary's authority within the NME, section I (1A) of the report recommended that the word "general" be removed from that portion of the 1947 National Security Act which described the secretary's authority to develop "policies and programs" and exercise "direction, authority, and control" over the separate services. To reinforce this point, section I (1F) called for the repeal of that section of the 1947 Act which relegated to the service secretaries "all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense."<sup>36</sup>

In order to enhance his authority over the service chiefs, section I (2B) stated that the secretary should have the power to appoint a chairman of the Joint Chiefs from among its members. The chairman, who was envisioned as a legal equal of the other service chiefs in their voting and deliberations, was expected to represent the secretary while "expediting the business of the Joint Chiefs." Section I (2C) of the report also recommended that the secretary be authorized to appoint a "principal military assistant" who, along with the JCS chairman, would represent the secretary within the JCS. By contrast to the chairman, however, the assistant would not be a member of the Joint Chiefs and "would not be authorized to make military decisions on his own responsibility."<sup>37</sup>

The Eberstadt task force also recognized that it would be impossible for the Secretary of Defense to exercise effective control over the separate services without "sharpening his authority over the military budget." Thus section I (1B) of the report recommended "giving him the power 'to exercise direction and control' over the formulation of budget estimates." Meanwhile, section I (1C) proposed that the secretary also have supervisory authority over service expenditures "in accordance with congressional appropriations." To bolster the secretary's direct control over the service budgets, section I (3A) recommended the establishment of the "office of controller in the office of the Secretary of Defense and conferring upon him, subject to the authority and direction of the secretary, authority over all organizational and administrative matters relating to the military budget." The task force also recommended (in sections IIB and IIC) the introduction of uniform budgetary and accounting procedures, uniform terminologies, and uniform appropriations structures for all three services. Finally, section II (4F) of the report proposed that "no requests by any of the elements

of the National Military Establishment for future authorization measures, or for appropriations to implement existent authorization acts, be forwarded to Congress without prior authorization of the Secretary of Defense."<sup>38</sup>

Although much of the task force's investigation focused on day-to-day problems of administration, the resulting report tended to be fairly vague in its recommendations for administrative reform. Its most important administrative recommendation, in section I (3B), was the granting of "broad powers of decision" to the chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. In the introduction to section IV of the report, the task force also noted that "immediate steps should be taken to establish closer working relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board." To accomplish this goal, sections IVA through IVE of the report recommended that (1) the chairman of the RDB "sit" with the Joint Chiefs on issues relating to research and development; (2) the staffs of the JCS and the RDB establish "close and continuous reciprocal arrangements"; (3) a joint weapons systems evaluation group be established, comprised of members of the JCS and the RDB; and (4) the RDB "review" the research and development budgets of the three services in order to "advise" the Secretary of Defense and "exercise its functions of coordinating the several military research and development programs." Section I (2A) of the report also recommended that the secretary "be relieved, as far as possible, of the burden of routine administration." To accomplish this, the task force called for the establishment of a "civilian Under Secretary of Defense, who would be in effect the deputy and general manager for the Secretary of Defense."<sup>39</sup>

The Eberstadt Report also went well beyond the issue of reform of the National Military Establishment, to encourage the government to think more expansively and ambitiously about the concept of national security. To this end, section V of the report pressed the case for "more vigorous attention" to the issue of civilian and industrial mobilization. Special emphasis was placed on bolstering the purview and authority of the National Security Resources Board. The report also made the case (in section VI) that "foresight, imagination, and vigor are necessary" to prepare the nation for "attacks by unconventional means and weapons." Specific recommendations included the development and implementation of plans for civilian defense, and the designation of "one agency" with overall authority to manage internal security. The report also recommended that "more vigorous and active attention" be given to psychological warfare; and that the NSRB develop plans for "a comprehensive economic warfare program, aimed at supporting our national security in times of peace as well as war."<sup>40</sup>

At the same time that the task force was developing its recommendations for reform, Forrestal was working with Eberstadt (and, increasingly, Eisenhower) to clarify his own thinking on the kinds of changes that were needed. The Secretary of Defense was still convinced that the three services should preserve their independent status, in part to "spread the burden of work" within the NME. But as Walter Millis has concluded, "This belief in Departmental autonomy put a greater responsibility upon the Secretary of Defense to secure underlying unification of strategic plan, policy and outlook."<sup>41</sup>

In December, Forrestal summarized his recommendations in the *First Report of the Secretary of Defense*. Not surprisingly, in light of the close collaboration between Forrestal and Eberstadt, the secretary's proposals were very similar to the conclusions of the Eberstadt study. In his introduction, Forrestal commended the patriotism of all of the service representatives, but also noted, "It is not strange that professional military men should think in the terms of the service to which they have devoted their entire adult lives; it is to be expected. But unification calls for the cultivation of a broader vision."<sup>42</sup> The secretary's specific recommendations were summarized in a subsequent White House memo:

- (1) establishing a Department of Defense and strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense, (2) authorizing an Under Secretary of Defense, (3) transferring some JCS functions to the Secretary of Defense and providing for a Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (4) enlarging the Joint Staff, (5) and elimination of the Service Secretaries from regular membership in the National Security Council.<sup>43</sup>

The most notable difference between the Eberstadt Report and the *First Report of the Secretary of Defense* was their disparate approaches to the subject of money. Although he was convinced that "it is out of the competition inherent in the division of the total funds allocated to the National Military Establishment that the controversies arise," Forrestal was not yet prepared to recommend that his office be granted greater direct control over the preparation and management of the budgets of the three services.<sup>44</sup>

The Eberstadt and Forrestal reports served as the basis for subsequent debate on reform of the 1947 legislation. In February, the Hoover Commission issued its comprehensive report on reform of the executive branch. While hewing closely to the recommendations of the Eberstadt task force, the Hoover Commission tended to present stronger rhetoric and recommendations for reform of the National Military Establishment. For example, Recommendation 1 of the Hoover Commission report called upon Congress to grant the Secretary of Defense,

under the authority of the president, "full power over preparation of the budget and over expenditures." As part of Recommendation 2, the Hoover Commission proposed that "all statutory authority now vested in the Service departments, or their subordinate units, be granted directly to the Secretary of Defense, subject to the authority of the President," and that, subject to presidential authority, "all administrative authority be centered in the Secretary of Defense."<sup>45</sup>

Three weeks after the release of the Hoover Commission recommendations, President Truman sent a message to Congress outlining his administration's plans for reform of the 1947 National Security Act. The president reminded legislators:

My message to Congress of December 1945 [in which he had made a strong case for full unification of the armed services] had a double purpose. It was intended to take advantage of our wartime experience and to prevent a return to the outmoded forms of organization which existed at the outbreak of the war.<sup>46</sup>

After surveying some positive developments in such fields as military purchasing, joint training, and education and civilian-military coordination, Truman noted, "We have now had sufficient experience under the Act to be able to identify and correct its weaknesses, without impairing the advantages we have obtained from its strength." He explained that his recommendations were designed "to accomplish two purposes":

First, to convert the National Military Establishment into an Executive Department of the Government, to be known as the Department of Defense; and, second, to provide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority, and with the civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibility.<sup>47</sup>

Most of the changes that the president proposed were consistent with the Eberstadt and Forrestal reports, including clarification of the secretary's authority over the three services, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs, and the creation of an undersecretary. But Truman recommended the establishment of three assistant secretaries on the staff of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>48</sup> The president also leaned toward Forrestal's report by leaving out any specific reference to a budget controller within the new Department of Defense. Most important, Truman communicated his strong support for the creation of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, to take precedence over all other military personnel, and to be the principal military adviser to the president and the Secretary of Defense."<sup>49</sup> This clause invited a direct confrontation between the

White House and key members of Congress over the old issue of a "Prussian Chief of Staff."

Congress and the White House moved quickly to accommodate one of Forrestal's priority interests. On April 2, the president signed HR 2216, which established an Undersecretary of Defense to serve (in Forrestal's words) as the secretary's "alter ego."<sup>50</sup> This amendment to section 202 of the 1947 National Security Act stipulated that the Undersecretary should be a civilian, appointed by the president with Senate approval. To bolster and clarify this individual's status within the defense establishment, the undersecretary was elevated to deputy secretary four months later. The enabling legislation specified that the deputy secretary "shall take precedence in the Department of Defense next after the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Secretary of Defense during his absence or disability."<sup>51</sup>

The Senate Committee on Armed Services, under the chairmanship of Senator Millard Tydings (D-Maryland), began hearings on comprehensive reform of the National Military Establishment soon after the receipt of Truman's message.<sup>52</sup> The House Committee on Armed Services followed with its own hearings during the summer.<sup>53</sup> The momentum generated by the public statements of Forrestal, Eberstadt, Hoover, and Truman tended to move the legislative process forward. Significant disagreements nonetheless surfaced during the hearings over the status of the Joint Chiefs, proposals for a JCS chairman, and the amount and type of authority that needed to be legally delegated to the Secretary of Defense.

Much of the difficulty that Forrestal faced as Secretary of Defense had its roots in the fact that the Joint Chiefs were at one and the same time members of a statutory staff agency responsible for assisting the secretary in the administration of the National Military Establishment and the senior military officers in their respective services (the so-called two-hat problem). Furthermore, although there was a legal basis for arguing that the JCS was directly subordinate to the authority of the secretary, all Americans (including Forrestal and the chiefs themselves) still had vivid memories of the extraordinary influence that the JCS had exercised in the formulation and management of the war effort. In its initial form, the Tydings bill sought to resolve the "two-hat problem" by removing all of the Joint Chiefs' statutory duties from the National Security Act and turning these duties over to the secretary. The Joint Chiefs nonetheless united in their opposition to this portion of the Tydings bill, expressing special concern about a situation in which the secretary would have full statutory authority for determining US strategy and "running the war," but the chiefs would still be

held responsible for the outcome.<sup>54</sup> In deference to these concerns, Congress backed away from the idea of eliminating all statutory references to JCS responsibilities.

The Joint Chiefs did not present a similar united front with regard to proposals for creating a JCS chairman. Predictably, the Army and Air Force were more inclined than their Navy counterparts to support the creation of a powerful chairman, under the auspices of the Secretary of Defense, who could exercise real control over the armed services. The compromise wording, approved by the Joint Chiefs, prohibited the chairman from exercising "military command" over the JCS or over the armed services. This arrangement was not enough to reassure some members of the House Armed Services Committee. Chairman Carl Vinson, who had led the fight against a "Prussian general staff" system during the first round of unification battles, warned that a "superabundance of caution" was needed regarding the future role of the chairman of the JCS. Vinson's suspicions were, in fact, encouraged by the testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, who expressed his personal opinion that the legislation "does not go nearly as far" as he had hoped in the direction of a powerful Chief of Staff. Such candid statements convinced Vinson that the best way to ensure that "no military man is going to rise up in free America" was to require that the proposed chairman of the Joint Chiefs be a civilian. "I know if he is a civilian, then it will eliminate two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from one Department. It will make positive that there will be civilian control. And that is what we all want."<sup>55</sup> This proposal was not well received within Congress, nor within the defense establishment, but it did reinforce in the minds of several legislators the need to monitor closely the trend toward greater centralization of military authority within the Department of Defense.

Some participants argued during the hearings that efforts to bolster the legal authority of the secretary vis-à-vis the Joint Chiefs were unnecessary, since the 1947 National Security Act stipulated that the JCS should perform their duties "subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense." Indeed, the question of how much legal authority the Secretary of Defense already had surfaced during both the Senate and the House deliberations. Once again, Carl Vinson was the most consistent and forceful proponent of the argument that most of the problems of coordination that had plagued the NME during its first eighteen months were attributable to personalities, and to the inevitable difficulties of establishing habits of cooperation and communication in a vast and complex organization. Vinson had difficulty sustaining this position in the face of overwhelming testimony to the contrary, and in light of the converging arguments of the

Eberstadt task force, Forrestal's *First Report*, the Hoover Commission report, and Truman's message to Congress. He concluded:

I think the Secretary could accomplish everything he wants to accomplish under the present law. But he doesn't think so. So I think it is the duty of the Congress to strengthen his hand and give him what he thinks he needs, because he is charged with the responsibility.<sup>56</sup>

In the end, a compromise was reached, but Congressional ambivalence and confusion regarding the status of the chairman permeated the amended legislation:

- The chairman was to be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve at the pleasure of the president for a two-year term that could be renewed once.<sup>57</sup>
- Though the chairman was designated as the "presiding officer" of the Joint Chiefs, he was prohibited from voting.
- Although the reforms stated that the chairman "shall take precedence over all other officers in the armed Services," it also stipulated that he "shall not exercise command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or over any of the military Services."
- The amended legislation did not grant Truman's request that the chairman be designated as the "principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense." This status continued to be reserved for the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body.<sup>58</sup>

As Edgar Raines and David Campbell have noted, the decision in favor of a JCS chairman rather than a powerful Chief of Staff represented "the greatest disappointment" for the proponents of armed forces unification. "By acting as the executive in dealing with the Services, the chief of staff would have permitted the secretary to develop to the fullest extent his control over the armed forces."<sup>59</sup>

The amended legislation also reflected a compromise between Forrestal's request for a larger Joint Staff and the warnings by Eberstadt and others about the dangers of unrestricted growth of the defense establishment. Congress agreed to increase the maximum size of the Joint Staff from 100 to 210.

The specific reforms introduced by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act were designed to give the Secretary of Defense "what he thinks he needs."<sup>60</sup> Starting at the top, the legislation transformed the National Military Establishment into "an Executive Department of the Government," to be called the Department of Defense. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were demoted from the status of independent executive departments to "military departments" that were to be "separately administered by their respective Secretaries under the di-

rection, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense." As a consequence of this demotion, the civilian service secretaries lost their seats on the National Security Council.<sup>61</sup> The amended legislation also prohibited the service secretaries from appealing directly to the president or the Budget director.

To eliminate any confusion about the secretary's authority within the new Department of Defense, section 202B of the 1947 legislation was significantly revised. Vaguely worded references to the secretary's duties ("establish general policies and programs," "exercise general direction," "take appropriate steps," "supervise and coordinate") were replaced by a short declaratory statement. "Under the direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of this Act, he [Secretary of Defense] shall have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense." To assist the secretary in this task, the legislation authorized a civilian Deputy Secretary of Defense, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, who "shall take precedence in the Department of Defense next after the Secretary of Defense." The legislation also elevated the status of the secretary's three special assistants to Assistant Secretaries of Defense (again, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate). It was left to the secretary to decide how to use two of the three assistant secretaries, but the amendments stipulated that one assistant secretary must serve as "Comptroller of the Department of Defense." The comptroller's duties were to assist the secretary in the preparation of Department of Defense budget estimates and in the development and administration of uniform accounting, reporting, and auditing procedures.<sup>62</sup>

The introduction of a comptroller between the secretary and the separate services was part of a completely new section (Title IV) that was added to the 1947 National Security Act to significantly enhance the secretary's direct authority over the budget process. It had been this issue, more than any other, that had eroded Forrestal's standing with the White House. In the end, Congress accepted Eberstadt's argument (during testimony) that the government could not reduce waste and redundancy within the NME unless the secretary was given more explicit authority over the budget process.<sup>63</sup> With the passage of the 1949 Amendments, "the only qualification on this budget control," according to C. W. Borklund, "was that the Secretary could not direct the expenditure of Defense funds in a way that would . . . starve a Service unit into impotence by denying it money."<sup>64</sup>

The 1949 reforms also made it easier for the Secretary of Defense to use the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board as staff agencies. To this end, the legislation gave the respective board chairmen "power of decision" over matters within their jurisdiction, as authorized by the Secretary of Defense. As John Ries has observed:

The result of this provision was to change the board from a group of Service representatives sharing in the policy process to a group of advisers for the board chairmen. . . . And the chairman became a staff officer for the Secretary.<sup>65</sup>

Soon after the legislation was passed, however, Forrestal's successor as Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, modified the status of the board chairmen by stipulating that they were only authorized to impose decisions when the other members of the board could not achieve consensus.

The 1949 Amendments constituted a fundamental shift in the underlying premises of the National Security Act. According to the Committee on Armed Services:

The loosely joined system of three executive departments, each with direct access to the President, was discarded. The new law changed the synonym of unification from "coordination" of the armed Services to "centralization" under the Secretary of Defense.<sup>66</sup>

Most commentators were convinced of the need for a more centralized and pyramidal system as a result of Forrestal's catastrophic tenure as Secretary of Defense. One influential participant nonetheless worried that the reforms had gone too far. Reprising the role of Cassandra that he had played during the 1947 Congressional hearings, Eberstadt testified:

From shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately disappear if only more and more authority is conferred on the Secretary of Defense. . . . I suggest that care be taken lest the Office of the Secretary of Defense . . . feeding on its own growth, becomes a separate empire.<sup>67</sup>

The president certainly viewed the situation differently, assessing the reforms as "a step nearer true unification of the armed forces." Truman went on to state in his memoirs, "To me, the passage of the National Security Act and its strengthening amendments represented one of the outstanding achievements of my administration."<sup>68</sup>

To conclude this discussion of the 1949 reforms, it bears mentioning that the amended legislation also imposed some new constraints on the Secretary of Defense, in three respects. First, because some legislators were concerned that the amended legislation would reduce Congressional oversight of the armed services, section 202C6 was introduced to authorize the civilian secretaries and the members of the JCS to present recommendations directly to Congress (after informing the Secretary of Defense). Second, the legislation stipulated (section 202C1)

that the Secretary of Defense could not exercise his new administrative or budgetary authority in such a way as to undermine the “combatant functions” of the congressionally authorized services. This provided representatives of the separate services with a convenient weapon for fending off interference by the Secretary of Defense. Finally, and most important, section 202B of the amended version of the National Security Act designated the Secretary of Defense as the “principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense,” whereas the original version of the legislation had identified the Secretary as the president’s “principal assistant . . . in all matters relating to the national security.” This narrowing of the secretary’s mandate was a useful clarification, since Forrestal had been encouraged by the much broader language of the original legislation to believe, incorrectly, that his status as Secretary of Defense had given him the *ex officio* authority to serve as the president’s surrogate within the network of national security institutions created in 1947.

#### THE STRUGGLE OVER STRATEGY:

#### FROM THE REFORMS OF 1949 TO THE REFORMS OF 1953

Although the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act were wide-ranging and significant, Carl Vinson was correct in his claim that personalities mattered a great deal in determining power relations within the defense establishment. Forrestal had been too respectful of the military and too committed to compromise as a good in itself. This was due in large part to his personal experiences as Assistant Secretary and then Secretary of the Navy. By the end of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was leaning toward more authoritarian solutions—dabbling with seeking the president’s backing to bully the JCS and considering the firing of Air Force Secretary Symington when he threatened key premises of the secretary’s balanced-forces program. In the end, however, Forrestal never abandoned his conviction that inter-service cooperation was the best means of making policy.

Forrestal’s successor, Louis Johnson, was, according to the diplomatic description of Edgar Raines and David Campbell, “a very different kind of administrator.”<sup>69</sup> He had assured Congress during the Armed Services hearings that if they gave him the authority to control the armed forces, he would be able to cut \$1 billion from the defense budget in the first year and \$1.5 billion in the second year.<sup>70</sup> Armed with the new statutory authority of the 1949 Amendments, Johnson wasted no time in asserting his personal control over the separate services in order to “bleed down” the defense budget. He also made it

clear to the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs that he intended to manage, and resolve, outstanding debates about strategy. The service representatives were to be informed, rather than consulted, and removed from office if they challenged his authority.

Johnson's critics leveled intensely negative and ad hominem accusations against the secretary. His opponents questioned his motives, claiming that he had his sights set on the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952. They also criticized his qualifications, claiming that he had been given the job as a reward for his successful management of Truman's fundraising effort during the 1948 re-election campaign. The term "dictator" was used frequently and openly to describe Johnson's administrative style (one of Truman's advisers described the new secretary as "the only bull I know who carries his own china shop around with him").<sup>71</sup> Some commentators implied that Johnson contributed to Forrestal's mental breakdown and subsequent suicide by his attempts to "undercut" Forrestal and edge him out of the office of Secretary of Defense.<sup>72</sup> Dean Acheson went farther than any of these critics, claiming that the Secretary of Defense's behavior over time "became too outrageous to be explained by mere cussedness . . . evidence accumulated to convince me that Louis Johnson was mentally ill."<sup>73</sup>

Johnson was undoubtedly a bully. He probably harbored political ambitions. And he came to office with only a superficial knowledge of many important policy issues.<sup>74</sup> But he was also convinced, with good reason, that his predecessor had failed in his responsibilities to support the president in his efforts to formulate and administer a coherent national security strategy. Furthermore, his conviction that the armed services could not be trusted to voluntarily eliminate redundancy and increase efficiency was widely shared within Washington. The president had informed the service representatives early in 1949 that he was not satisfied with the budget compromises that they had worked out with Forrestal, and he put them on notice that he intended to impose a much tighter defense budget ceiling. Johnson's actions were entirely consistent with this message.

Johnson also took over the new Department of Defense at a crucial moment in the history of the Cold War. For four years, the administration had been pursuing an ambitious postwar foreign policy agenda without the aid of a coherent military strategy. Forrestal and Truman's commitment to a balanced force had more to do with domestic priorities (demobilization, Universal Military Training, concerns about inflation and budget deficits) than with the relationship between threats and capabilities. By 1949, efforts to postpone difficult strategic choices had become unsustainable. Priorities had to be established and choices

had to be made, and the decisions would have long-term implications for all three services.

By the time that he became secretary, Johnson had formulated his own ideas about the strategy that the United States needed to pursue. As Steven Reardon has noted:

While his sympathies for the Air Force were never really as strong as the Navy and its partisans imagined, Johnson appeared to have few doubts about the potency of land-based strategic air power or reservations about making it the predominant element in U.S. defense policy.<sup>75</sup>

Johnson's commitment to the goal of bleeding down the defense budget made him an early proponent of the threat of massive retaliation as the most reliable and cost-effective means of insuring US national security. This led him, in turn, to press for military custody over atomic weapons (an ongoing battle since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1946) and for an accelerated program of production of nuclear weapons. It also led Johnson to support the so-called air-power budget for fiscal year 1950, which explicitly favored the Air Force, and the B-36 intercontinental bomber in particular, at the expense of the other services.

Johnson's efforts to force a strategy upon a still-divided Joint Chiefs of Staff culminated in the well-known "B-36 controversy." This story has been well told by several scholars and need not be addressed here in any detail.<sup>76</sup> Some aspects of the story bear mentioning, however, because of their implications for the development of the national security bureaucracy. The trigger event for the B-36 controversy was Johnson's decision, less than a month after taking office, to cancel construction of the Navy's "supercarrier," the *USS United States*, which was designed to perform a wide range of missions, including the forward deployment and launching of B-29 bombers as part of any future strategic air offensive. Johnson's decision had the support of both the Army and the Air Force representatives on the Joint Chiefs. Furthermore, the secretary cleared his decision with President Truman prior to taking action. The secretary nonetheless acted in such a way as to emphasize his personal role in the decision, and to draw most of the public criticism to himself.

The Navy leadership was outraged by Johnson's decision, and claimed that the secretary was not qualified to judge the value of either the Air Force's claims about strategic bombing or the Navy's plans for sea-based air power. In fact, shortly before Johnson was sworn in as secretary, the recently established Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (discussed in Chapter 5) had been tasked by the Joint Chiefs to analyze the feasibility of strategic bombing. It took ten months for the WSEG

staff to organize itself, undertake the technical analysis of various issues (including B-36 performance characteristics and the vulnerability of high-altitude bombers to Soviet air defenses), and present its report to the Joint Chiefs. In the end, the conclusions of the WSEG study were so conditional that Johnson and Truman disagreed about whether it supported or undermined the Air Force's case.<sup>77</sup> The fact that the secretary made decisions that favored the Air Force prior to the completion of the WSEG study nonetheless bolstered the Navy's claim that the secretary had acted irresponsibly.

Three days after Johnson announced his decision, Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan, who had not been consulted before the decision, submitted his resignation. This was the first salvo in what came to be called the "revolt of the admirals." As it had done during the 1947 unification debates, the Navy sought the support of its friends in Congress. Under the chairmanship of Carl Vinson, the House Armed Services Committee opened hearings on "unification and strategy" in October 1949 and issued an unusually well-written and provocative report five months later. The first part of the report, which dealt with grand strategy, demonstrated the deep ambivalence of the Navy leadership in the wake of the cancellation of the supercarrier. Although the *United States* was, in the words of C. W. Borklund, "the Navy's bid to gain a piece of the Air Force's strategic bombing mission," Navy representatives chose to attack the whole concept of massive aerial bombardment of cities.<sup>78</sup> They testified that the threat of "atomic blitz warfare" by means of intercontinental high-altitude bombers (the Air Force's B-36) would not deter aggression. Furthermore, Navy spokesmen argued that nuclear bombardment of civilian populations in the early stages of a war would not break the enemy's will. On the contrary, it might serve to "develop a flaming hatred among enemy peoples" and unify the enemy, as Pearl Harbor had done in the American case.<sup>79</sup> Navy witnesses then went to the heart of the matter by arguing that a strategy that "contemplates the slaughter of millions of noncombatants" in the first stages of a conflict constituted a "barbaric" and "immoral" form of warfare that would set an example that "would prevent the attainment of a stable world society after the war even though the war would be waged specifically for that purpose."<sup>80</sup>

The Navy leadership next turned its attention to more pragmatic issues of cost, asserting that in a situation of severe budgetary constraints, the nation could not afford to give priority to the development of an intercontinental bomber force. America's "first needs" were forces that could contribute to the defense of the United States, defense of allies, defense of militarily significant bases, and "command of the

seas." Any weapons system that did not serve these "first needs" constituted "an unsupportable luxury."<sup>81</sup>

Under Vinson's leadership, the Armed Services hearings provided an influential platform for the Navy spokesmen. The committee's final report leaned in favor of the Navy by claiming that the relative merits of the intercontinental bomber and the supercarrier could only be determined by qualified experts, but then concluding that the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group was the appropriate body for evaluating the B-36, while the Navy was best qualified to evaluate the supercarrier.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, although the report concluded that "the concern of the committee, in this labyrinth, is . . . not whether or not this or that strategic doctrine is the sound one," it stated that the committee had been "considerably disturbed" by the testimony of Admiral Robert Carney:

In that testimony appears factually based evidence that strategic bombing can best be performed by methods other than intercontinental methods in order to achieve comparable results, and that the intercontinental method of strategic bombing is twice as costly as any other possible method.<sup>83</sup>

The committee then turned its attention to the issue of armed forces unification, noting that "while most people seem to be emphatically in favor of 'unification,' as is the committee, there are few who agree fully as to its meaning."<sup>84</sup> The report emphasized that "unification is a concept, not a fact," and although the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act made the Department of Defense much more centralized, relations among the armed services were still confounded by "sharp disagreements" that frequently erupted within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>85</sup> The committee noted the Navy's "lively suspicion" that it would be "at a disadvantage in any tripartite councils, due to the fact that the other two Services were originally one," and concluded that such suspicions "cannot be wholly discounted."<sup>86</sup> They also registered some sympathy with the Navy's "active fear" about a public mood of indiscriminate and ill-informed fascination with the Air Force and its "atomic blitz" doctrine.

The final committee report also took note of the special vulnerability of the Marine Corps in the existing tripartite system, due in large part to the fact that the Marines were not represented in the Joint Chiefs. This was a special problem, according to the report, because of the "animus" between the Marines and the Army and Air Force. The committee challenged the claims by Army and Air Force witnesses (led by JCS chairman Omar Bradley) that Marine Corps aviation was "excessive," and asserted that "neither Service can but concede that the approach of the Marine Corps to its aviation requirements is predicated upon

needs and concepts peculiarly of a Marine Corps nature."<sup>87</sup> The committee concluded, as item 23 in its list of findings:

The Joint Chiefs structure, as now constituted, does not insure at all times adequate consideration for the views of all Services. The committee will sponsor legislation to . . . add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a member thereof.<sup>88</sup>

Compromise legislation passed in June 1952 granted the Commandant of the Marine Corps membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with equal status and voting rights—but only when the JCS was considering issues that concerned the Marine Corps.<sup>89</sup>

The committee leveled its most intense attacks against Secretary of Defense Johnson, for "administrative indelicacies . . . which have opened Service scar tissue on the subject of unification."<sup>90</sup> Johnson was attacked for the "summary manner of cancellation" of the Navy's supercarrier.<sup>91</sup> With specific reference to Johnson's decision to withhold funds for a weapons system that had been appropriated by Congress, the report concluded that the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act provided the secretary with the legal authority, but went on to assert that the committee "does not consider this practice to be in harmony with the desires of the Congress."<sup>92</sup> To ameliorate this problem, the committee proposed to

sponsor legislation to require, within reasonable limits, consultation by the Secretary of Defense with the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives before appropriated funds are withheld by administrative act.<sup>93</sup>

The committee nonetheless gave itself an alternative to new, and more restrictive, legislation by noting that

this particular kind of difficulty—a difficulty which lies at the root of many unification difficulties—can be eliminated or at least minimized by the Committee on Appropriations by keeping itself progressively and constantly informed of development of plans and policies.<sup>94</sup>

Over the next several years, Congress in general, and the respective Appropriations Committees in particular, were more prone to monitor, and demand feedback from, the Secretary of Defense regarding appropriations issues.

The committee reserved its most controversial conclusion for the very end of the report. Item 33 in the committee's findings rebuked (without specifically naming) Johnson for engaging in what a majority of the members of the committee viewed as a "reprisal" against Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, for his testimony during

the Unification and Strategy hearings. Denfeld, who had presented a strong defense of the Navy's position during his testimony, was removed from office on October 27—one week after the conclusion of the House hearings. The report concluded that this action constituted

a blow against effective representative government in that it tends to intimidate witnesses and hence discourages the rendering of free and honest testimony to the Congress.<sup>95</sup>

The report also interpreted this action as a direct violation of the "language and intent" of section 202C6 of the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act, which authorized the service secretaries and the members of the Joint Chiefs to communicate directly with Congress (after informing the Secretary of Defense).<sup>96</sup> This was the only finding in the report that generated a dissenting statement (from ten of the thirty-five committee members). The minority noted that there was "nothing whatsoever in the record of the committee hearings to support the finding" of the majority. They further asserted that the Secretary of the Navy had, in fact, informed the president, in the company of the Secretary of Defense, of his opinion that Denfeld should be removed prior to the October hearings.<sup>97</sup>

In spite of the criticisms that were directly and indirectly leveled against Johnson by the House Committee on Armed Services, the Secretary of Defense was not terminally wounded by the Unification and Strategy hearings. This was due in large part to the fact that he was serving both the president's and Congress's interests by his efforts to keep a tight lid on the defense budget. There was also a general sense, in the wake of the much-publicized battles during the Forrestal era, that the armed services needed to be disciplined by a strong civilian administrator. In the words of C. W. Borklund:

Johnson sailed energetically on, wielding his economy bludgeon. In January, 1950, he had revealed that \$20 billion in fiscal 1951 money asked by the Services had been trimmed to \$13.5 billion, which, he said, was "adequate to defend the nation against any situation that might arise in the next two years."<sup>98</sup>

But Johnson's very public role in the economy campaign also made him an easy target when, three months after the publication of the committee report, elements of the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea.

Truman wasted no time in replacing the controversial Johnson with a man who could instill confidence and exercise authority within the entire Washington policy community. George Marshall, who had been Truman's closest collaborator in the failed campaign for "real" armed

forces unification, now found himself in control of a defense establishment that was both strategically and organizationally in chaos, as a result of five years of intense interservice conflict over very small defense budgets.

The first source of confusion was resolved quickly. Congress passed legislation that exempted Marshall from section 202A of the 1947 National Security Act—which prohibited an individual who had served in the armed forces within the last ten years from serving as Secretary of Defense.<sup>99</sup> Marshall's mere presence at the top of the defense establishment also immediately transformed the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department, which had reached one of its lowest points under Johnson.

The new secretary also wasted no time in introducing a more efficient, and more vertical, advising and reporting system within the defense community. Arguably the most significant administrative change that Marshall made during this period was the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, to assist him in the complex task of reversing five years of dramatic reductions in troop strength. Few people questioned the need for this new position, but considerable controversy was generated by Marshall's choice of a candidate. Eisenhower recommended Anna Rosenberg, who had served as a member of the War Mobilization Advisory Board under Roosevelt and as a member of Truman's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training. Both Marshall and Truman accepted Eisenhower's recommendation, but the administration was not prepared for the problems that they confronted during Senate hearings on her nomination. Rosenberg herself was not surprised by the difficulties: "I was Jewish, an immigrant, had been a pro-labor worker, and was a woman? What could have been worse?"<sup>100</sup> Rosenberg nonetheless survived the confirmation process and established herself as a valued Assistant to the Secretary. Marshall reciprocated by gradually expanding her areas of responsibility to include, among other things, all Munitions Board functions relating to manpower and industrial relations. Rosenberg was also given the difficult job of establishing guidelines for evaluating what Doris Condit has called the "seemingly insatiable" manpower demands of all three services during the Korean War, and then holding the services to the established limits. The assistant secretary also created the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, which identified new opportunities for women in noncombat positions within the Department of Defense. Finally, Rosenberg influenced legislation that provided benefits to Korean War veterans that were comparable to the benefits provided to World War II veterans.<sup>101</sup>

Rosenberg also made a valiant effort to help Truman and Marshall save the UMT scheme, which by this time was on life support. By linking the issue of Universal Military Training to the issue of compulsory military service, Rosenberg and Marshall actually succeeded in convincing Congress to pass the Universal Military Service and Training Act in June 1951. But this legislation merely established a National Security Training Commission to consider various plans for universal military service. When the commission put forward a proposal for a pilot project, Congress balked at the proposed price, and the entire project was quietly put to rest.<sup>102</sup>

Confusion over the strategic direction of the armed forces was even harder for Marshall to manage. Prior to his appointment as Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs had been grappling with two realities: the need for a massive increase in conventional forces to meet immediate needs associated with the Korean conflict, and the need for longer-term improvements in the nation's deterrent and war-fighting capabilities in accordance with the recommendations of NSC 68. This now-famous joint State-Defense document, written under the supervision of Paul Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, had been officially approved by the Truman administration three months after the North Korean invasion. It called for a "substantial increase" in America's military forces in order to "frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will." Without providing details, the study conceded that this campaign would "involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments."<sup>103</sup> Melvyn Leffler contends that

despite its hyperbolic rhetoric, NSC 68 essentially reaffirmed the assumptions that had been driving U.S. foreign policy during the Truman administration. . . . What was new about NSC 68 was that Nitze simply called for more, more, and more money to implement the programs and to achieve the goals already set out.<sup>104</sup>

While it is true that many of the themes developed in NSC 68 had already been developed by other US policymakers, this document was different. It made an authoritative case for what John Gaddis would later describe as a symmetrical containment strategy, "acting wherever the Russians chose to challenge interests."<sup>105</sup> The document also introduced a novel argument in support of America's ability to finance a campaign of indefinite and indiscriminate global containment. Aaron Friedberg notes that NSC 68 "asserted that economic growth could provide an all-but-painless solution to the nation's problems." Friedberg also observes, however, that these economic arguments are contradicted by the document's calls for national sacrifice, in the form of reduced federal spending and increased taxes.<sup>106</sup>

Michael Hogan concludes that NSC 68 gave earlier NSC documents "a new sense of urgency and integrated them more fully into a national security ideology."<sup>107</sup> The decision by the Truman administration to commit to NSC 68 effectively ended a debate that had been ongoing among defense planners since the end of the Second World War regarding competing geographic priorities in a situation of limited resources.<sup>108</sup> At the same time, acceptance of NSC 68 triggered a new debate among the military services over the implications of the new global strategy for their respective roles, missions, and budgets.

The specific implications of NSC 68 were still being discussed among the armed services in September 1951, when Marshall informed the president of his desire to step down. He encouraged Truman to ask his Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, to become his successor. Like Forrestal, Lovett had learned to fly during World War I, achieved great success in Wall Street, and acquired extensive administrative experience with the armed services before he was appointed Secretary of Defense. Lovett was widely respected, both within the defense community and in the larger Washington policy community, for his intelligence and his managerial skills. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas have observed:

He was a very good Secretary, one of the few who actually gained some control over the Pentagon bureaucracy. . . . Lovett's greatest capacity as a thinker was to look ahead. . . . When the brass had urged more battleships early in World War II, Lovett insisted on bombers. Now that the Pentagon was clamoring for bombers, Lovett wanted to build missiles.<sup>109</sup>

In fact, the story was not that simple, and the problems that Lovett faced were not so easily resolved. The secretary had to deal with some intense bureaucratic battles, many of which were concentrated in and around the Munitions Board, which was "overwhelmed by an unanticipated large-scale mobilization" as a result of the Korean War.<sup>110</sup> As discussed in Chapter 5, the secretary was under considerable pressure from the chairmen of the Munitions and Research and Development boards to support their efforts to bolster their individual authority in relations with the armed services in general and with the Joint Chiefs in particular. The secretary resisted these demands in order to limit his confrontations with the service chiefs at a time when his office was attempting to sponsor new missile programs "with our left hand while fighting Korea with our right."<sup>111</sup>

Although Lovett's tenure as secretary was fairly brief, he nonetheless developed some strong opinions about what needed to be done to improve efficiency within the Department of Defense. Soon after the Democrats lost the 1952 presidential election, Lovett sent Truman a let-

ter designed to give the next Secretary of Defense “a running start on certain of the administrative and operational problems in the Department of Defense.”<sup>112</sup> Although Lovett described it as an “informal letter,” it was, in fact, a substantial and influential document, which helped to focus attention on the issue of organizational reform at the start of the Eisenhower presidency.

Lovett was careful to frame his arguments so that they did not invite a new round of battles between the Secretary of Defense and the military leadership. He complimented both the members of the armed services and the civilian staff within the Department of Defense for their service and professionalism and presented his recommendations as steps that should be taken now in order to make his department more effective in the event of a future war. Citing in particular continuing problems relating to the personal authority of the Secretary of Defense and problems associated with the management of the defense budget, Lovett asserted that “we should not deliberately maintain a Department of Defense organization which in several parts would require a drastic reorganization to fight a war.” He noted that great progress had been made in improving the efficiency of the Department of Defense since the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, but he also observed that the Act, as amended in 1949, was still burdened with “contradictions and straddles.”<sup>113</sup>

Lovett’s first proposals related to the secretary’s status within the defense establishment. While making it clear that he had enjoyed excellent relations with the service chiefs, he observed that “the question is occasionally raised by legal beavers as to whether or not, in view of the vagueness in the language of the Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are directly under the Secretary of Defense.” Lovett argued for a major change in the status of the service chiefs:

Since they wear two hats—one as Chief of an Armed Service and the other as a member of the Joint Chiefs, it is difficult for them to detach themselves from the hopes and ambitions of their own Service without having their own staff feel that they are being let down by their Chief.<sup>114</sup>

Aside from the issue of divided loyalty, Lovett observed that the “two-hat problem” resulted in the chiefs being “grievously overworked.” This problem was exacerbated, according to Lovett, by the fact that the secretary had no reliable military staff of his own and had to rely upon the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff “for the development of military facts or to draw on experienced military judgment.”<sup>115</sup> To resolve these problems, the secretary recommended new legislation that would “confine” the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff “exclusively to planning functions” and transfer the “balance of the military staff functions” to

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also recommended that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be given a vote within the JCS, even though he recognized that "the 'voting' procedure is not normally used" by the Joint Chiefs. Lovett's reasoning seems to have been based upon the belief that any change that bolstered the chairman's influence within the JCS would also enhance the personal authority of the secretary in his day-to-day relations with the armed services.<sup>116</sup>

The secretary argued that the problems associated with the "interdepartmental" identity of the Joint Chiefs also plagued the other two statutory boards—the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. The fact that three of the four positions on these boards were reserved by the National Security Act for representatives of the three services created the same "two-hat problem" that Lovett identified at the level of the Joint Chiefs. Stating that "real flexibility" was necessary in the membership of these boards, Lovett proposed that either the secretary should be given discretion over the choice of members, or the boards should be abolished and their duties transferred to the office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>117</sup>

Lovett also expressed concern about the "possible confusion" between the secretary's "direction, authority and control" over all three services and the statement in the National Security Act that military departments are "separately administered." Lovett made his own opinion clear in this regard: "I feel that the Secretary of Defense clearly has authority to step in where necessary in these fields" provided that he does not unilaterally change the legally mandated functions of the three services. But he argued that it would be helpful to resolve any confusion before the secretary's authority was actually tested.<sup>118</sup>

He also went to the heart of the issue of armed forces unification with two proposals. First, he asserted that the National Security Act needed clarification

as to whether, in the case of unified commands, the theater commander reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense. In my opinion, the Secretary of Defense, as the "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense" should, in effect, be the Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief and, therefore, any unified command should be established by him, report as directed by him, and similarly, receive orders by his direction.<sup>119</sup>

He also speculated on a much more radical reform of the technical branches of the armed services, based on "function" rather than "profession." "In other words, let us say that civil engineers are in the Corps of Engineers; electrical and communication engineers in the Signal Corps; mechanical, industrial, hydraulic, ballistic engineers are in

Ordinance, etc.” Although he claimed that such a change was “long overdue,” he also admitted that getting it done would be “more painful than backing into a buzzsaw.”<sup>120</sup>

Doris Condit concludes her comprehensive study of the Department of Defense during the Korean War years with an assessment of Lovett’s record as secretary:

It is ironic, perhaps, that Lovett—who had tried to get along without greater Secretarial power and who often expressed his desire to work within the existing system—provided the impetus for major changes toward greater centralization of power in the secretary’s hands, as had the reluctant Forrestal in 1949. . . . If during the war years military influence had necessarily grown in some spheres, Lovett’s final report pointed the way to redressing any civil-military imbalance. Indeed it helped move the balance toward the civilian side.<sup>121</sup>

Both Forrestal and Lovett came to the office of Secretary of Defense with widespread bipartisan backing. Forrestal’s power base was considerably weaker, however, because he did not have the president’s confidence and support. Forrestal also faced a much more difficult time because he was attempting to establish a *modus vivendi* with the leadership of the armed services without the benefit of precedent, and in an atmosphere of extreme suspicion and resentment following the battles over armed forces unification. By contrast, Lovett had the president’s backing and the benefit of enhanced authority as a result of the 1949 reforms. Lovett also followed two secretaries who had shaken up the armed services in very different ways—the first through dogged efforts to achieve compromise, and the second through direct confrontation and personal authority. Lovett wisely concluded that he could, and should, work within this system. But he also used his time in office to identify enduring defects that would need to be addressed by his successor.

## THE EISENHOWER REVOLUTION

The Lovett letter gave the Eisenhower administration the “running start” that the secretary had envisioned, but the president did not need to be encouraged. Eisenhower had campaigned on the need to reform the Department of Defense. He came into office with specific ideas about what needed to be done, and communicated these ideas to his new Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson. As one of his first official duties, Wilson appointed a Committee on Department of Defense Or-

ganization, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, to continue the movement for reform that had been started by the publication of Lovett's letter. Since Lovett was a member of the seven-man committee, it is not surprising that its conclusions were similar to the major recommendations of the Lovett letter. The Rockefeller Committee called for clarification of the Secretary of Defense's authority, in light of the "long record of challenges" from within the department. In a legal opinion appended to its report, the committee stated that "statutory interpretation is not an esoteric pursuit reserved for word-splitters," and concluded, "In our opinion . . . the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense is complete and supreme" within the Department of Defense.<sup>122</sup>

The committee also agreed with Lovett that the terms of the Key West agreement needed be modified to allow the Secretary of Defense, rather than the Joint Chiefs, to designate a particular branch of the armed services to function as "executive agent" for each unified command. Finally, the Rockefeller Report concurred that the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board should be abolished, and that these duties should be turned over to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The committee report went beyond Lovett's letter, however, by specifying six new assistant secretary positions that should be created within the Department of Defense, to handle the duties of the two collapsed boards and to improve the administration in other areas. The report also called for the establishment of the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Defense, to work with the legal officers of the separate services "in order to eliminate and prevent confusion which has been caused . . . by inconsistent opinions, interpretations, and approaches."<sup>123</sup>

The Rockefeller Report was less clear than the Lovett letter regarding the problem of the "two-hat" identity of the service chiefs. At one point, the report concurred with Lovett's general argument that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as a planning and advisory group, not to exercise command."<sup>124</sup> Rather than specifically prohibit the service chiefs from performing command functions, however, the committee stated that "planning and advisory work" were the primary responsibilities of the JCS, and "insofar as possible," the Joint Chiefs should turn over less important duties to their subordinates.<sup>125</sup>

Three weeks after the Rockefeller Committee submitted its findings to Secretary Wilson, the president forwarded his own message to Congress, entitled Reorganization Plan no. 6. Stating that "the Defense Establishment is in need of immediate improvement," Eisenhower proposed several changes. His most important recommendations were:

- Giving the Secretary of Defense, rather than the Joint Chiefs, responsibility for designating the service that is responsible for supervising each unified command.
- Abolishing the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.
- Creating six new Assistant Secretary of Defense positions.
- Authorizing the president to appoint a civilian General Counsel of the Department of Defense, "by and with the consent of the Senate."
- Giving the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, rather than the JCS, the responsibility for managing the Joint Staff.

Eisenhower's message reflected the Rockefeller Committee's approach to the controversial issue of dual-hatting by the JCS. Noting that the service chiefs were "clearly overworked," the president recommended that they be "encouraged to delegate lesser duties to reliable subordinate individuals and agencies."<sup>126</sup> Eisenhower's plan also did not go as far as Lovett's letter regarding the status of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, since he did not argue for giving the chairman a vote within the JCS.

Although Eisenhower was careful not to press for too much centralization, his critics were quick to read his plan as one more step toward a "Prussian general staff" system. The president had invited such suspicions by his comments during the presidential campaign. For example, in a speech delivered in Baltimore on September 25, 1952, Eisenhower had argued:

Such unity as we have is too much form and too little substance. We have continued with a loose way of operating that wastes time, money, and talent with equal generosity. With three Services in place of the former two, still going their separate ways and with an over-all defense staff frequently unable to enforce corrective action, the end result is not to remove duplication but to replace it with triplication. All this must be brought to as swift an end as possible.<sup>127</sup>

Members of Congress leveled their strongest attacks against Eisenhower's recommendation that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs be authorized to manage the Joint Staff. "Uncle" Carl Vinson, who had argued during the 1949 hearings that the chairman should be a civilian, chose not to oppose Eisenhower's reorganization plan. He nonetheless used the occasion of the 1953 House Armed Services hearings to warn against further constraints on the authority of the service chiefs. Representative Edward Hebert (D-Louisiana) went further, warning Congress that Eisenhower's proposals were part of a "trend . . . toward the single staff concept." And in a letter addressed to the president, dated May 20, 1953, Congressman Leslie Arends (R-Illinois) specifically asked

Eisenhower whether "the proposed changes . . . contribute in any way toward a single military command." Eisenhower assured Arends that "just as not one of the prerequisites for the single military commander with a superstaff exist today, so none can exist or be established under the proposed reorganization."<sup>128</sup>

In spite of Eisenhower's reassurances, the reorganization plan stalled in committee. The plan was nonetheless saved by an intense White House lobbying effort, and by the fact that, as an executive branch administrative reform proposal, the Congress only had sixty days to make a decision for or against passage.<sup>129</sup> Reorganization Plan no. 6 became law, without any significant revisions, on June 30, 1953. Taken together, the reforms represented another significant enhancement of the personal authority of the Secretary of Defense and, to a lesser extent, of the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. On the other hand, some experts have argued that the 1953 revisions actually constituted a "step back" from the goal of centralization, at least as it related to the Joint Chiefs' role in the management of unified commands. According to the new arrangement:

The Service Chiefs provided operational direction of the combatant forces, but now it was solely by virtue of their role as heads of their Services rather than because of their membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this narrow respect, the 1953 reorganization provided even less centralization than the World War II system.<sup>130</sup>

Over the next five years, the Department of Defense underwent only minor organizational changes. The president was still convinced that more needed to be done to improve efficiency within the defense establishment, and from time to time members of his administration tested Congress's willingness to revisit the issue of armed forces unification.<sup>131</sup> When Air Force representatives expressed their continued support for a strong chief of staff, Paul Douglas (D-Illinois) warned his colleagues in the Senate that "the problem of the proper place for the military in our system of government was considered and debated by those who wrote the constitution. . . . The current drive of the supreme general staff-national general staff proponents is aimed to override these fundamental concepts of our form of government."<sup>132</sup>

In the face of strong opposition to further Department of Defense reform, Eisenhower and Wilson concentrated their efforts on adapting roles, missions, and budgets to the demands of the "New Look" strategy. This campaign tended to favor deterrence over war-fighting, missiles over manpower, and nuclear over conventional weapons. The president relied upon his unchallengeable military credentials and his skill as a "hidden hand" administrator to impose these changes upon

the separate services.<sup>133</sup> The cumulative effect of these strategic adjustments nonetheless transformed the relations between the various services during the mid-1950s. The major change was a growing rift between the Army and Air Force, which replaced the Navy-Air Force conflicts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. With the end of hostilities in Korea, the Air Force became the principal beneficiary of the New Look doctrine, and the Army found itself "relegated to the role of defending strategic air bases."<sup>134</sup> Under these circumstances, Army leaders became increasingly disenchanted with the idea of unity of command, which they had consistently advocated since the war, out of fear that any conceivable arrangement would only serve to consolidate Air Force dominance.<sup>135</sup>

Wilson also focused his attention on fine-tuning the organization that he had inherited. He was assisted in this regard by a comprehensive study of technical aspects of Department of Defense administration that was undertaken by the Second Hoover Commission between 1953 and 1955. This study addressed such issues as personnel management, budget and accounting procedures, and the administration of common supply and services.<sup>136</sup> One topic confronted by the Hoover Commission that struck a nerve with Wilson involved the growth of the civilian staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Critics of the administration made much of the comment by Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor that there were "nineteen civilian officials" between himself and the president.<sup>137</sup> When Bryce Harlow, the president's legislative liaison, looked into this matter, he had no difficulty finding service spokesmen who shared Taylor's concerns. A representative statement by Captain J. V. Noel, Jr., complained of a "well motivated, unqualified, smothering bureaucracy in the Department of Defense," and concluded:

Our basic difficulty is that we are trying to manage and operate the Department of Defense under two diametrically opposite concepts of organization. One, the concept of the Unification Act of 1947, is that the Departments and their operating forces shall be separately administered. . . . The other, the concept of the Secretary of Defense and his office as an active participant in the management of the Departments. Whatever the reasons, since 1947 we have been shifting from the first toward the second. . . . The results are evident.<sup>138</sup>

While both Wilson and Eisenhower were sensitive to these criticisms, they attributed them in their public statements to the fact that the Office of the Secretary of Defense was still not fully in control of the defense establishment, and had to invest too much manpower in inefficient coordination functions.

By the fall of 1957, Eisenhower was ready to revisit the issue of reform of the defense establishment. In fact, it can be argued that Eisenhower never lost sight of this goal. He nonetheless needed some trigger event that highlighted problems of defense organization before raising the issues, once again, with a still-skeptical Congress. His opportunity came in August 1957, with the first Russian launch of a multistage missile and the subsequent launch into orbit of a Soviet satellite ("Sputnik"). Robert Watson has described the national reaction to the launch of Sputnik as "not outright panic but genuine consternation, followed by a veritable orgy of national self-examination and self-criticism."<sup>139</sup> Most of the criticism was leveled at the president, since his Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, was preparing to step down after nearly five years in office. Eisenhower attempted to short-circuit the attacks by assuring the American people that satellites did not pose a new danger to the United States. At the same time, however, he began to make the case that new technologies of war-fighting cut across traditional service boundaries and demanded fundamental reform of the defense establishment.

Eisenhower's campaign to reform the military drew momentum from another source, as well. Shortly after the public was informed of the launch of Sputnik, Nelson Rockefeller presented the president with a memo that summarized the recommendations of a study on military reform that he had personally sponsored. The Rockefeller Report on military reform was part of a larger, ongoing project that considered issues of diplomacy and economics as well as military affairs. In light of the national uproar over Sputnik, Rockefeller decided that it was necessary to go public with the military portion of the report as quickly as possible.

The subcommittee's report argued that America's worldwide forces needed to be more mobile and better integrated. It recommended the creation of a network of unified commands that would be under the direct authority of the Secretary of Defense. The report criticized the existing three-service system as inherently inefficient and inappropriate for the challenges of the missile age, and proposed that the military departments be removed from the channel of operational command. It also recommended that the authority of the Secretary of Defense within the defense establishment be clarified and enhanced, that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs be designated as the principal military adviser to the secretary and the president, and that the Joint Chiefs function primarily as "advisors to the Chairman."<sup>140</sup>

At the same time that the Rockefeller Report was being prepared for publication, the subcommittee's chairman, Henry Kissinger, completed work on his own influential book, entitled *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign*

*Policy.* Excerpts from Kissinger's study deserve to be quoted in some length, both because of their impact at the time, and because of the flair with which they were presented:

It has often been remarked that nothing stultifies military thought so much as a victorious war, for innovation then must run the gamut of inertia legitimized by success. It is no different with United States military thought after World War II. . . . Thus, whatever the technological transformations of the postwar period, we sought to fit them into a concept of war which we had perhaps learned too well.<sup>141</sup>

In the process [of the B-36 hearings], the Navy brought into the open for the first time the inadequacies of our method of arriving at strategic decisions. According to this procedure, three Service Chiefs, whose primary task is the maintenance of the morale and efficiency of their respective Services are also required to make over-all strategic judgments which may run counter to their basic task.<sup>142</sup>

Complete unification of the Services is probably out of the question. . . . It may, therefore, be best to begin reorganization by creating two basic commands, each representing a clearly distinguishable strategic mission. . . . The Strategic Force would be the units required for all-out war. . . . The Tactical Force would be the Army, Air Force and Navy units required for limited war.<sup>143</sup>

Kissinger's book became a best-seller, and although most of the public debate that it generated dealt with the author's argument in favor of the stockpiling of tactical nuclear weapons, his contention that the three armed services were incapable of working together to formulate and manage an effective strategic doctrine was also widely discussed. In conjunction with the findings of the Rockefeller Report, it served as valuable suppressing fire as the Eisenhower administration initiated the next major battle over unification.

Neil McElroy, president of Proctor and Gamble, replaced Wilson as Secretary of Defense in October 1957. "The nation's number one soap salesman" asked the president to give him some time to get oriented before the administration launched its all-out campaign for defense reform. Eisenhower was sympathetic to McElroy's concerns, but he was also enough of a politician to appreciate the importance of timing. The president instructed his Secretary of Defense to meet with Rockefeller and members of the White House staff to work out the details of a proposal for comprehensive reform. Eisenhower, meanwhile, agreed to Rockefeller's recommendation to include a strong message of support for organizational reform in his upcoming State of the Union speech.<sup>144</sup>

In his address to Congress, the president identified defense reorganization as the administration's top priority. He also made it clear that he was not seeking incremental reform:

The advent of revolutionary new devices, bringing with them the problem of overall continental defense, creates new difficulties, reminiscent of those attending the advent of the airplane half a century ago.

Some of the important new weapons which technology has produced do not fit into any existing Service pattern. They cut across all Services, involve all Services and transcend all Services, at every stage from development to operation.

The president then shifted his focus to the specific problem of policy coordination in an era of nuclear deterrence, citing "pride of Service and mistaken zeal in promoting particular doctrine" as sources of current difficulty:

I am not attempting today to pass judgment on the charge of harmful Service rivalries. But one thing is sure. Whatever they are, America wants them stopped.<sup>145</sup>

Shortly after the State of the Union speech, McElroy put together a team, chaired by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Coolidge, that began conversations with key military and political leaders, including some members of Congress who had proven themselves in the past to be among the most committed opponents of centralization. This made good sense from a political perspective, but it also led to compromises before the plan was even launched. As a result of these discussions, the administration backed away from some of the more extreme proposals of the Rockefeller subcommittee—leading Rockefeller to criticize the White House's plan as "weak" and "watered down."<sup>146</sup>

Eisenhower's opponents in Congress did not see it that way. While the administration's proposals were still being developed, Carl Vinson attempted to short-circuit the White House campaign by convening hearings designed to focus public attention on the aforementioned issue of the size and inefficiency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The specific proposals put forth by Vinson's committee included eliminating fourteen of the twenty-nine undersecretary and assistant secretary positions in the Department of Defense, placing a limit of 600 on the number of civilian Defense employees, and creating new statutory restraints on the authority of the comptroller. Committee members also argued for returning to the service secretaries the right to serve as members of the National Security Council.<sup>147</sup> Although Vinson's efforts were unsuccessful, he put the president on notice that he faced an uphill battle over institutional reform.

Three months after his State of the Union message, Eisenhower submitted his specific proposals to Congress. Portions of his introductory statement sounded like the testimony given by supporters of comprehensive unification between 1944 and 1947. In words that were strikingly similar to Henry Stimson's comments on "triphibious warfare," the president informed Congress that "separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever." To manage "one concentrated effort" in time of war, and to prepare for such a contingency in time of peace, the Secretary of Defense had to be accorded "clear and direct" authority over the armed services. Eisenhower also put legislators on notice that he intended to "regroup and redefine certain Service responsibilities." Although he attempted to soften the impact by assuring members of Congress that "we should preserve the traditional form and pattern of the Services," the president knew that he was inviting a major confrontation with powerful members of the House and Senate by including this last statement in his message.<sup>148</sup>

The most important proposal in the president's message to Congress involved the organization of the armed services into unified commands (comprising all land, sea, and air forces in a specific theater of operations—for example, the Pacific Command) and specified commands (in which only one service was represented—for example, the Air Force's Strategic Air Command).<sup>149</sup> Eisenhower probably knew more about this general subject than any other American. In 1941 he had been personally responsible for writing the memo that was designed to provide Army Chief of Staff George Marshall with the ammunition to convince the British to accept a unified command arrangement in the Pacific Theater.<sup>150</sup> As the war progressed, Eisenhower was placed in the position of translating the principle of unified command into practice, first in North Africa, then in Sicily, and finally across the entire Europe Theater of Operations.<sup>151</sup> During his postwar tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he admitted that he missed being a "little Czar in my own sector." The position nonetheless gave him the opportunity to work with his military counterparts and the commander in chief in the formulation of the first Unified Command Plan in 1946. Finally, Eisenhower was reintroduced to the problems of managing a unified command when he was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1951.<sup>152</sup>

In his message to Congress, the president described the unified commands as "the cutting edge of our military machine" and noted that "our entire defense organization exists to make them effective." To be sure that the nation was adequately prepared for war, he informed Congress of his intention that "subject only to exceptions personally approved by the Commander in Chief, all of our operational forces be

organized into truly unified commands."<sup>153</sup> In order to "remove any possible obstacles to the full unity of our commands," Eisenhower proposed that the commander of each unified command be given complete authority over all of the military components of his command. Furthermore, "clear command channels" would be established at the top of the system—from the commander in chief to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commands. This represented a fundamental change from the existing system—which Eisenhower had introduced in 1953 with Reorganization Plan no. 6—according to which the Secretary of Defense designated a particular service secretary as "executive agent" for each command. Under the proposed system, Eisenhower noted, the unified commands would be "in the Department of Defense but separate from the military departments." The president also informed Congress that the commander in chief and the Secretary of Defense would need the unchallengeable authority "to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions" of the separate services in order to properly manage a system composed of unified commands.<sup>154</sup>

At the same time that he was arguing for a significant expansion of the authority of the Secretary of Defense within the chain of command, the president also made the case for clarifying and enhancing the powers of the secretary in the management of the defense establishment. He repeated the by-now-familiar complaint that the language of the 1947 National Security Act was still "inconsistent and confusing," because it gave the secretary "direction, authority, and control" over the entire defense establishment while at the same time providing that the three military departments were to be "separately administered." Citing "endless, fruitless argument" within the Department of Defense, the president proposed "that we be done with prescribing controversy by law." His solution was the removal from the legislation of all "needless and injurious restraints on the authority of Secretary of Defense." He also asserted that the secretary needed "greater flexibility in money matters," and requested that Congress change its appropriation procedures so that the bulk of the funding for the armed services could be placed under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense.

Eisenhower also proposed changes within the Joint Chiefs of Staff system in order to "provide the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands." Although he stated that the current arrangement was "essentially sound," he argued that "I think it important to have it clearly understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff act only under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense." With specific reference to the proposed system of unified commands, the president stated that the

Joint Chiefs would perform staff functions only. It is worth noting that some of Eisenhower's advisers also recommended that he solve the dual-hat problem once and for all by prohibiting the service chiefs from performing any command functions, so that they could focus on staff and planning duties in support of the secretary. Robert Watson notes that the president preferred that "for the sake of prestige, they should retain a few powers over their Services."<sup>155</sup> Consequently, he recommended in his message to Congress that each service chief be authorized to delegate "major portions of his Service responsibilities" to his Vice Chief of Staff.

The president's message also recommended changes designed to enhance the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First, he proposed that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be given a vote within the JCS. Second, he recommended that the chairman be authorized by statute to assign duties to the Joint Staff and, with the approval of the secretary, to appoint the director of the Joint Staff. Finally, to assist the chairman, the secretary, and the Joint Chiefs in their management of the various planning and administrative activities, Eisenhower requested that the statutory ceiling of 210 officers in the Joint Staff be repealed.<sup>156</sup>

The president also addressed various miscellaneous issues relating to the secretary's administrative control over the defense establishment. In light of the transformative effect of technology, the president emphasized the need for a new director of Defense Research and Engineering within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to exercise "expert, single direction" over the entire research agenda of the armed services. He proposed that the number of assistant secretaries be scaled back (from nine to seven), but also recommended that the assistant secretaries be given "full staff functions," which meant that they would be authorized to give direct instructions to members of the three military departments. The president also made it clear that he intended to exercise greater control over the relationship between Congress and the armed services by moving various legislative-liaison and public-affairs functions into the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Finally, Eisenhower communicated his intention to introduce new personnel guidelines designed to give the Secretary of Defense personal control over the promotion and assignment of all officers above two-star rank, as well as the authority to transfer officers between services, with the consent of the individuals involved.<sup>157</sup>

Key members of Congress wasted no time in expressing their strong opposition to portions of Eisenhower's message. In hearings convened by the House Committee on Armed Services, Vinson registered pre-

dictable concerns about a "Prussian general staff," even though Eisenhower's proposals actually tended to bolster the relative power of the civilian Secretary of Defense.<sup>158</sup> Criticisms were also leveled against those recommendations which were interpreted as potential threats to Congressional prerogatives. Eisenhower's proposal that the secretary be given the authority to transfer service functions was interpreted as an indirect attack on specific services. The request for changes in the procedures for appropriating defense funds was interpreted by some legislators as an effort to convince Congress to abdicate its constitutionally designated spending and oversight authority. Some House members also criticized the president's plans for tighter controls over the armed forces in their public-information and Congressional-liaison activities, returning to some of the acrimonious arguments of the B-36 hearings.

The House Committee on Armed Services completed its hearings on May 16 and sent a revised reform bill, HR 12541, to the full House for a vote. Although the revised bill gave the president much of what he had requested, Eisenhower criticized three aspects of the legislation. First, the wording of the proposed legislation stated that the military departments would be "separately organized" (rather than "separately administered") and that the Secretary of Defense would continue to work through the service secretaries to administer the three military departments. Second, while granting the secretary the right, in principle, to transfer combatant functions, the revised legislation gave each service chief the authority to decide what constituted such functions and then exercise a veto over the secretary's action. Third, in order to ensure Congress's oversight authority, the committee also preserved the right of the service secretaries and chiefs to bring any issue to the attention of Congress.

By the time that the House Armed Services Committee completed its hearings, Eisenhower was very actively involved in a public campaign of pressure in support of his vision of reform. As he notes in his memoirs:

So strong were my convictions on the need for this reform, that I resorted to a means I had not used before—at least on such scale. I began to write directly to influential citizens across the nation to explain the issues at stake and to ask them to make their conclusions known to members of Congress, especially to members of its military committees.<sup>159</sup>

On a few occasions, the president's pressure campaign got out of hand. His public statements that his opponents in the House were encouraging "legalized insubordination" among the services and that Congress

"hopes for disobedience and interservice rivalries" elicited a strong reaction from members of Congress as well as from influential members of the media. Hanson Baldwin noted:

Such generalized, unfair and extreme language may shift the focus of public attention from the Soviet lead in sputniks and long-range missiles . . . but . . . is scarcely calculated to win friends and influence people.<sup>160</sup>

As the legislative process moved forward, Senators Mike Mansfield and Paul Douglas informed the White House that, in spite of the president's "high-pressure selling campaign," his plans for reform of the defense community were in serious jeopardy. They specifically cited four provisions of HR 12541 that they viewed as "a dangerous surrender of congressional responsibilities": the procedures for transfer of major combatant functions by the Secretary of Defense; the designation of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than Congress, as the body authorized to decide what constituted a major combatant function; the granting of authority to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to manage the Joint Staff and select its members (creating, in the view of the senators, a "factual Chiefs of Staff system"); and the dilution of the authority of the service secretaries by the further expansion of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mansfield and Douglas concluded that the proposed legislation "clears the way for a major transfer of constitutional legislative powers and duties to the Executive Branch," and put the president on notice that "we shall not be stampeded into abdication of Congressional authority and possible serious danger to our cherished freedoms."<sup>161</sup>

By this time, the White House was also under attack from groups outside of government who were opposed to a more centralized Defense Department. Supporters of the Navy and the Marine Corps were especially vocal in their public criticisms of the president's plans. The Secretary of Defense sought to control this situation by pressing Navy and Marine Corps spokesmen not to stray too far from the official administration position. This only served to encourage members of Congress to attack the White House for censorship. To avoid a replay of the problems that had surfaced during the B-36 hearings, the president met with key legislators on June 24 to discuss the legislation and reassure them that military representatives would be free to express their views in testimony before Congress.<sup>162</sup> This meeting seems to have helped to improve the tone of the deliberations between the White House and Congress. The Senate hearings were completed, and compromise legislation was negotiated between the two houses.

The president signed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599) into law on August 6. In spite of intense Congressional resistance during the hearings, the final product gave the president most of what he had asked for:

- It established the comprehensive system of unified and specified commands that was at the core of Eisenhower's proposal. These commands were placed under the direct authority of the commander in chief and the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs.
- It stated that the three military departments were to be "separately organized" (rather than "separately administered") under the overall authority of the Secretary of Defense.
- It authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer major combatant functions among the services, but gave Congress seventy days to reject such transfers, by a majority vote in either house.
- It permitted the Joint Chiefs to delegate duties to their respective vice-chiefs, without specifying the types of duty that could be so delegated.
- It gave the chairman of the Joint Chiefs a vote within the JCS, but authorized both the chairman and the Joint Chiefs to direct the activities of the Joint Staff.
- It authorized an increase in the size of the Joint Staff to 400, and set the tenure of its members at not more than three years, except in times of war.
- It established the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering, along with seven assistant secretaries and a general counsel. Assistant secretaries were permitted to give orders to the separate military departments, but only with the written authorization of the Secretary of Defense.
- It preserved the right of both the service secretaries and the service chiefs to make recommendations directly to Congress.<sup>163</sup>

Eisenhower registered his dissatisfaction with two elements of the compromise legislation: The right of either branch of Congress to block efforts by the Secretary of Defense to transfer major combatant functions, and the perpetuation of "legalized insubordination" in the form of the right of direct appeal to Congress by the civilian and military heads of the three military departments. He nonetheless concluded that his administration had finally "placed the Defense Department on a foundation of organization and procedure that would make a reality of civilian control by the president and Secretary of Defense, and make it possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fulfill the vast responsibilities that only they were qualified to discharge."<sup>164</sup>

## CONCLUSION

During the remaining months of his presidency, Eisenhower continued to tinker with issues of defense reform, but he recognized that most of what he had realistically hoped to achieve had been accomplished. The Department of Defense was still a far cry from the vision of “real” unification that he had shared with Marshall and Truman at the end of the war. But it was much closer to their ideal vision than it was to the confederal arrangement created by the 1947 National Security Act.

The first important difference was that although there were still three separate armed services, their primary duties were to perform support functions for a network of “supra-service commands.”<sup>165</sup> By 1961, Eisenhower’s goal of organizing all of America’s fighting forces into this worldwide network of unified commands had been accomplished, leading Paul Hammond to predict that “a major shift in power will gradually take place from the armed Services to the unified and specified commands.”<sup>166</sup> In fact, the separate services proved remarkably resilient, and resistant, to such a shift in power. As David Jablonsky has observed, “The unified commands had to plan for their missions with resources provided by the Services through a process defended by the Services.” Over time, this pattern of behavior created structural defects that became dangerously apparent during the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage crisis, and other Cold War military tests.<sup>167</sup>

The restructuring of the Department of Defense around a system of unified commands was nonetheless part of a tectonic shift within the defense establishment—away from the separate services and toward the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The OSD benefited from specific changes in statutory authority as a result of the post-1947 reforms, most notably the creation of the Office of Comptroller (in 1949) and the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (in 1958). These reforms bolstered OSD control over all branches of the armed services at every stage in the process of policy formulation, program development, procurement, and administration.

By the time that Eisenhower left office, the Secretary of Defense had been transformed from a relatively weak mediator into something very similar to the “super-secretary” that the Army had called for and the Navy had warned against during the postwar unification hearings. Conditions were in place for a strong individual to use the Office of the Secretary of Defense to exercise direct and comprehensive control over the armed services. John Kennedy’s choice for Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had both the executive experience and the

personal ambition to take advantage of this opportunity. He was particularly effective at establishing a top-down Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that centralized the Department of Defense policymaking process and established new procedures for medium-term strategic planning. It is a comment on McNamara's extraordinary accomplishment that the system that he introduced is still in use today.<sup>168</sup>

Another important change that had taken place by the time that McNamara took office was the establishment of the Joint Chiefs as the military advisers to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs had lost their privileged relationship with the commander in chief at the end of World War II, but the JCS had retained a great deal of corporate influence within the Washington policy community following the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, however, the Joint Chiefs still had a place in the chain of command, but it was only in the capacity of agents of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, the service chiefs had to share their residual authority with a chairman, who was designated by statute as *primus inter pares* within the JCS—with senior rank, and the right to set agendas, preside over meetings, vote, and serve as liaison with the secretary and the commander in chief.

Of course, the practical reality was less than the supporters of centralization had expected as a result of the 1958 reforms. For example, the fact that the service secretaries and service chiefs were still authorized to take their concerns directly to Congress imposed limits on the secretary's ability to "indirectly merge the three Services."<sup>169</sup> But the fact that the Department of Defense had not become the completely unified institution that Eisenhower had been "preaching and praying for" in the mid-1940s must be weighed against how much had been accomplished since 1947.<sup>170</sup> While there were still some vestigial traces of the original institutional DNA of the National Military Establishment in the Department of Defense by the time that John Kennedy came to office, the overall institution bore little resemblance to the NME. It took a president with unchallengeable military credentials to effect this transformation, and to establish true civilian control over military services that had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy for 150 years.

## Chapter Seven

# CLOSING THE PHALANX

## THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NSC AND

## THE CIA, 1947–1960

THE EFFORTS by Truman and Eisenhower to increase efficiency within the armed services represented one important element of a larger campaign to ensure presidential control over the national security bureaucracy. This chapter will survey the attempts by the two postwar presidents to place their stamp on two other key components of this bureaucracy: the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I will also comment on the efforts by the State Department to preserve an influential role in this emerging national security system during the period from 1947 to 1960.

It is useful to discuss the early history of the NSC and the CIA in the same chapter since the two agencies were closely linked by statute. The 1945 Eberstadt Report made the case that the CIA “should be part of, and report to” the NSC because reliable intelligence “is an important part of the grist of the Council’s mill.”<sup>1</sup> When the CIA was created by section 102A of the 1947 National Security Act, it was placed under the authority of the NSC. According to the first executive secretary of the NSC, Sidney Souers, the founding legislation had established the CIA as the “eyes and ears for the Council and the President for intelligence.”<sup>2</sup> In theory, at least, the CIA also had the potential to be more than this, since section 102D5 of the 1947 legislation authorized the agency to perform “such other functions and duties related to intelligence” as the NSC might direct. From the outset, many experts and policymakers argued that “such other functions” should include authoritative coordination of the entire intelligence community. This is why, as Amy Zegart has observed, the placement of the CIA under the authority of the NSC “suited the War and Navy departments to a T.”<sup>3</sup> As statutory members of the NSC, the Army and Navy secretaries could block any efforts, short of a presidential directive, to expand the CIA’s control over the other intelligence services.

At the same time that Truman and Eisenhower were adapting the NSC and the CIA to a rapidly changing strategic environment, the American people were adapting to the new logic of national security.

Once again, Pendleton Herring played an important part in the process. Having completed his work on the Eberstadt Report and his brief tenure as secretary of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Herring moved out of the Washington policy community and into the increasingly influential community of postwar foundations. His most important role in this community was as president of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) for an extraordinarily long period (1948–1968). In this capacity, he helped to cultivate a generation of academics and policy experts who utilized theories borrowed from political science, public administration, and economics in the service of US national security. One illustrative example was the SSRC's sponsorship of Samuel Huntington's influential study of *The Soldier and the State* in 1957.<sup>4</sup> According to Kenton Worcester, "Pendleton Herring's orderly, empirical and intellectually serious approach to Council business helped make it possible for the organization to spin off into multiple directions while retaining its cachet within the social sciences."<sup>5</sup>

In spite of the fact that foundations such as the SSRC helped to accclimate the American people to the logic and rhetoric of national security and anti-Communism, they were not exempt from McCarthyite attacks during the 1950s. Herring was to play an especially important role during this period, as the only representative of a major foundation to be allowed to testify during the House Hearings on Tax Exempt Foundations (the Reece hearings) of 1954. In a situation in which the hearings were "stacked against the foundations," Herring provided a spirited and wide-ranging rebuttal to questions by members of the committee staff regarding Communist infiltration into the foundation world.<sup>6</sup> Herring described these accusations as "better understood as symptomatic of a troubled state of mind on the part of a few persons than as a logical statement to be refuted literally."<sup>7</sup> In his counterarguments, he also provided the members of the committee with an introduction to the ideas of Plato, Locke, Tocqueville, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and, of course, the founding fathers.

With his influential testimony in 1954, Herring once again demonstrated that he was ahead of many other thinkers in identifying a fundamental problem in American society. In 1941 he had made a forceful argument for military preparedness and new procedures for foreign policymaking in the face of new threats and vulnerabilities. By the mid-1950s, Herring was beginning to identify, and speak out against, the dangers that could arise when the pendulum was permitted to swing too far in the other direction. This chapter will highlight the ways in which the question of how much national security was enough influenced decisions about the composition and purposes of two important components of the national security bureaucracy: the NSC and the CIA.

## THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Amidst the rancorous debate over armed forces unification during the deliberations that culminated in the 1947 National Security Act, the proposal for what Herring had called a “gyroscopic device” to keep American foreign policy on an even keel received relatively little public attention. It was generally understood that the NSC was to be an instrument for improving the president’s administrative control over national security affairs, and that the president should decide how, and how often, to use this institution.<sup>8</sup>

Some Congressmen did express concern about the constitutional implications of an arrangement that would give the president greater personal control over foreign, and perhaps domestic, policymaking. They pressed for either a permanent legislative presence on the council, or at least some arrangements for Congressional input and oversight. White House staffers resisted all proposals designed to give Congress an opportunity to interfere in the workings of the NSC. In the end, the council was clearly established as “the President’s instrument.”<sup>9</sup> Robert Cutler, who would serve as the first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, explained at the end of his term why Congress needed to give the president a relatively free hand in his management of the NSC: “The danger is that the great flexibility of the present statute, which commends it so to presidents, will in some way . . . get ‘embedded in legislative concrete’ ” if Congress seeks to regulate its activities and membership. Under these circumstances, “the Council would become a fifth wheel.”<sup>10</sup> Most members of Congress accepted this argument, which helps to explain why the NSC was not subjected to the kind of nearly continuous statutory revision that the Department of Defense experienced during the Truman and Eisenhower eras. The only specific changes in the National Security Act relating to the NSC had to do with personnel who were added or removed from statutory membership. The most important deletions were the service secretaries (1949) and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board (1953), and the most important addition was the vice president (1949).

But although most legislators were inclined to give the president considerable leeway in his management of the NSC process, they were not prepared to uncritically accept the *product* of these deliberations.<sup>11</sup> As the NSC became a more visible and influential actor, Congressional complaints about the content and direction of US foreign and defense policies led to attacks on the council itself. By the late 1950s, these attacks were coming from so many directions that there was good reason to believe that the National Security Council would end up like the

National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board—as another failed experiment in national security policy coordination. This chapter will endeavor to explain why the NSC not only survived this intense criticism, but prospered. The simple answer was provided by Senator Henry Jackson in his influential study of the council: “If there were no NSC, we would have to invent one.”<sup>12</sup>

*The NSC during the Truman Era: Surviving  
“Capture” and “Castration”*

The National Security Council held its first official meeting on September 26, 1947. As discussed in Chapter 4, even though Truman recognized the need for some system for bringing together civilian and military views on national security, he nonetheless gave only grudging and conditional support to the provision of the 1947 National Security Act (section 101) that created the NSC. The president harbored two specific concerns. His first concern was that the council would become a “second cabinet” that would intrude on the prerogatives of the president. His second concern, which became more focused and personalized after he chose James Forrestal as the Secretary of Defense, was that spokesmen for the military would “capture” the council and provide the president with advice and information that favored their point of view. To protect against both of these developments, the president made it clear that he intended to keep the NSC small and informal, and that he would only occasionally attend NSC meetings. The president also chose as the first executive secretary of the council a person who completely agreed with his interests and concerns regarding the proper role of the new agency.

Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was well qualified for the new position. Most of his relevant professional experience had been in the field of intelligence—as Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence during the war and then as the author of the intelligence section of the Eberstadt Report in 1945. Souers had also demonstrated impressive talents as a coordinator and negotiator during his tenure as the first director of Central Intelligence in the postwar Central Intelligence Group. By the time that he took over the NSC position, he had become a trusted presidential adviser.

Souers was fond of saying that he was “an anonymous servant” of the council.<sup>13</sup> But he was also the person who served as the bridge, and gatekeeper, between the council and the White House. The scope of Souers’s presidential briefings—every morning at 9:30—was compre-

hensive, as illustrated by a comment that he made in a private letter dated August 19, 1963:

In Mr. Truman's memoirs he indicated I was his Special Assistant for top level intelligence. Perhaps he considered my briefings as "intelligence" covering the views of his cabinet officers and other officials.<sup>14</sup>

Souers claimed that he assisted the president and the White House staff in "watering down the powers of the NSC considerably as conceived by Messrs. Forrestal and Eberstadt."<sup>15</sup> According to Clark Clifford, Souers and his assistant, James Lay, pressed the White House to reject Forrestal's demand that "the NSC report to him, and . . . that his decisions should be final, and binding on the executive secretary." Clifford backed Souers on this issue, and also refused Forrestal's efforts to locate the NSC in the Pentagon, with a staff composed almost entirely of military officers.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the National Security Act designated the Secretary of Defense as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security," Truman announced at the first NSC meeting that the Secretary of State would preside over all council deliberations in his absence. The State Department's clout within the NSC was also reinforced by the designation of a senior Foreign Service officer as "staff coordinator"—a position that Souers described as "captain of th[e] team" of staff members who were seconded to the NSC by the constituent agencies.<sup>17</sup> Souers would later assert that

in the National Security Council, of the Cabinet officers participating, the Secretary of State must inescapably be "first among equals." It is right and proper that the viewpoints of the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies concerned with national security be made known through the NSC to the President. Yet the Secretary of State, as the President's principal adviser on foreign policy, must bear the main burden of helping the President define our political objectives in the world and initiating and developing policies for achieving them.<sup>18</sup>

Truman's decision to designate State as the lead agency in the NSC system helped to mitigate the concern that Secretary of State Marshall had expressed prior to the passage of the National Security Act, that the NSC would undermine the constitutionally designated authority of his department and that the Secretary of State would become an "automaton" of the council. On the other hand, it created unavoidable concerns and suspicions among other agencies—most notably, the representatives of the National Military Establishment.

Sidney Souers relied upon the small staff of the NSC to help him to reconcile the differing interests and worldviews of the representatives

of the major national security institutions. In his selection of NSC staff members, Souers sought to “steer a middle course between two undesirable extremes”: an “ivory tower” of permanent employees, and a group composed of representatives of the participating services, which would be prone to “loss of continuity.”<sup>19</sup> Within a year he had put together a staff of thirty, built around a “small nucleus of career personnel” and including representatives of the participating agencies and “consultants” from both the public and private sector. “To allay any fears of empire-building,” Souers assured a group of military representatives in 1948 that the entire council budget for fiscal year 1950 was only \$217,000.<sup>20</sup>

Several years after leaving the NSC, Souers commented, “There is no question in the early days of the NSC that Mr. Truman did not look upon the NSC with much favor.”<sup>21</sup> This fact has led many commentators to gloss over this formative period in the history of the council. The period between 1947 and 1950 is significant, however, because it provided important tests of the future responsibilities of the NSC. One of the first such tests occurred during the summer of 1948, as America and Russia wrestled over the fate of Berlin. After negotiations over Western access to Berlin broke down on July 14, Truman brought the US military governor for Germany, General Lucius Clay, and his State Department assistant Robert Murphy, back to Washington and utilized the NSC as one of the venues for substantive discussions and crisis management. These NSC deliberations are significant for two reasons: Not only did they include the president, serving as *ex officio* chairman, but the membership was also temporarily expanded to include the Joint Chiefs—providing a context for in-depth face-to-face discussions between the White House and the leadership of the State Department and the National Military Establishment.

The Berlin stand-off also served as Washington’s introduction to Cold War brinksmanship. From an administrative point of view, it provided valuable lessons regarding time management and the use of institutional resources during a crisis. At some points during the confrontation, it also gave various actors a chance to clarify their missions and their status within the new national security bureaucracy. For example, Forrestal seems to have initially viewed Berlin as an opportunity for bolstering the influence of the Secretary of Defense within the national security network. The experience nonetheless seems to have had a chastening effect on him. At the height of the crisis, on September 8, Forrestal recorded in his diary that

this whole negotiation provided food for thought on the question of concentration of all authority and power in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I pointed out [to Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall] that these negotiations were of a nature that requires almost continuous attendance in order to follow the threads between State and the Defense Departments. That if it were all concentrated in my office I would have had to assign some particular person to do it, but that with all the minutiae of detail . . . I would have had to maintain daily and almost hourly familiarity. Furthermore, all discussions with State would have had to have been carried on by me.<sup>22</sup>

Forrestal did not record in his diary any specific ideas for solving this problem. Nor did he indicate any awareness of the fact that the president had already effectively resolved the problem for him.

The NSC also played an important role in the initial formulation of America's Cold War strategy. One top-secret document, completed on November 23, 1948 (NSC 20/4), deserves special mention in this regard, because of its comprehensive assessment of the nature of the Soviet threat. Conceptually and prescriptively, NSC 20/4 represented a bridge between George Kennan's containment arguments and the open-ended recommendations of NSC-68. While highlighting the "hostile designs and formidable power" of the USSR and warning that "no later than 1955," Moscow would be "capable of serious air attacks upon the United States," the document also preached caution and restraint. It argued that America's ability to resist Communist aggression would be undermined by "prolonged or exaggerated economic instability" and by "an excessive or wasteful usage of our resources." The study also registered a note of optimism, and self-congratulation, regarding the success of the administration's efforts to "stiffen the resistance of western European and Mediterranean countries." With specific reference to the "success of ERP [the European Recovery Plan]," the report concluded that the Soviet-sponsored campaign of "political conquest" had not only been stopped at the borders of Western Europe, but "has in turn created serious problems for them behind the iron curtain."<sup>23</sup> Thus, while making a strong argument for preparedness, NSC 20/4 also made a case against US overreaction, in the form of dramatic increases in defense budgets or provocative behavior.

NSC 20/4, which was based on a draft written by the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (chaired, at this time, by Kennan), is of interest as an illustration of the ongoing power struggle within the council between the State Department and the armed services. Steven Reardon notes that the document "presented in both tone and substance a restrained and cautious assessment" of the Soviet threat.<sup>24</sup> As such, it served as an influential challenge to demands by the Joint Chiefs for immediate and substantial increases in the defense budget.<sup>25</sup> This may explain why the president chose to distribute the conclusions

of NSC 20/4 "to all appropriate officials in the U.S. government," including the Secretary of Agriculture and the Postmaster General.<sup>26</sup>

The fact that the NSC began to function as a venue for strategic planning within its first year of operation was either not recognized or not appreciated by some critics of the administration. In April 1949, Bernard Baruch reprised his gadfly role by publishing an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* that attacked the NSC as too weak and attacked the administration, implicitly, for relying upon "improvisation or luck" to combat a growing Soviet threat. Baruch called for the establishment of a larger and more influential "think-body" to assist the president in the formulation of long-term policies for a period in which the United States was "neither at peace nor war."<sup>27</sup>

By the time that Baruch's article was published, the president was already making changes in the composition of the NSC in order to improve efficiency. In March he sent a message to Congress proposing revisions of the National Security Act that included the addition of the vice president and the removal of the three service secretaries as statutory members of the NSC. He also recommended that the Joint Chiefs be officially designated as the principal military advisers to the council. These changes went into effect in August, with the passage of the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act. The president also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to attend NSC meetings, in accordance with the authority granted to him by the 1947 legislation. In August, Truman also issued Reorganization Plan no. 4, which officially located the NSC within the Executive Office of the President.<sup>28</sup> Finally, during 1949, the White House took very tentative steps toward the expansion of the mandate and staffing of the NSC, establishing the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (to coordinate domestic intelligence activities) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (to coordinate internal security activities not involving investigations).<sup>29</sup>

The removal of the service secretaries had the most immediate impact on the functioning of the council. It also contributed to the marginalization of the civilian secretaries within the defense community (as discussed in Chapter 6).<sup>30</sup> Over the long term, however, this change was probably not as important as the much less controversial decision to add the vice president to the list of statutory member of the NSC. This reform set the stage for Richard Nixon's inclusion in NSC meetings, and Eisenhower's decision to designate his vice president as his surrogate in those instances when he was not able to attend council meetings. Nixon would later attempt to replicate the structure and procedures of the Eisenhower NSC when he became president in 1969—

setting in motion changes that would fundamentally alter the role of the NSC within the national security bureaucracy.

Sidney Souers observed in 1963, "At some point, whether it was late 1949 or early 1950, I am not sure, but the president considered the NSC a valuable instrument."<sup>31</sup> Truman came to this conclusion gradually, and by default.<sup>32</sup> His clear preference had been to preserve the State Department's status as *primus inter pares* within the national security community. This preference reflected not only the president's understanding of the constitutionally designated role of the Secretary of State, but also his personal admiration for both Marshall and Acheson. For his part, Acheson gave the defense community ample reason to suspect, as Forrestal put it, "that State under Acheson's leadership . . . would undoubtedly try to castrate its [NSC's] effectiveness."<sup>33</sup> In fact, the first Secretary of Defense was articulating a fundamental problem with the NSC system—that unless all of the participating departments saw the council as a nonthreatening forum for the articulation and advancement of their institutional interests, they would find ways to undermine it.

By the spring of 1950, serious problems of coordination had begun to surface between State and the armed services. As an important test of State's leadership, the department's Policy Planning Staff had been given responsibility in January for drafting the comprehensive strategy paper that would become NSC 68. When the draft document was presented to Secretary of Defense Johnson in March, it triggered the explosive reaction that convinced Dean Acheson that Johnson was "mentally ill." Johnson's complaint was that his office had not been consulted during the drafting process and that he was being presented with a *fait accompli*, in spite of the fact that the Defense Department's liaison officer, Major General James Burns, had participated in the drafting of the document from the outset.<sup>34</sup>

The rift between State and Defense confounded efforts by Truman to achieve top-level coordination. To help Souers to manage this problem, the president asked Averell Harriman to serve as his Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs. Harriman described his mandate as finding out "what the President wanted to have happen," and then getting "the staff-level interdepartmental committees to make these recommendations" to their superiors. Harriman would later contrast this bottom-up approach with Henry Kissinger's efforts to place himself "between the President and the members of the cabinet"<sup>35</sup>

Truman also asked Harriman to serve as the first director for Mutual Security, with responsibility for administering the government's foreign assistance programs. In this capacity, it was more difficult for Harriman to play a strictly facilitative role, since he was given real, if

vague, decisional authority over programs that often straddled the line between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. In this case, Harriman's responsibilities appear to have been somewhat closer to the Kissinger model. As his assistant, Theodore Tannenwald, has observed, Harriman's job

involved a very delicate balance because he was really a layer between the cabinet officers and the president. Needless to say, there were many occasions, particularly in the field of military assistance, when the Secretary of Defense would try an end run.<sup>36</sup>

Although the NSC's problems of miscommunication and turf were constantly on the minds of the president and his chief advisers, they were largely invisible to the American public. Until Korea. Suddenly, influential journalists, academics, and legislators were united in their criticisms of the "planlessness and improvisation" of the Truman administration.<sup>37</sup> Truman did not need outside pressure to motivate him to take action. On July 19, he issued a memo to the statutory members of the NSC and to selected advisers. The president informed them of his plans for "steps which are necessary to make the National Security Council of maximum value" to the president. He stated his desire to have all national security policies brought to him through the council, which was to meet every Thursday. He also asserted that there were too many participants in NSC meetings and informed all parties that, in the future, meetings would be attended only by statutory members, plus the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the director of Central Intelligence, the executive secretary (James Lay, who had replaced Souers in this role), Averell Harriman (special assistant to the president), and Souers (as a "special consultant" to the president). The president also took note of the need for "carefully coordinated staff work" to support a more active and influential council, and requested that each participating department nominate one individual to serve on a new "senior NSC staff Group."<sup>38</sup> At the president's request, the NSC staff was reorganized to accommodate this new senior staff and a supporting group of staff assistants.

In April 1951, the president took another step that indicated his desire to give the National Security Council a larger role in the formulation and management of Cold War policies. He established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the auspices of the NSC to take the lead in the formulation of a comprehensive strategy for psychological warfare against the Soviet Union. The PSB was also expected to delegate responsibility for overt and covert activities to the appropriate departments and to monitor the implementation of these activities. This was a default solution to a problem that had been simmering for three

years. Truman had originally authorized the State Department to take the lead in psychological warfare, but the department had been slow to act and reluctant to be associated with covert operations that might damage State's reputation if they became public. Under the pressure of a "quasi-war" environment, Truman concluded that a new agency within the NSC was the best option. John Prados notes that by the middle of 1952, the PSB had become the "largest component of the NSC machinery," with a staff of 130 and a budget that was more than twice the size of the rest of the NSC staff.<sup>39</sup> By this time, however, the PSB was also experiencing strong resistance from other established bureaucratic actors—most notably, the State Department. The PSB did not survive into the Eisenhower era, but it did set an important precedent, as the first agency within the NSC system that was given responsibility for monitoring the performance of assigned tasks once a decision had been made by the president. Soon after coming to office, the Eisenhower administration would be guided by this precedent to establish the much more ambitious Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). As Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, would later assert, the OCB "arose like a phoenix out of the ashes of the old Psychological Strategy Board."<sup>40</sup>

Truman's reforms represented the start of the "second phase" of the NSC's history, which lasted until the arrival of the Eisenhower administration.<sup>41</sup> During the summer of 1950, the council began to meet on a regular basis, with Truman usually in attendance. But although the president had clearly changed his opinion of the utility of the NSC by this time, he also continued to work outside of the council—with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Budget director—to formulate major policies. Indeed, in view of the still-limited role that the NSC played in the formulation of US strategy, members of the administration had ample justification for outrage when John Fisher described the council as "Mr. Truman's Politburo" in a 1951 article in *Harper's*. As George Elsey observed in a letter to Lay in which he quoted from the Fisher article: "The President has not delegated his authority in foreign affairs 'to the uttermost limit that the Constitution permits,' and he exerts a strong and decisive leadership in foreign affairs."<sup>42</sup> The Truman reforms did result in improved staff work within the council, and the NSC became a much more productive and visible player in the national security bureaucracy.

By the time that Truman left office, Walter Millis could still claim that the NSC did not often "deal with the really big issues."<sup>43</sup> The president had become a conditional convert, however, and had even allowed the council to take on an elementary institutional identity, with its own staff and standing committees. The president had also reduced

the risk of "capture" of the NSC by the armed services, first by promoting the Secretary of State within the council and then by removing the service secretaries from statutory membership. He had also experimented with new arrangements for controlling the risk of departmental "castration" of the NSC, most notably his appointment of Harriman as his personal representative, with a mandate to resolve interdepartmental conflicts before they reached the level of the council.

If the NSC was still underdeveloped at the end of Truman's term, it was nonetheless available for use by the next president, who saw its potential. Dwight Eisenhower had made it clear during the presidential election campaign that he viewed the NSC as an underutilized resource, and that he intended to make it a centerpiece of his administration. Once he put the Washington policy community on notice that he intended to place the NSC at the "top of Policy Hill," however, it was only a matter of time before his critics in Congress began to reconsider the principle of deference to the executive regarding the organization and management of the council.<sup>44</sup>

### *Eisenhower Institutionalizes the National Security Council*

Eisenhower pursued reform of the National Security Council with the same zeal that he demonstrated in his efforts to centralize the Defense Department. One day after his inauguration, Eisenhower asked Robert Cutler, an adviser and speechwriter during the presidential campaign, to undertake a comprehensive study of the national security advisory system. Cutler's report, submitted on March 16, 1953, made two important recommendations: that the president establish the new post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and that both the policy planning function and the staff function of the council be elevated in importance and made more efficient.

Cutler's report envisioned the special assistant as a member of the White House staff, chosen by the president without Congressional confirmation. He described the special assistant as the "executive officer" of the council, with responsibility for determining the agenda, appointing ad hoc committees and standing groups, briefing the president on NSC matters, and "bringing to the attention of the president, with recommendations for appropriate action, lack of progress on the part of an agency in carrying out a particular policy which has been assigned to it." The special assistant's more general mandate was to "insure that the President's views as to policy-planning are carried out."<sup>45</sup> This was a much more ambitious vision than Souers's "anonymous servant" of the council. Cutler's assistant, James Lay, would later observe:

At the beginning it had been Admiral Souers' view that the Council could best operate in areas where the agencies felt that policy integration through the Council would be useful to them. Accordingly, Admiral Souers had sought out such areas instead of attempting on his own to lay out an elaborate program of Council work.<sup>46</sup>

Rather than avoid controversial issues, Cutler felt that the special assistant should highlight irreconcilable "splits" between participating agencies. At the same time, however, the special assistant was expected to help the president to "orient the members toward action as a corporate body rather than as agency protagonists."<sup>47</sup>

Cutler and Eisenhower agreed that the special assistant would have the greatest impact on the day-to-day workings of the council in his capacity as chairman of the proposed Planning Board. The official functions of the Planning Board were the same as the senior staff, which it was to replace: "to provide the required analyses and draft policy statements for the consideration of the Council," and to "facilitate the formulation of policies." But the Planning Board was envisioned as a more independent and influential actor than the senior staff. Although candidates for the Planning Board were to be proposed by the participating departments, they were to be appointed by the president, with the approval of the special assistant, to make certain that they were not narrowly partisan agents of departmental interests.

Cutler did not recommend that the president do away with the position of executive secretary. Rather, he proposed that this position be made subordinate to the special assistant and, with the help of a deputy executive secretary, that it be responsible for the administration of the NSC staff. Cutler envisioned a modest overall increase in the size of the NSC staff, and a Planning Board that would be slightly larger than the senior staff. On the other hand, he recommended that "there should not, as a general rule, be more than *eight* persons who have the right formally to participate as Council members." Cutler also expressed interest in the use of "standing" or "ad hoc" committees to assist the NSC, and recommended that some "civilians of stature" be included in these committees, "in order to bring to the Council deliberations a fresh, frequently-changing civilian point of view and to gain public understanding of national security problems." On the other hand, he specifically proposed that "members of Congress should not attend NSC Meetings."<sup>48</sup>

The weakest portion of Cutler's memorandum involved the issue of implementation after the president had made a decision. Cutler argued, "The Council is an advisory, not an operational, body. It is not appropriate for its permanent Staff to follow-up on policy perfor-

mance." He nonetheless left the door ajar, by proposing that the special assistant have the authority "to inspect, not to evaluate or direct," the activities of any executive department that is given responsibility for implementing a presidential decision. This vaguely worded recommendation was a red flag for any Cabinet member who understood the importance of protecting his subordinates from outside interference.

One day after he received Cutler's report, Eisenhower replied in his typically concise fashion: "I approve both your letter and the recommendations."<sup>49</sup> He also asked Cutler to serve as the first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and approved his request to retain James Lay as executive secretary of the council. In order to assure that fiscal conservatism informed every stage in the planning process, the president added Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey and Budget Director Joseph Dodge as permanent members of the council. As a close friend and confidant of the president, Humphrey also served, along with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as another bridge between Eisenhower and the NSC.

The president also approved one of Cutler's recommendations that he would come to regret. He accepted the argument that NSC deliberations would be enriched by the participation of outsiders with fresh ideas and needed expertise. Soon after his NSC was up and running, Eisenhower was inviting representatives from both the public and private sectors to serve on standing and ad hoc committees under the auspices of the council. Over the next few years, these individuals became a high-maintenance distraction for both the president and the NSC, and, as John Prados has noted, "By Eisenhower's second administration the consultants' analyses most frequently were going straight into the file cabinets."<sup>50</sup> Unfortunately for the president, by inviting these individuals to contribute to the NSC policymaking process, giving them some access to council deliberations, and then discarding or discounting their ultimate contributions, the White House was inadvertently creating a community of influential, and disgruntled, critics of the NSC.

Shortly after he approved Cutler's reforms, the president began to develop plans for the creation of another key element of the NSC system. The Operations Coordinating Board was designed to assist the special assistant in monitoring the implementation of presidential decisions. In accordance with the principle that there was no intermediary between the president and the Cabinet departments, however, the OCB's mandate was to be merely advisory. This left the board in the same kind of bureaucratic limbo in which the special assistant found himself when he attempted to monitor the performance of departments. The OCB's ambivalent status was also symbolized by its official

designation as a stand-alone agency that was technically outside of the NSC. Although the Operations Coordinating Board could not exercise real control over the departments, it acquired a relatively large staff and an "elaborate system of interagency working groups."<sup>51</sup> It was soon functioning as a battleground for representatives of executive branch agencies, whose mission was to resist meddling in their departments' affairs. Eisenhower would continue to tinker with the OCB throughout his two terms in office, but he never succeeded in resolving the tension between his desire for some system to insure policy implementation and the principle that the NSC was not an operational agency.<sup>52</sup>

During the summer of 1953, as the administration was working out the administrative details for the Operations Coordinating Board, the president utilized the NSC as the context for an ambitious exercise in strategic planning. Concerned that the United States had been pursuing a too-complacent and reactive approach to containment, Eisenhower launched "Project Solarium." The president organized three teams of "bright young fellows," each responsible for making the strongest case possible for a distinct strategy for dealing with the Soviet empire.<sup>53</sup> Task Force A (headed by George Kennan) made the case for a continuation of the containment doctrine that the Eisenhower administration had inherited from its predecessor. Task Force B (headed by Air Force Major General James McCormick Jr.) argued for a more assertive posture—what Richard Leighton has described as a "thus-far-and-no-farther" approach—accompanied by a threat of massive military retaliation.<sup>54</sup> Task Force C (directed by Vice Admiral Richard Connally) made the case for what came to be known as the "rollback" strategy—designed to assist the "captive nations" in breaking free of Communist control. When the three task forces presented their arguments to the NSC on July 16, Eisenhower could find no basis for preferring one approach over the other two. He instructed the participants to continue to work on the problem. After debating how to proceed, the council instructed the Planning Board to come up with a document that would merge key elements of all three plans. When the work was completed, however, the NSC "ended where it had begun—with the inherited six-year-old containment policy."<sup>55</sup> The Solarium experience provided some cautionary lessons regarding the inherent tension between the NSC's mandate to "highlight" fundamental policy differences and its responsibility to help resolve such differences.

The president's quest for a more proactive anti-Soviet strategy reflected a widespread American mood of frustration and fear. By the time that Eisenhower came to power, Moscow had consolidated its control over the Eastern Bloc. The Korean War was still draining America's assets and morale. US-sponsored multilateral initiatives like NATO had

been matched by Soviet-sponsored inventions like the Warsaw Pact. In the Western camp, the United States was frequently placed in the position of guilt by association with European colonialist powers like France and Portugal.<sup>56</sup> To the extent that there was movement in the international system, it seemed to many people to favor the Communists.

The Eisenhower administration attempted to cope with the frustrations of the Cold War by extracting more efficiency from the bureaucracy. The NSC played a key role in the president's efficiency campaign. Over time, the NSC became slightly larger and considerably more complex. Robert Cutler would later argue that the NSC functioned differently during Eisenhower's first and second terms in the White House. Initially, he asserted, the NSC was intensely active—reviewing and revising policies that had been established during the Truman era and establishing new policies and procedures. Once this foundational work was completed,

it was possible, in accordance with the President's wishes, to adjust somewhat the Council's primary focus from the necessary considerations and approval of written policy statements more toward oral discussions of national security policy issues.<sup>57</sup>

Critics would later argue that this shift was part of a process of gradual displacement of the council by the Planning Board, where much of the substantive discussion and negotiation took place.<sup>58</sup> Cutler supervised the activities of the Planning Board, with the help of a small staff that included about ten "think people." He also helped to shepherd its policy recommendations through the council. The challenge for both Cutler and Eisenhower in this process was to encourage consensus at the board level without alienating the lead agencies. Success could be measured by the active and positive participation of these departments at the level of the council and the OCB. Failure usually took the form of end runs around the NSC or stonewalling when a policy reached the implementation stage.

The president also placed a great emphasis upon the White House Office of the Staff Secretary to address national security issues. Eisenhower recruited Brigadier General Paul Carroll as his first staff secretary, and then asked Colonel Andrew Goodpaster to take on the assignment when Carroll died in September 1954. With a very small staff and an office next door to the president's, Goodpaster played a unique role as Eisenhower's confidential assistant for national security matters. In terms of Cutler's familiar metaphor of a "Policy Hill," it can be argued that Goodpaster was actually at the summit, with the NSC below him and the Cabinet at the base. Goodpaster was nonetheless scrupulous about preserving his anonymity within the Washington

policy community, and seems never to have been tempted to utilize his influential position to place his personal stamp on the administration's foreign and defense policies.<sup>59</sup>

Eisenhower also relied upon personal advisers like Dulles and Humphrey for advice and information regarding national security issues. John Foster Dulles's role is particularly interesting. On the one hand, he was extremely influential as a personal counselor to the president. On the other hand, Dulles rarely used his personal influence to advance and protect the institutional interests of the Department of State during the Eisenhower era. This is partly attributable to the fact that Dulles was a "traveling secretary"—representing the president overseas as his personal emissary and chief negotiator. As the Jackson Subcommittee would later conclude, "Much of the effectiveness of the Secretary of State depends upon his being in Washington, on hand for advising the president, leading his department, and consulting with Congress."<sup>60</sup> In a situation in which Dulles was not able to invest considerable time and energy in defense of his department's status within the still-evolving national security community, members of the Foreign Service could do little more than fight a series of rear-guard actions—a "control-or-divert" strategy according to Jackson—which provided critics with plenty of ammunition for subsequent campaigns to further marginalize the State Department.<sup>61</sup>

Dulles also seems to have held a view of State's proper role that made it easier for opponents to challenge his department's position in the fevered environment of the early Cold War. As Paul Nitze recounts in his memoirs:

Immediately after the inauguration ceremony Foster Dulles, the new secretary of state, called me into his office. . . . He told me that he thought the work of the [State Department's] Policy Planning Staff was of the utmost importance, but since it dealt principally with national security issues rather than diplomatic affairs, he thought its work should be placed directly under the control of the National Security Council.<sup>62</sup>

The secretary's subsequent comments to Nitze make it clear that he did not interpret this distinction as a constraint on his own role in the national security community:

He hoped to devote ninety-five percent of his own time to those [national security] issues, leaving to his deputy, Bedell Smith, the responsibility for running the State Department and the conduct of foreign affairs.<sup>63</sup>

It can be argued that this meeting represented a turning point in the history of the State Department, only slightly less important than the moment when Truman decided not to support Secretary of State Mar-

shall's recommendation that the sections relating to the creation of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency be removed from the proposed National Security Act.

Two years after Cutler's reforms were introduced, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs felt justified in informing the president that "today, the National Security Council is a smooth-functioning and high-speed mechanism, available to aid you in formulating national security policy."<sup>64</sup> To many critics, however, the NSC often looked as the Jackson Subcommittee would later describe it: "A gray and bloodless ground of bureaucratic warfare."<sup>65</sup> This image was reinforced during 1955 by some of the findings of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the government. As discussed in Chapter 6, the president welcomed those findings by the Hoover Commission which supported his efforts to press for greater efficiency and eliminate redundancies within the Department of Defense. He was less appreciative of the commission's investigations of other elements of the national security policymaking machinery, including the NSC.

Since the Hoover Commission was primarily concerned with problems of waste and inefficiency, it is not surprising that much of its criticism of the NSC had to do with the council's "lack of an 'over-all fiscal look.'"<sup>66</sup> The final report recommended that the NSC pay greater attention to the budgetary implications of competing policy options during its deliberations. The commission also offered specific recommendations for making the NSC a more useful instrument for policy coordination and advisement. Commenting on a draft version of the commission report, Robert Cutler observed that its "principal adverse criticism" was that "the Council and its Planning Board are capable only of stating general directions and policy to guide day-to-day decisions."<sup>67</sup> To assist the council in developing better recommendations, the commission recommended a significant increase in the NSC's permanent staff, both to perform research functions and to assist the special assistant in resolving interdepartmental disagreements.

Former president Herbert Hoover also called for greater concentration of authority *above* the level of the National Security Council. Arguing that the president's administrative tasks had become unmanageable, Hoover proposed the creation of two "vice president" positions: one responsible for foreign affairs, and the other responsible for domestic matters. Both individuals were to be appointed by the president, with Senate confirmation. These officials would pressure coordinating committees like the NSC to produce more than watered-down compromises. Hoover's proposal would set in motion a continuing debate, both within the Eisenhower administration and outside, over the

need for some form of “super-cabinet officer” to force the national security bureaucracy to deliver more than “lowest common denominator” agreements.<sup>68</sup>

In fact, Eisenhower had already taken steps by this time to ensure that the constitutionally designated vice president played a key role in the national security policymaking process. As previously mentioned, the vice president had been added to the statutory membership of the council by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act, and Truman had been scrupulous about keeping his vice president informed about, and involved in, national security matters. But Eisenhower went much further with his vice president. Richard Nixon was asked by Eisenhower to replace the Secretary of State as presiding chairman of the NSC in the president’s absence. Eisenhower would later praise Nixon for his expertise in the field of foreign and defense affairs, and register his special appreciation of Nixon’s management of the NSC while he was recovering from his heart attack. The president nonetheless understood that, since the vice president was not officially a member of the executive branch of government, there were limits to what he could be asked to do in order to improve administrative efficiency. As the Jackson Subcommittee would subsequently observe:

Of course, the role of the Vice President need not be limited to his constitutional obligation to preside over the Senate. But any attempt to make the Vice President a kind of Deputy President for Foreign Affairs would be to give the wrong man the wrong job.<sup>69</sup>

The subcommittee also recognized that there was a more practical political reason why any president would want to steer clear of giving his vice president too much responsibility for the shaping of national security policy:

A modern Vice President is likely to be a person of importance in the President’s own party. A broad grant of executive authority to the Vice President could invite eventual misunderstandings and embarrassments between the two highest officials in our Government.<sup>70</sup>

These limitations notwithstanding, Nixon was given a unique opportunity to participate in the formulation of national security policy within the NSC. This experience would inform his vision of the proper role of the NSC when he was elected president.

The Hoover Commission also recommended that the president place a greater reliance on outside experts to enrich debates within the National Security Council. A similar proposal was made by Bernard Baruch. While still supportive of the occasional use of outsiders, Cutler strongly opposed all recommendations for attaching a permanent com-

mittee of "Nestors" to the NSC, in part because they would increase the number of participants in council deliberations, and, more importantly, because they would jeopardize the small-group "pow-wow element" of the council.<sup>71</sup> He also believed that a group of influential outsiders would alienate Cabinet members by threatening their administrative authority.<sup>72</sup>

Cutler's warnings about the negative influence of "Nestors" was actually an expression of frustration with a situation that the president had already allowed to get out of hand. The most important ad hoc advisory group convened during the Eisenhower administration was the 1957 Gaither Committee, which was officially known as the Security Resources Panel. Recommended by the NSC Planning Board, it was designed to assist the Office of Defense Mobilization in formulating a national plan for the use of active and passive defenses against nuclear attack. By defining active defense in terms of America's nuclear deterrent capability, the committee was able to significantly expand its mandate. The final report, submitted to the NSC in November, included not only an appeal for a comprehensive national fallout shelter program, but also recommendations for changes in US war-fighting and deterrence doctrines, proposals for significant increases in America's IRBM and ICBM stockpiles, and a call for administrative reforms within the Department of Defense.<sup>73</sup> The fact that the NSC received a full briefing by the members of the Gaither Committee just five days after the launch of Sputnik contributed to Eisenhower's discomfort with the committee's budget-busting conclusions. John Foster Dulles used the occasion of the NSC meeting to criticize the committee's ambitious plans for national defense against nuclear attack, warning that such a campaign would drive a wedge between Washington and its anti-Communist allies.<sup>74</sup>

Eisenhower decided not to officially support the findings of the Gaither Committee. He also refused to publish the Gaither Report, on the grounds that the committee had been providing confidential advice to the president. This decision added to the frustration of key members of the committee, some of whom retaliated by leaking portions of the report to Eisenhower's critics in the media and Congress or by publicly criticizing the NSC advisory system.

Members of the Gaither Committee had no difficulty finding venues for registering their complaints against the council. In the post-Sputnik environment, the NSC seemed to be coming under attack from all sides. Eisenhower was certainly correct that some of these criticisms were indirect attacks on him personally, but that did not make the problem any easier.<sup>75</sup> In Congress, the attacks came from both sides of the aisle. Democratic Senator and presidential hopeful John Kennedy

was, by this time, a consistent critic of the administration's management of national security. Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York was also a leading critic of the NSC. In February 1958, he proposed legislation (S. 3301) to add four new members to the council and to require annual reports by the NSC to Congress. When this effort failed, Javits came back a year later as the sponsor of a joint resolution (SJ Res. 83) for the establishment of a permanent Advisory Council on National Security to monitor the activities of the NSC and submit semi-annual reports to Congress and the president.<sup>76</sup>

An even more controversial proposal, which generated a fair amount of debate within the media, was put forward by John Burns, president of RCA, in a speech before the Harvard Business School on September 6, 1958. Arguing that "we are in danger of nuclear annihilation," Burns called for the creation of a Permanent Council on Plans and Policies, composed of "top-ranking leaders in education, science, business management, defense, labor and other important segments of the national activity." As a "fourth branch of government," the Permanent Council would be able to look at the "over-all picture" rather than the too-narrow perspective of executive branch agencies like the NSC.<sup>77</sup>

By the time that these attacks began to multiply, Eisenhower had appointed a new Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Gordon Gray had extensive experience with policy coordination by the time that he took over at the NSC. He had served on both the Psychological Strategy Board and the Office of Defense Mobilization and had worked closely with the Gaither Committee. He was not prepared, however, for the problems he experienced at the top of the NSC system. He communicated his concerns to the president's assistant, Bryce Harlow, in a confidential memo dated December 16, 1958. The impetus for the memo was Burns's proposal for a "fourth branch of government," but Gray placed this recommendation in a larger context of "unrest and misgiving." He reported that he was working with State and Defense to compose a list of candidates for yet another panel of consultants to the NSC. He also assured Harlow that he was "making every effort" to use the NSC staff and Planning Board "in ways which would make our work less 'department oriented' and more 'President oriented.'" Gray admitted, however, that the Planning Board was "struggling with the problem of devising a national strategy which I think perhaps means looking ahead for ten years rather than the two or three which has been our customary procedure."<sup>78</sup>

Then the special assistant got to the nub of his personal concerns about "a matter that I am not informed about in any detail." He noted that the president had made a reference in a recent Cabinet meeting to plans for the establishment of a "First Secretary who would have under

him State, USIA and ICA." Gray observed that the president "made no reference to Defense, and I have no notion what the creation of such an office would do to the Council and its machinery. Conceivably this could wash out what we now have." Gray speculated that this "may explain" an earlier comment by Secretary of State Dulles that Gray had interpreted as casting doubt on the NSC's future.<sup>79</sup>

Gray's consternation is understandable. It was also justified. By this time, the president and his staff were flailing about in a quest for new arrangements for national security policymaking. These exertions were partly attributable to Eisenhower's personal interest in improving administrative efficiency. But they were also the acts of a beleaguered president. Writing in *The New York Times Magazine* in the summer of 1959, Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago had attacked the NSC as an institution that "cannot cure the disease of fragmentation and parochialism but institutionalizes it on the highest level." His solution was the appointment of "one man" to represent the president in the management of all aspects of US national security.<sup>80</sup> Six months later, Samuel Huntington of Harvard published an article in *Foreign Affairs* in which he listed a number of familiar criticisms of the national security policymaking process, including the tendency toward "compromises," "generalities," "delay and slowness." With specific reference to the NSC, he cited the inclination to "routinize the old rather than stimulate the new." Huntington went on to observe, "Few persons familiar with the process by which strategic programs are determined would challenge the general accuracy of these allegations."<sup>81</sup> It is not surprising that, in the face of a barrage of similar attacks, Eisenhower and his advisers were extremely interested in new arrangements for national security policymaking.

The idea of the First Secretary had special appeal to Eisenhower since it played to his instincts for centralization. The concept had its roots in the proposals by Hoover and others for a vice president for foreign affairs. Nelson Rockefeller, who chaired the president's Advisory Committee on Government Organization from 1953 to 1958, had become the most influential proponent of a First Secretary arrangement, as a variation on Hoover's proposal. Rockefeller viewed the First Secretary plan as the best way to impose order on an "overelaborate pattern of interdepartmental committees."<sup>82</sup> He recommended that the First Secretary be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, that he be designated by statute as "Executive Chairman" of the NSC, that he serve as the president's representative in the management of the national security bureaucracy, and that he be provided with his own "super-cabinet" staff that would be "empowered to use and reorganize all of the interdepartmental planning machinery of the government."

His most controversial proposal was that the First Secretary be authorized to “act for the President in international matters at the prime ministerial level, with the Secretary of State operating on the level of ministers of foreign affairs.”<sup>83</sup> Thus, more than a decade after policymakers had agreed that the United States needed to be careful not to rely too much upon parliamentary models in the development of plans for the national security bureaucracy, the debate had come full circle.

The proposal for a First Secretary became one element of a much larger and more influential study of the national security bureaucracy that culminated in the Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level. Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of Washington launched his campaign to reform the executive branch machinery on April 16, 1959, in a speech before the National War College. Returning to a theme that Pendleton Herring had developed in 1936, the senator argued, “The central issue of our time is this: Can a free society so organize its human and material resources to outperform totalitarianism?” He then proceeded to indict the Eisenhower administration for creating an “enormous executive branch and elaborate policy mechanisms” that fail “to produce what we need.” While criticizing the entire network of executive branch committees and agencies—“this modern Hydra, with nine times nine heads”—he focused his strongest attacks against the NSC. He described the NSC system as “a pretty picture on an organizational chart” that “has nothing to do with reality.” He attacked the NSC as an institution that was designed to achieve compromises among competing agencies. In such a system, Jackson observed, “clear and purposeful planning becomes almost impossible,” and “national decision-making . . . becomes in fact a series of *ad hoc*, spur of the moment crash actions.” He concluded his address by informing his audience of his proposal to Congress for a “full-dress study of this problem, with public hearings and a formal report.”<sup>84</sup>

Jackson’s speech infuriated the president, and he was soon working with his staff to limit the damage that the senator could do.<sup>85</sup> In exchange for a commitment by the president to cooperate with the Congressional inquiry, Jackson agreed that his Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery would undertake a study rather than an investigation, that it would concentrate on procedural and organizational issues rather than on substantive policy issues, that testimony by individuals who had served or were currently serving on the NSC or its affiliated agencies would be taken first in executive session, and that the White House would have a veto over public testimony and the publication of testimony by such individuals. The parties also agreed that the study “will not attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to infringe upon

the Constitutional privilege of the president to obtain advice through such organization and procedures as he deems appropriate."<sup>86</sup>

The ongoing hearings represented an enormous drain on the energies and morale of key Eisenhower staffers. The hypercritical atmosphere also made it easier for political opponents to depict the administration as stodgy and unimaginative—burdened by what presidential candidate John Kennedy called a "Maginot-line mentality."<sup>87</sup> It certainly did not help the president's case when, in the midst of the Jackson Subcommittee hearings, the administration suffered its most embarrassing political crisis—the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Russia.

Gordon Gray and Kenneth Lay worked with members of the White House staff to provide the Jackson Subcommittee with information about the workings of the NSC while at the same time developing responses to criticisms and questions that were generated by the hearings. Former Special Assistant Robert Cutler testified on behalf of the administration regarding the organization and activities of the NSC. But most of the other invited witnesses were chosen because of their disgruntlement with some aspect of the NSC structure or operations. George Kennan, who had witnessed the displacement of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff by the council, argued that the NSC bureaucracy stifled discussions by overwhelming the council with detailed and authoritative reports and recommendations. Kennan concurred with a comment by Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine) that this process was "like trying to argue with Univac." Kennan also made a strong case for returning the Secretary of State to his "position of primacy" within the national security policymaking system.<sup>88</sup>

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett used the occasion of the Jackson Subcommittee hearings to comment on administrative problems affecting not just the National Security Council, but the departments of Defense and State and the Budget Bureau as well. With specific reference to the NSC, Lovett repeated Kennan's complaints about the organization's tendency to produce "fuzzy compromise." Lovett asserted that the council had been "fairly productive in the early days," but had become overorganized. Steered by Jackson's questions, Lovett argued that the NSC was "a rather amorphous thing" that predigested issues before they reached the president. The former Secretary of Defense concluded, "I think the president, for his own protection, must insist on being informed and not merely protected by his aides."<sup>89</sup>

Lovett nonetheless argued that it was "wholly unrealistic to talk of making government simple," and reminded the subcommittee that the founding fathers had introduced checks and balances and the separa-

tion of powers—what Lovett called the “foul-up factor”—in order to ensure that the government would not become a dictatorship:<sup>90</sup>

This device of inviting argument between conflicting interests—which we can call the “foul-up factor” in our equation of performance—was obviously the result of a deliberate decision to give up the doubtful efficiency of a dictatorship in return for a method of protection of individual freedom, rights, privileges, and immunities.<sup>91</sup>

The subcommittee also found critics of Eisenhower’s NSC among the experts whose reports to the council had gone “straight into the file cabinets.” The Gaither Committee was a particularly rich source of disaffected individuals, including Paul Nitze, Robert Sprague (a leader in the electronics industry who served as head of the committee while its official chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, was ill), and John Corson (a management consultant). Sprague used the Senate platform to press the Gaither Committee’s recommendation for a massive campaign to construct fallout shelters across the United States (at an estimated cost of \$25 billion).<sup>92</sup> Corson focused on personnel issues, expressing concern that “the men responsible for aiding the president to formulate and carry out this Government’s national security policies are a very transitory group.” He claimed that, on average, individuals had served on the Eisenhower National Security Council for less than two and a half years. He recommended procedures for enriching the pool of qualified candidates for top positions in the government, and also made the case for a more systematic and ambitious use of private citizens as advisers to the administration on national security affairs.<sup>93</sup> Other witnesses criticized the way the president had utilized the expert advice of ad hoc groups such as the Gaither Committee. When he testified before the subcommittee on May 24, Robert Cutler asserted that “it is quite untrue that the Council paid little or no attention to the Gaither Committee Report.”<sup>94</sup> Cutler’s comments notwithstanding, key members of the Gaither Committee welcomed the opportunity provided by the Jackson hearings to register their complaints against both the president and the national security policymaking process.

It is somewhat ironic that the Jackson Subcommittee hearings, which were designed to improve bureaucratic efficiency, became a slow-moving and cumbersome initiative that took over a year to complete. By the time that the Jackson Subcommittee completed its inquiry in 1962, Eisenhower was out of office. The ongoing hearings had nonetheless served as an effective partisan device for bolstering John Kennedy’s claim during the 1960 presidential campaign that the Republicans’ approach to foreign policy was “narrow, cautious, and in the literal sense reactionary.”<sup>95</sup> The subcommittee’s actual conclusions were not nearly

so polemical. Speaking for the subcommittee, Jackson expressed sympathy for the many challenges faced by the president in an era of globalized Communist threat. He then proceeded to offer certain "broad conclusions" that implicitly indicted the Eisenhower administration:

- We need a clearer understanding of where our vital national interests lie and what we must do to promote them.
- Radical additions to our existing policy machinery are unnecessary and undesirable. Our best hope lies in making our traditional policy machinery work better.
- The key problem of national security is not reorganization—it is getting our best people into key foreign policy and defense posts.
- The true worth of the [National Security] Council lies in being an accustomed place where the President can join his chief advisers in searching examination and debate of the "great choices" of national security policy.
- No task is more urgent than improving the effectiveness of the Department of State.<sup>96</sup>

The general picture of the NSC painted by the subcommittee was of an overstuffed bureaucracy that focused on mundane issues and avoided controversy. The subcommittee leveled much of its criticism at the Planning Board, which it described as "the heart" of "a highly formalized and complex 'policy paper production' system." The subcommittee argued that in its quest to make the president's job easier, the Planning Board sought to resolve interagency disagreements before they reached the level of the council. The result was an approach to policymaking in which compromise was often achieved at the expense of strategic vision and comprehensiveness. The subcommittee took note of the claim by Cutler and others that the Planning Board did, in fact, present the council with "splits" ("statements of different departmental viewpoints"). But it concluded":

Such differences do not necessarily define or illuminate the real policy choices available. Moreover, "splits" are themselves the product of interagency bargaining. Their phrasing is adjusted to what the traffic can bear.

The subcommittee also interpreted the NSC's reliance upon outside consultants as proof that the Planning Board was "not a creative instrument." While accepting that "some group akin to the present Board, playing a rather different role than it now does, can be of continuing help to the Council," the subcommittee recommended a smaller, less influential and less formalized institution that "would not be used as an instrument for negotiating 'agreed positions' and securing departmental concurrences." The subcommittee also argued for a greater reli-

ance upon committees of experts "such as the Gaither Committee" to guarantee that the council has access to "fresh perspectives."<sup>97</sup>

The final report was also extremely critical of the Operations Coordinating Board and its "elaborate system of working groups." As an "interagency committee that lacks command authority," the OCB was caught between its mandate to assist in the operationalization of NSC decisions and the inevitable resistance of executive departments to interference in their day-to-day activities. The subcommittee contended:

Actually, the OCB has little impact on the real coordination of policy execution. Yet, at the same time, the existence of this elaborate machinery creates a false sense of security by inviting the conclusion that the problem of teamwork in the execution of policy is well in hand.

The report concluded:

The case for abolishing the OCB is strong. . . . Responsibility for implementation of policies cutting across departmental lines should, wherever possible, be assigned to a particular department or to a particular action officer, possibly assisted by an informal interdepartmental group.<sup>98</sup>

With reference to the council itself, the subcommittee concluded that its effectiveness as a source of advice to the president "has been diminished by the working of the NSC system." It recommended that future presidents "deinstitutionalize" and "humanize" the NSC. Meetings of the council should be informal, intimate, and occasional conversations among "principals, not staff aides." The purpose of such meetings should be to allow the "full airing of divergent views" in the president's presence. The subcommittee also argued that "the President must rely mainly upon the Secretary of State for the initial synthesis of the political, military, economic, and other elements that go into the making of a coherent national strategy."<sup>99</sup>

John F. Kennedy used the Jackson Subcommittee's investigation to good effect during the presidential campaign. He also took advantage of leaks from members of the Gaither Committee, citing in his famous "missile gap" speech "another secret report with another urgent plea for more unity, more priority and more funds for our missile effort."<sup>100</sup> Kennedy campaigned on a promise to overhaul the NSC system in accordance with the general conclusions of the Jackson Subcommittee's findings. He made good on his commitment by announcing prior to his inauguration that he would appoint McGeorge Bundy as Special Assistant to the President, as "a first step toward streamlining the National Security Council."<sup>101</sup> Bundy would later inform Jackson of three "specific changes" in the NSC system that were introduced by Kennedy and then maintained by Lyndon Johnson. First, NSC meetings

were fewer, and convened by the president only when "a particular issue is ready for discussion." Second, the OCB was disbanded (by Executive Order 10920), and the administration "rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation" by giving NSC staff members responsibility for both sides of the policymaking process. Finally, Bundy claimed that the president had clearly designated the Secretary of State "as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations."<sup>102</sup>

Both Kennedy and Johnson accepted the Jackson Subcommittee's call for a small, informal, and "deinstitutionalized" NSC. It is at least possible that the council might have continued to wander in this direction if not for two things. First, the NSC became associated with Johnson's mismanagement of the Vietnam War, thus making it an attractive target for editorial criticisms and investigations. Second, Johnson was succeeded by a Republican who had extensive experience with, and a strong affinity for, Eisenhower's style of national security policymaking.

Candidate Richard Nixon campaigned on a commitment to "restore the National Security Council to its prominent role in national security planning," and he accorded this project high priority once he was elected.<sup>103</sup> Nixon gave the NSC such unprecedented influence over American foreign policy that he felt justified in merging the roles of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser in the person of Henry Kissinger in 1973. Although his plan for the NSC went far beyond what Eisenhower had envisioned, Nixon's decision to reposition the council "at the top of Policy Hill" was nonetheless a vindication of Eisenhower's claim that an institutionalized NSC was an indispensable instrument for the management of US national security.

The experiences of both Truman and Eisenhower alert us to the fact that there is no institutional solution to the problem of interagency cooperation. Indeed, as Robert Lovett observed in his testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee, the "foul-up factor" was unavoidable within the federal bureaucracy. Lovett nonetheless warned of "a discernable and constantly increasing tendency to try to expand the intent of the system" by the creation of more and more interagency committees.<sup>104</sup> On the other hand, the Jackson Subcommittee's solution—"committee killing"—has often proven to be unworkable or unwise.

What Robert Lovett called the "foul-up factor" was also apparent in both Truman and Eisenhower's relations with Congress, the media, and the American public. Neither president was able to protect the NSC from political attacks once their foreign policies lost public support. Efforts to preserve the secrecy of NSC deliberations became especially problematic for the Eisenhower administration during the late 1950s, as the public became increasingly frustrated with the Cold War

stalemate. Without directly challenging the president's right to utilize instruments like the NSC to obtain advice on national security matters, Congress was able to exert pressure on the executive branch in many forms, including appropriations, oversight, confirmations, investigations, and studies.

Paul Hammond described this perennial issue as "the democratic policy-making problem."<sup>105</sup> According to Hammond, "The President's setting his signature to a NSC document does not make it policy. What does is his will and capability to get it executed, coupled with effective support from Congress."<sup>106</sup> During the debates that culminated in the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, some experts, including Eberstadt and Forrestal, had recommended procedures for keeping Congress informed about NSC deliberations. The Eberstadt Report also recommended that nonclassified NSC documents be published. "In this way, the Council could aid in building up public support for clear-cut, consistent, and effective foreign and military policies."<sup>107</sup> Truman had resisted efforts to include statutory requirements for reporting on NSC deliberations as part of the 1947 National Security Act, and both Truman and Eisenhower defended the principle of executive privilege in their subsequent dealings with the media and Congress.

The lesson of Eisenhower's experience for future presidents was nonetheless clear. Even if a chief executive succeeds in designing an NSC that is ideally suited to his or her personality and foreign policy goals, the institution will not be exempt from politics. Paul Hammond concludes that the politicization of the NSC policymaking process significantly compounds the problems that a president must face in the management of national security affairs. "But the relative quality of the public and the secret debates over foreign policy has nothing to do with whether the former will or ought to occur, for they are a political necessity."<sup>108</sup>

## THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By comparison to those of the National Security Council (and, for that matter, the Department of Defense and the Department of State), the CIA's activities during the early Cold War years have been extensively analyzed.<sup>109</sup> This section will focus only on the agency's institutional development during this period, with special reference to the CIA's missions, organization, and status. In the process, I will attempt to explain how and why the agency never fulfilled its primary statutory mandate, and instead acquired a very different role and identity within the national security community.

### *Intelligence Coordination*

The debates that culminated in the passage of the 1947 National Security Act make it clear that Congress viewed the CIA's principal purpose as interagency coordination of intelligence. But the framers of the legislation chose not to address the obvious problems that the new agency would face in its efforts to fulfill this mandate. As discussed in Chapter 4, representatives of the FBI and the War, Navy, and State departments had opposed efforts by Hoyt Vandenberg, the second director of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), to provide his agency with the instruments and the authority to effectively coordinate intelligence. Vandenberg's arguments nonetheless struck a chord with members of the media and Congress, who were increasingly concerned about the need for centralized intelligence in order to cope with the Soviet threat. The result was compromise language in the 1947 National Security Act that could be read differently by the opponents and the supporters of intelligence coordination. At one extreme, section 102E of the legislation authorized the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to inspect "for correlation, evaluation and dissemination" the intelligence produced by the departments and agencies involved in national security planning. It then watered down this authority by stipulating that inspections had to be recommended by the NSC and approved by the president. Since the heads of the major departments involved in national security affairs were statutory members of the NSC at this time, they were assured of a veto over such intrusive activities. Similarly, section 102D stated that "it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council . . . to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security." But the same section also made it clear that the other departments involved in intelligence should "continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence."<sup>110</sup>

The problems that the CIA would inevitably face in its efforts to assert authority over the other intelligence agencies were compounded by the appointment of Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter as the first director of the new agency. By contrast to Vandenberg, Hillenkoetter was an instinctive conciliator who concluded soon after taking office that nothing would be gained by an attempt to establish the DCI's personal influence over the other intelligence agencies.<sup>111</sup> At his first official meeting with the National Intelligence Authority (one month prior to the passage of the 1947 National Security Act), the DCI volunteered to give up the authority to issue orders in the name of the secretaries of War, Navy, and State. Vandenberg had fought hard to acquire this "executive agent" power, and, more importantly, Secretary of State

Marshall, Secretary of War Patterson, and Admiral Leahy (the president's representative on the NIA) had come to accept this arrangement. They agreed to accept Hillenkoetter's offer, however, after Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed that the existing system made the CIG look like a "Gestapo" and created unnecessary problems with the other intelligence agencies.<sup>112</sup>

Hillenkoetter also proposed, in the first National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID 1), the creation of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) as a successor to the National Intelligence Authority, "to furnish the active direction of the Central Intelligence Agency."<sup>113</sup> As a subcommittee of the NSC, the IAC effectively served as a second layer of control over the Director of Central Intelligence. Hillenkoetter recommended that the IAC be composed of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of National Defense. After considerable jockeying, however, intelligence representatives from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs, and the Atomic Energy Commission were all designated as permanent members of the committee. The committee was also permitted to bring in intelligence representatives of other agencies, as needed. Although Hillenkoetter envisioned the committee as an instrument for advising the DCI, it was soon functioning more as a governing board than an advisory board.<sup>114</sup>

It can be argued that, in the face of such powerful bureaucratic actors as State, War, and Navy, Hillenkoetter was probably wise to avoid a major battle over control of the intelligence community. Indeed, in view of the record of the OSS and the CIG, he had ample reason to fear that his fledgling agency would not survive at all if it pushed too hard and too fast against the established centers of power within the Washington policy community.<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, if the CIA was not prepared to perform its statutory role as intelligence coordinator, then what purpose did it serve?<sup>116</sup>

By the spring of 1948, influential journalists and members of Congress were beginning to ask this question, particularly after the administration seemed to have been caught by surprise by a major civil uprising in Colombia. The fact that Secretary of State Marshall was in Bogotá at the time of the riots, to attend the Ninth International Conference of American Republics, increased the significance of the intelligence failure. It also did not help that President Truman admitted that he had been completely unprepared for this event. When Hillenkoetter was called by Congress to testify on the Bogotá incident, he accepted responsibility for the intelligence failure but also made it clear that his agency was severely constrained in its ability to collect and disseminate information among the leading executive agencies.<sup>117</sup>

By the time that Hillenkoetter testified before Congress, two independent committees had been formed to evaluate the CIA's performance and make recommendations for reform. The first, the aforementioned Eberstadt task force of the first Hoover Commission, began hearings in June 1948 and presented its unclassified report to Congress on January 13, 1949. Much of the task force's focus was on matters of economic and administrative efficiency. But the final report also made a strong case for centralization of the intelligence function, with the CIA at the "apex of a pyramidal intelligence structure."<sup>118</sup> The report stopped short, however, of recommending that the DCI regain executive agent authority within the intelligence community.

The Eberstadt task force also confronted an issue that would become increasingly important, both as a practical matter of administrative coordination and as a symbolic measure of the CIA's status within the national security community. It noted that

an organization as large as the CIA requires a substantial amount of housekeeping, telephone service, maintenance of personnel records, etc. The problem is complicated by the fact that accommodations to house CIA centrally are not available and could only be constructed at a substantial cost and with considerable publicity.<sup>119</sup>

The report also noted, however, that "a certain amount of decentralization may be desirable for security reasons."<sup>120</sup>

Over the next decade, members of the Washington policy community would debate the relative merits of having CIA offices spread throughout Washington (with its main office in the old OSS headquarters at 2430 E Street) and having a single large facility to house the bulk of CIA activities. Supporters of the first approach argued that multiple locations made it possible for the agency to develop close collaborative relations with the other intelligence agencies in Washington. Critics of the existing situation countered that any benefits derived from decentralization were more than offset by the administrative inefficiency and lack of supervision that were inevitable in such a situation.<sup>121</sup>

At the same time that the Eberstadt task force was conducting its hearings, a second study was investigating the organization and activities of the CIA. At the request of the president, the NSC established the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) in January 1948 under the chairmanship of Allen Dulles, who had served in the State Department prior to World War II and in Donovan's OSS during the war. The ISG's classified findings, which would come to be known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, were submitted to the NSC on January 1, 1949.<sup>122</sup> The report would have a major impact on subsequent debates about the organization and mission of the CIA.

Like the Eberstadt Report, the ISG study focused much of its attention on the “vital” problem of intelligence coordination. The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report was more explicit and forceful in its criticisms of the CIA and Hillenkoetter, however. Not surprisingly for a study sponsored by the NSC, the ISG report was generally supportive of the existing organizational structure, noting that the CIA was “properly placed under the National Security Council for the effective carrying out of its assigned function [i.e., intelligence coordination].”<sup>123</sup> While taking note of the fact that the CIA had experienced great difficulty in its efforts to work with the other agencies involved in intelligence gathering and analysis, the report interpreted this as a failure on the part of the agency. It also concluded that this persistent problem was “necessarily a reflection of inadequacies of direction”—a direct attack on Hillenkoetter himself.<sup>124</sup>

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report registered special concern about the lack of coordination of counterintelligence and domestic intelligence activities between the CIA and the FBI. After noting that the CIA had responsibility for such activities overseas, whereas the FBI had comparable responsibility within the United States, the report concluded with a statement that appears extremely prescient today:

Fifth column activities and espionage do not begin or end at our geographical frontiers, and our intelligence to counter them cannot be sharply divided on any such geographical basis.<sup>125</sup>

Rather than recommend solutions that would have triggered sensitivities about an “American Gestapo,” however, the Dulles Committee simply proposed that the FBI director be designated as a permanent member of the IAC.

When the NSC finally took action in response to the wide-ranging Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, they offered a mild rebuke for the ISG committee’s “too-sweeping” criticism of Hillenkoetter. They nonetheless issued NSC 50—a call for comprehensive reform of the CIA that hewed closely to the recommendations of the Dulles group. The official CIA historian of this period, Ludwell Montague, has argued that the DCI’s “spirit was crushed by the NSC’s approval of NSC 50. . . . Instead of being stimulated to exert the ‘forthright leadership’ called for by the Dulles Report and NSC 50, he became psychologically withdrawn [and] . . . unwilling to exercise initiative and leadership.”<sup>126</sup>

The Washington policy community was still discussing the implications of NSC 50 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report when the CIA, and Hillenkoetter in particular, suffered another body blow. The North Korean invasion of South Korea looked to many Americans like precisely the kind of Pearl Harbor catastrophe that the new national secu-

riety bureaucracy was created to avoid. And no portion of that bureaucracy seemed more at fault than the CIA. Within a few months, Hillenkoetter had been replaced as DCI by Walter Bedell Smith, an individual who approached his job with the same kind of ambition and energy that had made Donovan and Vandenberg such threats to the other intelligence agencies prior to the establishment of the CIA.

One of Smith's first priorities was to put the other intelligence agencies on notice that Hillenkoetter's "go-along-get-along" approach to intelligence coordination would not continue. A relative novice in the intelligence community, Smith relied upon a number of experienced advisers to develop his arguments. Lawrence Houston, who would serve as the CIA's general counsel during Smith's tenure, provided the DCI with a particularly influential memorandum on August 29, 1950, in which he identified "the basic current problems facing CIA." He focused his attention on the agency's mandate to coordinate intelligence. Starting at the top, Houston criticized the NSC for "impos[ing] upon CIA the board of directors mechanism of the Intelligence Advisory Committee." Under these circumstances, Houston noted, "recommendations which go forward to the NSC are not CIA recommendations as contemplated by the law, but actually are watered-down compromises, replete with loop-holes, in an attempt to secure complete IAC support." He also went to the heart of the coordination problem: "CIA is not empowered to enforce its collection requests on IAC agencies, or establish priorities."<sup>127</sup>

The fact that many of the CIA's coordination problems were the result of voluntary initiatives by his predecessor probably encouraged Smith to believe that he had both the right and the capability to solve them unilaterally. In his first official meeting with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Smith presented the representatives of the other major intelligence agencies with a memo entitled "The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for National Intelligence Estimates," in which he made a powerful defense of the CIA's statutory responsibility for intelligence coordination, based upon section 102D of the 1947 National Security Act (the aforementioned "correlation, evaluation, and dissemination" mandate). He informed the representatives of the major intelligence services that henceforth the CIA would take the lead in the production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which would serve as authoritative statements of the collective judgment of the various intelligence agencies regarding a specific policy question. Perhaps because the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report had emphasized the need for such documents, the IAC accepted Smith's demands.

The DCI established the Office of National Estimates (ONE) for the purpose of producing the NIEs. He also announced plans for the cre-

ation of a Board of National Estimates (BNE), a small group of experts who were responsible for guiding the work of the ONE staff and assisting the DCI in his efforts to extract support for the NIEs from the senior intelligence representatives on the IAC. Soon after Smith presented his ambitious plans for the ONE, he ran up against practical aspects of the “content/consensus” paradox. First, it was clear that the agency would have to depend for staffing on the other departments involved in intelligence—both because the CIA did not have the requisite manpower and because it was considered to be essential if those departments were to recognize any stake in the NIE process. The positive aspect of this arrangement was that NIEs were homogenized before they reached the IAC, so they were relatively uncontroversial and acceptable to all participants. From the point of view of the leadership of the CIA, however, this did not compensate for the diluted quality of the early NIEs. The ONE functioned, in Smith’s words, as an “assembly plant for information produced by collaborating organizations.”<sup>128</sup> Over time, the agency sought to correct this situation by gradually establishing control over the ONE staff. The result was a more satisfactory product, from the CIA’s perspective, but also a loss of support for the NIE process by the other intelligence agencies.

Smith also had to strike a balance within the ONE between “front office” representatives of the contributing agencies and individuals with substantive expertise. The former were able to speak with some authority for their agencies, but they brought no special competence relating to the issues at hand. The latter brought valuable knowledge to ONE deliberations, but because they were less senior in their organizations, they were often incapable of speaking for their agencies. As Montague correctly noted, “No satisfactory resolution of this dilemma has ever been devised.”<sup>129</sup>

In spite of the inherent problems of coordination, Smith made modest progress in establishing the CIA as the coordinator of national intelligence during his tenure as DCI. Some of this progress was attributable to his development of coherent procedures for the formulation of National Intelligence Estimates. But it was also attributable to his personal efforts at selling his NIEs to the NSC. The Church Committee would later report: “Former members of ONE have said that this was the period when they felt their work really was making its way to the senior level and being used.”<sup>130</sup>

As a result of Smith’s development of more coherent procedures for the formulation of NIEs, and his personal efforts as DCI to present and defend these estimates to the members of the National Security Council, the CIA had reclaimed some of its status as the coordinator of national intelligence by the time that Eisenhower came to office. By this time, however, the center of gravity within the CIA was shifting from

intelligence coordination to covert activities, and Smith's successor was fully committed to continuing this trend. Most commentators agree that Allen Dulles passed up opportunities to preserve, if not enhance, the CIA's authority as the coordinator of national intelligence. But these commentators also agree that this was not where the action was by the time that Dulles became DCI. To the extent that he worried about issues of coordination, they tended to be issues relating to control of covert operations. In these cases, Dulles was both tenacious and effective.

By 1958, Dulles was coming under increasing criticism for his failure to fulfill the CIA's mandate for intelligence coordination. An attempt was made to bolster the DCI's status as the coordinator of national intelligence by replacing the IAC with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), with the DCI as its chairman.<sup>131</sup> But as William Leary has correctly observed, the USIB

had no budgetary authority, and did not provide the DCI with any direct control over the components of the intelligence community. The separate elements of the community continued to function under the impetus of their own internal drives and mission definitions. Essentially, the problem that existed at the time of the creation of the CIG remained.<sup>132</sup>

It would be misleading to leave readers with the impression that the CIA never had any chance of escaping from the disadvantaged position of the late 1940s. Under the leadership of Bedell Smith, the agency had taken some important steps to assert its statutory authority as the institution responsible for "correlation, evaluation, and dissemination" of national intelligence. But whatever momentum had been achieved during Smith's time as DCI was lost during the tenure of his successor.

### *The Development of the CIA's Independent Research and Analysis Function*

When he took office in the fall of 1950, Walter Bedell Smith also recognized the need for substantial reform of the CIA's activities as an independent source of intelligence. The agency inherited this function from the CIG. It also inherited the Office of Research and Estimates (ORE), which had been established by Vandenberg in 1946 to produce both coordinated and independent intelligence. Under Hillenkoetter, the intelligence coordination function of the ORE was allowed to stagnate, but the CIA became an active producer of independent analyses. Once the ORE's "daily" and "weekly" intelligence reports became popular with the White House, the CIA began to gain leverage with the other intelligence agencies, which saw the reports as a tool for bringing their specific interpretation of events to the president's attention. Unfortu-

nately, Hillenkoetter failed to use this leverage to bolster his agency's status as the coordinator of national intelligence. By 1949, the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report concluded that the ORE had become an inchoate source of numerous "narrowly defined short-term" and "non-predictive" studies, many of which duplicated the intelligence provided by other agencies.<sup>133</sup>

Soon after Smith replaced Hillenkoetter as DCI, he scrapped the ORE and created the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), with a narrower mandate relating to the independent production of intelligence. Drawing upon the recommendations of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, Smith concentrated the agency's energies in two areas: economic intelligence relating to the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes, and analysis relating to science and technology. In 1952, these activities were grouped under a new Deputy Directorate of Intelligence (DDI), which supervised the work of the ONE in the formulation of coordinated national estimates, administered the agency's economic analysis function (within the ORR), and oversaw its scientific and technological analysis (within the Office of Scientific Intelligence [OSI]). The DDI also included the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which continued production of the daily briefings (renamed the Current Intelligence Bulletin).

The decision to carve out specific niches for the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence paid off in terms of all of the traditional measures of bureaucratic success. The size of the intelligence analysis branch of the agency grew dramatically in the early 1950s, as did its clout within the intelligence community. As it acquired more influence, the agency inevitably intruded on the turf of the established departments involved in intelligence collection and analysis. When Smith initially announced plans to focus much of the CIA's intelligence analysis activities on issues of science and technology, the armed forces were quick to respond. In August 1952, they succeeded in pressuring the DCI to limit his agency's activities to issues of basic science and medicine. Within two years, however, the CIA had expanded the scope of its activities to include various scientific and technological issues relating to national security.

The CIA's most important intrusion into the military's turf was its acquisition of direct responsibility for the development and utilization of intelligence derived from high-altitude aerial reconnaissance. The CIA's development of the U-2 reconnaissance craft is a classic story of bureaucratic opportunism. Since coming to office, Eisenhower had been plagued by unanswerable questions about the pace and scope of the Soviet Union's development of offensive capabilities. In March 1954, the president convened a panel of scientists, headed by MIT pres-

ident James Killian Jr., to consider technological issues relating to the Soviet threat. During subsequent meetings between the so-called Surprise Attack Panel and CIA representatives, a good deal of attention became focused on two related topics: the potential for high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, and improvements in the field of long-range photography.<sup>134</sup> The Air Force had, in fact, rejected a Lockheed proposal for the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft just a few months earlier. When a preliminary plan was brought to Dulles, he was initially skeptical, largely because of his preference for human intelligence gathering. The members of the panel gradually won him over, however, by arguing that

this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for a contemporary version of CIA: a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence—and choosing such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to start.<sup>135</sup>

The panel members also took their case directly to the president, who agreed that the agency was the appropriate institution to manage the process.

Dulles placed the project under the supervision of his special assistant, Richard Bissell. Armed with Eisenhower's imprimatur, Bissell overcame a myriad of budgetary and administrative problems. More impressive still, Bissell not only succeeded in rebuffing efforts by the Air Force to place the project under the Strategic Air Command (SAC), but also worked out an arrangement whereby the SAC would provide the pilots, who would be required to become civilians and to operate under direct CIA authority.

Eight months after Dulles's initial meeting with Eisenhower, the U-2 took its first test flight. Over the next five years, the top-secret U-2 program served as an extraordinary source of intelligence for CIA analysts. As the CIA's official history of the U-2 project has concluded, it also "produced major changes in the Agency":

The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of the Agency's photointerpretation capabilities, which finally resulted in the creation of the National Photographic Interpretation Center to serve the entire intelligence community.<sup>136</sup>

Allen Dulles effectively leveraged the CIA's photointelligence to bolster the status and influence of his agency within the Washington policy community. It provided the CIA with an important position in the

very competitive field of intelligence gathering and analysis. But it was still a far cry from the central coordinating role that Donovan and Vandenberg had envisioned for the CIA at the end of World War II.

*"The New Activity": The CIA and Covert Operations*<sup>137</sup>

Richard Bissell would later describe the CIA's U-2 project as an "empire within an empire."<sup>138</sup> To the extent that the agency had become an empire by the late 1950s, it was not as a source of independent analysis—and certainly not as a coordinator of intelligence. Rather, it was as the lead agency in America's campaign of covert competition with the Soviet Union. Indeed, as an exercise in top-secret intelligence gathering, the U-2 program was as much a victory for the covert side of the CIA as it was for the analytical side.

As is well known, the 1947 National Security Act did not provide the CIA with a specific mandate to engage in covert activities. On the other hand, the debates that led up to the passage of the legislation and the deliberations that took place in the mid-1940s between the departments of State, War, and the Navy (much of it under the umbrella of the SWNCC) make it clear that the government had already accepted the principle of covert operations in peacetime. What had not been resolved by 1947 was which agency should bear the responsibility for the management of such operations. Shortly after the CIA was established, the lead agencies involved in intelligence activities accepted the State Department's argument that it should have exclusive responsibility for conducting all forms of psychological warfare, including the production and dissemination of propaganda. Soon after this decision was made, however, Secretary of State Marshall informed his colleagues that he was opposed to the idea of his department having direct supervision over covert activities. According to William Leary:

He was vehement on the point and believed that such activities, if exposed as State Department actions, would embarrass the Department and discredit American foreign policy both short-term and long-term.<sup>139</sup>

Although there were still important matters of turf and administration to be resolved, there was no doubt by this time that the CIA would play an important role in America's covert war against the Soviet Union. Congress confirmed this fact during the summer of 1949, when it passed the enabling legislation that the CIA had been waiting for since 1947. In the same session in which it amended the National Security Act to make both the NSC and the military establishment more efficient, Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.<sup>140</sup> The legislation authorized the DCI to use unvouchered funds

for the management of covert operations. Over the next decades, this exemption from the normal budgetary reporting procedures was to have a transformative effect upon the CIA, and upon the agency's relationship with other branches of the government.

Although Marshall had made it clear that he was opposed to any covert role for the State Department that might embarrass his agency, the Policy Planning Staff, under Kennan's leadership, was not prepared to let the fledgling CIA take complete control over covert activities. It would appear that much of Kennan's opposition was due to the fact that he doubted Hillenkoetter's ability to manage this important element of postwar containment.<sup>141</sup> Once Hillenkoetter concluded that "State evidently will not go along with CIA operating this political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner," he accepted an extremely cumbersome compromise in the form of an Office of Special Projects. Established by NSC 10/2 on June 17, 1948, the Office of Special Projects soon became the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). As John Ranelagh has noted, the OPC was an "anomaly":

It was paid for and staffed by the CIA. Its head was appointed by the secretary of state and reported to the secretaries of state and defense, by-passing the director of Central Intelligence.<sup>142</sup>

The administrative confusion was compounded by the fact that the agency was developing its own clandestine intelligence gathering branch, named the Office of Special Operations (OSO).

Between 1948 and 1952, when the OPC and the OSO were finally merged into the Deputy Directorate of Plans (DDP), the two branches were engaged in a continuous turf war, although they were theoretically partner institutions within the CIA. The interoffice conflict only intensified as both the OPC and the OSO became larger and more influential bureaucracies, as a result of internal and external developments. Internally, policy documents like NSC 68 accorded a high priority to all forms of covert activity, as a middle ground between accommodation and war with the Soviet Union. Externally, the Korean War had opened the floodgates of appropriations for such covert operations.

The consolidation of the OPC and the OSO within the Directorate of Plans was part of Bedell Smith's ambitious campaign to streamline the CIA, in accordance with the guidelines established by the 1949 CIA Act and the recommendations of NSC 50 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa study. It is a reflection of the importance that the DCI accorded to the Dulles group's report that Smith recruited two of its primary authors, Jackson and Dulles, to oversee the reorganization and management of the agency, as his first and second Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (DDCIs), respectively.

Under Smith's leadership, the CIA expanded its activities in all three areas—intelligence coordination, independent collection and analysis, and covert operations. But the biggest growth—in personnel, budgets, and inside-the-Beltway influence—was clearly in the field of covert operations. Conditions were in place, therefore, for a dramatic expansion of the CIA's covert activities when Allen Dulles replaced Smith as DCI with the arrival of the Eisenhower administration. According to the CIA's official history, Smith harbored serious concerns about Dulles's "self-restraint." "It was all right for Dulles to be an enthusiastic advocate of covert operations as long as the decision rested with Bedell Smith, but if Dulles himself were DCI, who then would control and restrain him?"<sup>143</sup>

The answer, of course, was the NSC and the president of the United States. In an atmosphere of growing frustration about the limitations of massive nuclear retaliation as a means of controlling Communist aggression, neither the council nor the president (nor, for that matter, Congress or the American people) wanted to handcuff the CIA. Under Allen Dulles's personal supervision, the CIA's "cowboys" undertook multifaceted covert operations, most notably in Guatemala and Iran. As John Ranelagh has observed, these interventions "met with spectacular success, . . . with a minimum of fuss, bloodshed, and time expended. In the process the agency established itself as the most effective instrument in the secret brinkmanship of the cold war."<sup>144</sup> These successes helped to protect the CIA against assaults by Senator McCarthy and criticisms by Congress and the media in the wake of the Suez crisis and the Soviet crackdown in Hungary.

Dulles's fascination with on-the-ground covert operations probably led to missed opportunities for the utilization of new technologies for intelligence gathering. Dulles was also too involved in the day-to-day management of covert operations to pay attention to larger issues of CIA administration. More important, the DCI made it clear that he had little interest in cultivating his agency's status as the source of National Intelligence Estimates for the entire intelligence community. By 1954, Congress felt compelled to establish a Task Force on Intelligence Activities, under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark, as part of the Second Hoover Commission, to look into these problems.

Eisenhower responded to this action by Congress in the same way that he responded to the creation of the Jackson Subcommittee, by seeking to contain the damage before the study got under way. In this case, the president authorized the creation of a second study of the CIA in order to eclipse the activities and findings of the Clark Task Force. The so-called Doolittle Report (written under the supervision of Lieutenant General James Doolittle) was submitted to the president on

September 30, 1954. It succeeded in diverting attention from the specific recommendations of the Clark Task Force Report, which was published eight months later.

The marginalization of the Clark Report was unfortunate in two important respects. First, the report highlighted the need for the CIA to play a more active role in the overall coordination of national intelligence. Second, the task force recommended that Congress play an active oversight role. In accordance with the task force's recommendation, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) sponsored a resolution designed to create a Joint Oversight Committee during 1955. The effort failed because of active resistance from both the executive branch and the CIA's sponsors within Congress. Floor debate on the Mansfield Resolution elicited a now-famous assertion by Senator Leverett Saltonstall:

The difficulty in connection with asking questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have, unless it was essential for me as a Member of Congress to have it.<sup>145</sup>

The situation did not change until the final stages of the Vietnam debacle, when, as Harold Koh reminds us,

a rare synergy between . . . internal institutional reforms and external circumstances drove Congress to enact statute after statute subjecting the president's delegated foreign affairs powers to stringent procedural constraints.<sup>146</sup>

It was in this context that Congress finally revisited Saltonstall's argument, and redefined the kinds of information that members of the legislative branch needed to have in order to fulfill their constitutional obligations.<sup>147</sup>

With the failure of the Mansfield Resolution, the future of the CIA was set for the next two decades. Absent Congressional oversight, the agency continued to develop its covert capabilities and expand the range of its covert activities. This was Dulles's legacy. He had inherited a much more balanced agency from Smith—an agency that had established a claim to be the coordinator of national intelligence and had become recognized as an important source of independent analysis. Without abandoning either of these mandates, Dulles allowed both the coordination and the analysis functions to be eclipsed by the agency's covert operations. Dulles's reaction to one of the conclusions of the Clark Task Force Report is instructive in this regard. The report recommended that the DCI turn over the administration of the CIA to a deputy director, so that he could concentrate on his intelligence coordination responsibilities. In the words of William Leary, "Dulles turned the

recommendation around and appointed General Lucian Truscott his deputy for community affairs. Clearly, Truscott lacked even the DCI's limited authority in his coordination task."<sup>148</sup>

In fact, Dulles's decision to retain control over the administration of the CIA is misleading, since he had little interest in organizational efficiency—a subject that had been accorded high priority by Smith. The Hoover Commission was particularly critical of Dulles in this regard. But even the Doolittle Report, which was widely recognized at the time as an instrument for defending the CIA against outside criticisms, concluded that the DCI had mismanaged the CIA in general and the covert side of the agency in particular. When he met with the president in person, Doolittle also registered his concern about the concentration of power in the hands of two brothers, Allen and John Foster Dulles.<sup>149</sup> While strongly defending his DCI and Secretary of State, Eisenhower allowed the NSC to develop new procedures for supervision of the CIA's covert operations. NSC 5412/1 (March 1955) and NSC 5412/2 (November 1955) established a small group, composed of representatives of the president, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, with a mandate to evaluate proposals for covert action. The "5412 Group" met infrequently during the remainder of Eisenhower's term, however, and never acted as a constraint on either the president's or the DCI's planning for anti-Soviet operations.

On November 3, 1959, Eisenhower officiated at the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The decision to give the CIA its own space in a relatively isolated location represented the culmination of a decade-long debate. On one side of the debate were those who had argued that both the CIA's interests and the nation's interests were best served by having the agency's offices distributed throughout downtown Washington so that CIA representatives could cooperate with their counterparts on a daily basis. On the other side of the argument were the proponents of consolidation, who claimed that the agency needed, and deserved, its own headquarters in order to pursue its distinct mission. The opening of the seven-story Langley facility in 1961 represented a victory for the consolidationists.

Langley also served as a powerful statement of the identity that the CIA had acquired by this time—as a large, influential, and independent player in the Washington policy community. It is probably true that the agency could never have achieved this status if it had not taken advantage of the opportunities that the Cold War provided to become the lead agency in the field of covert operations. But this was not the agency's primary mandate, according to the 1947 National Security Act. And having turned away from the "correlation, evaluation,

and dissemination" role in the early 1950s, the agency would never again be in a position to reclaim it. Nor, for that matter, would any other agency.

## CONCLUSION

Amy Zegart reminds us that "the National Security Council system emerged as an artifact" in the 1947 National Security Act, "an all but forgotten remnant of larger battles between the War Department, the Navy Department and the president."<sup>150</sup> As an integral part of that system, the CIA was also only vaguely defined by the 1947 legislation. As a result, events and decisions during the initial period of operation were especially important in determining the identities of both the NSC and the CIA. The council was initially viewed with deep suspicion by Truman, and then grudgingly accepted as a useful tool for presidential management of foreign affairs. Under Eisenhower, the NSC was bureaucratized and accorded more status. In spite of these changes, Eisenhower continued Truman's efforts to preserve and protect the NSC's role as a "creature" of the president. In spite of significant changes over the years, it remains so today.

The CIA took a different path. Created as the "eyes and ears" of the NSC, it soon broke out of that restrictive role and began to establish its own institutional identity—with a large budget, a large and complex bureaucracy, and its own patrons in Congress. These changes were attributable in part to legislative action—in particular, the 1949 Central Intelligence Act—and in part to the emergency atmosphere of the early Cold War period. By the time that Eisenhower left office, the CIA was established as a quasi-independent player in the Washington policy community, as symbolized by its new headquarters in northern Virginia. In spite of Congressional investigations, embarrassing exposes, and the transformation of the international security environment, it remains so today.

## CONCLUSION

THE AMERICAN Political Science Association celebrated its one-hundredth anniversary in 2004. As part of the festivities, the association organized an event in honor of one of its former presidents, Dr. Edward Pendleton Herring, who, coincidentally, had also just turned 100 years old. Herring came from his home near Princeton for the occasion. He was recognized for his career as a political scientist, for his leadership of such institutions as the Social Science Research Council and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, and for his distinguished service as president of the American Political Science Association. What some people in the audience did not know was that Herring had actually played another role that may have had greater significance for his country. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, Herring was ahead of his time in arguing for a new approach to foreign and defense policymaking based on the concept of national security. His vision of institutionalized preparedness, in which military advisers would have a permanent and influential place within the Washington policy community, represented a radical departure from a system that had accorded pride of place to the State Department for over 150 years. It was the shock of Pearl Harbor that convinced most Americans of the need for this fundamental break with history.

Pendleton Herring also helped to create the system that he had envisioned before World War II. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume, between 1942 and 1946 Herring served as chairman of the Committee of Records of War Administration. The committee's final report—*The United States at War*—was the official administrative history of the performance of the 158 agencies that Franklin Roosevelt utilized to manage the war effort. This experience provided Herring with a practical understanding of the interagency process. At the same time that he was completing this project, Herring was also playing an indispensable role in the formulation of the 1945 Eberstadt Report, the study that came closer than any other document to serving as a blueprint for the 1947 National Security Act. The Eberstadt Report also provided the Navy with the ammunition that it needed to challenge the efforts by Truman and the Army leadership to achieve "true unification" of the military services.

The battle over armed forces unification, which is the subject of Chapters 3 and 4 in this book, eclipsed all other issues addressed by the framers of the 1947 Act. As a result of the compromises that were

built into the National Security Act, a new, and catastrophically inefficient, institution was created: the National Military Establishment (NME). In 1949 the NME became the Department of Defense. In spite of its inauspicious beginning, the Department of Defense was soon established as the dominant agency in the Pearl Harbor system of national security institutions. The Defense Department derived much of its clout from its sheer size. Despite Eisenhower's efforts to scale back the armed forces between 1956 and 1960, there were just under 2.5 million men and women in uniform, supported by an annual budget of more than \$40 billion, by the time he left office.<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense representatives permeated the entire national security bureaucracy, either as *ex officio* participants on interagency committees and boards or as resources for other agencies requiring military intelligence, information, or expertise. One particularly important source of Defense Department influence was secondment. As the only department with enough manpower and funding to contribute personnel to other executive branch agencies on a semi-permanent basis, the Department of Defense guaranteed that it would have direct involvement in, and influence over, the daily activities of numerous executive agencies.

By the time that Eisenhower left office, the Department of Defense had also acquired considerable institutional clout from the fact that it was able to speak with one voice. As a result of a process of almost continuous struggle—the subject of Chapter 6 in this volume—the defense community had been transformed by 1960 from a loose confederation of three relatively autonomous military services to a much more centralized federal arrangement. The Secretary of Defense's control over this system had been confirmed by statute and bolstered by an increasingly powerful Office of the Secretary of Defense, with approximately 1,800 employees.<sup>2</sup> The secretary benefited from reforms that clarified his authority over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service secretaries. His power was also enhanced by the redesign of the armed forces around a network of unified and specified commands that cut across the vertically structured system of three military services. The Department of Defense was still a far cry from Truman's vision of "one team, with all the reins in one hand." But it was much closer to this ideal than anyone had reason to expect following the passage of the 1947 National Security Act.

The role played by the Secretary of Defense by the time the Eisenhower left office did not correspond to what Forrestal seems to have had in mind when he made the case for locating the National Security Council within the Pentagon and placing the NSC's executive secretary directly under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Forrestal's assumption that the Secretary of Defense would function as the

president's surrogate in the coordination of national security affairs was explicitly rejected in 1949, when the National Security Act was amended to designate the secretary as the president's "principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department of Defense" rather than "in all matters relating to national security." It can be argued, however, that this change actually served the longer-term interests of the Secretary of Defense, since it was part of the process of consolidation of the secretary's authority over the defense community.

It should also be emphasized that the system that was in place by the end of the Eisenhower era was a far cry from the "man on horseback" situation that so many experts and policymakers had warned against at the end of World War II. By 1960, the power within the defense community had clearly shifted to the civilian Secretary of Defense and the civilians within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Congressman Carl Vinson and others were nonetheless worried that the preconditions for a "Prussian general staff" were in place. They expressed special concern that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might pose a threat to civilian authority at some time in the future. When the military leadership was subsequently tested during the Vietnam War, however, many critics concluded that the armed forces were actually too submissive in the face of ill-informed civilian authority.<sup>4</sup>

But if the Pearl Harbor system was not under the direct control of the military, it was nonetheless a militarized approach to foreign policy. Ernest May is correct in his observation that nothing in the 1947 National Security Act made it inevitable that the US government would evolve into an arrangement "with the military ascendant and military-security concerns dominant."<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the debates that are summarized in Chapters 1 through 4 of this volume make it clear that the American people and their leaders understood that some degree of militarization of American foreign policy was required in order to fulfill the demands of national security. Over the next six decades, the institutionalized logic of national security would continue to tilt the policymaking process in favor of military interpretations and military advice. As a result, it would be more accurate to refer to the existing national security bureaucracy as a "mil-pol" system rather than a "pol-mil" system.

By comparison to the Department of Defense, which was clearly on track to become the dominant institution in the national security bureaucracy by the end of the Eisenhower era, the future of the National Security Council was very much in doubt. As discussed in Chapter 7, Eisenhower came under attack from numerous sources for his management of the NSC. These criticisms convinced both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations to transform the council from a complex

bureaucracy to a much less formal arrangement for presidential advisement—something much more akin to what Robert Lovett described as a “court . . . over which the President would preside.”<sup>6</sup> With the arrival of the Nixon administration, however, the Eisenhower model of an institutionalized NSC “arose like a phoenix out of the ashes” (to borrow Robert Cutler’s evocative phrase).<sup>7</sup> It would retain this general form from that point onward, in spite of regular turnover in the White House and occasional investigations into misdeeds by, and mismanagement of, the NSC.<sup>8</sup>

Every administration since Nixon has also confronted the same five issues that Eisenhower and Truman faced in their efforts to carve out an appropriate place and purpose for the NSC. First, every president has had to confront Truman’s concern that the NSC might function as a “second cabinet” that would undercut his authority over national security decisions. Initially, Truman’s solution was to distance himself from the NSC’s deliberations so that he would not be “captured” by the council. With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, the president felt compelled to become more directly involved in the NSC’s deliberations. But he never lost sight of the risk of losing control of the council.

Based on his experience with vertically structured military advisory systems, Eisenhower did not share his predecessor’s concern about capture by the NSC. He met regularly with the council during his two terms as president, and only seems to have been concerned about intrusions into his constitutionally designated authority when the NSC provided outside experts with a pretext for meddling in his administration. The president also relied upon three strategies to bolster his personal control over the policymaking process. First, he designed the NSC system—including the Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, and the offices of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Executive Secretary—to bolster his personal influence over both the “uphill” and the “downhill” sides of “Policy Hill.” Second, with specific reference to the council itself, the president usually reserved his decisions until after NSC meetings. He also subjected the council members to periodic lectures on their responsibilities as corporate members of the presidential advisory team. Third, Eisenhower relied upon certain individuals (Dulles, Humphrey, Goodpaster) and the Office of the White House Staff Secretary to provide him with independent advice and information.

Eisenhower also dabbled with the idea of designating a specific individual as the gatekeeper between himself and the NSC, both as a means of preserving his autonomy and as a way to manage issues of national security that constantly threatened to consume all of his time

and energy. Hans Morgenthau described this second perennial issue as the need for “one man’s mind grasping the nation’s interests.”<sup>9</sup> Herbert Hoover made the case for a “vice president for foreign affairs”.<sup>10</sup> Nelson Rockefeller favored the creation of a “First Secretary” to assist the president. Eisenhower himself had concluded by the end of his tenure that some version of Rockefeller’s First Secretary scheme was the best solution for the nation.

Some experts and policymakers argued that the constitution already provided the president with just such a person, in the form of the Secretary of State. But efforts by both Truman and Eisenhower to bolster the status of their Secretaries of State highlighted a third, and more fundamental, issue relating to the national security advisory system. As I will discuss later, the displacement of the concept of national interest by the concept of national security virtually guaranteed that the State Department would be the big loser in any post–World War II interagency policymaking process. Truman’s decision to block Forrestal’s efforts to establish the Secretary of Defense as the president’s *ex officio* representative within the national security community, and his subsequent support for the removal of the three service secretaries from the NSC, alleviated to some extent the “automaton problem” about which Secretary of State George Marshall had warned Truman in 1947. But no institutional reforms could compensate for the fact that the logic of national security tipped the scales, inexorably, in favor of the military. This reality was especially apparent at the level of the NSC, where the differences between civilian and military perspectives were forced into the open.

The fourth issue that has plagued every president since 1947 has to do with the fact that, in accordance with Ferdinand Eberstadt’s vision, the Pearl Harbor system in general, and the National Security Council in particular, assumes a high level of voluntary cooperation among relatively autonomous agencies. The inherent problems with such an approach to policymaking were familiar to Washington insiders long before the 1947 National Security Act was signed into law. As Dean Acheson observed at the time, “A good many of us had cut our teeth and our throats with this sort of nonsense.”<sup>11</sup> By the end of the Eisenhower era, the defects of this arrangement were everywhere apparent. The lesson for future policymakers was that every individual responsible for managing an interagency working group faces three choices: attempt to impose solutions on the participants in the deliberations; try to circumvent the group by taking independent action; or work within the system to achieve compromise. The problem with the first and second options is that unless the agencies responsible for translating a policy decision into action recognize a stake in that decision, they

are not likely to support or implement it. Unfortunately, the third option is equally problematic, since it often encourages interagency discussions that (in the words of Paul Hammond) are “inclined to be more courteous than probing.”<sup>12</sup>

Nor is there a solution to the fifth and final issue raised by Truman and Eisenhower’s efforts to design an advisory system that would serve as the president’s “creature.” As discussed in Chapter 4, during the deliberations that led up to the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, Congress accepted the principle that the president needed institutions to personally assist him in his formulation and management of US foreign and defense policies. But it soon became apparent that the system that was put in place assumed, in Harold Koh’s words, “a strong plebiscitary president.”<sup>13</sup>

Some experts, including Eberstadt and Forrestal, had recommended that the proposed legislation should include procedures for keeping Congress informed about NSC deliberations. Truman nonetheless resisted efforts to include statutory requirements for reporting on NSC deliberations as part of the 1947 National Security Act, and both Truman and Eisenhower defended the principle of executive privilege in subsequent dealings with the media and Congress.

But neither Truman nor Eisenhower could protect the NSC from political attacks when their foreign policies lost public support. The lesson for future presidents was clear. Even if a chief executive succeeds in designing an NSC that is ideally suited to his or her personality and foreign policy goals, the institution will not be exempt from politics. Once key elements of that foreign policy become unpopular, there is a natural tendency for critics to link the product to the process, and to question the way that the president obtains advice and information and manages his or her subordinates.

The National Security Resources Board (NSRB), which is the subject of Chapter 5 in this book, was envisioned by Eberstadt and Forrestal as the domestic economic counterpart to the National Security Council. They expected the NSRB to become the second most important element of the new national security bureaucracy. In contrast to the other major institutions of the Pearl Harbor system, however, the NSRB did not survive the initial shake-out period following the passage of the National Security Act. Soon after the NSRB was created, it began to be viewed as a liability by the Truman administration, as each regulatory action generated protests from some politically influential interest group. The NSRB also suffered from guilt by association with a few highly visible and vocal individuals—Arthur Hill, Eberstadt, and, most notably, Bernard Baruch—who had at least as many enemies as friends within the Washington policy community. The National Security

rity Resources Board continued to function until the arrival of the Eisenhower administration, at which point it was scrapped, and no attempt was made to fill the institutional void created by its elimination.

This was arguably the point at which the national security state stopped short of becoming a garrison state. Both Aaron Friedberg and Michael Hogan provide readers with valuable insights regarding the anti-statist traditions in the United States that tended to stack the deck against the success of the NSRB. Without challenging those arguments, this study has focused on another important factor in this story—the lessons of World War II—which cast doubt on the need for a powerful new agency to regulate American business and industry. The fact that the document that authoritatively raised these questions for the Washington policy community was the product of a committee chaired by Pendleton Herring is just one more illustration of this individual's extraordinary, and underappreciated, role in the shaping of modern American history.

The Central Intelligence Agency was at least as vulnerable as the NSRB at the time of its creation in 1947. According to the National Security Act, the CIA's primary purpose was "coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies." Pearl Harbor confirmed the need for some institution capable of performing this function. But intelligence was too valuable a commodity to be given away by any of the established national security agencies, and Congress was not willing to grant the CIA the authority to compel these agencies to do so. Under these circumstances, the fact that the agency survived at all is impressive.

As discussed in Chapter 7, the CIA's survival is attributable in large part to its willingness to exploit the opportunities created by escalating Cold War tensions. The situation of superpower stalemate resulted in new demands for an organization capable of engaging in a wide range of covert activities overseas. The established national security agencies did not want to become too closely associated with such missions. The CIA, on the other hand, had little to lose and a great deal to gain by taking on this responsibility. The CIA's second Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Walter Bedell Smith, attempted to develop the agency's covert capabilities while at the same time expanding his personal authority as the coordinator of intelligence and enhancing the CIA's reputation as an independent source of information and analysis. After Smith was succeeded as DCI by Allen Dulles, however, the CIA gave top priority to its covert activities at the expense of its primary responsibility—to provide the National Security Council and the president with centralized intelligence. Regarding the CIA's third area of activity, its function as an independent source of intelligence, Dulles

and his successors succeeded for a time in using the DCI's status as the author of National Intelligence Estimates in order to provide the agency with special access and influence within the intelligence community. But by the mid-1970s, John Ranelagh was justified in concluding that "the CIA was now just one of several competing agencies, and the director of Central Intelligence was no longer the President's chief intelligence officer in practice."<sup>14</sup>

No agency was more frustrated about its relative status in the system created by the 1947 National Security Act than the State Department. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the State Department had enjoyed a preeminent position in the shaping of America's peacetime foreign policy. Furthermore, as Walter Russell Mead reminds us, "The greatest minds and the most powerful politicians in the United States were eager to serve as secretary of state in the nineteenth century."<sup>15</sup> During the debates that led up to the passage of the legislation, it became increasingly apparent that the circumstances that had made it possible for State to dominate the Washington policy community no longer applied, and the State Department faced a fundamental choice. Either it could play a new role as a reasonably helpful and reliable member of the supporting cast in the Pearl Harbor system, or it could attempt to fight a rear-guard campaign designed to preserve its pre-World War II status as the lead agency in the formulation and management of US foreign policy. After an initial period of resistance, State tried to establish itself as a resource for the national security institutions that actually ran the system. It was nonetheless frequently criticized during the Truman and Eisenhower eras for being a particularly uncooperative and curmudgeonly participant in the interagency process. Indeed, the Jackson Subcommittee Report of 1961 asserted, "'Control or divert' is the State Department's guiding strategic principle."<sup>16</sup>

The Jackson Report also recognized the source of this problem. "The Secretary of State is the President's principal adviser on foreign policy," yet on the "gray and bloodless ground of bureaucratic warfare," the secretary and his agency are uniquely disadvantaged:

Filtered through committees, the Secretary's voice becomes muted, his words blurred. His responsibilities to the President remain, but his power and authority to exercise them diminish.<sup>17</sup>

One of the great tragedies of the Pearl Harbor system was that, over time, the State Department became inured to its subordinate role. As a result, it has frequently behaved as its own worst enemy when Congress or the White House have dabbled with proposals for bolstering State's influence within the Washington policy community.

## FROM PEARL HARBOR TO THE "ROMAN PREDICAMENT"

By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the defining elements of the Pearl Harbor system were in place. It is ironic that a system designed to identify, monitor, and oppose the next Japan proved to be fairly appropriate to the challenges posed by the postwar Soviet empire. A new institution for intelligence gathering and covert activity, new procedures for civilian-military and interservice policy coordination, and new arrangements designed to provide the military with a leading role in the formulation of peacetime diplomacy, all fit the requirements of the "long twilight struggle" against Communism.

But the Pearl Harbor system was also costly for America. Created in response to a national crisis, it perpetuated an atmosphere of crisis. Designed to identify and prepare for the next enemy, it encouraged worst-case analyses and militaristic modes of behavior that were frequently inappropriate to the circumstances. Established to reverse a 150-year tradition of marginalization of our armed forces, it evolved into a system that provided very little space or leverage for America's traditional instrument for diplomacy, the Department of State.

The American preoccupation with national security, which grew out of the shared experiences of Pearl Harbor and World War II, was institutionalized by the 1947 National Security Act. For the next four decades, as Washington and Moscow jockeyed for dominance, the logic of national security and the institutions created in 1947 to serve that logic sustained and legitimized each other. Together they formed what Thomas Kuhn has famously described as a paradigm—a closed system of mutually reinforcing beliefs, values, procedures, and reward structures that was strong enough to endure throughout the Cold War era, even though it was constantly confronted with what Kuhn calls "anomalies."<sup>18</sup> These anomalies were most apparent in the Third World, where they took the form of popular leaders who supported postcolonial nationalism, democratically elected governments associated with the nonaligned movement, and embarrassingly authoritarian but pro-American *caudillos*. Washington also confronted anomalies among its major allies, in their attempts to pursue independent détente relationships with governments in the Eastern bloc and in their challenges to US nuclear doctrine. These anomalies were a source of constant irritation for Washington during the Cold War, but they never generated enough concern within the policymaking community to justify a serious search for some alternative to the Pearl Harbor system.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a few experts, and a smaller number of policymakers, began to question whether the Pearl

Harbor system was still appropriate.<sup>19</sup> But neither the White House nor Congress was prepared to invest the political capital required to sponsor fundamental reform of the procedures and institutions that were associated with America's victory in the Cold War. In an article published in 2000, Major General (ret.) William Navas Jr. registered his frustration at a decade of missed opportunities for institutional reform: "The United States cannot afford to wait for a new 'burning platform' like Pearl Harbor to create a bias for action. This would be criminal."<sup>20</sup>

Less than a year later, the United States had its "burning platform," in the form of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush administration moved quickly to create a new Department of Homeland Security—the most ambitious institutional reform since the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. Once the new department was in place, the White House shifted its focus to other elements of the 1947 system, most notably the intelligence community.<sup>21</sup> What was missing, and what is still sorely needed, however, is the kind of architectonic debate that resulted in the 1947 National Security Act. In fact, the post-September 11 atmosphere in the United States has only served to reinforce the institutionalized habit of viewing international affairs through the lens of national security. The result is a "Pearl Harbor Plus" system, in which American foreign policy is still driven by concepts of threat and preparedness but without the clarity provided by the Soviet opponent. It is hard to say whether this situation poses greater problems for strategists or for civil libertarians, but it clearly poses serious problems for both.

## NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR A TRANSFORMED INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

It is possible that the public's frustration with America's embroilment in Iraq will serve as the impetus for a national debate about fundamental institutional reform. If such a debate can be launched, it will only be productive if it begins with an appreciation of the defining characteristics of the current international system. The first characteristic of the current system has more to do with 11/9 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall) than with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It is America's status as the "sole remaining superpower." Most Americans are uncomfortable with talk of empire, as illustrated by the number of euphemisms that have been created in order to avoid the word: "hyperpower," "colossus," "hegemon," "empire light," and "world's government."<sup>22</sup> What all of these terms have in common is an appreciation of America's preeminent power position in the international system. But with preemi-

nence comes great responsibility. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has observed, without American leadership, there is “no hope of a peaceful and stable future for humanity in this century.”<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, it is not sufficient for Washington to exercise leadership only in those circumstances which require the application, or implication, of military power.

The second important characteristic of the current international system is the existence of a cluster of complex and interacting threats, including transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spillover effects from failed and failing states. These very dangerous aspects of the current international system compel the United States to continue to accord a very high priority to national security. But it is also true that all three of these problems can only be addressed in collaboration with other nations. The same is true for other threats to national and human security, including resource depletion, environmental degradation, and pandemics.

But this is where the United States runs up against what Harold James has called the “Roman Predicament.” According to Professor James, a rule-based liberal international order that is viewed by the major actors in the system as equitable and reliable is “needed to restrain violence.”<sup>24</sup> The United States is, in Madeleine Albright’s words, “the indispensable nation” in the creation and maintenance of such a system in the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, the Pearl Harbor system predisposes the United States toward what James describes as “insular hostility . . . to the rest of the world.”<sup>25</sup> It also makes it extremely difficult for Washington to accord priority to other important national interests, such as the maintenance of a dynamic and competitive US economy and the cultivation of American political and diplomatic influence.

Under these circumstances, Washington needs new policymaking machinery and procedures that will allow for the articulation and advancement of a wide range of American interests. The appropriate metaphor for this new policymaking system will not be a “Policy Hill,” with a small number of national security agencies at its top. Rather, Washington will have to create something more akin to a plateau, which allows all executive agencies to move easily and quickly into and out of positions of prominence as circumstances require. In such a system, national security will still enjoy a privileged position, but it will no longer be the alpha and omega of foreign policymaking.<sup>26</sup>

Some people will worry that a system that gives various national interests a greater opportunity to compete with national security in the day-to-day formulation of US foreign policy risks making the nation more vulnerable to twenty-first century threats. But it is at least as

likely that an American foreign policy that is focused on a much wider range of international issues will make the nation safer in the medium and longer term. Indeed, the 2006 *National Security Strategy* seems to accept this point, as illustrated by the priority that it accords to such themes as economic growth, expansion of the “circle of development,” democratization, public health, and the global environment.<sup>27</sup>

## NEXT STEPS

This study has been guided by a conviction that any attempt at substantive reform of the foreign policy machinery will benefit from an understanding of how and why the framers of the existing system were able to make such sweeping institutional changes nearly sixty years ago, and how and why they made certain mistakes in the process. Scholars and policymakers would also be well advised to replicate some of the preliminary research undertaken by Eberstadt, Herring, and their colleagues in the immediate postwar period. It would be particularly useful to revisit the history of the British debates that took place at the start of the twentieth century. As discussed in Chapter 4, the contributors to the Eberstadt Report derived considerable insight from their study of these debates.

The British experience may be especially instructive now, because of the similarities between London’s situation at the start of the twentieth century and Washington’s situation at the start of the twenty-first century. In the case of the United Kingdom, a period of triumphalism symbolized by the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of 1897 had been followed by a period of frustration, recrimination, and confusion as a result of the Boer War. According to Niall Ferguson:

What Vietnam was to the United States, the Boer War very nearly was to the British Empire, in two respects: its huge cost in both lives and money—45,000 men dead and a quarter of a billion pounds spent—and the divisions it opened up back home.<sup>28</sup>

Attempts by the agents of empire to control the Boers by means of concentration camps became a special source of embarrassment and outrage for the British public. The result was a series of hearings and investigations that culminated in significant changes in the way London made and managed its imperial policies.<sup>29</sup>

There is no need to belabor the similarities with the present US situation. It is sufficient to note that American foreign policy from the end of the Cold War to the quagmire of Iraq traces an arc from triumphalism to frustration, recrimination, and confusion that shares some

intriguing characteristics with the British situation in the early 1900s. America is indeed a "Colossus" at present, but like England at the start of the twentieth century, it is a chastened Colossus that is increasingly aware of the limits of its capabilities and the complexity of its challenges. This is why a policymaking system that asks, "Where is the threat?" and "Who is the enemy?" is not as useful as a system that asks, "What are the issues?" and "What are our interests?"

Anyone interested in institutional reform would also be wise to listen to what others have to say about the US policymaking process. The insights of Australian and, in particular, British government representatives will be especially valuable, because they have had privileged access to the inner workings of the US policymaking community for many years.<sup>30</sup> The fact that these governments have earned the trust and respect of Washington will also be helpful, since some of their comments on the American system are likely to be extremely critical.<sup>31</sup>

Anyone who attempts to make the case for a new system that balances the demands of military security against other national interests will also have to confront two specific problems. The first problem with an interests-based system is that policymakers may conflate both utopian goals and the goals of pressure groups with the national interest. As discussed in Chapter 1, criticisms of both of these tendencies contributed to a devaluation of the concept of national interest by both the mass and the elite public during the interwar period. With regard to the risk of utopianism masquerading as national interest, suffice it to say that this is a permanent problem for a nation that defines itself as a "city on a hill." Indeed, the problem was in no way resolved by the adoption of the Pearl Harbor system. It can also be argued that, in a situation in which the United States will continue to view itself as an exceptional nation with an exceptional mission, a return to themes associated with traditional Wilsonian diplomacy (including active support for international law and international organizations) will be more effective than the current militarized and unilateralist form of utopianism.

Regarding the risk that the national interest will be co-opted by the forces of what Herring called "particularism," again it is necessary to point out that the problem did not disappear with the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. Indeed, certain special interests have been well served by a system that has demanded a high level of military preparedness. It is at least possible that an effort at comprehensive reform of the US policymaking system will disrupt some of the more entrenched relationships between Washington and the major corporations involved in the business of national security.

During the interwar period, the public also raised concerns about the influence of ethnic minorities in the United States. Our nation is engaged in the same debate today. Samuel Huntington worries that ethnic minorities—Mexican immigrants in particular—are eroding America’s identity and confounding efforts to articulate a coherent national interest. “We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are,” Huntington states.<sup>32</sup> But it is at least as likely that the different international perspectives of these new citizens will play an essential role in a process of redefinition of the national interest that will benefit all Americans.

The second, and more specific, problem with a policymaking system designed to articulate and advance American national interests is that the State Department would seem to be the obvious candidate for the status of lead agency in such a system. But sixty years of marginalization have exacted a terrible toll on this agency’s status within the Beltway. More important, the last six decades have created habits of deference within the State Department that will be extremely resistant to change. Indeed, marginalization has encouraged those negative aspects of State Department culture—effete, elitist, and out of touch—which Dean Acheson railed against in the 1940s. Under these circumstances, the agency that should be in the forefront of a campaign for institutional reform is more likely to remain part of the problem. As was the case in the post-World War II era, the impetus will have to come from other sources, and State will have to be brought along.

## CONCLUSION

Daniel Yergin has observed:

At certain moments, unfamiliar phrases suddenly become common articles of political discourse, and the concepts they represent become so embedded in the national consciousness that they seem always to have been with us. So it was for the phrase “national security.”<sup>33</sup>

This study of the 1947 National Security Act provides part of the explanation for how national security became “embedded in the national consciousness.” The combination of assumptions and institutions associated with the Pearl Harbor system guided American foreign policy during the Cold War and helped the US to achieve the status of the “sole remaining superpower” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Pendleton Herring seems to have foreseen this consummation as early as 1941, when he argued that even if the immediate threats of Nazism, fascism, and Japanese militarism were to disappear, America would

still be well served by a more militarized foreign policy because "the Roman phalanx was a necessary preliminary to the *Pax Romana*."<sup>34</sup> But as Edward Gibbon reminds us, "The decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable result of immoderate greatness."<sup>35</sup> America today has its own problems of immoderation, and many of these problems can be traced to assumptions and institutions developed between 1937 and 1960, in response to a very different world.

# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Norton, 2004), p. xvi.
2. According to Richard Posner, the report's conclusions "come to very little. Even the prose sags." "The 9/11 Report: A Dissent," *The New York Times Book Review*, August 29, 2004, p. 11.
3. Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969). Three books also deserve mention for their contributions to our understanding of one aspect of the 1947 reforms—the relationship between the civilian authority and the armed services: Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Paul Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); and Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). Two of the major players in the story of the 1947 National Security Act are the subject of Jeffery Dorwart's valuable study, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991). One essential memoir also deserves mention at the start of this book: Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951).
4. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5. John Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 37.
6. Melvyn Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48," *American Historical Review* 89, no. 2 (April 1984): 346–81, reprinted in John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005), p. 86.
7. See, in particular, Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
8. Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
9. Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
10. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, p. 3.

11. See Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40 (April 1988): 340-44. See also Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Political Power," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 393.

12. Dean Acheson's book, *Present at the Creation*, remains one of the best examples of the political memoir. Acheson also deserves credit for penning one of the catchiest titles in this genre, borrowed from King Alphonso X of Spain: "Had I been present at the creation I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe."

13. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 380.

14. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), p. 2.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 255-56.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

17. *Washington Post*, August 31, 1945, reprinted in Charles Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 320.

18. Herring, *The Impact of War*, p. 278.

19. See, for example, Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 24-46.

20. Quoted in Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 157.

21. C. P. Trussell, "Voice Vote in House Sends Unification Bill to Truman," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1947, p. 1.

22. *Social Science Research Council, Annual Report, 1953-54* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954), pp. 13-14. The official records of the SSRC are available as reference 300.6 SOC at the Rockefeller Archives Center in Sleepy Hollow, NY.

23. The phrase is borrowed from Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (New York: Penguin, 1997).

## CHAPTER ONE

### A FAREWELL TO NORMALCY

1. Larry Bland et al., eds., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 2 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 308-9.

2. David Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 459.

3. Quoted by Wayne Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 378.

4. For analysis, see Loren Baritz, *City on a Hill* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 17-18.

5. Samuel Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937* vol. (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 406-9.

6. James Abrahamson, *The American Home Front* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 102.

7. One measure of the attendant confusion and inefficiency is wartime production of airplanes. The Secretary of War had obtained \$600 million from Congress in 1917 with a promise to produce 20,000 airplanes. He was forced subsequently to scale back predictions to 17,000 planes, then 15,000, then 2,000. The final production figure was 37 airplanes. See Michael England, *U.S. Industrial Mobilization, 1916-1988: An Historical Analysis* (Washington, DC: Defense Technical Information Center, 1989), p. 31.

8. Quoted by Alan Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality*, McNair Paper no. 50 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 19.

9. Regarding the Army's contribution to the Victory Plan, see Charles Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1990).

10. John Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 45.

11. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, p. 409.

12. Vilhjalmur Stefansson, "The Logic of the Air," *Fortune* 4 (April 1943): 70-75, cited in Geoffrey Parker, *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), pp. 105-7.

13. Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 95.

14. Archibald MacLeish, *Air Raid: A Verse Play for Radio* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), pp. 24 and 34-35.

15. Alexander de Seversky, *Victory through Air Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), pp. 18-19. Ironically, in light of de Seversky's attack on popular fairy tales, the book was made into an animated film by Walt Disney, with the author himself as the narrator.

16. Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), p. 95.

17. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, pp. 380-81.

18. Quoted in Michael Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 30.

19. Forrest Pogue notes that this meeting also established the ground rules for the personal relationship between the two men: "I remember he called me 'George.' (I don't think he ever did it again. . . . I wasn't very enthusiastic over such a misrepresentation of our intimacy.)" *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 322-23.

20. See Paul Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 99-101.

21. Quoted by Alexander Kendrick, *Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 208.

22. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1 (New York: Knopf, 1945), p. 234.

23. Harold Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State* (New York: Pelican, 1937), p. 11.

24. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 139.

25. Harold Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), p. 10.

26. Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 251.

27. Quoted in Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, p. 111.

28. James Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 91–93.

29. Quoted by Alan Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State,” in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 85.

30. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), pp. vii–viii.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

32. On the dangers posed by “alien groups” before, during, and after the Great War, see Edward Lewis, *America: Nation or Confusion, A Study of Our Immigration Problems* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928), esp. pp. 205–87.

33. The Americanization campaign of the early twentieth century is criticized by Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration: A World Movement and Its American Significance* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 414–33. For a more balanced assessment, see Samuel Huntington in *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 131–35.

34. Lewis, *America: Nation or Confusion*, p. 314.

35. Charles Beard, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 355.

36. Quoted by Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 174.

37. Clarence Bonnett, “The Evolution of Business Groups,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 179 (May 1935): 7–8.

38. Senate Hearings, *Independence of the Philippines*, 71st Cong., 2d sess., January 15 to May 22, 1930, discussed in Beard, *The Idea of National Interest*, p. 514.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 522.

40. Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930’s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 25.

41. *Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry*, US Senate, 74th Cong., 2d sess., February 24, 1936, pp. 3–13; the quote is from pp. 7–8.

42. Quoted in Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, p. 152.

43. Harold Sprout, “Pressure Groups and Foreign Policy,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 179 (May 1935): 123.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

45. Franklin Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928–1945*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt and Joseph P. Lash, 2 vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), 1:506–7, quoted in Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, p. 156.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, pp. 386–87.

48. David Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War* (New York: Knopf, 1988), p. 27.
49. David Kennedy, in his discussion of J. M. Keynes's criticisms of the Versailles settlement, *Freedom from Fear*, p. 7.
50. Hans Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 29.
51. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," November 1, 1886, published in *Political Science Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (June 1887): 1-26.
52. See the "Foreword" by Harwood Childs, guest editor of the special issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, entitled *Pressure Groups and Propaganda*, vol. 179 (May 1935): xi-xii.
53. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest*, p. 524.
54. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation before Congress* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929).
55. Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, p. 343.
56. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), p. 78.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 343-44.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 399.
60. Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, p. 207. See also Leonard White's critique of interwar administration in *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 11.
61. Herring, *The Impact of War*, pp. 11-12.
62. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1974), book 1, ch. 13, p. 101.
63. Herring, *The Impact of War*, p. 18.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
65. William Y. Elliott, *The Need for Constitutional Reform: A Program for National Security* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 272.
66. Personal file of W. Y. Elliott, Harvard University Archives (HUA).
67. See John Carver Edwards, *Patriots in Pinstripes: Men of the National Security League* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), *passim*.
68. Herring, *The Impact of War*, p. 45.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
72. Charles A. and William Beard, *The American Leviathan*, quoted by Herring in *The Impact of War*, p. 18.
73. Herring, *The Impact of War*, p. 277.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 263-84.
76. Quoted in Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, p. 368.
77. The quote is from a memorandum from Marshall to his assistant, Captain William Sexton. It is not a coincidence that Larry Bland, the editor of Marshall's papers, titles the volume dealing with the immediate prewar era "We Cannot Delay," for that was the general's central preoccupation during this period. See *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, p. 274.

78. John Ohl, *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 47.

79. James Carroll, *House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), p. 2.

80. *Ibid.*

81. Quoted in David McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1976), p. 38.

82. This incident is discussed by David McLellan, *ibid.*, pp. 24–29.

83. Reprinted in James Chace, *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), p. 81.

84. Walter Millis, Harold Stein, and Harvey Mansfield, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 94. Regarding Hull's claim that he considered resigning as Secretary of State in January 1942 because of ill health, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1137.

85. See Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 34.

86. Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (June 1955), reprinted in Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, eds., *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 8.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

88. Irwin Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 228.

89. "United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941," in Ernest May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 479.

90. See Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the O.S.S.*, prepared by the History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1947 (New York: Walker and Co., 1976), pp. 5–8.

91. For background on the establishment of the COI and the bureaucratic disputes that it triggered, see Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 107–11.

92. Discussed in Bruce Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775–1941* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), pp. 395–400.

93. G. Pascal Zachary, *Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 422 n. 60.

94. James P. Baxter III, *Scientists against Time* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown Books, 1946), p. 32.

95. Quoted in Robert Albion and Robert Connery, *Forrestal and the Navy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 3–4.

96. For background, see *ibid.*, pp. 2–7.

97. Jeffery Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), pp. 24–29.

98. See Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, pp. 41–52.

99. Vannevar Bush would later observe that what drew the members of the scientific community to Washington in the months before Pearl Harbor was the "one thing we deeply shared—worry." Quoted in Zachary, *Endless Frontier*, p. 108.
100. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, p. 503.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 511.
102. Quoted in Sherry, *In the Shadow of War*, p. 65.
103. Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War*, pp. 89 and 96.
104. Quoted by Ed Cray, *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), p. 272. Part of the reason that the military was subjected to intense criticism for letting down its guard in Pearl Harbor had to do with the fact that defense planners had been studying scenarios for war with Japan since 1907. See Harry Ball, *Of Responsible Command: A History of the Army War College* (Carlisle, PA: Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1983), pp. 109–10.
105. Quoted in Brinkley, "The New Deal," in Fraser and Gerstle, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal*, p. 101.
106. Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson (The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy)* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), p. 14.

## CHAPTER TWO

### "ONE MAN IS RESPONSIBLE"

1. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 8, 1941.
2. The phrase is from Senator Warren Austin, a member of the Military Affairs Committee during the war. Quoted by Gordon W. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), p. 559.
3. War Production Board, *Wartime Production Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 1.
4. Alan L. Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality*, McNair Paper no. 50 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 127.
5. Quoted in Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II*, p. 5.
6. Samuel Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1941 vol. (New York: Macmillan, 1945), pp. 623–24.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. Acheson testimony before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st sess., June 11, 1969, pp. 618–28. Reprinted in Herbert Schiller and Joseph Phillips, eds., *Super State: Readings in the Military-Industrial Complex* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 219–33.
10. See Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II*, pp. 15–16. See also Michael England, *U.S. Industrial Mobilization, 1916–1988: An Historical Analysis* (Washington, DC: Defense Technical Information Center, 1989), pp. 15–57.

11. The successive revisions are listed in *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government*, Historical Reports on War Administration no. 1, Bureau of the Budget, Pendleton Herring, Chairman (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 16 (hereafter referred to as the Herring Report), and discussed in Paul Koistinen, *Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920–1939* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 42–71.

12. Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), p. 35. See also R. Eberton Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1991), pp. 40–45.

13. Quoted in Jeffery Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University, 1991), p. 59.

14. Discussed by Cecilia Stiles Cornell, “James V. Forrestal and American National Security Policy, 1940–49,” Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Department of History, May 1987, pp. 57–60.

15. See Robert Albion and Robert Connery, *Forrestal and the Navy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 24–25.

16. Donald Nelson, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), pp. xvii–xviii.

17. Herring Report, p. 394.

18. Quoted in Alonzo Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 255.

19. Quoted in John Ohl, *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 47.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

21. Quoted in David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 262.

22. Ohl, *Supplying the Troops*, pp. 161–80.

23. Herring Report, pp. 397–98.

24. David Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 629.

25. Herring Report, p. 281.

26. The phrase is Roosevelt’s, as reported by Nelson in *Arsenal of Democracy*, p. 389.

27. Herring Report, p. 394.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 519.

29. Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II*, p. 5.

30. Herring Report, p. 51.

31. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 321.

32. Lawrence Legere, Jr., “Unification of the Armed Forces,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 1950, p. 202.

33. See Ray Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, The US Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 100-104.
34. Legere, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, p. 220.
35. Quoted in Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 298-99.
36. Leahy's account of the discussions that led up to the announcement is presented in his memoir, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), pp. 96-98.
37. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, pp. 298-300.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 300
39. James Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 491.
40. In this regard he differed from Churchill, who was inclined to micro-manage many aspects of his nation's military effort.
41. Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002), p. 17.
42. Kent Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), p. 15.
43. Lippmann's article was published in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 20, 1941.
44. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, pp. 76-77.
45. For discussion, see Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 476.
46. Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 7.
47. Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II*, pp. 98-100.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-11.
49. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 276.
50. Grace P. Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War against Japan* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 96.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 728.
52. Quoted in G. Pascal Zachary, *Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 126.
53. James P. Baxter III, *Scientists against Time* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown Books, 1946), p. 33.
54. Irvin Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development*, Science in World War II Series (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p. 324.
55. Quoted by Baxter, *Scientists against Time*, p. 438.
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57. *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.
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62. Roosevelt, *War Report of the O.S.S.*, pp. 23-25.

63. See Ernest Volkman and Blaine Baggett, *Secret Intelligence* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 49-50.

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65. Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 128.

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68. Roosevelt, *War Report of the O.S.S.*, p. 105.

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71. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors*, pp. 256-57, and Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, pp. 165-66.

72. See Carolle Carter, "Mission to Yenan: The OSS and the Dixie Mission," in Chalou, *The Secrets War*, pp. 304-5.

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76. *Ibid.*

77. Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, p. 303.

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82. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 1109-10.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

84. Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 60-63 and 149.

85. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 320.

86. Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 316-17.

87. One instructive incident is discussed by Forrest Pogue in "George C. Marshall on Civil-Military Relationships in the United States," in Richard Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 213-14.

88. For a survey of proposals, see Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 317.

89. See the analysis by Paul Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 400-401. It should be noted that Forrestal also made a claim to paternity of the SWNCC, noting in his diary on the week that the SWNCC was created that he had "talked with Harry Hopkins" about the need for "something similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the civilian side." Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 19.

90. Alan Ciamporcerio, "The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Beginning of the Cold War," Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Graduate School of Public Affairs, 1980, pp. 28 and 43.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

92. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 316.

93. Draft memo from Major General Howard Craig, February 3, 1945, quoted in Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 331.

94. Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Knopf, 1995), p. 176.

95. Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 13.

96. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 12.

97. This well-known comment can be found in several sources, including Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 774-75.

98. One incisive joke from the period depicts Nelson, after being stabbed in the back by a general, removing the knife and returning it to his assailant with the statement, "General, I believe you dropped something." The attacker accepts the knife with thanks, and then proceeds to stab Nelson again. Quoted by Brinkley, *The End of Reform*, p. 188.

99. See McCullough, *Truman*, p. 263.

100. Quoted by Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, p. 729.

### CHAPTER THREE MARSHALL'S PLAN

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2. Stuart interview with Herring, July 16, 1998.

3. Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Department of National Defense*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., January 21, 1932 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 249-50.

4. *Final Report of War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps*, July 18, 1934, reprinted in Raymond O'Connor, ed., *American Defense Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 207.

5. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 308.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Department of National Defense*, 72d Cong., 1st sess., January 21, 1932 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 3-5.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 86.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 249-50.

11. *Final Report of War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps*, reprinted in O'Connor, *American Defense Policy*, p. 214.

12. Leonard White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York: Macmillan, 1934).

13. For a summary of the corporatist perspective, see Jeffery Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), pp. 4-7.

14. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 338.

15. Quoted by Cecilia Stiles Cornell, "James V. Forrestal and American National Security Policy, 1940-49," Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Department of History, May 1987, p. 294.

16. John Ries has observed that, by the end of the war, the proponents of air power had accepted that "unification must 'triply' as well as 'unify.'" See *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964), p. 5.

17. Williamson Murray, "Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences," in Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 96.

18. Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee, *United Air Service*, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1919-20), p. 422, quoted by Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 9.

19. Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 96-97.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

21. Larry Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 4, *Aggressive and Determined Leadership: June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 36. See also the Army's contribution to a roles and missions report to the Joint Action of the Army and Navy committee in August 1942. This report is discussed in Lawrence Legere, Jr., "Unifi-

cation of the Armed Forces," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 1950, pp. 245-46.

22. The Navy's case is put forward by Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946*, pp. 145-46.

23. Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 222.

24. Discussed by Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, pp. 71-73.

25. For analysis, see James Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 70-76.

26. Ed Cray, *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), p. 278.

27. Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, pp. 74-75.

28. Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 4:156.

29. *Ibid.*, 4:156-57.

30. Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," p. 280.

31. Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 4:418.

32. *Ibid.*, 4:419-20.

33. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, *Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., April 1944 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 33-37.

34. Harry Yarnell, "A Department of War," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 69 (August 1943): 1100-1101.

35. Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in War and Peace*, p. 519.

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37. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

38. Vincent Davis provides an excellent summary of Navy arguments in *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946*, pp. 55-57.

39. *Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense*, April 1945, reprinted in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 415.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 410.

41. For a discussion of Richardson's dissenting statement, see Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," pp. 283-85.

42. Truman told his assistant, Clark Clifford, that "if the Army and Navy had given as much time to defeating the enemy as they gave to fighting each other, the war could have been ended a good deal sooner." Quoted in Frank J. Smist, Jr., *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), p. 3.

43. Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified," *Collier's* (August 26, 1944), reprinted in Hearings before Senate Committee on Military Af-

fairs, *Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 192-97.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 47.

46. *Ibid.*, 2:34.

47. "White House Conference on the Postwar Navy," September 14, 1945. Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Harold D. Smith Diary, B File, p. 1.

48. "Conference with the President," February 28, 1946. HSTL, Harold D. Smith Diary, B File, p. 1.

49. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), p. 510.

50. *Ibid.*

51. "Memorandum for: All Flag Officers." November 14, 1945. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 93, Folder: Postwar Military Organization—Magazine Articles and Clippings, pp. 1 and 2.

52. Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, pp. 86-87.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

54. "Memorandum for Mr. Eberstadt," July 21, 1945. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University (SML), Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers.

55. *Report to Honorable James Forrestal*, October 22, 1945. Reprinted in Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 3; hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt Report.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

61. *Ibid.*, p. iv.

62. Eberstadt's testimony, in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 79th Cong., 2d sess., May 9, 1946 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 178-79.

63. Quoted by Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*, p. 49.

64. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 51-52.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*, p. 443.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-101.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 242 and 249.

69. "Nimitz Versus Eisenhower," November 19, 1945, reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 441-42.

70. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:49-50.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 119.

73. Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*, p. 189.
74. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, p. 163.
75. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 61.
76. Discussed by Alonzo Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 297-98.
77. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 520.
78. *Ibid.*
79. "Conference with the President," May 2, 1946. HSTL, Harold D. Smith Diary, Box 1, Folder: Diary, p. 1.
80. "Conference on Unification of the Services," May 13, 1946. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 93, Folder: Postwar Military, p. 3.
81. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 162.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
83. Robert Albion and Robert Connery, *Forrestal and the Navy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 139.
84. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 79th Cong., 2d sess., May 9, 1946 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 24-25.
85. Quoted in Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 160.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
87. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 248-49.
88. "Memorandum for: The President," January 14, 1947. HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, B File, p. 11.
89. "Conference with the President," May 22, 1946. HSTL, Harold D. Smith Diary, Box 1, Folder: Diary, May 1946, p. 1.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
91. *Central Organisation for Defence* (British Joint Staff Mission, Offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC), undated report, with cover memo from James Fokett to President Truman, October 22, 1946. HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Box 125, Folder: Agencies: Military: Army-Navy Unification, p. 5.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
93. "War Department, The Assistant Secretary for Air," November 8, 1946. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 82, Folder: Unification, p. 10.
94. Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, *National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services)*, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 687-88.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
96. Quoted in Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*, p. 152.
97. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 152.
98. Truman's letter is inserted into the Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, *National Defense Establishment*, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2.

99. " 'Unification' of the War and Navy Departments," January 30, 1947. HSTL, Confidential File, Harry S. Truman Papers, Box 33, Folder: Unification of the Armed Services—Drafts [of legislation] 3 of 3, pp. 1 and 2.

100. "President's Intention Was Merger," February 5, 1947. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 82, Folder: Unification I, p. 2.

101. "Editorial Reaction to Current Issues: Army-Navy Merger," January 24, 1947. HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, B File, p. 1.

102. On July 18, 1947, the House Committee on Armed Services took up discussion of HR 4278, *A Bill to Enact the National Security Training Act of 1947* (80th Cong., 1st sess.). The proposed legislation did not survive the criticisms leveled against it by Republican naysayers, but Truman kept pressing during the next three years for some form of universal training.

103. *Memoirs* 1:511-12.

104. Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 59.

105. Published by the US House of Representatives, "Communication from the President of the United States, Transmitting a Draft Bill Entitled 'National Security Act of 1947,' " 80th Cong., 1st sess., Document 149, February 26, 1947 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947).

106. *Ibid.*, p. i.

107. "Summary of Views Expressed by Members of the Senate Armed Forces Committee . . .," April 16, 1947. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 82, Folder: Unification IV, p. 1.

108. "Comments on Changes in the President's Unification Bill," June 6, 1947. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 83, Folder: Unification VII, pp. 1 and 2.

109. "To: Don Bermingham," May 30, 1947. HSTL, Papers of Frank McNaughton, B Files, p. 3.

110. "Unification of the War and Navy Departments," January 30, 1947. HSTL, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Box 7, Unification of Armed Services File, p. 1.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

112. "Memorandum for the President," July 22, 1947. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 83, Folder: Unification VII, p. 2.

113. Quoted in Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*, p. 172.

114. Quoted in Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," p. 349.

115. Quoted in Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 157.

116. Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, *National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services)*, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 674-75.

117. House Conference Report to Accompany S. 758, Report 1051, *National Security Act of 1947*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., July 24, 1947 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 6-10.

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

119. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 162.

CHAPTER FOUR  
 EBERSTADT'S PLAN

1. In fact, Eberstadt had been put on notice that it would be difficult to recruit Herring "away from the job he now has" at Harvard. For leverage, he asked Forrestal to send a telegram to Herring asking him "to lend a hand to Eberstadt." See "Memo to Mr. Eberstadt," dated June 18, 1945, and "Day Letter," dated June 19, 1945. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (SML), Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Selected Correspondence and Related Materials File.

2. Jeffery Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), p. 96.

3. Stuart interview with Herring, July 16, 1998.

4. See Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, pp. 31-32.

5. "Memorandum of Thoughts in Connection with the Report," June 28, 1945. SML, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Public Career file, 1945.

6. *Report to Honorable James Forrestal*, October 22, 1945. Reprinted in Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 1; hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt Report.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 359-60.

13. Quoted in Franklyn A. Johnson, *Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 360.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 366 and 359-60.

16. Larry Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 4, *Aggressive and Determined Leadership: June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 50

17. Johnson, *Defence by Committee*, p. 315.

18. Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, p. 86.

19. "Eberstadt—Notes," July 19, 1945. SML, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Selected Correspondence and Related Materials File.

20. Paul Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 229-30.

21. See Eberstadt's discussion of the underlying premises of the corporatist perspective in Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, pp. 4-7.

22. "W.H.B. Court," April 9, 1945. Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 93, Postwar Military.

23. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 60.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

25. Discussed by Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, p. 129.

26. Thomas Campbell and George Herring, *The Diaries of Edward S. Stettinius, Jr., 1943–1946* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), p. 185.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–86.

29. Minutes of initial meeting of the SWNCC, reprinted in Alan Ciamporero, “The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Beginning of the Cold War,” Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, Graduate School of Public Affairs, 1980, pp. 30–31.

30. David McClellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1976), p. 100.

31. Ciamporero, “The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Beginning of the Cold War,” p. 43.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

33. Quoted in Ray Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, The US Army in World War II Series* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 329.

34. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:165.

35. *Ibid.*, 2:58.

36. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 479.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 480.

38. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 161. See also Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 54–58.

39. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 213.

40. Eberstadt Report, pp. 51 and 47.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

42. “Memorandum of Meeting,” June 9, 1945. SML, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Public Career, 1945. Pendleton Herring has observed, “I think we [the members of the Eberstadt Committee] realized at the beginning that we weren’t going to win” on the issue of unification, due to Truman’s opposition to the Navy line. Stuart interview with Herring, July 16, 1998.

43. “Memorandum of Meeting Held June 8 in Room 2500,” June 8, 1945. SML, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Public Career, 1945.

44. Thus, for example, Dr. Herring informed the author that “the important thing” for the members of the committee “was to bring foreign policy and defense together, not to make the Navy’s case.” Stuart interview with Herring, July 16, 1998.

45. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), p. 22.

46. While the British experience had the greatest influence on the thinking of Eberstadt and his colleagues, the committee also looked at Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan. See “Organization of the Armed Forces of

Other Countries," October 13, 1945. HSTL, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 93, 1945 Organization File, p. 1.

47. Eberstadt Report, p. 55. In the summary section of the report, (p. 7) the NSC is described as being responsible for "formulating and coordinating overall policies in the political and military fields."

48. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

49. *Ibid.* The line-and-box outline is presented as "Proposed Organization for National Security," Eberstadt Report, p. 6.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

53. "Memorandum to the Drafting Committee," August 27, 1945. SML, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Public Career, 1945.

54. "Memorandum for Judge Rosenman," December 13, 1945. HSTL, Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman, B File, p. 2.

55. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:48-49.

56. "Draft of March 12, 1946." SML, Ferdinand Eberstadt Papers, Public Career, 1946, pp. 6-7.

57. Eberstadt testimony, May 9, 1946, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 178-79.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. George Fielding Eliot, "Our Armed Forces: Merger or Coordination?" *Foreign Affairs* 24, no. 2 (January 1946): 262-76, HSTL, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 92, p. 6.

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

65. See the survey of these debates by Alfred Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," reprinted in Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, eds., *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishers, 1988), pp. 16-28.

66. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President," February 7, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* vol. 1, *General: The United Nations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 712-13.

67. *Ibid.*

68. "'Unification' of the War and Navy Departments," January 30, 1947. HSTL, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, B File, pp. 1-4.

69. "Memorandum to: Mr. Clark Clifford," June 20, 1947. HSTL, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 83, Folder: Unification VII, p. 2.

70. "Memorandum for the President," July 22, 1947. HSTL, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 83, Folder: Unification VII, p. 2.

71. *Ibid.*

72. This change is discussed by Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), ch. 6, pp. 313-14 n. 11.

73. Statement by James Lay, Truman's assistant executive secretary, in Francis Heller, ed., *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945–1953* (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press, 1980), p. 207.

74. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, p. 212.

75. *The National Security Act of 1947* (S. 758), 80th Cong., 1st sess., Public Law 253, reprinted in Alice Cole et al., eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 37; hereafter referred to as the National Security Act.

76. *Ibid.*

77. This compromise is discussed in an internal White House memo: "To: Don Bermingham," May 30, 1947. HSTL, Frank McNaughton Papers, B File, p. 3.

78. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 316.

79. See Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 162–63.

80. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:56.

81. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), p. 99.

82. "Memorandum for the President," November 18, 1944, reprinted as appendix M in Thomas Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981), p. 445.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

84. Interview with Murphy, in John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 100.

85. Mark Reibling, *Wedge* (New York: Knopf, 1994), p. 14.

86. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 287.

87. "Conference with the President," September 5, 1945. HSTL, Harold D. Smith Diary, Box 1, Folder: Diary, September 1945.

88. Reibling, *Wedge*, p. 74.

89. Truman letter to Byrnes, reprinted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 463.

90. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 158 and 161.

91. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 312.

92. "Donovan to Truman," May 5, 1945. HSTL, Conway Files, Box 15. Cited in Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 60–61.

93. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 160–62.

94. Eberstadt Report, p. 12.

95. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, pp. 317–19.

96. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 158.

97. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 347.

98. Leahy diary, January 24, 1945, cited by Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 217 and 455.

99. Quoted in Nathan Miller, *Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 308.

100. In fact, Byrnes initially refused to give Souers access to State Department cables to incorporate into his daily reports, and only relented when he was instructed to do so by Truman. See Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 165.

101. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:58.

102. This, according to Elmer Staats, who served in the Budget Bureau during this period. Staats's comments can be found in Heller, *The Truman White House*, p. 171.

103. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 359.

104. *Ibid.*, pp. 363-65. See also the report "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," which the CIG completed on July 23, 1946, less than six weeks after Vandenberg's appointment as DCI, reprinted in Michael Warner, ed., *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), pp. 65-76.

105. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 374.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 391.

107. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President," February 7, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. 1, *General: The United Nations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 714-15.

108. The legislation is reproduced in Warner, *CIA Cold War Records*, pp. 131-37.

109. See Vandenberg's "Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Special Operations," October 25, 1946, in Warner, *CIA Cold War Records*, pp. 87-89. See also William Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 23.

110. Vandenberg's public testimony is reproduced in Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, *National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services)*, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 491-94. Vandenberg's closed testimony is discussed by Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 381.

111. See Arthur Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p. 173.

112. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 409.

113. Walter Pforzheimer, "Memorandum for the Record," January 23, 1947, reprinted in Warner, *CIA Cold War Records*, pp. 105-9.

114. "Memorandum from C. H. Carson of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Ladd)," June 21, 1946, reprinted in C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David Patterson, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 382.

115. The participants in these debates were well aware of the model provided by J. Edgar Hoover, whom Senator Chan Gurney put forward as his candidate for the first DCI. They differed, of course, in their judgments of

whether Hoover constituted a positive or a negative model. See the memo “To: Don Bermingham,” May 30, 1947. HSTL, Papers of Frank McNaughton, B File, p. 3.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## CONNECTING THE DOMESTIC LIGAMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Robert Duffy, *Nuclear Politics in America: A History and Theory of Government Regulation* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), esp. pp. 3–10.

2. The Baruch Plan is summarized in Morris Rosenbloom, *Peace through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a Blueprint for Security* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp. 270–91.

3. Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 14.

4. Quoted in R. Eberston Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1991), pp. 37–38.

5. See Margaret Coit, *Mr. Baruch* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 166–68.

6. Bernard Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1960), p. 54.

7. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), pp. 180–81.

8. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years*, pp. 56–58.

9. Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, p. 39.

10. Alan Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality*, McNair Paper no. 50 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 17. The Army’s interwar education initiatives are surveyed by Harry Ball in *Of Responsible Command: A History of the Army War College* (Carlisle, PA: Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1983), pp. 147–257.

11. The various Industrial Mobilization Plans are discussed by Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman in *The Army and Industrial Manpower* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 3–20. This volume also discusses the role played by the Nye Committee in discouraging efforts at pre-war planning (see pp. 11–12).

12. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years*, p. 264.

13. Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry*, p. 45.

14. Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, p. 156.

15. See David Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 630–31. The Victory Plan is discussed by Ray Cline in *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, The US Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1951), passim.

16. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, pp. 629–30.

17. Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry*, p. 85.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

19. *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government*, Historical Reports on War Administration no. 1, Bureau of the Budget, Pendleton Herring, Chairman (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 519; hereafter referred to as the Herring Report.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 514.

21. *Report to Honorable James Forrestal*, October 22, 1945. Reprinted in Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 8-9; hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt Report.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. "My first draft," December 14, 1945. Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Papers of George M. Elsej, Box 93, Folder: 1945--Organization, pp. 1-2.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

28. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 8-9.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-55.

30. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Report to Accompany S. 758, *National Security Act of 1947*, Report no. 239, Calendar no. 246, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 10.

31. Quoted in Edward Hobbs, *Behind the President: A Study of Executive Office Agencies* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1954), p. 182.

32. Cited in Jeffery Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), p. 156.

33. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years*, pp. 389-90.

34. "To Tell Mr. Hill Why His Paragraph 3 Won't Work" (undated). HSTL, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Box 12, File: NME--National Security Resources.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Hobbs, *Behind the President*, p. 161.

37. "My Dear Mr. President," December 5, 1947. HSTL, White House Central Files: Confidential Files, Box 27, National Security Resources folder no. 1 (cover letter and appendix).

38. "A Recommendation to the President by the National Security Resources Board on Steps and Measures Essential to the Fulfillment of the National Security Program," April 30, 1948. HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Box 146, File: Agencies, NSRB, 2.

39. "Report by F. Eberstadt to Arthur M. Hill," June 4, 1948. HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's File, pp. 8-9.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

44. Quoted in Michael England, *U.S. Industrial Mobilization, 1916-1988: An Historical Analysis*, unclassified Department of Defense Technical Report (Washington, DC: Defense Technical Information Center, 1989), p. 104.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

46. Francis Heller, ed., *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945-1953* (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press, 1980), p. 57.

47. "Oral History Interview #1, with David H. Stowe," May 27, 1969. HSTL, by Jerry N. Hess, p. 24.

48. The hearings are summarized for the president in "Brewster Committee Report on Industrial Mobilization for War," April 30, 1948. HSTL, Papers of George M. Elsey, B File.

49. See Baruch's memoirs, *Baruch: The Public Years*, p. 388.

50. Hobbs, *Behind the President*, pp. 171-74.

51. Oral History Interview #1, with David H. Stowe," by Jerry N. Hess, pp. 2-3.

52. The 1948 report is summarized, and expanded upon, in the "National Industrial Dispersion Policy," which President Truman distributed to the heads of all executive departments and agencies on August 10, 1951. HSTL, President's Secretary's File: Agencies, NSRB, Box 147, NSRB Reports Folder, p. 1. See also the analysis of the NSRB's industrial dispersal policies in Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, pp. 212-14.

53. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, p. 213.

54. "Confidential: Memorandum for Mr. Clifford," September 26, 1949. HSTL, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Box 12, File: NME-Selective.

55. Harry Yoshpe, *Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1981), pp. 115-16.

56. See Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 307-11.

57. These arrangements are discussed in the minutes of the National Advisory Committee on Mobilization Policy, December 19, 1950, declassified--HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, Box 146, File: Agencies, NSRB 1, p. 2; and in an unsigned White House memo dated May 28, 1951, entitled "Responsibilities of the National Security Resources Board and Its Relationships with the Office of Defense Mobilization and the National Security Council." HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Box 146, File: Agencies, NSRB-Miscellaneous.

58. "National Industrial Dispersion Policy," August 10, 1941. HSTL, President's Secretary's File: Agencies, NSRB, Box 147, NSRB Reports, p. 2.

59. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, p. 222.

60. "Responsibilities of the National Security Resources Board and Its Relationship with the Office of Defense Mobilization and the National Security Council," May 28, 1951. HSTL, Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File, p. 3.

61. "Oral History Interview #1, with David H. Stowe," p. 2.

62. Paul Koistinen, *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 14.

63. Dwight Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1960-61* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1035-40.
64. Bruce Smith notes that of more than 100,000 submissions, only 39 inventions were approved by this board, and only one went into production. *American Science Policy since World War II* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1990), p. 29.
65. Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), preface (no page number).
66. Cited in G. Pascal Zachary, *Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 112.
67. Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), p. 6.
68. James P. Baxter III, *Scientists against Time* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1946), p. 32.
69. Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, p. 6. These figures do not include the enormous quantities of manpower and money allocated for the Manhattan Project. In this regard, see Vincent Jones, *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 606.
70. See vol. 1 of the official history of the AEC, by Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr., entitled *The New World, 1939/1946* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), esp. pp. 431-37.
71. Hearings on S. 1717 before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, *A Bill for the Development and Control of Atomic Energy*, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946).
72. Data is presented in "A Report to the President by John R. Steelman, Chairman, The President's Scientific Research Board," *Science and Public Policy*, report and 4 vols. Of analysis, vol. 4, *Manpower for Research*, August 27, 1947 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 9-15; hereafter referred to as the Steelman Report.
73. On the issue of patent controls, see House Committee on Science and Technology, *Science Policy Study Background Report No. 1: A History of Science Policy in the United States, 1940-1985*, 99th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 24 and 26. Daniel Kleinman has argued that while the National Association of Manufacturers was "in the forefront" of the campaign to pressure Kilgore, its influence was mostly indirect. See *Politics on the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 110-14.
74. Testimony of Harold Smith, October 10, 1945, before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Hearings on Science Legislation*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 108. See also Smith, *American Science Policy since World War II*, pp. 40-43.
75. Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, p. 228.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
77. "Conference with the President," June 8, 1945. HSTL, Harold Smith File, Box 1, Folder: Diary, May 1945.
78. For background, see "Memorandum for John W. Snyder and Judge Samuel I. Rosenman," written by James Newman, Assistant Deputy Director of the

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, August 21, 1945. HSTL, Samuel Rosenman File, Box 4, Folder: Research. Newman also recommends in this memo that the White House reject Bush's "implication" that the Army continue to oversee nuclear research on a permanent basis.

79. Steelman Report, 1:6–7 and 31.

80. "Memorandum of Disapproval of the National Science Foundation Bill," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 369.

81. According to US Senate estimates, there had been a tenfold increase in government spending on science between 1940 and 1944 (from \$70 million to \$700 million). See Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Hearings on Science Legislation, 79th Cong., 1st sess., part 1* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 1.

82. Steelman Report, 1:3.

83. *Ibid.*, 1:viii.

84. "Science Dons a Uniform," September 14, 1946, p. 19, quoted in Herbert Foerstel, *Secret Science: Federal Control of American Science and Technology* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p. 2.

85. Eberstadt Report, p. 148.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

87. See the background information prepared for the White House as "Memorandum for Judge Rosenman," July 12, 1945. HSTL, Samuel I. Rosenman File, Box 4, Folder: Research.

88. Irvin Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development*, Science in World War II Series (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), pp. 317–18.

89. Harvey Sapolsky, *Science and the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 7.

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 44 and 50.

91. House Committee on Science and Technology, Task Force on Science Policy, *Science Policy Study Background Report No. 1: A History of Science Policy in the United States, 1940–1985*, 99th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 37 and 42.

92. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 319.

93. *National Security Act of 1947* (S. 758), 80th Cong., 1st sess., Public Law 253, hereafter referred to as the National Security Act. For the convenience of readers who are interested in studying the legislation, my page references are to the reprinted version of the legislation, which is available in Alice Cole et al., eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 495–510.

94. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Report to Accompany S. 758, *National Security Act of 1947*, Report no. 239, Calendar no. 246, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 14.

95. National Security Act, in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, p. 47.

96. *Ibid.*

97. The report also made it clear, however, that it would not be “sound public policy” to allow this agency to coordinate the federal government’s civilian science policy; see Steelman Report, 1:63–64.

98. Quoted in Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 118.

99. Sapolsky, *Science and the Navy*, p. 53.

100. Forrestal raised the issue of using the ONR as the central research office for all three services in a letter to Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, one day after Forrestal was sworn in. See Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 314.

101. Discussed by Steven Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 1, *The Formative Years, 1947–1950* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 98–99.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 401–2.

104. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 541.

105. Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:98.

106. Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, p. 250.

107. *The National Security Act of 1947, as Amended by Public Law 216, 9* (63 stat., 578), 81st Cong., August 10, 1949, reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 95–97.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

109. See George Lincoln, *Economics of National Security*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 365.

110. See the excellent summary of events in Doris Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 2, *The Test of War, 1950–1953* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 508.

111. “Dear Mr. President”: Office of the Secretary of Defense Records, 1952, reproduced in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 123–24.

112. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization*, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 11.

113. *Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953* is reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 157–58.

114. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p. 475.

115. Herring Report, p. 518.

116. E. Mendelson, M. Smith, and P. Weingart, “Science and the Military: Setting the Problem,” in Everett Mendelsohn, Merriitt Smith, and Peter Weingart, eds., *Science, Technology and the Military* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. xvii.

## CHAPTER SIX

### FROM THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Regarding OP-23, see, in particular, the Arleigh Burke Papers in the Naval War College Archives (NWC). OP-23 is also discussed by Jeffrey Barlow, *Revolt*

of the Admirals: *The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), esp. pp. 164–73.

2. “Conversation—President Truman,” July 26, 1947, in Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 295.

3. “To A. L. Barach,” August 5, 1947, in *ibid.*, p. 300.

4. *Ibid.*

5. “To John McCone,” December 3, 1948, in *ibid.*, p. 540.

6. For an analysis of the budget implications of Korea and NSC-68, see Aaron Freidberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 109–26.

7. Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 416.

8. Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 159.

9. Carl Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 59.

10. Alonzo Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 369.

11. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, esp. pp. 463–82.

12. See Steven Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 1, *The Formative Years, 1947–1950* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 12–13 and 316–17.

13. *Final Report: War Department Policies and Programs Review Board*, August 11, 1947, cited in Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals*, p. 53.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

15. Summarized by Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:313–16.

16. Quoted in Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, pp. 43–44.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 393–96.

18. On Forrestal’s assurance to Truman, see Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 389–90.

19. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 219.

20. See, in particular, Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 24–47.

21. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 397.

22. See Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:316–25.

23. The phrase was reportedly used by Webb. See *ibid.*, 1:326.

24. Quoted in Jeffery Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), p. 166.

25. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 473.

26. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Report to Accompany S. 758, *National Security Act of 1947*, Report no. 239, Calendar no. 246, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 13.

27. Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:34-35.
28. Millis records the secretary's concern about the NSC being perceived as a second cabinet, but he clearly had hopes that it would be an influential source of policy advice. See *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 317.
29. *The National Security Act of 1947* (S. 758), 80th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1947, Public Law 253, hereafter referred to as the National Security Act. Reprinted in Alice C. Cole, et al., eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 35-49.
30. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Report to Accompany S. 758, *National Security Act of 1947*, Report no. 239, Calendar no. 246, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 13.
31. Lawrence Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 16.
32. Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 63-64.
33. Discussed in Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:95.
34. Quoted in Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal*, p. 164.
35. Dorwart's assessment is in *ibid.*, p. 96.
36. Relevant portions of the Eberstadt Report are reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 65-75.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-69.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68, 72-73.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 74
41. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 465.
42. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1948), reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, p. 63.
43. "Historical Background Relating to Unification of the Services." Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL) Staff Files: Bryce Harlow, Box 1, DOD Reorganization, Folder: Defense Department, Reorganization of, revised April 28, 1958, p. 6.
44. House Committee on Armed Services, *Unification and Strategy: A Report of Investigation*, HD 600, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 2.
45. Reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 75-77.
46. Truman's message is reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 77-80.
47. *Ibid.*
48. The differing views of the president and the Secretary of Defense were addressed in a meeting on October 5, 1948, discussed in Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 497-98.
49. Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 77-80.
50. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense*, reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, p. 64.
51. *The National Security Act of 1947 as amended by Public Law 216*, 81st Cong., August 10, 1949, hereafter referred to as the 1949 Amendments. Reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, p. 89.

52. Senate Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on the National Security Act Amendments of 1949*, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949).

53. House Committee on Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearings on HR 5632, to Reorganize Fiscal Management in the National Military Establishment, to Promote Economy and Efficiency, and for Other Purposes*, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949).

54. Senate Armed Services Committee, *National Security Act Amendments of 1949*, Report no. 366, Calendar no. 356, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 115.

55. Excerpts from Vinson's statements, in "Defense Department, Reorganization of; Chronological Summarization of the Opinions of the Parties . . ." DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 1, Folder: DOD Reorganization, revised as of April 28, 1958, Tab A, p. 2.

56. House Committee on Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearings on S. 1843 to Convert the National Military Establishment into an Executive Department of the Government, to be Known as the Department of Defense, to Provide the Secretary of Defense with Appropriate Responsibility and Authority, and with Civilian and Military Assistants Adequate to Fulfill His Enlarged Responsibility*, Paper no. 95, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 2920. Quoted in John Ries, *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964), pp. 140–41.

57. In the event of war, the chairman could be reappointed for an unlimited number of terms.

58. 1949 Amendments, in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 84–107. Section 211, which deals with the JCS and the chairman, is on pp. 94–95.

59. Edgar Raines and David Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942–1985*, Historical Analysis Series, US Army Center of Military History (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 60.

60. 1949 Amendments, in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 84–107.

61. Forrestal's successor, Louis Johnson, initially invited the service secretaries to continue to attend NSC meetings, but Truman terminated this practice in June 1950, stipulating that only the president could invite nonmembers to attend NSC deliberations.

62. 1949 Amendments, in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 84–107.

63. Ries, *The Management of Defense*, p. 128.

64. C. W. Borklund, *The Department of Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 55.

65. Ries, *The Management of Defense*, pp. 129–30.

66. House Committee on Armed Services, *Unification and Strategy: A Report of Investigation*, HD 600, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 3.

67. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on the National Security Act of 1949*, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 49. Quoted in Ries, *The Management of Defense*, p. 140.

68. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 53.
69. Raines and Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 60.
70. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, p. 84.
71. Quoted by Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals*, p. 174.
72. See Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 549.
73. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 374.
74. See, for example, Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, pp. 66–67.
75. Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:405.
76. See, in particular, Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals*, passim.
77. The WSEG study is summarized by Steven Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:405, 408–10.
78. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, p. 71.
79. House Committee on Armed Services, *Unification and Strategy: A Report of Investigation*, HD 600, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 21 and 28.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
82. The actual committee reference is to the “Joint Weapons Systems Evaluation Board,” but it is clearly a reference to the WSEG. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
89. Public Law 416 (66 stat. 282), 82d Cong., June 28, 1952.
90. House Committee on Armed Services, *Unification and Strategy: A Report of Investigation*, HD 600, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 42.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 53. For the wording of section 202C6, see Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, p. 89.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 57. For details, see Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals*, esp. pp. 215–90.
98. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, p. 86.
99. Public Law 788 (64 stat. 853), 81st Cong., September 18, 1950.
100. Quoted in Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, p. 122.
101. See Doris Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 2, *The Test of War, 1950–1953* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 488–95.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 490–91.

103. Excerpts from NSC 68 are from Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1:521–35. See also “Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of 31 January 1950,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 235–92.

104. Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 355–56.

105. John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 99.

106. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*, p. 109.

107. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p. 295.

108. This debate is analyzed by Douglas Stuart and William Tow in *The Limits of Alliance*, pp. 24–46.

109. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 555–56.

110. Richard Leighton, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 3, *Strategy, Money and the New Look, 1953–1956* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 32.

111. Quoted in Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, p. 130.

112. Lovett’s letter is reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 115–26.

113. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–18.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

115. *Ibid.*

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 120–22.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–24. This section of the letter deals primarily with the Munitions Board, but Lovett notes that the Research and Development Board “suffers from similar ills.”

118. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–24.

121. Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 2:531.

122. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization*, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1953), Appendix A, p. 18.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

125. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

127. “Chronological Summarization of the Opinions of the Parties . . . : Defense Department, Reorganization of.” DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 1, Folder: DOD Reorganization, revised as of April 28, 1958, Tab A, p. 5.

128. *Ibid.*, Tab J, p. 7 (Vinson), Tab N, p. 1 (Hebert), and Tab K, p. 1 (Arends).

129. See Leighton, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 3:33–34.

130. Raines and Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 78–79.

131. See, for example, Eisenhower's statement during a press conference in May 1957 to the effect that the National Security Act, as amended, still did not provide for "unification . . . in the form I thought it should be." "Historical Background Relating to Unification of the Services: Defense Department, Reorganization of." DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 1, Folder: DOD Reorganization, revised as of April 28, 1958, p. 10.

132. Congressional Record, July 23, 1956, "Chronological Summarization of the Opinions of the Parties . . . : Defense Department, Reorganization of." DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 1, Folder: DOD Reorganization, revised as of April 28, 1958, Tab S, p. 1.

133. Fred Greenstein's insightful analysis of Eisenhower's administrative style is entitled *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), *passim*.

134. Raines and Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 85-86.

135. *Ibid.*

136. The Second Hoover Commission Report and Wilson's response are summarized by Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 164-71.

137. Hanson Baldwin, "Military Deficiencies Laid to Decisions by Civilians," *The New York Times*, February 6, 1958, p. 14.

138. "Office Memorandum: 21 February, 1958," and "Office Memorandum: 7 February 1958." DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 2, Folder: DOD Reorganization no. 2.

139. Robert Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 4, *Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 124.

140. The report is summarized, and critiqued, in "Comments on the Rockefeller Report (Panel II)," undated. DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 2, Folder: DOD Reorganization no. 2. See also Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *International Security: The Military Aspect* (New York: Doubleday, 1958), *passim*.

141. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), pp. 28-29.

142. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 419.

144. Discussed by Cary Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 259-67.

145. "State of the Union Message by President Eisenhower, January 9, 1958," reprinted in Robert Branyan and Lawrence Larson, *The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A Documentary History* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 252-53.

146. Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 4:257.

147. Discussed by Dwight Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, vol. 2, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 245-46, and Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 4:254.

148. "President Eisenhower's Message—3 April, 1958," reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, p. 175-76.

149. An internal White House memo envisioned nine unified and specified commands as a result of the 1958 reforms. See the chart entitled "The Depart-

ment of Defense,” in “Defense Department, Reorganization of.” DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 1, Folder: DOD Reorganization, revised as of April 28, 1958.

150. David Jablonsky, “Ike and the Birth of the CINCs: The Continuity of Unity of Command,” in Douglas Stuart, ed., *Organizing for National Security* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2000), pp. 25–26.

151. See, in particular, Rick Atkinson’s extraordinary account of Eisenhower’s education in the challenges of unified command: *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943*, vol. 1 in the Liberation Trilogy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002), *passim*.

152. Jablonsky, “Ike and the Birth of the CINCs,” pp. 36–46.

153. “President Eisenhower’s Message,” reprinted in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, p. 179.

154. *Ibid.*, pp. 179–80 and 185.

155. Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 4:255.

156. “Eisenhower’s Message,” reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 180–81.

157. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–86.

158. The administration was prepared for this argument, and arranged for General Twining to read into the record a detailed analysis of the German general staff system. See Hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 6178–79.

159. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 251.

160. “Pentagon Reorganization: President’s Message Tied to Politics,” *The New York Times*, June 2, 1958.

161. “Following Letter Dictated over Telephone by Senator Symington,” June 23, 1958. DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 2 (letter dated June 19, 1958), pp. 1–3.

162. See Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 4:271–72.

163. For details, see Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Report to Accompany HR. 12541*, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Report no. 1845, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958).

164. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 253.

165. The term is from Paul Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 372.

166. *Ibid.*

167. Jablonsky, “Ike and the Birth of the CINCs,” p. 57. Congress did little to correct this situation until 1986, when it passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. For a fascinating insider’s account, see James Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), *passim*.

168. For an analysis of PPBS, see Joseph Cerami, “Institutionalizing Defense Reform: The Politics of Transformation in the Root, McNamara and Cohen Eras,” in Stuart, ed., *Organizing for National Security*, pp. 101–32.

169. John Ries, an articulate critic of excessive centralization, warned in 1964 that the secretary had acquired this power as a result of the 1958 reforms. See *The Management of Defense*, p. 188.

170. "Chronological Summarization of the Opinions of the Parties . . . : Defense Department, Reorganization of." DDEL, Staff Files, Bryce Harlow, Box 1, Folder: DOD Reorganization, revised as of April 28, 1958, Tab A (President Eisenhower), p. 7.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CLOSING THE PHALANX

1. *Report to Honorable James Forrestal*, October 22, 1945, reprinted in Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 7; hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt Report.

2. "Policy Formulation for National Security," in Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, eds., *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishers, 1988), p. 54.

3. Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 182.

4. Huntington states that he is "profoundly grateful" to Herring in the preface to *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. ix.

5. Kenton Worcester, *The Social Science Research Council: 1932-1998* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2001), available at the Rockefeller Archives Center (RAC), Sleepy Hollow, NY.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

7. Hearings before the House Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, *Tax-Exempt Foundations*, 83d Cong., 2d sess., May 10-July 9, 1954 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), part 1, pp. 796-97.

8. Robert Cutler, who served as Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, even raised doubts about the "questionable constitutionality" of Congress's designation of statutory members for the council, although he admitted that this stipulation "has proved no handicap" for the president. Robert Cutler, "Report to the President," April 1, 1955. Dwight David Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Files, Administration Series, Box 25, p. 3.

9. Senator Henry Jackson, ed., *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 39.

10. Robert Cutler, "Testimony Delivered to the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery," in executive session, May 24, 1960, reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 119.

11. Paul Y. Hammond would call this the "democratic policy-making problem." *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 363-64.

12. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 7.

13. See, for example, Souers, "Policy Formulation," in Inderfurth and Johnson, *Decisions of the Highest Order*, p. 50.

14. "Dear Mr. Osborne," August 19, 1963. DDEL, Papers of Sidney Souers, Box 13, Folder: Souers Correspondence, p. 4.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 3. See also the letter from Budget Director James Webb to Maurice Latta: "Dear Mr. Latta," August 4, 1947. Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Official File, Harry S. Truman Papers, Box 1593, Folder: OF 1285 (1947-March 1949).

16. Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 163.

17. Sidney Souers, "The National Security Council" (address to the Joint Orientation Conference of the National Military Establishment), November 8, 1948. HSTL, Papers of George Elsey, Box 84, Folder: National Defense no. 15, p. 4.

18. "Opening Statement before the Jackson Subcommittee," by Admiral Sidney Souers, May 10, 1960. HSTL, Papers of Sidney Souers, Box 1, Folder: Souers--National Policy, p. 3.

19. Souers, "The National Security Council" (address to the Joint Orientation Conference of the National Military Establishment), November 8, 1948. HSTL, Papers of George Elsey, Box 84, Folder: National Defense no. 15, p. 4.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

21. "Dear Mr. Osborne," August 19, 1963. DDEL, Papers of Sidney Souers, Box 13, Folder: Souers Correspondence, p. 2.

22. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 485.

23. "Report to the President by the National Security Council," *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948*, vol. 1, *General: The United Nations*, November 23, 1948 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 663-69.

24. Steven Reardon, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Press, 1984), pp. 348-50.

25. *Ibid.*

26. "Report to the President by the National Security Council," p. 662.

27. Morris Rosenbloom, *Peace through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a Blueprint for Security* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp. 55-57.

28. Alice Cole et al., eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 115.

29. Information on the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, along with an assessment of their activities, is provided by McGeorge Bundy in "National Security Action Memorandum #136," March 14, 1963. John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL), Box 6, Internal Security.

30. Presidential adviser George Elsey made the case for removing the secretaries in a memo to Clark Clifford dated November 17, 1948. He stated that their presence on the NSC "gives an overwhelming predominance to the military." He also argued that this had been agreed to in 1947 in order to appease Forrestal, but that since then, the Secretary of Defense "sees the light." "Memorandum for Mr. Clifford," November 17, 1948. HSTL, Papers of George Elsey, B File, p. 1.

31. "Dear Mr. Osborne," August 19, 1963. DDEL, Papers of Sidney Souers, Box 13, Folder: Souers Correspondence, p. 3.

32. Both the Eberstadt task force Report and the Hoover Commission Report also took note of the need for improved policy coordination at the top. See Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 70 and 76.

33. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 315.

34. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 373-74.

35. Francis Heller, ed., *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945-1953* (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press, 1980), pp. 154-55.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

37. See, for example, "A Timely Step," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1950, reprinted in HSTL, Papers of George Elsey, Box 84, National Defense, folder 15.

38. "Cross Reference Sheet," July 19, 1950. HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House Central Files, Confidential Files.

39. John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morrow, 1991), p. 54.

40. "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs* 34 (April 1956), reprinted in Inderfurth and Johnson, *Decisions of the Highest Order*, p. 59.

41. James Lay and Robert Johnson, "An Organizational History of the National Security Council," June 30, 1960. HSTL, Papers of Sidney Souers, Box 1, Folder: Souers-National Policy, Table of Contents, p. i.

42. "Memorandum for Mr. Lay," April 17, 1951. HSTL, Papers of George Elsey, Box 84, Folder: National Defense, folder 15, p. 1.

43. Walter Millis, Harold Stein, and Harvey Mansfield, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 182.

44. Robert Cutler introduced this influential metaphor in "The Development of the National Security Council," reprinted in Inderfurth and Johnson, *Decisions of the Highest Order*, p. 59. See also Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Fall 1983): 307-26.

45. "Memorandum for the President," March 16, 1953. DDEL, Bryce Harlow Records, 1953-61, Box 6, pp. ii and 8.

46. "Memorandum for the Record," August 28, 1959. HSTL, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948-61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 12, pp. 3-4.

47. “The National Security Council under President Eisenhower,” testimony delivered by Robert Cutler to the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, in executive session, May 24, 1960, reprinted in Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 121.

48. “Memorandum for the President.” DDEL, Bryce Harlow Records, 1953–61, Box 6, pp. 5, 6, and 18.

49. “Dear Mr. Cutler,” March 17, 1953. DDEL, Bryce Harlow Records, 1953–61, Box 6, Folder: NSC (Korean War), 1953–54.

50. Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, p. 63.

51. Study submitted to the Senate Committee on Government Operations by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security: Super-Cabinet Officers and Superstaffs*, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 7; hereafter referred to as Jackson Subcommittee Report, Super-Cabinet Officers.

52. Eisenhower’s most important reform relating to the OCB was Executive Order 10700, dated February 25, 1957, which brought the OCB within the NSC machinery and designated the special assistant as its chairman. For an analysis of the OCB, see Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 37–40.

53. See, in particular, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954*, vol. 2, *National Security Affairs*, part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 323–29, 349–67, and 387–443. See also Richard Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), pp. 62–63.

54. Richard Leighton, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 3, *Strategy, Money and the New Look, 1953–1956* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 148.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 150. See also John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 143–44.

56. See, in particular, Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), *passim*.

57. Cutler testimony, reprinted in Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 113.

58. See, for example, Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 33–36.

59. See the analysis of Goodpaster’s relations with the NSC in Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, pp. 65–68.

60. Study submitted to the Senate Committee on Government Operations by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security: The Secretary of State and the National Security Policy Process*, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 9.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

62. Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 142.

63. *Ibid.*

64. Robert Cutler, "Report to the President," April 1, 1955. DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 27, Folder: National Security Council (2), p. 1.
65. Jackson Subcommittee Report, Super-Cabinet Officers, p. 4.
66. Cutler, "Report to the President," April 1, 1955. DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 27, Folder: National Security Council (2), p. 9.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
68. Jackson Subcommittee Report, Super-Cabinet Officers, p. 3.
69. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 24.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
71. Nestor, elderly king of Pylos, gained fame in the Trojan War for his wise counsel.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
73. Summarized by Robert Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 4, *Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 136-41.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.
75. Eisenhower made this claim with reference to the Jackson Subcommittee hearings. See Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, p. 92.
76. Charles Haskins, "Memorandum for Mr. Gordon Gray," April 21, 1959. HSTL, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 48-61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 11, Folder: Jackson Committee (1), pp. 1 and 2. See also the memo by Gordon Gray to Senator J. W. Fulbright regarding the Brookings Institution study, "The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy," in "Dear Senator Fulbright," December 9, 1959. HSTL, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 48-61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 11, Folder: Jackson Committee (3).
77. "R.C.A. President Urges 4th Federal Branch for Defense Planning," *The Boston Daily Globe*, September 6, 1958, p. 3.
78. "Memorandum for: Honorable Bryce N. Harlow," December 16, 1958. HSTL, Bryce Harlow Records, 1953-61, Box 6, Folder: National Security Council, 1958, pp. 1-2.
79. *Ibid.*
80. Hans Morgenthau, "Can We Entrust Defense to a Committee?" *The New York Times*, June 7, 1959, pp. 9, 62, 64-67.
81. "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 2 (January 1960): 285.
82. Rockefeller testimony, in Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 169.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72.
84. "How Shall We Forge a Strategy for Survival?" reprinted in Inderfurth and Johnson, *Decisions of the Highest Order*, pp. 78-81.
85. Regarding the White House reaction, see Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, pp. 92-95.
86. Eisenhower's letter to Jackson, dated July 10, 1959, with the attached "proposed guidelines," is available in DDEL, White House Office, NSC Staff

Papers, 1948–61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 11, Folder: Jackson Committee (2).

87. Allan Nevins, ed., "Speeches of John F. Kennedy," published as *The Strategy of Peace* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 82.

88. Charles Haskins, "Memorandum for Mr. Lay," June 1, 1960. DDEL, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 12, Folder: Jackson Committee (5), attachment, pp. 32 and 34. Haskins's cover note to this memo offers a particularly harsh criticism of Kennan's qualifications for evaluating the NSC.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97.

90. Lovett testimony, reprinted in Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 77–78.

91. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 78.

92. See the analysis of Sprague's proposed testimony by Charles Haskins in "Memorandum to Mr. Gordon Gray," February 11, 1960. DDEL, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 12, Folder: Jackson Committee (4).

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94. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 131.

95. Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 304.

96. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, *Organizing for National Security: Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, 87th Cong., 1st sess.* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), reprinted in Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 65–69.

97. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 33–35 and 40.

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99. *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40.

100. Reprinted in Robert Branyan and Lawrence Larson, *The Eisenhower Administration, 1953–1961: A Documentary History* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 1230.

101. Kennedy's announcement is reprinted in Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 302–3.

102. Bundy's letter is reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 275–80.

103. Quoted in Inderfurth and Johnson, *Decisions of the Highest Order*, p. 93.

104. *Ibid.*

105. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 363–70.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

107. Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Senate Committee Print, *Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, 79th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 7–8.

108. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, p. 367.

109. See, in particular, the two declassified volumes published under the auspices of the "DCI Historical Series": Arthur Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), and Ludwell Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), as well as C. Thomas Thorne, Jr. and David S. Patterson, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996).

110. *The National Security Act of 1947*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Public Law 253, reprinted in Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, pp. 37–39.

111. According to the *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (hereafter referred to as the Church Committee Report), "Hillenkoetter did not have the instincts or the dynamism for dealing with senior policymakers in State and Defense." See Senate Report 94–755, book 4, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence*, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 11.

112. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, pp. 200–201.

113. "R. H. Hillenkoetter to the National Intelligence Authority," September 11, 1947, reprinted in Michael Warner, ed., *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), pp. 137–38.

114. Lawrence Houston, the CIA's general counsel, would make this point in 1950. See "Memorandum for the Record," August 29, 1950, reproduced in Warner, *CIA Cold War Records*, pp. 342–45.

115. These assumptions inform Arthur Darling's interpretation of Hillenkoetter's record in his official CIA history of the period in *The Central Intelligence Agency*, *passim*.

116. This question is at the core of Ludwell Montague's much more harsh assessment of Hillenkoetter's performance in his official CIA history, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, *passim*.

117. Details regarding the Bogotá incident are provided by Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, pp. 240–44.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

119. "Memorandum from Allen W. Dulles to Mathias F. Correa and William H. Jackson," January 21, 1949, reprinted in C. Thorne and Patterson, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950*, p. 913.

120. *Ibid.*

121. Regarding the issue of office locations, see Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, pp. 200–202.

122. See "Report from the Intelligence Survey Group to the National Security Council," January 1, 1949, reprinted in Thorne and Patterson, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950*, p. 903. The other two key members of the ISG were William Jackson, a lawyer who had served on Omar Bradley's staff during the war, and Mathias Correa, also a lawyer, who had served as an aide

to Navy Secretary Forrestal. Both men had been involved in various studies of intelligence reform during and after the war.

123. *Ibid.*

124. Quoted in Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, p. 333.

125. Thorne and Patterson, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950*, p. 905.

126. Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, pp. 46–47.

127. Memorandum for the Record, “August 29, 1950, reproduced in Warner, *CIA Cold War Records*, pp. 342–45.

128. Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, p. 144.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

130. William Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 31.

131. “National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1,” September 15, 1958. DDEL, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–61, Executive Secretary’s File Series, Box 11, File: Intelligence Directives.

132. Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, p. 75.

133. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 28.

134. The “Surprise Attack Panel” is discussed in Stephen Ambrose, *Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), pp. 264–78.

135. “Letter, Project Three Panel to DCI Allen F. Dulles,” November 5, 1954, *OSA History*, ch. 1, annex 1, quoted in Gregory Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), p. 33.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

137. This euphemism is employed by Frank Wisner in a memo to Hillenkoetter regarding the Eberstadt task force’s investigations into CIA covert operations. “Memorandum from the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter,” September 13, 1948, reprinted in Thorne and Patterson, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950*, pp. 875–76.

138. Quoted in John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 319.

139. Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, p. 40.

140. Public Law 110, 81st Cong., 1st sess., signed into law on June 20, 1949, is reproduced in Warner, *CIA Cold War Records*, pp. 287–94.

141. See Kennan’s memo to Lovett and Marshall, dated May 19, 1948, in which he recommends three options, including the replacement of Hillenkoetter by Dulles as DCI. Under these circumstances, Kennan appears to have been willing to let the CIA manage covert activities. The memo is reproduced in Thorne and Patterson, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950*, pp. 684–85.

142. Ranelagh, *The Agency*, p. 134.

143. Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith*, p. 264.

144. Ranelagh, *The Agency*, p. 259.

145. Quoted in Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, pp. 65–66.

146. Harold Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 46.
147. See, in particular, Koh, *The National Security Constitution*, passim; Frank J. Smist, Jr., *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), and the Church Committee Report, vol. 7, *Covert Action*.
148. Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, p. 73
149. "Tuesday, October 19, 1954." DDEL, Ann Whitman Diary, 1953-54.
150. Zegart, *Flawed by Design*, p. 106.

## CONCLUSION

1. See Robert Watson, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 4, *Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 776 and 780.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 778.
3. See Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 163.
4. See, in particular, H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), passim.
5. Ernest May, "The U.S. Government: A Legacy of the Cold War," in Michael Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 219.
6. Quoted in Senator Henry Jackson, ed., *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 95.
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8. See, in particular, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Random House, 1987), passim, and John Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparatus," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1971-72): 3-27.
9. Hans Morgenthau, "Can We Entrust Defense to a Committee?" *New York Times Magazine*, June 7, 1959, p. 67.
10. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, pp. 171-73.
11. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 161.
12. Paul Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 357.
13. Harold Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 102.

14. John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 623.

15. Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2001), p. 12.

16. Jackson, *The National Security Council*, p. 47.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 9 and 47–48.

18. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. viii and 52.

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